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Abstract: 
This thesis is based on extensive literature reviews and field work, 
and examines the process of humanitarian engagement with armed groups 
and its impact on peaceful conflict transformation. The research asks 
whether or not humanitarian engagements with armed non-state actors have 
an impact on the transformation and, if so, how this impact occurs. From the 
data gathered during field research in Sudan, the analysis concludes that, in 
the case of Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005), humanitarian 
engagements with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/ A) had a generally positive impact on the peaceful transformation of 
conflict contributing through a number of ways to a positive environment 
for the start of peace talks. 
The research is based on a qualitative approach emphasising the 
importance of understanding complex processes such as humanitarian 
engagements or peace processes through the subjective reality of the actors 
involved in these processes. The data was gathered through qualitative 
interviews with members of the SPLM/ A, the Government of Sudan and 
international actors involved in the humanitarian engagements researched 
(non-governmental organisations and United Nations agencies) during field 
research in Khartoum (Sudan), Juba (South Sudan) and Geneva. 
This thesis attempts to advance beyond the existing literature in a 
number of ways. The findings of this research aim at expanding the 
literature on humanitarian action by highlighting the specificity of 
humanitarian engagement as a specific type of humanitarian action, 
providing a greater understanding of a humanitarian practice that remains 
under-researched and bringing a new dimension to the "Do No Harm" 
principle by highlighting the capacity of humanitarian dialogue with armed 
groups for peaceful conflict transformation. As a result, this research aims to 
provide a more holistic approach to the literature on peace processes by 
examining humanitarian engagement as an active factor in triggering 
peaceful conflict transformation. Finally, this thesis provides a greater 
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understanding of armed non-state actors and their attitude towards 
humanitarian dialogue and peace talks. 
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Chapter I : Introduction 
Introduction 
Civilians in the midst of civil wars bear the brunt of the conflict. 
Forced displacement, hunger and mass killings are some of the atrocities 
that civil wars have brought to civilian populations who seem to have 
become a central part of wars (Kaldor, 1999). Humanitarianism and 
humanitarian action are an offspring of this reality, putting the well-being of 
human beings back in the picture. As the large number of United Nations 
agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) present in conflict 
zones proves, humanitarian actors playa significant role in conflicts. With 
growing insecurity for such actors in internal conflicts as well as a growing 
number of violations of humanitarian principles and human rights by all 
actors involved in conflicts, humanitarian actors find the necessity to engage 
with all actors in a conflict for such principles to be safeguarded 
(Bruderlein, 2001). 
A growing practice of engaging in dialogue with all parties to a 
conflict has emerged since the mid-1980s. Such dialogue includes both 
governments concerned and armed groups. In an era where. a discourse of 
anti-terrorism has isolated a number of those armed groups fighting in civil 
conflicts, engaging armed groups in a dialogue on humanitarian or human 
rights principles has become highly controversial. While this may constrain 
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direct humanitarian engagement with armed groups, the humanitarian reality 
in most civil conflicts calls for a process of involving and committing all 
actors to a conflict to this humanitarian effort. Whereas numerous forums 
exist for states to be involved and committed to humanitarian and human 
rights principles, armed groups are kept outside of the system. As armed 
groups are responsible for numerous violations and atrocities carried against 
civilian populations in internal conflicts, a process of engaging with them on 
humanitarian issues and providing a better accountability system for them 
seems paramount (Bruderlein, 2001). 
A number of humanitarian actors have thus advocated for a more 
direct involvement with armed groups on humanitarian and human rights 
issues involving dialogue on humanitarian and human rights principles, safe 
and secure delivery of aid and humanitarian ceasefires, etc. These 
engagements have taken different forms from treaty-like agreements to oral 
and informal agreements but always involve a process of dialogue and 
engagement. The literature on humanitarian engagements has highlighted 
that in certain instances humanitarian engagements seemed to have favoured 
the start of peace negotiations. This research aims at developing this idea 
and gaining a better understanding of how humanitarian engagements with 
armed groups in internal conflicts may impact upon the peaceful 
transformation of conflict. The research therefore examines whether or not 
humanitarian engagements with armed non-state actors have an impact on 
the transformation of conflict and, if so, how this impact occurs. Moving 
away from a position of apolitical humanitarianism, this research bases itself 
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on the belief that humanitarian action is political and as such humanitarian 
actors need to understand the wider political impact of their action. 
Research objectives 
What is to be researched: aims and objectives 
This research is concerned with finding the consequences of 
humanitarian engagements with armed non-state actors on the conflict 
situation. Humanitarian action has proven to cause a number of effects on 
the environment in which it occurs beyond its initial humanitarian 
objectives (Anderson, 1999). Humanitarian engagement with armed group, 
as part of humanitarian action, must also impact the environment in which it 
occurs. This research takes a specific approach and examines humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups as a process of dialogue, a process of 
humanitarian diplomacy. This research is also inscribed within a specific 
position on humanitarianism that includes the peaceful transformation of 
conflict as a humanitarian aim. As humanitarian actors engage with armed 
groups on humanitarian issues, these humanitarian actors are concerned 
with preventing a worsening of the conflict through their action, but also at 
favouring a peaceful transformation of conflict. As stated before, this entails 
that this research embraces the view that humanitarian action is necessarily 
political. As such, humanitarian actors need not to question whether 
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humanitarian action is political, but how humanitarian action is political to 
understand better the political impact of humanitarian action. 
Taking these important aspects into account, the research aims at 
examining the consequences of humanitarian engagements on the possibility 
of a peaceful transformation of conflict. While aiming to find all 
consequences, negative and positive, the research aims at finding avenues in 
which humanitarian engagements with armed groups can be positive for a 
peaceful transformation of conflict. Through a literature review of 
humanitarian action, humanitarian engagement and conflict transformation, 
the thesis proposes a number of positive avenues through which 
humanitarian engagement favours a peaceful transformation of conflict. 
Highlighting these positive avenues for a peaceful transformation of conflict 
forces us to examine the possible negative consequences of humanitarian 
engagement. The positive impact that humanitarian engagement with armed 
groups may have might be undermined by negative effects. 
The objectives of the research include a number of aims relating to 
the understanding of humanitarian engagement, armed non-state actors 
(ANSAs) and the peaceful transformation of conflict. It aims at providing a 
better understanding of the process of humanitarian engagement with armed 
groups as a growing practice in humanitarian action and protracted conflicts. 
It aims at understanding the behaviour of armed groups towards 
humanitarian engagements and peace processes. It aims at uncovering the 
negative and positive consequences of humanitarian engagements on 
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conflict, by understanding how characteristics of armed groups can playa 
role in shaping this impact as well as how characteristics of humanitarian 
engagements can playa role in shaping this impact. 
Rationale for research 
There is a lack of systematic research in the field of humanitarian 
engagement with armed non-state actors. The practice of humanitarian 
engagements with ANSAs proves to be necessary due to the lack of legal 
provisions and mechanisms for armed groups. However, there is no great 
understanding of this process and the impact it may have on conflict. This 
research is inscribed within the beliefthat humanitarianism is not only about 
providing humanitarian relief but bringing an end to human suffering 
through the peaceful transformation of conflict. Therefore, there is a need to 
understand whether humanitarian engagement has a negative impact on 
conflict. If the opposite, it has a positive impact, then there is a need to 
understand how and in which situations. This research departs from a 
position where the literature on the topic has claimed that humanitarian 
engagement provides a positive impact but without really investigating the 
nature of this impact and how humanitarian engagements with armed groups 
link with peace processes and peaceful conflict transformation efforts. 
There is a lack of research on armed groups and a lack of 
understanding of the behaviour of such actors towards humanitarian action 
and towards peace processes. This is why this research focuses on armed 
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groups. An understanding of these actors is necessary if humanitarian and 
human rights violations are to be curbed as well as if international actors 
want to transform internal conflicts through mediation and the signing of a 
peace agreement. 
Hypotheses 
In order to answer the research question, three hypothesis are 
proposed as a result of the literature review on armed non-state actors, 
humanitarian engagements, and the transformation of conflict. As explained 
above, the research examines whether or not humanitarian engagements 
with armed non-state actors have an impact on the transformation of conflict 
and, if so, how this impact occurs. As the literature on humanitarian 
engagement provides some grounds to believe that this impact is positive, 
the conceptual framework formed by these three hypothesis presents the 
ways in which humanitarian engagements can impact positively on the 
conflict situation. However, it is in no way a constraining conceptual 
framework, and the negative consequences of humanitarian engagements 
with armed groups on the conflict situation will be examined in this research 
as well. 
The three hypotheses are as follows: 
• Hypothesis 1: Humanitarian engagement may affect the internal 
dynamics of the armed group by raising the voice of a moderate 
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faction (may affect power distribution and decision-making 
procedures) 
• Hypothesis 2: By offering the opportunity for the armed group to 
acquire greater knowledge of negotiation procedures or other skills 
necessary in the process of political negotiations, the process of 
humanitarian engagement might reduce the group's apprehension to 
enter in further negotiations 
• Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian engagement may allow for a continuous 
communication channel between the different parties to the conflict. 
Humanitarian engagement may act as a confidence-building measure 
affecting the dynamic among the different actors involved in peace 
negotiations (NGOs, lOs, UN Agencies, ANSAs, Governments). 
Thesis structure 
Departing from this research question, the first three chapters will 
examine the literature on the different aspects of this research. One of the 
central concepts in this research are the terms "armed groups" and "armed 
non-state actors". With a growing emphasis on terrorist groups in 
international affairs, the first chapter will be dedicated to understanding the 
international legal framework that regards armed groups as well as 
discussing the choice of terms and issues behind the labelling of these 
groups. Finally, a framework of understanding will be proposed which aims 
at providing a tool for analysing and understanding armed groups with 
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regards to their involvement m and commitment to humanitarian 
engagements. 
The second central concept in this research is the term "humanitarian 
engagement". Through a review of the existing literature and the existing 
practice, the concept of "humanitarian engagement" will be examined. 
Humanitarian engagement is part of a wider humanitarian discourse and in 
order to understand the sometimes-felt controversy of this practice, it is 
important to understand the on-gomg debates and Issues that 
humanitarianism faces today. The practice of humanitarian engagement as 
well as the sparse literature existing on the subject raises more questions 
than answers. These questions on the other hand help us frame the research 
agenda on the subject. Inspired by these questions, a second framework will 
be presented. This framework provides a reading grid for humanitarian 
engagements and isolates the characteristics that may influence the impact 
that humanitarian engagement may have on the peaceful transformation of 
conflict. 
The third chapter provides the conceptual framework for the research 
and the thesis. It examines the literature on the general impact of 
humanitarian action on conflict as well as the literature on peace processes 
with a special emphasis on peacemaking. From this, the chapter concludes 
by providing three main hypothesis that will become the guiding framework 
for the methodology and empirical research. 
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The methodology chapter focuses on the difficulty of researching 
armed groups and conducting research in a conflict or post-conflict 
environment. Through a single-case study approach, fieldwork involving 
elite interviews will provide the data necessary to answer the research 
question. Two fieldwork periods were conducted. The first took place 
between January and March 2007 in Juba, South Sudan. The second one 
took place between July and August 2007 in Khartoum, North Sudan. The 
second civil war in Sudan (1983-2005) is chosen as the most appropriate 
case study to challenge the hypotheses presented in the research and answer 
the research question. 
The remaining chapters in the thesis focus on the single case-study 
as well as providing an analysis of the data and answering the research 
questions in the light of the hypotheses proposed. One chapter is dedicated 
to analysing the conflict in Sudan that occurred between 1983 and 2005 and 
involving mainly the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM). The next chapter examines how the type of 
armed groups engaged and the characteristics of humanitarian engagements 
playa role in the impact that humanitarian engagement with armed groups 
may have on the conflict situation as underlying factors. The final chapter 
focuses on the analysis of the data gathered during fieldwork in order to 
provide an answer to the research question and the evaluation of the 
hypotheses. 
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The research alms at providing a better understanding of 
humanitarian engagements with armed non-state actors as well as 
understanding how this process of dialogue affects the possibility of a peace 
dialogue. By looking at the experience in Sudan, one can identify more 
clearly the ways in which these two parallel processes have affected one 
another. While aiming at providing clear guidelines for practitioners to 
ensure that humanitarian engagement has a positive impact on the 
transformation of conflict, this research might only provide a partial answer 
to a complicated question but will provide a further step from which future 
research can start examining this question. 
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Chapter II: Armed Non-State Actors: the legal, political and 
legitimacy debates. 
Introduction: 
Internal conflicts echo images of mass-killing, the cutting of limbs, 
displacements, hunger, and disease. Internal conflicts echo images of armed 
groups terrorising civilian populations such as in northern Uganda where 
young people hide from the Lord's Resistance Army so as not to be 
abducted as child soldiers. As Weinstein states, the death toll from civil 
wars since 1945 can be estimated to exceed 16 million, 'more than five 
times as many people as have died in interstate wars. In the 1990s, over 90 
percent of deaths caused by war occurred in internal conflicts' (2007 :4-5). 
In 1998, for instance, out of twenty-five conflicts, 'twenty-three were 
internal in character, engaging one or more nonstate actors' (Bruderlein, 
2001:222). Indeed, armed non-state actors (ANSAs) involved in internal 
conflicts share the burden with states of this disastrous death toll, which 
include both combatants and non-combatants. The protection of civilians in 
war is regulated by international humanitarian law (IHL). However, the 
international legal system has faced challenges to account for the violations 
conducted by ANSAs in internal conflict. 
This research examines whether or not humanitarian engagements with 
armed non-state actors have an impact on the transformation of conflict and, 
if so, how this impact occurs. In order to answer this question, one needs to 
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examine four important parameters concerning armed non-state actors: the 
relationship between armed non-state actors and humanitarian principles; 
why "engage" with armed non-state actors on humanitarian principles; what 
is meant by armed non-state actors; and, finally, how the characteristics of 
armed non-state actors may impact on the possible relationship between 
humanitarian engagement and conflict transformation. 
Armed groups are key actors of violence, humanitarian and human 
rights violations (Bruderlein, 2001:222). International law, which includes 
humanitarian law and human rights law, remains a state-centred legal 
system. The law of war, or humanitarian law, was created to regulate wars 
between states. However, as Bruderlein states, armed groups today are the 
main violators of humanitarian and human rights principles (Ibid.). The 
discrepancy between the provisions of rules and norms to protect civilians 
during conflict and the marginalisation of the actors of violations of these 
norms mean that the protection of civilians in internal conflict remains a 
challenge. 
The first section of this chapter will examine this international legal 
context in order to understand better the controversy around the legal status 
of ANSAs and their obligations concerning civilian protection under 
international law. It will be argued that the international legal context 
provides a number of rules that ANSAs are accountable to, but without 
providing a mechanism for engagement. In consequence, the vacuum left by 
the international legal system explains the origin of a different, less legal 
23 
and more pro-active, mechanism for engagement through humanitarian 
dialogue and engagement with armed groups. 
Armed non-state actors are not only contextualised within the legal 
discourse. The second section of this chapter will examine further the status 
of ANSAs through definitions and labels referring to them. In an era where 
the label "terrorist" is prevalent in the public and political discourse, the 
choice of label for non-state actors needs to be explained. It will be argued 
that the terms "armed non-state actors" or "armed groups" are preferred to 
the label "terrorist" as the latter reflects negative, emotional characters often 
relating to political condemnation. Furthermore, labels reflect attitudes and 
it will be argued that assumptions and biases hide behind the choice of terms 
used to name such actors. After examining the legal controversy 
surrounding armed groups, this section will highlight the general attitude 
towards armed groups and whether it is legitimate to engage with them on 
humanitarian issues, through the lens of political violence. It will be argued 
that there are no armed non-state actors beyond the pale, as humanitarian 
engagement aims at regulating political violence in conflict and therefore 
armed groups involved in the most atrocious political violence should be at 
the forefront of humanitarian engagement. 
Finally, a framework will be proposed to help analyse and understand 
ANSAs as organisations. This framework appears necessary in providing a 
better understanding of ANSAs, as well as defining what specific 
characteristics of ANSAs matter both for the purpose of analysis and in 
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evaluating the effects of humanitarian engagement on conflict 
transformation (Jones and Cater, 2001:238; Weinstein, 2007:5; Zeender, 
2005: 109). 
A legal approach to armed non-state actors: 
Understanding armed non-state actors entails understanding the 
framework in which their actions take place. The international system today 
is framed significantly in legal terms and it appears inevitable to take into 
account the legal aspects of armed non-state actors. International Public 
Law relating to armed non-state actors and internal conflicts remains 
extremely complex. Far from trying to resolve the controversies existing on 
the matter, this section reviews the main debates and provisions 
contextualising engagement with armed groups in this legalistic framework. 
Defining the legal status of armed non-state actors remains an important 
step, as a consensus on the legal personality of such actors has not been 
reached. Furthermore, it is from the definition of the legal status of armed 
non-state actors and the perception that we may have of this debate, that the 
provisions of rights, duties and the capacity to enter into legal relations 
arise. The main legal framework that international law provides today for 
armed groups involved in internal conflicts relates to the Geneva 
Conventions, the Additional Protocols (in other words humanitarian law) 
and the Statute of the International Criminal Courts (which takes into 
account both human rights and international criminal law). By highlighting 
the controversies and the lack of consensus in the legal community, I will 
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argue that the legal gap supports the necessity of a "political" framework of 
engagement with armed groups on humanitarian issues. 
Legal personality and the state-centred system: the legal status of armed 
non-state actors within the international system 
Understanding the legal personality debate surrounding ANSAs 
helps us understanding the marginalisation of ANSAs in the international 
system. The issue of armed non-state actors in International Public Law is 
first and foremost an issue regarding their non-state entity. It is important to 
understand that the international system, in which International Public Law 
is situated, revolves around states: it is run by states and for states. In legal 
terms, it is said that only states enjoy legal personality. Today, this 
statement has become controversial as some international lawyers have 
argued that other non-state entities have acquired international legal 
personality, such as the United Nations (UN) or individuals (Clapham, 
2006). 
This section will examme what legal personality entails and the 
extent to which one can argue that armed non-state actors have legal 
personality and therefore have accountability to certain principles of 
international law. Without legal personality, ANSAs are marginalised from 
the elaboration of norms and principles relating to them and the 
implementation of these norms and principles. The remaining controversies 
around the legal status of armed groups is a first building block towards 
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understanding the necessity for a more pro-active engagement with armed 
groups on humanitarian issues. 
The legal status of armed non-state actors and their obligations under 
international law became a significant issue post-1945 as wars of de-
colonisation and the formation of liberation movements rendered part of 
international law obsolete. Facing the apparently changing nature of wars, 
the international community embraced the challenge of adapting parts of 
international humanitarian law with the adoption of the 1977 additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 1 The adoption of these protocols can 
certainly be characterised as a step towards creating some duties for 
liberation movements, which represent a specific type of armed groups. As 
Paul Grossrieder, former head of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (lCRC) states, the proliferation of liberation movements in the 
colonised regions in the 1970s placed the ICRC in front of a changing 
reality such that if the Geneva Conventions were to remain a useful tool for 
the respect of international humanitarian law, the international community 
would need to adopt further legal means. Grossrieder argues that the 
changing reality was at the heart of the 1977 Additional Protocol II of the 
Geneva Conventions which extends the Conventions' mechanisms to render 
liberation movements accountable (1999: 12-3). Nevertheless, the 1977 
Additional Protocols may have provided further rights and duties for 
liberation movements as Cassese points out, but did not provide the ability 
1 It is important to note that states which have signed the original Geneva Conventions did 
not all sign the Additional Protocols. In effect, it is only a part of the international 
community that truly embraced this apparent changing nature. 
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of such movements to enter into legal relations (1981 :420).2 The possibility 
to make a unilateral declaration is the only legal relation that organised 
movements may have with the international community. There is no real 
institutional legal mechanism through which a liberation movement can 
truly participate in the Protocols. Cassese highlights this limitation as a 
possible ground to conclude that ANSAs as organised entities do not have a 
legal status or legal personality (Ibid.). 
Having international legal personality means being a subject of 
international law. According to Malanczuk, enjoying legal personality 
entails that an entity 'has a capacity to enter into legal relations and to have 
legal rights and duties' (1997 :91). McCorquodale adds that legal personality 
should be explored 'by reference to the direct rights and responsibilities [ ... ] 
under the international legal system, [the] capacity to bring international 
claims and [the] ability to participate in the creation, development, and 
enforcement of international law' (2003 :299). The ability to participate in 
the activities relating to international law render the issue of the legal 
personality of armed groups paramount. Indeed, the legal controversy 
around the legal personality of armed groups has meant that 'nonstate armed 
groups are repeatedly barred from participating in international conferences 
on the protection of civilians and contact with such groups is subject to 
intense political pressure from many sides' (Bruderlein, 2001:223). 
2 'No provision is made for the 'participation' in the Protocol by Rebels, when civil war 
breaks out on the territory of a contracting party. This is all the more striking as Protocol I, 
which aIlows 'liberation movements' to 'participate' in the Protocol by means of a 
unilateral declaration addressed to the Swiss Federal Council, the depository of the 
Conventions and the Protocol' (1981 :420). 
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Malanczuk explains that only states could claim to have international 
legal personality until recently. He argues that even if states remain the 
principal actors of the international system, it is recognised today that 
'international organisations, individuals and companies have also acquired 
some degree of international legal personality' (Malanczuk, 1997 :91). 
Warbrick shares this point of view as he advances that peoples who can 
aspire to self-determination and individuals enjoy legal personality 
(2003 :218). Nevertheless, when one tries to define the extent to which these 
new subjects of international law have legal personality, an array of 
different perspectives and views arise. 
The legal personality of armed groups can be looked at in three ways 
(Zegveld, 2002; Clapham, 2006:280). The first is to look at the legal 
personality of armed groups. The second is to look at legal personality of 
individuals within the group. Finally, legal personality could be conferred to 
armed groups as future governments or de facto authorities. 
Providing ANSAs with legal personality presents an important 
challenge as no clear legal definition of ANSAs exists (Zegveld, 2002).3 It 
is not clear, states Zegveld, 'whether groups should fulfil some set of 
minimum objective conditions, say as to their size and power, to qualify as 
international legal persons' (2002: 134). The Geneva Conventions for their 
application provide some necessary characteristics of armed groups such as 
responsible command, control over territory and sustained and concerted 
3 For a more detailed account of the issue of legal personality and accountability of armed 
groups, see Zegveld, L. (2002) Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International 
L(J\\'. 
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military operations.4 These characteristics remain disputed in terms of the 
possible issues with implementation and legal consequences (Cassese, 
1981:427). Consequently, Zegveld argues that 'a gap currently exists [ ... J in 
the enforcement of international humanitarian law. There are no judicial or 
quasi-judicial mechanisms specifically competent to examine claims against 
armed opposition groups' (2002:162). 
Whereas the legal personality of armed groups seems to be a cul-de-
sac, international law theorists have turned to the legal personality of 
individuals, thus indirectly armed groups, as an answer (Zegveld, 2002; 
Clapham, 2006; Cassese, 2003). Zegveld argues that 'the trend of 
accountability of individuals has entered the body of international law, and 
has been constantly supported in practice' (2002:220). Such instances as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have demonstrated that individual non-state 
actors can be considered as subjects of international law (Ibid:98). More 
generally, the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court has 
s.hifted the debate further toward the acceptance that individuals have legal 
personality. 
'The Statute of the International Criminal Court is a radical 
departure in that it clearly fixes on individuals who can be judged 
at the international level without any cooperation from their state 
of nationality. If you commit a crime, for example, in a state party 
to the ICC Statute, you can be judged in the International Criminal 
Court. This holds whether you are an individual member of an 
~ In Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, Article 1 (1). 
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NSA, or a state actor, or working for the UN, or indeed working 
for NATO, the individual can be judged. [ ... J' (Clapham, 2000:44-
45). 
Not only did the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
provides rights and duties for individuals, it also provided a mechanism for 
individuals to enter into legal relations with the international community. 
Furthermore, the attention given to human rights treaties as well as 
the creation of the European Court of Human Rights (which also allows 
individuals to bring cases in front of a transnational court) has emphasised 
this shift towards the accepted international legal personality of individuals. 
Cassese also points out that the development of international criminal law 
entails 'the personal criminal liability of the individuals concerned' 
(2003:738), therefore signalling again that individuals are subject of 
international law. Through this newly acquired international legal 
personality, ANSAs indirectly also enjoy a certain legal personality. 
Armed groups may indirectly have legal personality as potential 
future governments. As Malanczuk explains: 
'Insurgents in civil war have long been recognised in international 
law as subjects having certain rights and duties because they 
control some territory and might become the effective new 
government of the state. This is also reflected in Articles 14 and 15 
of the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, according to which, as long as the old government 
is still in power, a wrongful act of an insurrectional movement 
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established in the territory of the state shall not be considered as an 
act of that state under international law (involving responsibility to 
other states for it). However, it will be considered as an act of that 
state (in a retroactive sense) if the insurrectional movement 
becomes the new government' (1997: 104). 
He adds that '[ ... ] at least the future prospect of gaining effective control 
over population in a given territory appears to be a central element of their 
recognition as subjects of the international community [ ... J' (Ibid.). As the 
future government will enjoy international legal personality, the ANSA is 
rendered accountable and indirectly seen as a subject of international law. 
Looking at the status of armed non-state actors specifically regarding 
human rights principles, Clapham argues further that the status of legal 
personality should be extended to other entities and criticises the traditional 
restrictive approach to legal personality. He argues that there is a need 'to 
go beyond the traditional, narrow, state-focused approach and argue that 
some of the obligations found in public international law, and traditionally 
only applied to states, also apply to non-state actors' (Clapham, 2006:28). 
According to Clapham, it is clear that 'international law has already 
extended this concern to inter-governmental organisations, and there is no 
evidence that the international tribunal legal order cannot accommodate 
duties for other kind of actors' (2006:31). He suggests that 'the traditional 
treatment of the question of the subjects of international law is confusing 
and incomplete' and 'the question of international legal personality has 
remained entangled with the misleading concept of 'subjects' of 
international law and the attendant question of attributions of statehood 
32 
under international law' (Clapham, 2006:59). On the other hand, Clapham 
proposes to step away from the legal personality debate and suggests that 
'we concentrate on the rights and obligations of entities rather than their 
personality' (2006:82). Nevertheless, Clapham, who focused on human 
rights obligations of armed non-state actors, has to conclude that the matter 
remains complex: 
'In sum, the development of the human rights obligations of non-
state actors is complex due to at least three factors: first is the 
rather unspecified and evolving nature of the obligations as they 
are adapted from the traditional realm of state obligations to 
obligations for non-state actors. Second, although international law 
binds states and non-state actors, the obligations vary in scope 
according to the context. Third, the complexity of modem life 
means that we have to try to disentangle complex networks and the 
influence and support that different actors lend each other before 
we can respond to enforce human rights obligations' (2006:561). 
These three paths have enabled us to understand the important points of 
the on-going debate regarding the international legal personality of ANSAs 
whether directly or indirectly. Indeed, as Clapham emphasises in this quote 
'individuals are the real subjects of international duties not only when they 
act on behalf of the state. They are the subjects of international duties in all 
cases in which international law regulates directly the conduct of individuals 
as such' (Lauterpacht quoted in Clapham, 2000:47-48). In spite of this 
account, the question of the international legal personality of ANSAs 
remains unanswered as no real consensus has been reached. Being a 
controversial area of international law, it is therefore difficult to provide a 
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clear legal status for ANSAs within the international system. As Malanczuk 
concludes, 'the present century has seen a growing tendency to admit that 
individuals - and companies - have some degree of international personality 
but the whole subject is extremely controversial' (1997: 100). 
Accountability of Armed Non-state Actors in international law 
The importance of defining the legal status of ANSAs is to identify 
the relevant bodies of law relating to their rights, duties and capacity to 
enter into legal relations. This section will focus on the four following 
sources of law for ANSAs: the Four Geneva Conventions, especially 
Common Article 3, Additional Protocol I, Additional Protocol II and the 
Status of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This discussion will not 
give a thorough account of these treaties. Rather, this section will provide 
some of the debates linked to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
and the Additional Protocols to today's internal armed conflicts, as well as 
the turning point that the ICC is in international criminal law. In spite of the 
existence of rules, ANSAs are barred from participating in the international 
legal system. It will be argued that the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols remain weak in their 
implementation mechanisms, and the legal vacuum created needs to be 
filled and has been filled in by a practice of humanitarian engagement with 
armed groups outside of the international legal system. 
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The laws relating to ANSAs revolve mainly around three main lines: 
humanitarian law, human rights and international criminal law. 
Humanitarian law is found in the Four Geneva Conventions, Additional 
Protocol I and Additional Protocol II. Human rights treaties are numerous 
and will not be a focus of discussion as, although their provisions apply to 
ANSAs indirectly, they address states as the responsible and accountable 
entities and it is mostly through international criminal law and the 
International Criminal Court that violations by ANSAs are accounted for. 
Indeed, human rights treaties do not name non-state actors as accountable 
apart from the obligations they may have through states' commitments to 
those treaties (Steiner, 2003 :776). Finally, International Criminal law can be 
found in different treaties but, in relation to armed groups, the Statute of the 
ICC is the main source of law. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are the main sets of rules relating to 
the conduct of war and, therefore, it is natural to start looking for the legal 
framework for armed non-state actors within the Conventions. The key 
principles of Geneva Conventions are: 
'( 1) that noncombatants have no strategic value (and should thus 
be spared the effects of hostilities) and that militaries should 
follow utilitarian considerations, (2) that parties to a conflict 
should provide access to humanitarian actors, (3) that humanitarian 
assistance should be neutral, and (4) that an international treaty 
would serve as an important guarantor of protection mechanisms' 
(Jones and Cater, 2001 :246). 
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Unfortunately, the Geneva Conventions provide a restricted application as 
they are mainly concerned with armed conflict with an international 
character. As Greenwood explains, 'the fundamental principle of the law of 
war is that it applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict [ ... ]. [ ... ] The 
bigger problem is whether the law of war ever applies to hostilities in which 
one side is not a state' (2003:791-2). It is difficult to imagine today that 
rules regulating the conduct of wars would not take into account conflicts 
not of international character as "modem" conflicts remain within the 
border of a state rather than involving two states. 
The first challenge to the application of the Conventions came from the 
era of decolonisation. The 1977 Protocol I was to overcome this challenge 
by taking into account armed conflicts involving liberation movements 
fighting against colonisation, racist regimes and alien occupations. 
Nevertheless, the solution provided by Protocol I did not erase the 
challenges of new types of conflicts. As Greenwood points out, this 
provision does not seem to have much relevance today as 'colonial 
situations are very few' and racist regimes have either collapsed or have not 
signed the Additional Protocol (2003:793). 
5 '[ ... J During the decolonisation era, many third world States argued that hostilities 
between liberation movements and colonial regimes would be treated as international and 
the whole law of war should apply. Their view prevailed in Article 1(4) of Additional 
Protocol I, 1977, which provided that the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol should 
apply to: Armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racists regimes in the exercise of their right to self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on 
Principles of International law concerning Friendly Relations on Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations' (Greenwood, 2003:792-3). 
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Despite this, one article within the Geneva Conventions applies to all 
armed conflict not of an international character. Indeed, Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions provides a number of minimum measures that 
apply to all conflicts: 
'Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies to 
any case of 'armed conflict not of international character' 
occurnng in the territory of one of the States party to the 
conventions requires that the parties to such an internal conflict 
shall be required to apply 'as a minimum' the following 
prOVISIons: 
(l) Persons taking no part in the hostilities, including member of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors 
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall 
in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or 
wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of 
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture. 
(b) Taking hostages. 
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, In particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment. 
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgement pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognised as 
indispensable by civilised peoples. 
(2) The wounded and the sick shall be collected and cared for' 
(quoted in Greenwood, 2003:814-5). 
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As Greenwood explains, Common Article 3 applies to all types of armed 
conflicts. It is maybe the clearest provision regarding the rules applying to 
internal armed conflict. 
On the other hand, Additional Protocol I and II only apply to certain 
armed conflicts. Greenwood provides us with a classification of the types of 
armed conflicts and the applicable bodies of law: 
'In effect, therefore, there is a scale of internal conflicts and 
disturbances, with different bodies of law becoming applicable the 
higher up the scale one moves: 
(1) at the lowest end of the scale come internal disturbances and 
acts of terrorism which do not amount to an armed conflict 
(such as the fighting in Northern Ireland before the cease-fire 
there). Such disturbances are not subject to the laws of armed 
conflict at all, although the State (but not the rebels), will be 
subject to the provisions of any human rights treaties to which 
the State is a party; 
(2) Once the fighting reaches the level at which it is described as an 
armed conflict, both government and rebel forces are bound by 
Common Article 3 and the government will continue to be 
bound by any applicable human rights treaties; 
(3) If the rebels acquire sufficient control of territory to meet the 
requirements of Additional Protocol II, the Protocol and 
Common Article 3 will apply to both sides in the conflict. 
Again, the government will continue to be bound by applicable 
human rights treaties; and 
(4) Finally, if another State intervenes on either side of the conflict, 
the conflict becomes international and the full body of the 
Geneva Conventions and, if the States concerned are parties, 
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Additional Protocol I become applicable at least to fighting 
involving the intervening State' (2003 :815-6). 
Cassese points out that Protocol I 'takes a rather restricted view of wars of 
national liberation, and actually only includes three categories, namely wars 
against colonial domination, against alien occupation or against racist 
regimes' (1981 :417). Cassese adds that from this restricted view 'it follows 
that most of the civil wars which have lately broken out in Third World 
countries, or are at present being fought there, do not fall under this 
heading' (Ibid.). He concludes by saying that 'it is therefore apparent that 
the Protocol has a high "threshold of application", and in substance only 
covers civil wars which in scale reach a level comparable to that of the 
Spanish war or the Nigerian conflict' (Ibid.). Cassese is right to point out 
that this leaves a gap, when wars do not fall within this threshold, where no 
law seems to apply. This appears even more problematic as most internal 
conflicts today fall between these two thresholds. 
As stated above, the application of both the Geneva Conventions and 
the Additional Protocols is restricted to certain types of conflicts. In addition 
to this, the application of these bodies of law is further restricted by the type 
of armed groups it applies to. 6 These characteristics may not fit all existing 
armed groups and therefore prevent further the application of the Protocol. 
6 Protocol II states in Article I (I) that it applies to anned conflicts taking place 'within the 
territory of [a state party to the protocol] between its anned forces and dissident anned 
forces or other organised anned groups, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol' (quoted in Greenwood, 2003:815). 
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Cassese points out the absurdity of enumerating such characteristics in order 
for armed groups to be accountable. He writes: 
'Article 1, Para. 1, stipulates that the Protocol can only apply when 
rebels fulfil certain conditions. These conditions include the 
existence of a "responsible command" controlling the "organised 
armed group" which fights against the Government in power. The 
"responsible command" and the "organised" character of the 
rebels are considered as prerequisites for permitting insurgents to 
implement the Protocol. In short, the Protocol only begins to apply 
when rebels prove to be able to, and do in fact, implement it. This 
being so, it would plainly be absurd to contend that the rebels must 
comply with the Protocol, in order for it to become applicable, yet 
do not acquired any rights or duties' (Cassese, 1981 :427). 
The application of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols is 
a complicated matter as it has been exemplified above. Their provisions are 
both restricted by the type of conflict as well as the characteristics of armed 
groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that ANSAs are accountable to the 
provisions given in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and, 
after evaluating the situation, to further obligations under Protocol I and II. 
For a long time the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols were the mam referent when discussing the accountability of 
ANSAs in international law. Since 1998 and the adoption of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), new regulations can be 
applied to ANSAs. By rendering individuals accountable, the ICC offers a 
further framework for the accountability of ANSAs in international law: 
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'The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
establishes the first permanent (as distinguished from ad hoc) 
international criminal tribunal with universal jurisdiction over 
individual natural persons for the 'most serious crimes of 
international concern' (genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and aggression) [ ... ]' (Santos, 2000:3). 
As mentioned above, the ICC has universal jurisdiction and is permanent. 
Its application is, therefore, not as restricted as the Geneva Conventions as it 
does not take into account the type of conflict as well as the characteristics 
of the armed groups: 
'[ ... J the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
not only confirmed the del inking of crimes against humanity from 
any type of conflict situation, but also expansion of the overall 
protective regime, in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva 
Conventions' (Andreopoulos, 2003: 19). 
The main limitation of the Statute appears to be the type of crimes that can 
be characterised as international criminal breaches. Cassese explains that 
'international crimes are breaches of international rules entailing the 
personal criminal liability of the individuals concerned' and constitute of 
'war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, [ ... J aggression, 
and some extreme forms of terrorism (serious acts of State-sponsored or 
State-tolerated international terrorism), (2003:738) . 
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The creation of the ICC remams a significant turning point m 
international law. Its creation was influenced by ad hoc tribunals for 
conflicts such as Rwanda or Sierra Leone. The ICC prosecutor has already 
mentioned his intention to carry out an investigation of the breaches of 
international crimes by the leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army in 
Northern Uganda (IRIN, 2005). 
This section on the legal character of armed groups highlights the 
context in which the issues relating to armed groups and their violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law occur. At the same time, it 
points out the weakness of the system. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions and 
the Additional Protocols remain difficult to implement as conditions relating 
to the type of conflict and armed groups prevail. Bruderlein argues that 
'international humanitarian law should certainly remain the core legal 
framework of any mechanisms of humanitarian protection' (2001 :233). 
However, mechanisms for dissemination and implementation should be 
reviewed as well as the role of non-state actors: 
'Efforts should be devoted to promote increased levels of 
participation of nonstate actors and their accountability to 
international standards, in particular armed groups and the 
corporations supporting those groups' (Ibid.). 
The examination of the legal proVIsIOns relating to armed non-state 
actors helps us understanding two important aspects of this research. First, 
the weakening of the protection mechanism for civilians provided by the 
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international legal system explains the emergence and the necessity for a 
more pro-active strategy of engagement with ANSAs on humanitarian 
issues and civilian protection. This strategy involves ANSAs in dialogue 
and furthers their participation. Secondly, the controversy of this process is 
explained by the controversy over the legal status of armed groups and the 
wanted marginalisation of such actors in an international system that 
remains states-centred. 
A political approach to armed non-state actors: 
The "Legal" and the "Political" are closely related in international 
relations. It is sometimes difficult to know which one influences the other. 
Political practice shapes international law through the formation of 
customary law. On the other hand, political practice is constrained by the 
legal framework it evolves in. I decided to begin by examining international 
law first as the accountability of armed non-state actors in terms of their 
actions in conflict finds its source within humanitarian law. However, 
international law has failed to offer a clear framework of engagement from 
existing state practice and existing bodies of law. There are ways in which 
international law takes armed non-state actors into account and offers 
channels of "engagement" with armed groups. Nonetheless, the different 
debates surrounding armed non-state actors, in terms of political and 
humanitarian engagement, needs to be taken beyond the legal discourse. 
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In times where the label "terrorist" is brandished hastily to define armed 
non-state actors, the issue of definition remains highly controversial. I will 
argue that the labelling of armed groups defines the attitude of political 
actors towards them. Whereas the label "terrorists" is a way of de-
legitimising armed groups and prohibiting dialogue, adopting a seemingly 
"neutral" label for armed groups underlies a will to accept such actors as 
potential interlocutors in political or humanitarian negotiations. Finally, the 
perception of armed groups as legitimate interlocutors for humanitarian and 
peace actors will be examined in relation to the perception that one may 
have on political violence. 
Labelling and defining: terrorists or armed non-state actors 
The issue of definition does not only involve defining what we mean by 
armed non-state actors but also involves a more profound questioning of the 
use of the term armed non-state actors (ANSAs). Indeed, labelling is 'an act 
of politics involving conflict as well as authority', 'an act of valuation and 
judgement involving prejudices and stereotyping' (Wood, 1985:347-8). 
Labelling armed groups is made even more complex by the fact that the 
numerous terms that have been used do not only represent different value 
judgements, but they also reflect a complex reality where armed group in all 
shapes and forms exist. The discussion will focus on the two main labels 
emerging from the literature: the term "terrorist" and different terms 
claiming to be more "neutral" such as "armed groups" or "armed non-state 
actors". Examining these terms and their definitions in terms of their biases, 
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usefulness and rationale, it will be argued that the term "armed non-state 
actors" or "armed groups" appear more appropriate not only within the 
context of this research but also in a broader academic context. Furthermore, 
the examination of labels reveals the beliefs and attitudes hidden behind the 
use of the different terms regarding the way in which armed groups should 
be accounted for, supporting Wood's claim that labelling is indeed a 
political act. 
Terror, terrorism and terrorist 
Whether one agrees with the usage of the term "terrorist", it is 
difficult today not to take this term into account, or at least not to explain 
why it may not be a useful term. The word "terrorist" has taken a new 
significant place in the post 9111 discourse but we should not assume that it 
had not been a common and widely-used term prior to this event. Its new 
prominence as part of the United States' foreign policy has only highlighted 
an already existing importance. Without dismissing this term altogether, this 
section will highlight the issues that may arise in using the term "terrorist" 
within this research. There are four main problems with using the label 
"terrorist": the definition of "terrorist" remains highly controversial; the 
label "terrorist" is a sensitive and emotional label; this label is only 
subjective and often used with political motivation; finally, labelling armed 
groups "terrorist" has been deemed to make negotiation work harder for 
actors on the ground. 
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The term "terrorist" raises numerous definitional debates. Hoffman 
argues that the term "terrorist" is hard to define because its meaning 'has 
changed so frequently over the past two hundred years' (Hoffman quoted in 
Whittaker, 2001:5). Hoffman offers a brief history of how the term has 
evolved. He points out a rather interesting development. The label 
"terrorist" was used to label nationalist and anti-colonialist groups, until 'the 
"politically correct" appellation of "freedom fighters" came into fashion as a 
result of the political legitimacy that the international community [ ... ] 
accorded to struggles for national liberation and self-determination' 
(Hoffman quoted in Whittaker, 2001:6). Guelke offers another account of 
the evolution of the definition and use of the term. "Terrorist" and 
"Terrorism" appeared in 1875 'in response to the reign of terror in post-
revolutionary France' (Guelke, 1995:3-4). The term was used in the 
nineteenth century to label 'the violence of the agrarian agitation against 
landlords and their agents in Ireland' (Ibid.). Later it was attached to 'the 
strategy of political assassinations employed by Narodnaya Volya (People's 
Will) against the Tsarist regime' (Ibid.). Before it was applied to colonial 
conflicts, Guelke explains that the term was used to describe the 'bomb-
throwing anarchists' by the end of the nineteenth century, linking anarchism 
and terrorism which remains 'important for the interpretation of terrorism as 
ideology' (Ibid.f This shows that the term is far from being novel, but its 
meaning and application changes with time. 
7 For a more detailed history of the evolution and use of the term "terrorist" and 
"terrorism", see W. Laqueur, (1978), The terrorism reader: a historical anthology, (New 
York, New American Library). 
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The term "terrorist" is rarely defined in the literature on the subject. 
"Terrorism", the action, is often taken as a starting point. A terrorist then 
becomes any person who commits an act of terrorism. George's definition is 
a prime example of that: 
'Terrorism is the method or technique of instrumental terror, and 
terrorists are those who use it. On this view, a terrorist is someone 
who furthers his ends by perpetrating acts of extreme violence in 
order to terrorise people into compliance' (1990:55). 
Indeed, the amalgamation between the action, terrorism, the actor, terrorist, 
and sometimes, the effect, terror poses a definitional problem. As Sederberg 
explains: 
'[ ... ] The confusion between the action (terrorism), the actor 
(terrorist) and the effect (terror) detracts from our ability to 
distinguish between terrorism and the larger class of coercive 
action of which it is a part' (1995 :296-7). 
In other words, it appears that "terrorism" becomes the mam defining 
character of "terrorist" groups even though it is described as a fighting 
strategy of a group rather than an ideology. By isolating violence as a 
defining variable, any ideological or political agenda that the group may 
have is hidden behind the type of violence used, making any groups branded 
as "terrorist", actors with no agenda or broader objectives than spreading 
terror. As Laqueur states, 'Terrorism is not an ideology but an insurrectional 
strategy' (1978b, 14-15). 
47 
There are two mam Issues with usmg violence as the defining 
character of a group. Firstly, if violence is chosen as a defining character of 
an insurrectional group then it should be used as the defining character for 
all groups. George for instance argues that 'terrorists are defined by the 
means they employ', whereas freedom fighters are defined by their ends 
(1990:54-5). Secondly, labelling a group from the type of violence it uses 
poses a problem when different types of violence are used as tactics. None 
of the definitions of terrorism leading to labelling a group as "terrorist" 
offers a benchmark or provides a percentage of acts of terrorism perpetrated 
in order to qualify as "terrorist". This raises a significant question mark on 
the usefulness and applicability of the label "terrorist". 
The label "terrorism", and therefore "terrorist", carry an emotional 
tone. Terrorism is often defined as a particular type of violence (Wilkinson, 
1990:44) and it is because of this particular type of violence that the label 
triggers an emotional reaction. Shultz describes terrorism as 'extranormal 
forms of political violence' (Shultz quoted in Conteh-Morgan, 2004:255). 
As Quinton writes, 'all terrorism is necessarily violent, but violence is not 
necessarily terrorism' (1990:35-6). Quinton argues that terrorism is a 
peculiar type of violence because 'the intention to kill or injure seriously is 
an essential part of terrorism', but also because the types and status of 
victims differ as with terrorism victims are passive (1990:37). Guelke agrees 
that terrorism is 'an emotive term' and states that terrorism 'cannot possibly 
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be treated as it if were a neutral technical term for a particular category of 
violence' (1995:6). 
The emotional side of the term is very well exemplified by Munck 
(2000), as he offers a rather vivid example of what terrorism inspires. He 
focuses on the discourse used during a 1980 Council of Europe conference 
report titled 'Defence and Democracy Against Terrorism' (Council of 
Europe 1981). He mentions the way the Spanish and the British delegates 
speak about terrorism. 
'We are told by the delegate from the Spanish State that 
'terrorism' is not only 'a general threat to the stability of 
democratic institutions' but represents 'a war declared against 
Western civilisation' (Fanjul 1981 :2). [ ... ] Citizens everywhere 
are in danger as 'the blows it strikes grow in savagery' and 
'become ever more treacherous and bloodthirsty' (ibid.:3), 
(Munck, 2000:2-3). 
The British delegate takes on a similar discourse: 
'The British delegate to the Council of Europe conference on 
'terrorism', Paul Wilkinson, an academic specialist on the matter, 
developed the same theme. Using Ireland as his example he 
declared confidently that the terrorists 'represent nothing but their 
own hate-filled and criminal mentalities', with their only 
'objective' being 'to impose their own petty tyranny of the gun and 
the bomb' (Wilkinson 1981 :4)' (Munck, 2000:3). 
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The emotional side of terrorism is defined rather well by Crenshaw who 
states that terrorism 'involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to 
communicate a political message to watching audiences' (Crenshaw quoted 
in Conteh-Morgan, 2004: 155). This highlights that if the label "terrorist" is 
to be defined from the emotional type of political violence that terrorism is, 
then the action of labelling a group "terrorist" carries with it this emotional 
burden. As such, this may not be problematic, but it carries a significant 
consequence with it: because of its emotional undertone, the labelling of a 
group as "terrorist" becomes an act with political motivation and intent to 
marginalise the group in question. In other word, the act of labelling a group 
as "terrorist" becomes subjective rather than analytical. 
The subjectivity of labelling armed groups as "terrorist" is maybe the 
most significant obstacle to using this label in academic research and as an 
analytical category. By branding the label "terrorist" as an instrument of 
condemnation, this term tends to reflect 'ideological or political bias' 
(Gibbs, 1989:329). As former U.S. President Jimmy Carter explains, '[ ... ] 
in many cases over the last quarter-century there is an increasing inclination 
on the part of any ruling party to brand as "terrorists" anyone who disagrees 
with them' (Jimmy Carter quoted in Ricigliano, 2005: 13). The label 
"terrorist" is used to marginalise and confer illegitimacy to an armed group 
(Higgins and Flory quoted in Whittaker, 2001 :257). As Hoffman states: 
'On one point, at least, everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative 
term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is 
generally applied to one's enemies and opponents [ ... ]. Hence, the 
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decision to call someone or label some organisation "terrorist" 
becomes almost unavoidably subjective [ ... J' (Hoffman quoted in 
Whittaker, 2001 :7 -8). 
As Wilkinson points out, this is the reason why armed groups which 
perpetrate acts of terrorism 'reject the appellation "terrorist'" (1990:46). He 
explains that these groups view the label "terrorist" as giving them a 
negative image as it carries with it 'clearly pejorative implications of 
illegitimacy and indiscriminate brutality against civilian targets' (Ibid.). 
Whereas "terrorist" groups in the nineteenth century embraced the label, it 
is today consciously avoided (Hoffman quoted in Whittaker, 2001:7). 
"Terrorism" and "terrorist" are therefore not a neutral label (Crenshaw 
quoted in Whittaker, 2001: 10-11). As Crenshaw argues, the ordinary use of 
terrorist and terrorism in day-to-day language, 'which contains value 
judgements' leads us to ask 'who calls what terrorism, why and when' 
(Ibid.). Labelling an organisation as terrorist becomes an act of 
condemnation that is not needed in either researching on engaging armed 
groups in humanitarian dialogue or in actually working on humanitarian 
engagements with armed groups. Indeed, using the label "terrorist" may 
actually complicate the work of people on the ground who try to either 
mitigate political violence or bring an end to it. During an interview, Jimmy 
Carter was asked whether introducing the label "terrorist" 'unnecessarily 
complicates things'. His answer was the following: 'Well, it [the label 
"terrorist"] does. It depends on the degree to which it deters outside 
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mediation' (Jimmy Carter quoted in Ricigliano, 2005: l3). According to 
Philipson, the labelling and naming of terrorist groups has a real impact: 
'Listing an organisation as 'terrorist' potentially lengthens the path 
to non-violent politics for that group as negative perceptions of the 
group are encouraged, and the group's own perceptions about 
whether they can or should have a place in non-violent politics 
may also be negatively affected. In Nepal, the US has listed the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and there has been pressure 
for other countries to do so to freeze their assets. In the absence of 
any external assets this has little practical purpose and serves only 
as a political label. In Nepal the effect of this threat leant weigh to 
those in both the Royal Nepal Army and the Maoist who were in 
favour of continuing war, rather than entering negotiations. It was 
taken as a signal that the international community would support a 
policy of isolating and defeating the Maoists' (2005 :70). 
Using the term "terrorist" carries with it a number of issues. As an 
analytical term, one to be used in academic research, the label "terrorist" 
does not provide a useful definition as it characterises an organisation using 
political violence solely by the type of political violence it carries out while 
other organisation also involved in acts of political violence may be judged 
by their ends or ideologies. The emotional and biased character of the term 
allows political motivations rather than analytical reasons to determine its 
usage. Finally, the wider picture seems to show that the use of the term 
"terrorist" closes doors to dialogue and engagement which makes a rather 
inappropriate label to use in researching on humanitarian engagements. 
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Armed non-state actors: a neutral label? 
To the tenn "terrorist", seemingly more "neutral" tenns such as 
anned non-state actors (ANSAs) or anned groups are presented as the other 
available option. In opposition to the emotional and value-loaded tenn 
"terrorism", ANSAs or anned groups is argued to offer a more factual and 
neutral label (Foster, 2000:2-3). It aims at including the multitude of 
complex organisations and groups involved in political violence by trying to 
capture the essence of these actors and their common denominator: these are 
actors that are anned and act outside of state control. 
As neutral as this tenn aims to be, a number of issues arise. Firstly, 
this tenn makes a number of value judgements on what organisations are to 
be included: the definition is limited to groups which have a clear political 
agenda leaving any groups with sole criminal intent aside; and the definition 
is limited to groups which are clearly outside of state control. Both these 
criteria may not always be clearly defined. Secondly, the tenn "ANSAs" has 
primarily emerged from the literature and the practice of engagement and 
dialogue with anned groups, carrying with it a certain bias. Finally, the 
dichotomy of state/non-state may be seen as a legitimisation of anned 
groups through its comparison with states. It will be argued that the tenns 
"ANSAs" or "anned groups" are useful analytical tenns, but that these 
terms should be applied with the knowledge that it carries with it a number 
of underlying assumptions. 
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Any definition will have limitations, including and excluding different 
items. The choice of these limitations, on the other hand, needs to be 
highlighted to uncover the biases of the definition. Most definitions of 
ANSAs or armed groups involve the three following criteria: (1) use 
violence as a way to attain given objectives, (2) have a political agenda, (3) 
act outside of state control.8 The last two criteria may not always be easy to 
define. As Petrasek argues, the distinction between a criminal organisation 
and a political organisation is necessary. Political violence seems to refer to 
violence within a coherent political project. Nevertheless, the 'classification 
is not simple'. As Petrasek explains, 'some armed groups with stated 
political goals resemble criminal organisations in their behaviour, so that it 
is difficult to say what they are with any certainty' (2000:6). Policzer raises 
the same issue arguing that' armed groups are narrowly defined according to 
static nominal dichotomies: groups that have political ends count, those with 
criminal ends do not' (2005:7-8). 
In a similar way, defining whether an organisation acts outside of state 
control or whether it is defined as not a state may not always be clear-cut: 
'Partly as a result of anxieties about the place of the state in global 
relations, the distinction between NSAs and states in the first place 
is made to look more clear-cut than it actually is. From NSAs 
covertly supported by governments, and militias partly controlled 
by governments, to de facto governing authorities (such as the 
8 Different definitions of armed groups or ANSAs include a number of other criteria. For 
more details and different definitions, see Foster (2000:3), Rupiya (2000:24), Santos 
(2000:36), Ricigliano (2005:6), Policzer (2005:6,8,9), w\\ w.genevacall.on.!, Hofinann 
(2004: 1), Petrasek (2000:5-6). 
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PLO and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic), to governments 
like South Africa with an NSA past, the boundaries between the 
two are blurred in practice' (Foster, 2000:4). 
To circumvent this problem, armed groups are sometimes defined as 
'challeng[ing] the state's monopoly on coercive force' (Ricigliano, 2005:6) 
or 'operat[ing] in opposition to the existing state or government' (Petrasek, 
2000:5-6). These definitional matters do not represent more of an obstacle 
than ensuring that any analysis of an armed group or categorisation of 
armed groups needs to be dynamic and flexible, taking into account these 
grey areas. 
A more significant bias exists in using these more "neutral" labels. The 
emergence of labels for armed groups that aims to be more neutral, such as 
ANSAs, came as a result of the growing practice and literature on engaging 
with armed groups on different issues including peace process and 
humanitarian principles. Discussions on defining ANSAs emerged from 
workshops on engaging armed groups (Rupiya, 2000:24) and from human 
rights organisations (Santos, 2000:36, Hofmann, 2004: 1). One has to ask 
whether the choice of a more neutral term is not indeed neutral as it seems 
to emerge with a specific policy towards armed groups. In other word, the 
term "ANSAs" is very much attached to a policy that encourages direct 
engagement with armed groups. 
The bias behind the use of these "neutral" terms appears again when 
looking at the dichotomy between state and non-state actors. As Policzer 
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explains, 'humanitarian and human rights organisations have tended to 
explicitly define, or implicitly assume, armed groups as would-be states' 
(2005 :6). Defining armed groups as armed non-state actors means implicitly 
comparing or confronting non-state actors to state actors. This appears 
problematic, especially when these terms are used within a very specific 
agenda of engagement, as it appears to be a legitimising label. By 
comparing armed groups to states or by assuming armed groups as would-be 
states, humanitarian and human rights organisations are actually justifying 
and legitimising their engagements with such groups. As Foster rightly 
states, "'Non-State actor" is no less fraught a term [ ... ] [ as it] seeks to 
identify [armed groups] in legally and normatively neutral terms' (Foster, 
2000:2-3). 
Legitimate actors and illegitimate actors: different perspectives on armed 
non-state actors 
One can conclude that labelling a group as an 'armed non-state 
actor' aims at legitimising this group and advocates for engagement and 
dialogue. On the other hand, labelling a group as "terrorist" aims at 
condemning this group, highlighting that a certain type of political violence, 
"terrorism", is in fact beyond the pale and engagement in any kind of 
dialogue prohibited. Is there a benchmark based on the type of violence used 
by armed groups for evaluating the possibility of engagement? If the answer 
to this question is positive, then humanitarian actors, as well as conflict 
mediators, are faced with an important dilemma as their aim is indeed to 
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mitigate, prevent or stop violence targeting civilians or violent conflicts in 
general. As Jimmy Carter points out: 
'[ ... ] We err on the side of at least talking to people who are 
pariahs in the international community when no one else will talk 
to them. The advantage of talking is that when I think our 
intercession might end a conflict or eliminate threats or actual 
human rights abuses, we engage more fully'(Jimmy Carter quoted 
in Ricigliano, 2005: l3). 
Within the current international political context where one is bombarded by 
the punitive discourse of the War on Terror, as every other armed group is 
labelled as terrorist, it is difficult to make the voice of those agreeing with 
Jimmy Carter heard. Indeed, as was argued earlier, the label "terrorist" may 
actually make the work of the people who are trying to resolve the problems 
on the ground harder. 
Is the benchmark at the level where all political violence is 
illegitimate9 and therefore actors of political violence are never legitimate 
actors to enter in a dialogue with? The answer to this depends on the view 
one takes on political violence. According to Apter, there are three main 
perceptions of political violence: a diagnostic view, political violence as 
individual pathology, or political violence as social pathology (1997:7). 
9 For a more detailed account on the legitimacy of violence, more specifically violence used 
by non-state actors and violence (more often referred in a legitimising way as "force") by 
states, see Besteman (2002), Tilly (2003). For a more general account see Apter (1997), 
Arendt (2002), Guelke (1995:25). 
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The diagnostic view states that 'political violence can be examined in 
tenns of theories of bargaining, coalition, and rational choice' because it is 
considered a 'rational phenomenon' (Ibid.). Political violence therefore 
becomes a rational problem with a possible rational solution making 
engagement and dialogue with those who perpetuate political violence 
possible and a valuable option. Where political violence is seen as either an 
individual pathology or a social pathology, the solution to the problem of 
political violence is the resolution of the source of the problem, i.e. the 
treatment of the pathology. By looking at political violence as a rational 
phenomenon, anned non-state actors are seen as part of the problem and 
therefore part of the solution. By adopting this perception of political 
violence, there is no such thing as political violence beyond the pale. All 
armed groups involved in political violence are potentially on principle able 
to enter into dialogue with those who want to mitigate its effects or end it. 
Armed non-state actors: an analytical framework 
The issue of labelling and naming actors involved in organised political 
violence is one important issue. Providing a framework and knowing which 
aspects of anned non-state actors need to be taken into account in order to 
acquire an analytical understanding of these actors is another. Indeed, 
researching organised political violence and anned non-state actors involves 
asking how anned non-state actors are to be researched and studied. The 
study of anned non-state actors is necessary if one wants to understand how 
the behaviour of anned groups can be influenced, if humanitarian 
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engagements work, and if it has an impact on conflict transformation. 
However, Jones and Cater explain that 'unconventional belligerents [ ... J 
have been significantly understudied for reasons ranging from a bias toward 
legitimate state actors to the practical and security constraints on close 
analysis of militia groups' (2001 :238). Unfortunately this means that 'we 
know surprisingly little about why some civil wars are so much more 
violent than others or why some groups commit horrendous atrocities and 
others do not' (Weinstein, 2007:5). 
This section aims at creating a tailored analytical framework in order to 
understand armed groups in relation to humanitarian engagements and the 
effect that it may have on conflict. In emphasising certain aspects of an 
armed group in the analysis, there are a number of assumptions as to which 
characteristics of an armed group may playa role in causing humanitarian 
engagements with armed groups to have a different impact on conflict. In 
other words, different armed groups have different characteristics such as 
hierarchy, relationship between the military and the political wings, 
relationship with their constituency or the rationale behind their activities. 
These different characteristics have to be taken as further variables that may 
potentially help understanding why and when humanitarian engagements 
with armed groups impact the conflict situation negatively or positively. 
This section will present briefly two approaches to researching armed 
groups while keeping in mind that the framework is aimed at understanding 
armed groups in relation to humanitarian engagements. It will be argued that 
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a flexible framework allows a better and more comprehensive understanding 
of armed groups in opposition to a typology. Coming up with a framework 
of analysis for armed groups has two main objectives. First, it provides a 
general tool that can be used in further research and improves the way 
armed groups may be studied. Second, it provides a necessary tool for this 
research to understand how different characteristics of an armed group may 
change the potential impact of humanitarian engagements on the conflict 
dynamic. In other words, the framework provided below and discussed in 
this section will be applied to a case study and used as another analytical 
tool. As Jones and Cater explain, 'enhanced understanding requires seeing 
belligerents in context and examining their varying behaviour, objectives, 
and instruments of war in order to shed light on how belligerents deal with 
civilians and to draw out the implications for international protection 
efforts' (2001 :238). 
Defining armed groups with a general label has proved to be a 
difficult endeavour. The term "armed group" only describes a group, or an 
entity made of more than two people, which is armed, or owns some kind of 
weapons. The term "armed non-state actor" provides a further detail, 
accentuating the status of the group as being outside of the state structure 
and command and giving a hint that this group is fighting against the state. 
Many different internal conflicts have presented many different armed 
groups. Faced with this multitude of different types of armed non-state 
actors, a reading grid or an analytical framework is necessary to understand 
and highlight the important aspects that make an armed group what it is. 
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Capturing the essence of these armed groups is also important m 
understanding their attitude and behaviour towards humanitarian 
engagements and dialogue in general (Conciliation Resources, 2004:5). This 
section will look first at different approaches to studying armed groups 
exemplified by Williams and Ricigliano (2005) and O'Neill (1990). 
Arguing that the first approach offers a more flexible framework by 
providing general characteristics rather than trying to generalise types of 
armed groups, I will then look at these different characteristics in details to 
work towards a framework of analysis rather than a typology. 
Williams and Ricigliano provide the following list of 'necessary 
things to know about armed groups' (2005:16): 
'1) Their political profile, including their history, ideology and 
allies; 2) their military capabilities, including the effective size of 
each grouping, their arms, degree of training and territorial 
influence or control; 3) their degree of constituency support, 
including any geographic or ethnic limits to their support; 4) their 
economic activities, including funding from abroad, from 
neighbouring states, from trade or from illegal activities such as 
drugs, kidnapping or extortion' (2005: 16). 
It is interesting to note that the list is composed of both military, political 
and economic aspects. This highlights a sometimes forgotten character of 
armed groups. 
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Table 2.1 : Analytical Framework For Armed Non-State Actors. 10 
. Name of armed group: 
----
History: date fonned, important 
turning point. 
Political profile: aims and 
ideology 
. Leadership and 
: organisation: 
Military structure: 
, Relationship with 
, constituency: 
~esources: 
] Territory: 
Policy towards 
humanitarian and human 
rights principles, and 
peace negotiations: 
"'-~.--- ---------
, What does the anned group try to achieve through' the use~T 
r violence? 
I What are the motivations behind the choice to use violence? 
: Are aims political, economic in character, or both? 
Is the group ideology a reflection of a particular minority, ~ 
, identity, religion, culture? ~ 
: Are the aims and ideology shares by all members of the 
, group? 
: Have the aims and ideology or any answers to the above 
questions changes since the beginning of the conflict? 
: i~ the~e-a distinct 'political- leade~hlp? 'is there adlStinct 
military leadership? What is the relationship between the 
i two? 
: What is the hierarchy and organisation of the anned group? 
I Is there a decision-making process? Is this process 
! democratic (open) or authoritarian (closed)? 
! Is there effective command and control over all the 
! membership of the armed group? 
Is there--a -clea~ chai~--of--~~~mand?--Whatfs--the---chain~ 0[- ~ 
command? 
What is the military strategy? How does the armed group 
, conduct warfare? What is the military capacity and the 
: means of warfare? 
: How many combatants are there? Who make up the armed 
: force: men, women, children, identity? What are the reasons 
! for joining the armed group? Is recruitment voluntary or 
, forced? 
I Who is defined as the armed group's constituency? 
: What is the relationship between the armed group and its' 
,constituency? What factors shape relations between the 
i armed groups and the constituency? 
! How does the armed group obtain the necessary resources 
for its economic survival? Who "sponsors" the armed 
• group? 
: Does the group benefit from the war economy? 
: Does the armed group have territorial aspirations? 
'Does it have de facto control over a territory and I 
population? 
• How is this control exerted? 
: What activities does the group carry out in this territory? 
, -- : Whatls' theh~~-~;~itarian and human rights record of th~ -
: armed group? 
i Has the group taken any commitment toward the respect of 
these principles? 
What are the justifications for taking up arms and how does 
it effect the group's position towards peace negotiations and 
: political dialogue? 
What is the group's negotiation history? 
How does the ideology and aims of the groups relate or 
'. effect their policy towards peace negotiations? 
10 The characteristics of anned groups presented in this section as well as the analytical 
framework proposed are mainly drawn from the following sources: Mc Hugh and Bessler 
(2006), Petrasek (2000), Williams and Ricigliano (2005). The framework proposed is also 
based on a working document used by Geneva Call to understand anned groups they 
engage in the ban against landmines. 
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In addition to this, Williams and Ricigliano offer a number of 
interesting points to be taken into account when looking at engaging with 
armed groups in any type of dialogues. The first issue raised is one that is 
not often factored in: the behaviour of other protagonists. Indeed, Williams 
and Ricigliano argue that in order to have a full understanding and an 
accurate analysis of an armed group it is important to understand the armed 
group's behaviour in relation to the behaviour of other actors in the conflict. 
As they write, 'this will play a significant role in shaping a group's 
strategies and attitudes towards political engagement' (Williams and 
Ricigliano, 2005: 17). This argument is reiterated by Petrasek who argues 
that 'the character of the armed groups is conditioned by the legitimacy of 
the state' (2000: 16). 
The second important point made by Williams and Ricigliano is the 
importance of looking at how the armed group describes the conflict, their 
understanding of the conflict and the possible solutions, as 'the group's 
analysis of the problem and their range of possible solutions reveal a great 
deal about them, their aims, and how they wish to be seen' (2005: 17). 
Finally, a critical factor according to Williams and Ricigliano is 'how the 
group accounts for the fact that it is armed' (Ibid.). This helps understanding 
how the group might prioritise between continuing an armed struggle and 
finding a peaceful solution (Ibid.). 
In opposition to Williams and Ricigliano, O'Neill presents at first 
sight a more rigid approach. As he writes: 'Our research suggests seven 
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types of insurgent movements - anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, 
pluralist, secessionist, reformist [ ... ]' (O'Neill, 1990:17). O'Neill aims to 
offer 'a structured framework for analysis', but seems to offer a rather rigid 
one (1990: 160). He admits that 'the complex nature of the subject [ ... ] 
defies facile generalisation' which he appears to do by providing these 
seven types of insurgencies (1990:160). O'Neill's complete analytical 
framework cannot be summarised by his provision of seven types of 
insurgent movements, and, therefore, this is not a critique of his work. On 
the other hand, it provides a very good example of what the framework 
presented in this section will not be. 
Following Williams and Ricigliano, this framework will move away 
from an approach that studies armed groups according to a typology where 
all armed groups need to fit into one category or another. On the other hand, 
the framework will provide a number of characteristics or aspects that need 
to be looked at in each group so as to provide an understanding of this 
group. Rather than defining different types that armed groups have to fit in, 
I propose a framework of understanding where certain aspects are examined 
and a number of different questions are asked in order to understand better 
armed groups rather than categorise them. Based on Williams and 
Ricigliano's list and adding from other sources 11, these characteristics will 
be examined now in more details. While offering a guide to understanding 
II The characteristics of armed groups presented in this section as well as the analytical 
framework proposed are mainly drawn from the following sources: Mc Hugh and Bessler 
(2006), Petrasek (2000), Williams and Ricigliano (2005). The framework proposed is also 
based on a working document used by Geneva Call to understand armed groups they 
engage in the ban against landmines. 
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anned groups, Table 2.1 is only a summary of a more comprehensive 
discussion provided in the following section. 
Williams and Ricigliano start their account by the political profile of 
anned groups. The political profile of an anned group includes its ideology, 
the aims it tries to achieve by fighting, and its motivations for its struggle. 
This aspect seems to be a central defining character of an anned group, but 
it is also perceived as a crucial variable in understanding the behaviour and 
attitude of anned groups towards humanitarian principles, negotiations and 
dialogues, the international community, etc. 
Different aspects of the political profile of an anned group may have 
different implications. The behaviour of an anned group during the conflict 
and towards peace negotiations will differ greatly depending on whether its 
aims are political or economic (Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction 
Unit, 2002: 1). The attitude of an anned group towards humanitarian and 
human rights principles will change whether the anned group aims at 
becoming a legitimate, official, recognised government in the future or not. 
According to Petrasek, the main rationale behind this is that an anned group 
that aims at becoming the head of a state will be 'more sensitive [ ... ] since 
they will understand that a certain conduct is expected of states that expect 
to join the international community' (2000: 16). This argument is reiterated 
by Zahar who states that 'a group seeking separation will also evaluate the 
costs and benefits of transgressing human rights nonns differently from one 
that seeks inclusion in the political system' (2001 :53). This inclusion in the 
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political system means that an armed group may have to behave according 
to the rules attributed to states to be recognised as a potential state actor and 
legitimised. Zahar explains that legitimacy in the international order is 
attached to statehood (Ibid.). This factor influences the behaviour of armed 
groups. Armed groups who wish to become legitimate actors will tend to 
behave as de facto states or at least to provide an image of themselves as 
such. They can do so through the control of territory, its organisation and 
constitution, governing "liberated areas", respecting principles and laws 
attached to statehood. Although Zahar argues that it is not always enough to 
ensure legitimacy, 'it is not uncommon for them to look increasingly like 
quasi-states or to develop governments-in-waiting' (2001 :54). 
The ideology of an armed group may directly influence its behaviour 
towards respecting humanitarian and human rights principles (Ibid.). 
Religious ideologies, for instance, may influence the code of conduct in 
warfare of a group. Furthermore, understanding the ideology, aims and 
motivations of an armed group may help external actors tailor their 
discourse and arguments to fit the armed group's ideology, aims and 
motivations, increasing the potential for change in attitudes and behaviours. 
Two important points need to be noted. Firstly, an armed group may 
change their objectives and motivations throughout the conflict (Jones and 
Cater, 2001:240). Although it may have originated due to political 
motivations, an armed group may continue fighting because of economic 
motivations. Secondly, an armed group should not be thought of as 
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monolithic. As Petrasek explains, 'most armed groups are a composite of 
different political and ideological tendencies, hard-liners and reformers, the 
war camp and the peace camp, fundamentalists and pragmatists' (2000: 17). 
The organisation of the armed group is one aspect not mentioned by 
Williams and Ricigliano, but that is present in the literature and should be 
part of the political profile of the group. An armed group cannot simply be 
seen as a military organisation. The complexity of certain important armed 
groups, such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka for instance, demands a study 
of how armed groups are organised. This includes the hierarchy of the 
group, the leadership, the relationship between the political and the military 
and finally the way the armed group is led (authoritarian or democratic 
rule ). 
As Zahar notes, armed groups may be structured in very different 
ways. Their structure may be more or less organised. This structure may 
mainly comprise of a military structure or 'have developed beyond the 
military realm and established social and economic divisions, earning, in the 
process, the label of quasi-states or de facto states' (Zahar, 2001 :55). Zahar 
argues that 'the structure of these groups is important because it may 
impede or assist in the development of norms of conduct toward civilians' 
and expects that 'the more structured a group, the easier it would be to 
determine the chain of command and control and therefore to attribute 
responsibility and accountability for violations of the rights of civilian 
populations' (Ibid.). Indeed, the control of the fighters' behaviour in armed 
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groups may be problematic especially with 'individual soldiers and small 
units operating far from the central command' (Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction Unit, 2002:3). This has far reaching consequences when 
engaging with armed groups on humanitarian principles. 
Petrasek points out that the armed group may be under military or 
political (civilian) control. Armed groups may be authoritarian or 
democratic in the way they are ruled. Where 'the leadership is accountable 
to its members to a significant extent, [it] could be considered democratic' 
(Petrasek, 2000: 18). According to Petrasek, 'where the military leadership is 
accountable better opportunities exists for advancing human rights 
claims'(Ibid.). On the other hand, Petrasek is quick to emphasise that a 
democratic leadership may not always entail the protection of human rights. 
He even states that ' a "supreme commander" may stop certain practices 
[ ... ] more quickly and effectively than a more democratic leadership' 
(Petrasek, 2000: 18). 
One aspect not always raised in the literature on armed groups is the 
relationship between the military wing and political wing of an armed 
group. These two distinct structures may not always exist, but where they do 
it is important to understand how they relate to each other. When engaging 
an armed group on humanitarian principles or human rights, it is often the 
case that the political wing is the one negotiating the agreement as the 
"diplomatic representation" of the armed group. On the other hand, the 
agreement usually affects the way the military wing will have to behave in 
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combat. It is therefore important to understand whether by engaging with 
the political wing, the engagement with the military wing is automatic, or 
whether the effort needs to be done with both the military and the political 
wings of the armed group. 
Within the military structure of an armed group a number of aspects 
need to be highlighted. The military structure, which includes the military 
hierarchy and the chain of command, is important. It is also necessary to 
include the military strategy and the way the military conducts warfare. In 
order to understand the cause of humanitarian crisis, it is sometimes 
necessary to look at the military strategy of an armed group. Armed groups 
may adopt strategies that consistently target the civilian population (O'Neill, 
1990:24-5). The effect of the conflict on the civilian population will differ 
greatly depending on whether an armed group adopt guerrilla tactics or 
"conventional" war, whether targeting the civilian population is seen as a 
military objective or not. 
Perhaps this is the least emphasised aspect of understanding an armed 
group. I think it is important to include the way armed groups fight, their 
military strategies and capabilities, to understand the possible constraints 
they may perceive in endorsing humanitarian principles. Without the 
military argument behind the fight against landmines, for instance, one 
doubts whether its principle would have been endorsed so quickly. If we 
want armed groups not to be apprehensive towards humanitarian dialogue, it 
is important to understand how humanitarian principles can be presented to 
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them in such a way that it does not threaten their military strategies and 
capabilities. 
As part of the military side of armed groups, one needs to take into 
account the composition of their army. In terms of facts, it is necessary to 
know whether we are dealing with an army of a few hundreds or an army of 
a few thousands. Secondly, it is interesting to understand who joins the 
armed group to fight: whether it is a voluntary recruitment or a forced 
recruitment; whether the armed group includes men, women or children 
fighting; whether the fighters belong to a certain constituency or whether the 
recruitment includes no limitation in terms of religion, identity, etc 
(Conciliation Resources, 2004:5). These facts may help us understand the 
attitude of the armed group towards certain humanitarian principles such as 
child soldiers for instance. It also allows us to understand better the 
relationship between an armed group and its constituency. 
Indeed, the relationship between an armed group and its constituency is 
rather crucial in understanding the armed group but especially 
understanding the armed groups in relation to its attitude towards the 
civilian population, in other words, parts of humanitarian principles. Zahar 
summarises well this possible relationship in the title 'Proteges, Clients, 
Cannon Fodder: Civil-militia relations in internal conflict' (2001). Her 
account of the relationship between an armed group and the civilian 
population is thorough providing a number of interesting conclusions 
compensating greatly the lack of research on the matter. As she writes, 'in 
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spite of this growing concern over the fate of civilian populations, there has 
been little systematic research on the crucial topic of civil-militia relations' 
(Zahar, 2001 :44). She argues that analysing this relationship could provide 
us with the necessary knowledge to understand which incentives impact 
militia behaviour towards civilian (Ibid). She presents three important 
questions: 
'What factors shape relations between these two groups [Militia 
and civilian]? Can these factors point to ways of alleviating a 
humanitarian crisis and encouraging militias to abide by legal and 
customary obligations toward civilians in war? Do they provide 
the international community with tools that improve access to 
civilian populations?' (Ibid). 
Zahar dismisses the simple dichotomy where the militia either identifies 
itself with the civilian population or the militia controls the civilian 
population. She argues that identification does not automatically infer that 
militias will treat their civilian populations well. Control can occur even in 
cases where the civilian population identifies with the militia. Furthermore, 
she argues that control cannot be thought of simply in military terms (Zahar, 
2001 :46). 
The first factor presented by Zahar is the treatment of 'in-groups' and 
'out-groups'. These can be defined through: 'social constructs, such as 
ethnicity, religion, language, tribe, or clan [ ... ], economic, where civilians 
identify with the economic grievances of the combatants, or political, where 
they share a common ideological creed' (Zahar, 2001 :46-7). According to 
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Zahar, the attitude of militia towards humanitarian principles and the 
treatment of the civil population may differ along the lines of 'in-groups' 
and 'out-groups' where militia may playa protection role with 'in-groups' 
but deliberately attack 'out-groups' (2001 :47). 
Zahar presents a strong argument regarding access to civilian 
population. She argues that membership is an important factor as 'the wider 
the "constituency" of a militia, the more it will be responsive to arguments 
about the need to improve the fate of civilians. The narrower a militia's 
constituency, the less likely this group will be to exhibit concerns for the 
civilian population at large' (Zahar, 2001 :47-8). 
Zahar links the relationship between militia and civilian to the economic 
dimension. Departing from the fact that 'militias often depend on civilian 
populations for two essential resources: fighters and revenue', 
understanding the relation between armed groups and their constituency in 
terms of economics is indeed crucial. Furthermore, the economic 
relationship between armed groups and civilians will depend on other 
economic resources available to armed groups (Zahar, 2001:48). Where an 
armed group can survive through the support of external patrons and 
sponsors, its relationship to the civilian population in terms of resources will 
not be a necessary one, in fact, subtracting a potential incentive for the 
armed group to treat the civilian population well. As Zahar states, 'the 
various forms of economic relations affect the incentives for militias to 
uphold international norms of conduct vis-a-vis civilians' (Zahar, 2001:48). 
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She uses a dichotomy between a symbiotic relationship and a parasitic 
relationship. A symbiotic relationship is one where 'fund-raising denotes 
efforts to promote certain types of activities in exchange for a share in the 
outcome' (Zahar, 2001:48). A parasitic relationship is one where fund-
raising occurs through 'the steady yielding of income through extortion, 
theft of international aid, licensing fees, or "revolutionary taxation'" (Ibid). 
Zahar provides the following types of civil-militia economic relations: 
(l) Predatory economic relations: extortion through fear; (2) Parasitic 
economic relations: security for financial contribution; (3) Symbiotic 
economic relations: 'orderly conduct of economic exchanges in return for a 
percentage of the profit made by the population' with the provision of 
security by the armed group; (4) Independent economic relations: where the 
militia relies on external sources of revenues (Zahar, 2001 :51). 
The manual for practitioner on humanitarian engagement provided by 
the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Action also includes 
"constituency" as an important category to be taken into account. The 
manual includes the special role of community leaders within the 
constituency and their relation to the armed group (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 
2006:83). 
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Petrasek emphasises two more specific actors within a constituency: 
refugees and internally displaced populations on one hand, and diasporas on 
the other hand. He explains the reason for isolating these two groups: 
'Exile communities are often ardent defenders of armed groups, 
irrespective of abuses the group may commit. Indeed, their support 
may be more unconditional that the support of communities living 
in the areas of conflict' (Petrasek, 2000:23-4). 
This is a rather valid point especially where diasporas appear as significant 
sponsors of armed groups. 
The relationship between the constituency and the armed group is a 
significant factor in understanding armed groups in relations to 
humanitarian engagements. This relationship may reveal a lot about the 
armed group: its objectives, motivations, ideology, potential attitudes 
towards a commitment on humanitarian principles, etc. 
Zahar makes a strong link between civil-militia relations and the way 
an armed group obtains the resources necessary to carry out its struggle. The 
"economy" of an armed group matters greatly for this reason but also for its 
definition as a pure economic organisation or as a political organisation. The 
term "Warlord" has often described armed groups which have for main 
motivation the revenue they get from war and conflict. It would be naIve to 
think that armed groups with political motivations do not play the war 
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economy. The two are not exclusive and armed groups with a clear political 
agenda may be involved and benefit greatly from the war economy. 
The possible options to acquire the necessary resources enumerated 
in the literature include: extortion, such as looting and theft (Zahar, 2001:49; 
Petrasek, 2000:22); when an armed group is in control of a territory, it may 
put in place a system of taxation or fees to be paid by the population or by 
visitors such as humanitarian organisations for instance (Zahar, 2001:49); 
diasporas may be a source of financial help; finally, state sponsors may be a 
significant source of revenue but may also provide political protection, 
provision of safe bases, military material, logistical support and training 
(Petrasek, 2000:22). Knowing the sources of revenue and support of an 
armed group may provide avenues for incentives or pressure to commit to 
certain humanitarian principles. As an armed group is more dependent on 
the population for food, soldiers and shelter, it will have to treat this 
population well to ensure its survival. The more independent the armed 
group will be from the population, the less incentives it will have to apply 
certain rules to its attitude towards the population (Petrasek, 2000:23). 
Weinstein reaches the same conclusion after companng the 
behaviour of armed groups in different conflicts. His central finding is that 
'rebel groups that emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with 
the external support of an outside patron tend to commit high levels of 
indiscriminate violence; movements that arise in resource-poor contacts 
perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence selectively and 
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strategically' (2007:7). Weinstein argues that the resources available to an 
armed group matter significantly. Resources necessary for the survival of an 
armed groups, especially at its formation, shape the membership of the 
armed group, in tum, 'the structures of internal control and external 
governance' (Ibid.: 10) and 'the potential strategies that its leaders can 
employ' (Ibid.:9). 
According to one report, state support remains one of the most 
'significant or critical to the survival and success of the movement' (Byman 
et aI., 2001:2). This was followed by refugees, then diasporas and then 
external actors such as relief agencies (Ibid.). According to Byman et aI., 
'understanding insurgent struggle today requires recognising the changing 
agendas and limited means of state sponsors, the possible increase in the 
role of diasporas, and the rise of other non-state backers' (2001 :xix). 
Territorial control is often included in analytical frameworks for 
armed groups (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006:83; Conciliation Resources, 
2004:5). The UN OCHA manual provides three main axis for analysis. The 
first one regards the extent of control over the population and territory. The 
second one regards the way this control is exerted. Finally, it looks at the 
basis for this control (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006:83). Territorial control is 
often an expression of other factors or aspects of an armed group. On may 
argue that the way they exert control on population and territory reflects 
their attitudes towards their constituency as well as the potential economic 
revenues they get from that control (Conciliation Resources, 2004:5). 
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Control of territory might also be part of the objectives or motivation behind 
the struggle of an armed group (Ibid.). In that case, one can argue that the 
aim of territorial control and therefore control over the population may 
become an incentive for a better treatment of the civilian population. Indeed, 
'the prospects of territorial control disciplines rebel behaviour across 
geographic regions because it embeds insurgents in an interaction with 
civilians that, if they are successful, will be repeated over time' (Weinstein, 
2007: 17). 
This analytical framework is provided to help understanding armed 
groups in relation to humanitarian engagements. For practitioners, it may be 
important to understand the history as well as attitude of an armed group 
towards not only humanitarian engagements but dialogue in general. As Mc 
Hugh and Bessler explain, 'the negotiating history of the group can provide 
valuable information on the group's strategy, objectives and commitments 
to the negotiations' (2006:20). Williams and Ricigliano add that it is 
important to understand how any future engagement 'will fit into the 
broader history of attempts at political dialogue' (2005: 17). 
In fact, Williams and Ricigliano present a number of interesting 
questions to ask when looking at how armed groups perceive negotiations in 
general: 
'Does the group have a positive vision for a peaceful future [ ... ]? 
Do they have a realistic understanding of the value of negotiating 
versus the value of not negotiating? [ ..... ] Do they have a clear 
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vision of what it means not to negotiate a solution [ ... ]? [ ... ] Do 
they feel it is legitimate to talk to the other sides? Believe that it is 
in their interests to talk? Do they envision possible negotiated 
solutions? [ ... ] Do they have the resources (finances, expertise, 
communication channels) and ability to negotiate - including the 
ability to manage internal divisions, deliver on commitments, 
problem solve, understand the other sides, etc?' (Williams and 
Ricigliano, 2005: 17). 
I would like to stress the last question as particularly important. 
Understanding the attitude of armed groups to negotiations must involve 
understanding their capacity for negotiations. Armed groups do not 
naturally have the diplomatic training or the necessary tools in their hands 
for negotiations and may, as a result, have a very apprehensive and negative 
attitude towards negotiations. This may not mean that they do not welcome 
negotiations. It is important to understand the armed group's perception of 
negotiations. 
In order to understand the position of an armed group towards 
human rights and humanitarian principles, the starting point can be its 
ideology and "mission statement". This may not reflect reality as it may not 
be implemented or followed. Armed groups who have a strong commitment 
to some of these principles will have made public statements or taken 
actions to protect them. 
I would like to present a number of hypothesis provided by Zahar 
that can become a starting point for a further reflection during this research, 
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and especially in analysing the data gathered during field work. The first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
'The more general the objectives (in the sense that they seek to 
improve society at large), the more likely it will be that the 
international community will find a way to engage combatants on 
the issue of civilian protection. The narrower a militia's objectives, 
the less receptive it is likely to be to plea to respect and protect the 
civilian population' (Zahar, 2001 :56). 
Zahar's second hypothesis is that the structure of the group enables this 
engagement and is, therefore, a facilitating factor without implying a 
necessary link between structure and protection of the civilian population 
(Ibid). According to these two propositions, the most challenging situation 
for humanitarian engagement would be an armed group with narrow 
objectives and a loose structure. The least challenging situation would be an 
armed group with broader objectives and a clear structure (Zahar, 2001 :56-
57). Adding to these two variables, Zahar also includes the four different 
types of economic relations, where 'the higher a militia's symbiotic 
dependence on the civilian population, the less likely it is that the militia 
will harm the civilians': Independent militia sources of revenue, predatory 
civil-militia relations, parasitic civil-militia relations and symbiotic relations 
(Zahar, 2001 :58). Finally, Zahar also takes into account the degree of 
identification between civilians and militia: 'the higher the perceived 
identification between a militia and the civilian population that it controls 
(in-group), the lower the likelihood that the militia will hurt this population' 
(Zahar, 2001:58). 
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In conclusion, I would like to offer three words of caution about the 
framework presented in this section. Firstly, all information may not be 
accessible or reliable and therefore the analysis of armed groups may not be 
complete. Researching armed groups remains difficult not only because of 
their diversity and complexity but also because of the difficulty of access to 
the groups themselves and information. Secondly, due to the dynamic nature 
of organisations and groups, it may be hard to capture the evolution of the 
group. There is, therefore, a danger to substitute the dynamic nature of 
armed groups for a static analysis and understanding. This provides a further 
obstacles to understanding and researching armed groups. Finally, the study 
of armed groups cannot be done outside of a thorough analysis of conflict. 
Understanding armed groups is as much about understanding the group in 
itself as it is about understanding the context in which it evolves. This 
analytical framework needs therefore to be applied in conjunction with a 
conflict analysis. 
Conclusion 
By locating the practice of humanitarian engagement with armed groups 
within a given international context and international system, I first 
examined the legal approach to armed groups. Indeed, the international 
system is regimented by a corpus of international treaties, laws and 
principles. Examining the existing legal framework for engaging with armed 
groups on humanitarian and human rights issues, the argument was put 
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forward that the existing legal framework remains controversial regarding 
the legal status of armed non-state actors as well as their accountability. 
This justifies the need for a more political approach to engagement with 
armed groups on humanitarian issues in order to fill the gap left by such 
legal controversies. 
Unfortunately, the political approach to armed groups raIses a 
number of controversies as well. The issue of labelling remains significant. 
The discussion on the label "terrorist" reveals the focus that the term brings 
on a certain type of political violence rendering it a highly emotional and 
politically-biased term. As this term appears to be used as an act of 
condemnation of certain armed groups, it is difficult to endorse it in a 
research aimed at understanding a process of dialogue with armed groups. 
The seemingly more "neutral" terms of armed non-state actors or armed 
groups are therefore endorsed in this research while keeping in mind the 
biases also attached to them. Indeed, terms such as armed non-state actors 
and armed groups are often used within the discourse of engagement and 
may be perceived as legitimising a policy of engagement. Labelling armed 
groups is difficult. These labels are often a way of positioning oneself on the 
issue of armed groups and their engagement on humanitarian issues. Labels 
can be a legitimising step. As a consequence, one can see the controversial 
step that engaging with armed groups on issues such as humanitarian 
principles or human rights is. 
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Chapter III : Engaging with Armed Non-State Actors on 
humanitarian issues. 
Introduction: 
'For humanitarian workers, the ability to negotiate with all actors in 
situations of crisis or conflict is essential to effective and timely 
provision of humanitarian assistance and protection. Indeed, where the 
humanitarian imperative dictates, negotiation - conducted in an 
independent, impartial and neutral manner - can sometimes be a 
humanitarian necessity' - Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for 
humanitarian affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (in Mc Hugh 
and Bessler, 2006:iii) 
The 1970s saw a number of changes in the practice of humanitarian 
action. As Policzer explains, at the beginning of the 1970s, the humanitarian 
and human rights communities experienced series of debates over 'how to 
grapple with acts of violence committed by non-state armed groups' 
(2005: 1). As a consequence of these debates, the question of the 
accountability of armed groups regarding their humanitarian and human 
rights credentials arose (Policzer, 2005 :2). Some substantial changes 
resulted from this, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol II of 
the Geneva conventions in 1977, which widened the scope of accountability 
to all parties to a conflict as well as to non-international armed conflicts. 
Policzer also notes the changing discourse in the 1980s and 1990s of both 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to cover acts committed by 
non-state armed groups in the definition of human rights violations (Ibid.). 
The salient issue of rendering armed groups more accountable results 
from two important realisations. The first relates to the type of armed 
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conflicts and the new environment that the humanitarian community IS 
facing (Bruderlein, 2001:226). Without entering the debate on whether the 
predominant type of conflicts today can be labelled "New Wars" (Kaldor, 
1999), intrastate conflicts have been more prevalent than interstate conflicts. 
Between 1989 and 2004, there were 111 intrastate conflicts, but only 7 
interstate conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005:624). Whether the 
reality on the ground has changed since the end of the Cold War to the point 
of characterising contemporary conflicts as "new", the perception from 
humanitarian actors emphasises the novelty of the challenge in the post-
Cold War era (Macrae, 1998:4,7). Intrastate conflicts involve both an armed 
state and one or more armed non-state actors. For the humanitarian 
community, these armed non-state actors present a challenge as 
humanitarian norms and obligations in international humanitarian law have 
tended to centre around states, both in the way humanitarian law has been 
agreed on (i.e. through treaties) and in its application, as accountability 
mechanisms also tend to target states (Jones and Cater, 2001 :246). Changes 
and developments in the application of international humanitarian law 
evolved, as argued earlier, to better take into account armed non-state 
actors. Nevertheless, humanitarian actors often find themselves in a legal 
and policy vacuum. As Bruderlein argues, there is a need to move away 
from traditional state-centred strategies to engagement with non-state actors, 
adapting international humanitarian law mechanisms to the changing 
environment and the growing role of non-state actors (2001:226). 
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The last point exemplifies the second realisation that brought the 
humanitarian community to the problem of ANSAs: the international system 
remains a state-centric system, run by states, made for states and where 
states are the main actors. For instance, the Geneva Conventions are far 
more developed for interstate than for intrastate wars. International 
organisations are very often constructed as interstate organisations, the 
United Nations being a prime example. Furthennore, diplomatic channels 
among states have been fonnalised and institutionalised, whereas such 
channels do not exist between humanitarian NGOs and anned groups. 
Representatives of states can meet during sessions of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations as well as make contact with NGOs who have 
acquired observant status. Treaty meetings, such as the Meeting of the State 
Parties to the Ottawa Convention on the anti-personnel mine ban, provide 
opportunities for important lobbying and diplomatic encounters among 
states and between states and NGOs. Such opportunities do not arise with 
armed groups as they are not taken into account within the international 
state-centric system. In consequence, when concerned with anned non-state 
actors, both the humanitarian and the human rights communities have to be 
pro-active in order to raise awareness and accountability among anned 
groups. As Jones and Cater argue, it is not a matter of developing new 
norms but a necessity to increase 'the prospects for the implementation and 
enforcement of those nonns' (2001:238). This need for pro-active actions is 
inscribed within the discourse of engagement: rather than simply monitor 
situations or apply existing frameworks and mechanisms, humanitarian 
actors must engage with ANSAs. 
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The first section of this chapter will look more closely at the 
definition of engagement and what is meant by "engaging with ANSAs". By 
looking at how both practitioners and academics define this process, a 
general definition will be presented 
The practice of engaging with ANSAs on humanitarian issues has 
resulted from a particular debate among the humanitarian community on 
rendering armed groups more accountable for their humanitarian violations. 
Beyond this specific debate, the humanitarian community has been 
confronted with a number of issues. How the practice of engagement 
reflects on these issues and within the discourse of humanitarianism will be 
explored in a second section. This reflection will centre around the relation 
between humanitarian action and the protection of human rights, the 
politicisation of humanitarianism, the impact of humanitarian action on 
conflict and the main principles of humanitarianism as established in the 
code of conduct adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(lCRC) and a number ofNGOs. 
Engaging with ANSAs on humanitarian issues has mostly been an 
ad hoc practice. As a result, gaining an understanding of this process 
remains a challenge. Most written accounts of humanitarian engagements 
are found in reports by practitioners rather than academic literature. The 
final section will aim at reviewing the practice of engagement via these 
reports and studies in order to gain a greater understanding of the process by 
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asking the following: who engages with ANSAs? which specific issues have 
been tackled in engagement? what types of humanitarian engagement are 
there? And finally, why do ANSAs accept engagement? In order to answer 
the research question and evaluate the potential impact of humanitarian 
engagements with armed groups on the transformation of conflict, these 
issues must be tackled. Furthermore, tackling these different issues and 
aspects of engagement matters greatly, not only for the success and the 
improvement of the humanitarian situation, but certainly in the way this 
dialogue may impact on the conflict situation. This enquiry will conclude by 
presenting the highlighted challenges, both ethical and practical, met in this 
process. 
Finally, in order to refine our comprehension of the process of 
humanitarian engagement with armed groups, an analytical framework will 
be presented. The main objective of this framework is to provide a tool 
which applies to every instance of humanitarian engagement with armed 
groups to enable a better understanding and assessment of each particular 
engagement, as well as a tool for comparison among different instances of 
engagement. This framework will therefore be used as a tool for analysis in 
the thesis. By providing a framework of understanding, drawing on the 
different characteristics of the engagement, this section will aim to enhance 
the understanding and the analysis of the process of humanitarian 
engagement with ANSAs. 
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Engaging with Armed Non-State Actors on humanitarian issues: 
defining an informal practice 
Defining the engagement with ANSAs on humanitarian issues 
requires defining an "informal" practice. Different definitions will be 
compared in order to bring together the different aspects of engagement in 
general, and humanitarian engagement in particular, and propose a general 
definition which will then be used throughout this work. 
Conciliation Resources, an NGO working on peace processes and 
dialogues, has defined engagement in simple terms: 
'Engagement is [ ... J a broad term that can have many different 
meanings, explored below. At this point, it is sufficient to adopt an 
inclusive definition of engagement, meaning generally to 'interact 
with' or 'to participate in'. [ ... J [TJhe term 'peace process' refers 
to a myriad of vehicles that are generally intended to advance the 
creation of a peacefully functioning society out of a situation of 
violent conflict. Most commonly, this includes negotiations and 
other forms of dialogue at various social and political 
levels' (Ricigliano, 2005 :6). 
There are two important aspects in this definition. First, it differentiates 
between "engagement" and "peace process". The term "engagement" seems 
to encompass a wider scope than the term "peace process". As mentioned by 
the author, this definition aims at giving 'an inclusive definition' rather than 
referring to a specific process. In addition, the definition invites the idea that 
engagement may take different forms and target different issues. The second 
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important aspect to note is the emphasis that the definition makes on 
interaction and participation when referring to both engagement and peace 
processes. Not only does this characterise engagement as a process rather 
than an end-product or an outcome, but it also strongly conveys the image 
of a dialogue with different actors. 
Petrasek proposes a second definition of engagement: 
'By "humanitarian engagement" is meant [sic] efforts to persuade 
armed groups to respect humanitarian and human rights principles 
[ ... ]. By "political engagement" is meant [sic] efforts to persuade 
armed groups to negotiate a peaceful resolution of armed conflict, 
including facilitating their participation in processes to this end' 
(2005 :44-5). 
As in the first definition, it is interesting to see that the author has referred to 
two different processes: one humanitarian and one political. Petrasek is 
quick to mention that the distinction between the two is not clear and, 
therefore, it may be difficult to identify two specific engagements 
(2005 :45). Comparing the first two definitions, one can notice the different 
terms used to refer to "engagement". Petrasek tends to focus on the 
advocacy part of engagement. He pictures the engagement process as one of 
persuasion rather than dialogue, which emphasises advocacy and lobbying 
rather than dialogue with armed groups. This approach is reflected by 
Harroff-Tavel who defines humanitarian diplomacy as 'a strategy of 
influence employed to prevent and resolve humanitarian problems through 
dialogue, negotiation and the preparation of rules' (2006:6). 
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The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action 
(OCHA), commissioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to produce a 
manual on humanitarian engagements with armed groups, defined 
humanitarian engagement as: 
'Negotiations undertaken by civilians engaged in managmg, 
coordinating and providing humanitarian assistance and protection 
for the purposes of: (i) ensuring the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and protection to vulnerable populations; (ii) preserving 
humanitarian space; and (iii) promoting better respect for 
intemationallaw' (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006:5). 
The authors state that engagement can take different forms: advocacy, 
negotiation, mediation and liaison interactions (Ibid.). The manual makes a 
clear distinction between political and humanitarian engagement, and, 
unlike Petrasek, argues that the two processes should be strictly separate 
(Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006:21). The definition alludes to the types of 
actors involved in engaging with ANSAs as it specifies that negotiations are 
undertaken by civilians, a characteristic that is not mentioned in other 
definitions. 
Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, in another manual on humanitarian 
negotiations, highlight a number of important characteristics of 
humanitarian engagement. They argue that, in principle, humanitarian 
norms are 'recognised as absolute and so, in an important sense, as non-
negotiable' (2004: 11). In other words, there is no bargaining when it comes 
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to humanitarian norms. However, as Mancini-Griffoli and Picot highlight, 
'in reality, [ ... J power enables parties to a conflict to violate people's rights, 
avoid their obligations or pick and choose when and where they decide to 
meet them' (Ibid.). Therefore, there are three dilemmas of humanitarian 
negotiation: 'it involves negotiating the non-negotiable; it typically takes 
place from a position of relative weakness; and, at most, it can usually only 
hope for second best outcomes' (lbid;II-12). This highlights the 
particularity of humanitarian engagement and negotiations. Following this, 
Mancini-Griffoli and Picot define four important characteristics of 
humanitarian negotiations: they are conducted by humanitarian actors, for 
humanitarian objectives, in countries affected by armed conflict, and with 
the parties to the conflict (Ibid: 19). 
The final definition I will mention is not exactly a definition, but 
rather the mission statement of Geneva Call, an NGO involved in engaging 
with armed groups on humanitarian principles. This mission statement states 
that 'Geneva Call is an international humanitarian organisation dedicated to 
engaging armed non-state actors (NSAs) to respect and adhere to ban on 
anti-personnel (AP) mines' (Geneva Call). As in Petrasek's definition, 
advocacy is at the centre of the engagement. Geneva Call, however, 
proposes a new aspect of engagement, as its mandate involves the signature 
of a treaty-like document called the Deed of Commitment. This is an 
interesting development in defining engagement not only as a process of 
negotiation or advocacy but also as a process leading to a formal agreement. 
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Defining the term "humanitarian engagement" is to define what is 
meant by engagement and what is meant by humanitarian. The definitions 
presented highlighted what was meant by "engagement". Some presented a 
more specific understanding of what humanitarian engagements or 
humanitarian negotiations entailed. Humanitarian engagement can thus be 
defined as a process involving dialogue and negotiations in order to ensure 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, preserve humanitarian space and 
implement humanitarian norms and principles. This definition will guide 
this thesis. In order to refine our understanding of humanitarian 
engagement, it is important to understand better the origins and evolution of 
humanitarianism. 
Humanitarian action and Humanitarianism: origins, principles, 
conduct and evolution 
Humanitarian action and the concept of humanitarianism are often 
surrounded by discussions on their origins, principles and conduct. The 
centre of this multifaceted debate has converged around such issues as the 
relation between humanitarian action and the protection of human rights, the 
politicisation of humanitarianism, the impact of humanitarian action on 
conflict, and the establishment of a code of conduct reaffirming the 
principles of humanitarianism. Far from being exhaustive, this list highlights 
the complexity of the discourse of humanitarianism. From looking at the 
issues at stake in humanitarian engagement, this discussion will then move 
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on to look at how engaging with armed non-state actors on humanitarian 
issues sheds light on the on-going debates about humanitarian action. 
Humanitarian and humanitarianism: a concept 
What is meant by humanitarian engagement relates as much to the 
term "engagement" as to the term "humanitarian". Some of the definitions 
of engagement presented above made a distinction between political 
engagement and humanitarian engagement stressing that this distinction, far 
from clear-cut, could appear artificial. Political engagement seems to be 
understood as being equivalent to a peace process, in other words an 
engagement based on bringing an end to a violent conflict. Humanitarian 
engagement, however, appears more complex. The engagement could be 
named humanitarian because its aims are humanitarian, the actors are 
humanitarian actors or the issues it puts forward are humanitarian. 
Engagements based on the advocacy of human rights issues or human rights 
defence could also be considered as part of a humanitarian engagement. As 
Slim argues: 
'[ ... ] Humanitarian NGOs want to put moral boundaries around 
what can rightfully be considered humanitarian action. In doing so, 
they seem to be suggesting that such boundaries to humanitarian 
action are not about activities (what is being done: food, water, 
shelter etc) but agents and motives (who is doing these activities 
and for what reason' (2003a: 1). 
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The vagueness and elasticity of the term "humanitarian" present a blurred 
picture of what humanitarian engagement entails. As Ozerdem and Rufini 
states 'the adjective "humanitarian" has never been so widely or so 
incorrectly used' (2004:51). 
When looking at humanitarianism, two important distinctions can be 
made. First, a distinction can be made between action and advocacy. 
Humanitarian action, which is often equated with humanitarian assistance or 
relief, centres around the provision and delivery of "humanitarian" goods 
such as food, medical assistance or demining. It relates to the actual process 
of bringing humanitarian aid, or relief, to a conflict zone where, very often, 
secure access and effective relief needs to be negotiated with the parties in 
the conflict and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) providing the 
relief. Humanitarian advocacy, on the other hand, involves raising 
awareness and lobbying to change a situation where humanitarian principles 
are not guarded, such as campaigns against torture or landmines. In terms of 
engaging with Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs), advocacy mainly 
involves trying to render these armed groups more accountable for their lack 
of humanitarian credentials. Mancini-Griffoli and Picot make three 
distinctions within the humanitarian objectives that are the most often 
negotiated by humanitarians: access, assistance programmes and protection 
programmes. Access and assistance programmes come under humanitarian 
action whereas protection programmes relate to humanitarian advocacy 
(2004:20). It does not follow from this practical distinction that NGOs 
involved in humanitarian action are not also engaged in humanitarian 
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advocacy, but this distinction helps to understand the concept of 
humanitarianism better and, therefore, the practice of humanitarian 
engagement. 
A second distinction can be made. This distinction reflects one of the 
debates in which humanitarian actors have been engaged: the relationship 
between humanitarian norms and human rights. Humanitarian action has its 
modern root in the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and International Humanitarian Law. The Red Cross was created to 
alleviate suffering in armed conflicts, regulating the treatment of combatants 
and non-combatants in war. As a result, Humanitarian Law is mostly 
concerned with the regulation of warfare. Humanitarian assistance and 
humanitarian relief have expanded from this idea: hunger and sickness are 
seen as harmful consequences of war on non-combatants and, therefore, 
demands assistance from humanitarian actors. MacFarlane and Minear offer 
a definition along these lines: 
'Humanitarian action has been understood broadly to include those 
activities designed to meet immediate needs for protection and 
survival and to engender economic recovery among conflict-
affected groups. Humanitarian action is grounded in the right, 
protected by international humanitarian law, of persons in need to 
have access to succour and of impartial aid organisations to 
provide such assistance' (1997: 101). 
Humanitarian action departs from international humanitarian law, but seems 
to have evolved beyond the regulation of warfare to intervention, in what 
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has been coined, "complex political emergencies". Humanitarian action 
intends to manage the numerous consequences of warfare on civilian 
populations from managing refugees and internally displaced people to 
providing food and medical assistance. 
Beyond this historical basis, humanitarian action relies on a more 
profound belief in the respect of human beings and humanity. Indeed, 
humanitarian action advertises a strong discourse of doing perceived good 
for humanity. This is where the conceptual link between humanitarian 
action and the protection of human rights arises: if humanitarian action is, 
first and foremost, concerned with respect for human beings and the 
protection of humanity, then it must be concerned with any violations of 
human rights. Indeed, Slim argues that 'the actual meaning of humanity 
transcends mere physical existence to embrace 'respect for the human 
being' and essentially 'extends the purview of humanitarianism to 
rights[ ... J' (1997:345). As a result, humanitarian law has sometimes been 
acknowledged as human rights norms in times of war. More importantly, 
humanitarian action has slowly embraced the protection of human rights in 
its discourse. According to MacFarlane and Minear, 'the concept of 
humanitarian action is viewed as including both the protection of human 
rights and the provision of assistance' (1997:3). Humanitarianism evolved 
in the Post-World War II era to recognise the importance of relieving deeper 
causes of human suffering by emphasising the role of developmental aid and 
the protection of human rights (Ozerdem and Rufini, 2004:52). 
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Humanitarian action and human rights: moral dilemmas and the 
humanitarian imperative 
Some humanitarian actors approach human rights violations as a moral 
dilemma. The issue of providing humanitarian assistance in an environment 
where human rights violations are the norm rather than the exception has 
posed a dilemma for a number of humanitarian actors. The thought that 
humanitarian assistance may tum a blind eye and cause an eventual 
prolongation of these violations by providing aid to an environment of 
impunity has raised the possibility of disengagement. This situation has 
raised the issue of whether humanitarian actors should take a stance on 
human rights violations: 
'Currently, there is a sharpened awareness of the problems of 
operating relief programmes under authorities (governments, rebel 
armies and militias) that are abusing human rights. These are old 
problems, but now there is the possibility to talk openly about 
them, and perhaps even to change operating practices. The central 
dilemma is whether it is possible to supply humanitarian 
assistance, under the auspices of a governing authority that abuses 
human rights, without also giving undue assistance to that 
authority, and hence doing a disservice to the people one is aiming 
to help' (African Rights quoted in Roberts, 1996:57). 
The engagement with ANSAs on humanitarian issues faces a similar 
dilemma. Armed groups, beyond the problem of recognition or legitimacy, 
have often been responsible for numerous human rights violations and 
breaches of international humanitarian law. The larger debate among the 
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humanitarian community on whether humanitarian action can happen under 
the auspices of an authority charged for human rights violations is highly 
relevant to the process of engagement with armed groups. 
An answer to this issue has been to approach humanitarian 
engagement with ANSAs as an outcome rather than a process. This means, 
as the Code of Conduct from the Red Cross Movement claims, that 'the 
humanitarian imperative comes first'. As the Code states: 
'The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a 
fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by 
all citizens of all countries. As members of the international 
community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian 
assistance wherever it is needed' (International Federation of the 
Red Cross). 
Each engagement has a specific humanitarian objective; for instance, secure 
access to a needy population or the prohibition of the use of landmines, are 
needs which must be attained. When engaging with ANSAs on 
humanitarian issues, it is important to keep this imperative at the forefront, 
as this process of engagement aspires to uphold the humanitarian 
imperative. In fact, in order to carry out the obligations of the international 
community provided by this code, engaging with armed groups may appear 
as a necessary action to provide needed assistance. 
Slim notes that there are two approaches to the principles of the 
humanitarian imperative. What he calls the 'Gallic humanitarianism' argues 
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that 'humanitarianism is non-negotiable' (Slim, 1997:346). On the other 
hand, 'classical humanitarianism [ ... J has always recognised that it must 
negotiate its place in violence, assuming the right of human beings to wage 
war, but seeking to limit the effects of that war with the consent of the 
warring parties' (Ibid.). Slim carries on criticising the humanitarian 
imperative arguing, that 'it displays some humanitarians' exaggerated sense 
of their own importance within a people's vision of their own conflict, 
suggesting that the new wave of humanitarian ideologues have failed to 
grasp that conflicting societies are usually deadly serious about their right to 
wage war' (Ibid.). 
Impartiality and neutrality: humanitarian code of conduct in danger 
Humanitarian engagement does not only relate to the first principle, 
the humanitarian imperative, of the Code of Conduct of the Red Cross 
movement. The twin principles of impartiality and neutrality provide an 
interesting insight in humanitarian engagement with ANSAs. The principle 
of impartiality demands that humanitarian priorities be decided on needs 
alone, 'regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients' 
(International Federation of the Red Cross). As is the case with the first 
principle regarding humanitarian imperative, impartiality often requires 
negotiated access to a needy population in places where the de facto 
authority is an armed group (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006:5). On the other 
hand, humanitarian negotiations 'can generate or reinforce a perception by 
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other anned groups, host government, and/or States that the humanitarian 
organisation is biased or lacking impartiality' (lbid:71). 
The principle of neutrality asks that 'aid will not be used to further a 
particular political or religious standpoint'(lnternational Federation of the 
Red Cross). The principle of neutrality in humanitarian action should not be 
taken for granted in a world where humanitarian actors are the target of 
numerous attacks. The fact that a high percentage of NGOs are western 
NGOs working in conflict where western governments are involved may 
hinder greatly the ability of these NGOs to be neutral. Even though financial 
motives may exist behind kidnapping or looting humanitarian convoys in 
such situations, there is a feeling that the neutrality of these workers cannot 
withstand the broader political context. As Ozerdem and Rufini states, 'the 
concept of neutrality aimed to ensure respect and immunity for third parties, 
and allow them to operate unmolested by the antagonists in a conflict' 
(2004:51-2). Unfortunately, neutrality does not seem to have reached its 
aims as negotiated access with anned groups is often necessary to grant 
some security to humanitarian workers. Indeed, as Leader recognises ' 
"complete" neutrality is impossible' (2000:2). 
While "complete" or perfect neutrality may not be possible, some 
would argue it is not desirable or applicable. Duffield and Prendergast argue 
that 'it is impossible to be neutral within the logic of internal war, a war 
whose destructive consequences are aimed precisely at disrupting the lives 
of the people whom humanitarian aid seeks to sustain' (1994: 14). Beyond 
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the impossibility of neutrality, Duffield and Prendergast also believe that 
neutral humanitarianism means avoiding the political reality and 'eschews 
the need for supporting participatory and accountable structures and 
institutions' arguably making matters worse (1994:15). The NGO African 
Rights also rejects the principles of neutrality as it is considered to be an 
'absurdity of current relief-agency' (African Rights quoted in Slim, 
1997:342). 
Slim offers an interesting response to this debate. Slim claims to 
uphold the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action but understands 
that the principle of neutrality has been abandoned by some NGOs for 
valuable reasons, mainly refusing the 'unacceptable silence [forced] upon 
them in the face of grievous violations of human rights' (Plattner quoted in 
Slim, 1997:348), because they lack the means to secure neutrality in their 
relief work (African Rights quoted in Slim, 1997:348). Slim offers an 
alternative to the principle of neutrality, namely a principle based on 
solidarity. He notes that 'the idea of solidarity obviously involves taking 
sides' and, as the good side is not always easily identifiable, some 
humanitarian actors have 'claimed solidarity not with those who are "right", 
but with those who are somehow 'innocent" (Slim, 1997:349-50). 
Political or not political: humanitarianism in question 
The problem of neutrality in humanitarian action is partly linked to 
the relationship between the political and the humanitarian. Humanitarian 
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action exists within a highly political environment and its neutrality may 
always be problematic because of this situation. It seems that rather than 
becoming more clear cut, the concept of humanitarianism is expanding. The 
discussion on the relation between humanitarian action and human rights 
has already showed this tendency. De Waal takes a rather strong stance on 
this development as he writes: 
'At the end of the Cold War, leading international humanitarians 
began to sense a historic opportunity lay within their grasp. The 
geo-political straitjacket was at last being removed and it seemed 
that the humanitarians could set their own agenda for the first time. 
Over the previous decade, the more thoughtful of the aid workers 
found themselves becoming amateur political scientists as they 
realised the shortcoming of material relief. Equitable development 
had always been on the humanitarian agenda, concerns now 
broadened to human rights, conflict resolution and the principle of 
state sovereignty itself (1997:133). 
Could the engagement with ANSAs on humanitarian issues be a part of this 
development, where humanitarian actors become 'amateur political 
scientists'? Even though engagement is based on humanitarian principles, 
the dialogue between humanitarian NGOs and ANSAs is political in its 
essence. 
The politicisation of humanitarian action has been somewhat 
perceived as a negative development. This can be understood in the light of 
the principles of neutrality and impartiality. On the other hand, as Leader 
and Macrae states, '[ ... ] humanitarian and political boundaries are blurred, 
101 
especially in conflicts where there is little political engagement and aid 
forms the primary vehicle for external engagement' (2000:3). Humanitarian 
action may be filling a political vacuum created by the disengagement of 
certain powerful state actors in internal conflicts. Especially in the field of 
humanitarian action and human rights protection, state actors are far from 
being the primary participants, as NGOs and civil societies appear to be 
more prominent actors. States support humanitarianism through financial 
aid and, as De Waal argues, 'supporting humanitarianism is a smokescreen 
for political inaction'(1997: 133). De Waal expands on the relationship 
between humanitarian action and politics. He explains that humanitarian 
action developed from three main 'ancestors': humanitarian action 'as an 
instrument of Realpolitik', 'private charities for the relief of suffering' and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1997:67). 
Humanitarianism as an instrument of realpolitik or foreign policy clearly 
provides a direct link between humanitarian action and politics. However, 
De Waal claims that 'the end of the Cold War created a vacuum in Western 
strategic interest in Africa' and that 'into this vacuum rushed 
humanitarianism' (1997: 133). 
It is difficult to understand where exactly the role of humanitarian 
action must start and end. On the one hand, humanitarian actors are playing 
the political game. On the other hand, political actors are instrumentalising 
humanitarian action for their own ends. Finally, there is a political vacuum 
which humanitarianism has had to fill as being the principal external 
intervention in complex emergencies. In engagmg with ANSAs on 
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humanitarian issues, whether it concerns humanitarian advocacy or 
negotiated access, the blurring of boundaries between the political and the 
humanitarian becomes a real challenge and an important concern. It may be 
necessary to provide a solution to this debate as the practice of engagement 
develops further. 
Minear takes a rather diplomatic stance on this issue and claims that 
this debate only highlights the need for coordination and coherence. He 
argues that 'humanitarian and political action need to be conceived and 
implemented on parallel tracks' placing 'humanitarianism in a limited 
partnership with politics' (Minear, 2002:84). In light of the previous 
discussion, it is difficult to conceive that such a simple solution to the 
complex relationship between humanitarian action and politics can be 
offered. The tracks of humanitarianism and politics seem to cross each 
others' paths rather than run alongside one another in a parallel fashion. In 
fact, if anything, re-conceiving the partnership between humanitarianism 
and politics has only put more pressure on humanitarian action and 
deepened the issue. As Leader and Macrae argue: 
'The two developments: the deliberate violation of IHL by the 
belligerents, and the growing demand for a 'coherent' political and 
humanitarian approach, have combined to put new pressures on 
humanitarian action and to redefine the nature of the relationship 
between humanitarianism and politics' (2000: 1). 
In a prevIOUS article, Macrae discusses the issue of the "purity" of 
humanitarianism, reflecting this problematic relationship between 
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humanitarian action and politics. Macrae argues that humanitarian action 
needs to be informed but not driven by the political (1998: 16). Nevertheless, 
political engagement should be kept separate from humanitarian 
engagement as 'while seductive, attempts to use relief aid as a tool for 
political engagement are fraught with practical and ethical difficulties'. 
Macrae embraces the principles of neutrality and impartiality as, while not 
unproblematic, they remain necessary to inform humanitarian action and 
avoid the challenges presented by the ambiguous relationship between 
political and humanitarian endeavours (1998: 1). 
Leader and Macrae shift the focus of the discussion as they state that 
the debate is not about whether humanitarian action is political or not, but 
how (2000: 1). This argument is made by Slim who claims that 
'humanitarianism is always politicised somehow'. 
'It is a political project in a political world. Its mISSIOn IS a 
political one - to restrain and ameliorate the use of organised 
violence in human relations and toe engage with power in order to 
do so. [ ... J For humanitarianism to be a political project is not a 
contradiction or necessarily a problem' (2003b: 1). 
Slim a~gues that the real questions are to know 'who is politicising 
humanitarianism today, how and to what end? Does the predominant 
politicisation of the day matter to victims? (Ibid.). 
Paradoxically, Leader explains that 'the confusion over the 
humanitarian/political divide comes from the fact that humanitarianism is a 
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form of politics in which it is useful to assert that one is non-political' 
(2000:56). This does not put an end to this debate, but pinpoints a 
potentially useful perspective on the matter. Engaging with ANSAs on 
humanitarian issues may be humanitarian in character but may also carry 
heavy political significance because of the type of actors involved and the 
process of negotiation and diplomacy used. In addition, humanitarian 
engagement may not appear as politically loaded, as it is embedded in an 
almost self-Iegitimising humanitarian discourse somehow dismissing the 
broader impact of engagement. The following quote exemplifies better what 
is meant here. Eliasson, when explaining the rationale behind Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, a project involving negotiation between the conflicting 
parties on unhindered humanitarian access to needy population in south 
Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s, states that 'instead of negotiating a local 
ceasefire, we decided to negotiate humanitarian corridors in the Sudan. [ ... J 
Instead of going for a political and military formula, we found a 
humanitarian concept that nobody could oppose' (2002:9). This shows the 
power that the discourse of humanitarianism can have. Somehow, because 
the agreement is on humanitarian issues, it does not carry the consequences 
of a military or political action and self-Iegitimises the agreement. As the 
author points out, when writing 'a humanitarian concept [ ... J nobody could 
oppose'. It is important to recognise the impact that humanitarianism can 
have in setting aside conflicting views but it is necessary to remember that 
humanitarian negotiations occur within politically sensitive environments 
and still carry political consequences. 
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The selj-legitimising discourse of humanitarianism and state sovereignty 
There is one more remark to be made adding to the debate on the 
politicisation of humanitarianism. Humanitarian action has evolved into a 
self-Iegitimising discourse, as briefly mentioned above, challenging in a 
sense state sovereignty. State sovereignty remains an important value in the 
current international system. The principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a state results from upholding the value of sovereignty. 
Reality may not mirror this principle, as the broad presence of international 
humanitarian NGOs in many countries witnessing internal conflicts could be 
described as an indirect and informal interference with the internal affairs of 
a state rendering the principle of sovereignty redundant. One could argue 
that the self-Iegitimising discourse of humanitarianism has eroded state 
sovereignty to a certain extent and, as such, humanitarian engagement with 
armed groups has been made possible by this development, and even 
deepened this trend. 
The literature on humanitarianism seems to reach a consensus on the 
erosion of state sovereignty (Macrae, 1998; Duffield and Prendergast 1994; 
Leader, 2000). Macrae explains the developments experienced regarding the 
status of state sovereignty: 
'The scope for greater humanitarian interventions in conflict zones 
has expanded considerably since the end of the Cold War. Until 
the mid-1980s, humanitarian intervention was limited by 
consideration of sovereignty. International actors, including the 
UN, could work only with the consent of national governments, 
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effectively limiting their engagement to government held territory, 
or to working with refugees who had sought safe haven in a 
second country (Duffield, 1994b). Only the ICRC could and would 
work on both sides of a conflict: their engagement was also subject 
to the condition of mutual consent. [ ... ] The barrier of sovereignty 
has been eased over the past decade, both de Jacto and de jure. The 
phenomenon of "failed states" where no clear government 
authority exists has effectively challenged the concept of state 
sovereignty' (1998: 7). 
Macrae argues that aid tends to be channelled to other actors rather than the 
governmg authority of countries expenencmg complex political 
emergencies as donors 'no longer automatically accord governments with 
having either the legitimacy or capacity to respond to emergencies; indeed, 
increasingly they are seen as being part of the problem' (1998:8). As such, 
the sovereignty of countries can be bypassed in order to ensure 'the 
operationality of the international relief system' (Ibid.). Indeed, as Duffield 
and Prendergast explain, 'NGOs, by their nature and their mandates, have 
the ability to form contracts with people rather than states' (1994: 11). They 
perceive this 'enhanced role of NGOs' as a 'practical manifestation of the 
challenge to sovereignty' to the extent that the plight of many oppressed 
African groups are directly brought to the international arena and 'better 
represented in Washington, London or Geneva than in Khartoum or 
Nairobi' (Ibid.). Humanitarian negotiations may primarily involve armed 
groups when operating within their de Jacto territories, thus encouraging this 
tendency to deepen. On the other hand, as humanitarian engagement with 
ANSAs is still perceived as a sensitive process, NGOs, like Geneva Call for 
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instance, will only act in transparency with the sovereign state as well as 
with its implied consent. 
As Duffield and Prendergast note, it is from their nature and mandates 
that humanitarian NGOs have the ability to bypass sovereign states 
(1994: 11). One could argue that humanitarianism has almost acquired a self-
legitimising discourse. Toole would agree with this statement, as he writes 
that 'the legitimacy of humanitarian negotiation lies in the supremacy and 
clarity of these principles [of humanitarian law and human rights] and in 
their near universal acceptance' (2001:2). As a matter of fact, the numerous 
debates amongst humanitarian actors as well as humanitarian and human 
rights lawyers shows that complex political emergencies challenge the idea 
of the 'supremacy and clarity of these principles'. The mere fact that 
negotiations with armed groups are necessary to ensure the application of 
these principles on the ground shows that there is no 'near universal 
acceptance' . The debates around the codes of conduct reflect that 
humanitarian action is a delicate endeavour and poses a number of moral 
dilemmas, can be obtrusive and violate sovereignty and potentially 
interferes with the internal political affairs of a state. This is not to say that 
it is a negative or bad action, but it would be naIve to promote it as 
universally legitimate. Slim rightly notes that 'the organisation and its 
individuals who dare to represent values of humanity in war will [ ... ] 
usually meet a mixed response, with their values being seen simultaneously 
by different groups as ones to cherish, to attack, or to abuse' (1997:344). He 
states that 'the task of representing humane values to various combatant 
108 
parties will always place humanitarian third party in a difficult position' 
(Ibid.). 
Bringing together these different distinctions, one can see that 
humanitarianism extends from action to advocacy and from humanitarian 
law to human rights. The practice and conceptualisation of engaging with 
ANSAs on humanitarian issues reflects this diversity. Humanitarian 
engagement may include principles from the Geneva Conventions, human 
security issues such as the use of landmines, or human rights principles. It 
may be defined as a process including both humanitarian norms and human 
rights principles, as Petrasek's definition shows. It may emphasise advocacy 
rather than securing humanitarian action. As in the case of Geneva Call, 
humanitarian engagement may focus on advocacy and one customary 
humanitarian norm such as the ban on landmines (as a first step for ANSAs 
to uphold other humanitarian principles). On the other hand, a number of 
humanitarian engagements have been specially concerned with securing 
access for safe humanitarian relief such as UNICEF for immunisation of 
children in conflict zones. Finally, it is important to understand 
humanitarian engagement with ANSAs within the context of the broader 
debates surrounding modem humanitarian action. 
The practice of humanitarian engagement 
Internal conflicts present an extremely complex reality. This complex 
reality becomes even more of a challenge when it involves engaging with 
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ANSAs on humanitarian issues. The prevIOUS chapter highlighted the 
controversy of such a practice as well as the difficulty in understanding and 
analysing such an array of different types of ANSAs. Beyond the challenges 
of interacting with ANSAs, the engagement process in itself gives an 
intricate picture. As mentioned in the first section, humanitarian engagement 
covers an array of different issues from negotiated access to human rights. It 
also takes different forms including informal oral consent and treaty-like 
agreements. In order to uncover the relationship between humanitarian 
engagement and conflict transformation, it is necessary to understand and 
make sense of the process of humanitarian engagement. By looking at the 
recorded practice of humanitarian engagement the following questions will 
be looked at: Who engages with ANSAs? Which specific issues have been 
tackled? What types of humanitarian engagement are there? How has the 
humanitarian engagement materialised? Why do ANSAs accept to be 
engaged on humanitarian issues? And finally, what are the challenges faced 
in this process? 
Who engages with ANSAs? 
Humanitarian engagements involve many different actors reqUIrmg a 
close examination of who engages with ANSAs. Practice confirms that 
NGOs have been at the forefront of the engagement process to the extent 
that states have only found a very limited role in this process. While there is 
a concern to keep humanitarian engagements within the principles of 
humanitarian action, the need for low-profile actors is reinforced by the fear 
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of recogmsIng or legitimising armed groups through the engagement. 
Indeed, humanitarian engagements with ANSAs have provided a paramount 
role to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as different UN 
agencies (such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)) and other 
agencies of the UN system (such as the World Health Organisation 
(WHO)). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been a 
prominent example of engagement as its very unique status in the 
international system has allowed the ICRC to carry out a number of 
engagements, particularly In informing armed groups of their 
responsibilities under international humanitarian law (Zeender, 2005: 105). 
As non-governmental in character, these actors have a wider freedom of 
action and maintain the low profile necessary in this highly controversial 
process. 
Hottinger presents modem diplomacy as offering an array of 
different actors that could be involved in engaging with armed groups 
(2005:56). He argues that these different actors provide both advantages and 
disadvantages In a process of engagement, whether political or 
humanitarian. Track one actors, which include government officials, 
representatives of inter-governmental organisations and third-party 
governments, bring both resources and status to a process of engagement 
(Hottinger, 2005 :57). However, resources and status may convey status and 
legitimacy on the armed group; state actors may be perceived as partial; 
track one diplomacy may meet 'legal constraints'; finally, involving states 
will certainly attract media attention, distorting a low-profile engagement 
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process into a high-profile matter (Ibid.). On the other hand, Track two 
diplomacy, characterised by 'an unofficial, informal interaction' and 
involving mainly non-governmental actors and organisations, ensures a low 
profile engagement. As Hottinger explains: 
'Track two parties are less threatening to armed groups, and find it 
easier to work flexibly, unofficial, and off-the-record, and have 
less to be concerned about in terms of conveying official/legal 
recognition. Lacking geopolitical interests and stakes in the 
conflict, they may be more impartial, forming relationships with a 
wider variety of actors in the conflict, and hearing things official 
actors do not' (2005:58). 
As with track one actors, the advantages of track two diplomacy can also be 
a disadvantage as they lack the capacity and incentives of states and formal 
diplomacy (Ibid.). 
Hofmann argues that in the specific case of engaging armed groups in 
humanitarian action, 'non-governmental organisations present the 
possibility to fill a gap in the international legal regime by employing lower-
key initiatives that avoid political issues like legitimisation or recognition of 
non-state armed groups' (2004). Hofmann believes that the main issue with 
humanitarian engagement with armed groups is the possibility of conveying 
legitimacy and recognition to the group. In this context, she argues that 
NGOs 'bear the capacity of engaging [Non-State Armed groups] without 
being associated with international diplomatic or political status' as well as 
'the capacity to be more problem-solving and policy-oriented, using a "soft-
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approach" that appeals to a humanitarian perspectives' (2004:6). Unlike 
Hottinger, Hofmann perceives this independence 'from the state-centred 
international sphere' as an unmitigated advantage for NGOs (Ibid.). The 
advantage of NGOs as a low-profile actor is also recognised by former US 
President, Jimmy Carter, who has been involved in a number of 
humanitarian negotiations. He explains: 
'One thing to remember is that almost invariably in a civil war, the 
last thing the ruling party in particular wants is for the United 
States or the United Nations or some highly identifiable mediation 
group to come in, because that in effect gives premature legitimacy 
to the revolutionary people in their country' (Interview with 
Jimmy Carter in Ricigliano, 2005: 12). 
Finding an appropriate role for state actors in this process is complicated as 
it involves legal, political and diplomatic issues (Ricigliano, 2005 :6). State 
actors are constrained by their own diplomatic principles and may not have 
the flexibility and ability to be directly involved within the engagement 
process (Hofmann, 2004:3). None of the authors, who argue that states do 
not appear as the most appropriate actors of engagement with ANSAs, 
provide a clear answer to what the role of state actors could be in such a 
process. From Hottinger's account of the advantages of states, their role 
could be summarised as one providing the resources, through funding, or 
logistical help, for NGOs or low-profile UN agencies to carry out 
humanitarian engagements with ANSAs. Geneva Call highlights the need 
for the international community to encourage governments 'to remove 
political obstacles that stand in the way of organisations working with NSAs 
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for humanitarian purposes' (Geneva Call, 2004:4). Geneva Call has 
demonstrated reluctance to sign on the part of armed groups where the 
governments did not allow monitoring to happen as it would 'mean that the 
group can be accused of using landmines and have no possibility of 
disproving allegations' (2004:24). 
In terms of practice, the array of actors involved in humanitarian 
engagements with ANSAs cannot be reduced solely to NGOs and low-
profile UN agencies. There are two important turning points in the 
development of the practice of humanitarian engagements with ANSAs. 
One should not forget that humanitarian engagements with ANSAs 
happened prior to World War II, especially within the practice of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (Harroff-Tavel, 1993: 195-6). 
Indeed, Henry Dunant, the founder of the ICRC, had in 1871 during the 
Commune in Paris engaged with actors on the issues of releasing hostages 
and raising awareness of humanitarian norms (Geneva Call, 2007)12. As 
Bruderlein argues, 'International Law [ ... ] pays little attention to the role of 
nonstate actors, with the notable but limited exception of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), (2001 :223). The practice of 
humanitarian engagement with ANSAs evolved as part of 'the expansion of 
a new arsenal in humanitarian action in the 1980s (De Wall, 1997:145). The 
first registered Days of Tranquillity in 1985 in EI Salvador (WHO, 2001) 
and the 1989 Operation Lifeline Sudan in South Sudan opened the door to a 
12 Notes from the conference Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed non-
State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, organised by Geneva 
Call, Geneva, 4-5 June 2007. As Chatham House Rules prevailed throughout the 
conference, reference to the author of this quote cannot be mentioned. The source, 
therefore, refers to the organiser of the conference. 
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more institutionalised, less ad hoc practice of humanitarian negotiations 
with armed groups (Glaser, 2003:9). 
The Days of Tranquillity were mostly organised and carried out by 
UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO), as the main purpose 
was the cessation of hostilities for a few days to allow an immunisation 
campaign for children (Hay and Sanger, 1992:161). The Days of 
Tranquillity involved a number of other actors at different stages of the 
process. Leaders of the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador were at the 
centre of the negotiations between the government and the Farabundo Marti 
National Liberation Front (FMLN). This choice was made to avoid any 
formal recognition of the FMLN and proved to be 'an ideal choice' as the 
Church had been 'a staunch defender of human rights' and had been in 
constant contact with the FMLN throughout the conflict (Hay and Sanger, 
1992:164). Local actors are essential, as they very often provide the first 
contact with armed groups. Nevertheless, being local, these actors can be 
deeply involved in the dynamic of conflict, and the external coordinator, be 
it UNICEF or another international NGOs, should be aware that this may 
impact the humanitarian engagement. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross and the local health authorities were also involved in the actual 
implementation of the program. 
In Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), UNICEF was agam at the 
forefront of the engagement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement I 
Army (SPLM/A), alongside the World Food Program (WFP). The 
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engagement consisted of organising a safe and unhindered food distribution 
in the south of Sudan during the conflict between the southern armed group, 
the SPLMI A, and the government of Sudan. The choice of UNICEF as the 
lead agency was not a neutral choice but 'was in part to stress non-
recognition of the [SPLM/A] while dealing with it on this humanitarian 
undertaking' (Akol, 2005 :54). 
Subsequent humanitarian engagements with ANSAs have continued 
to involve low-profile UN agencies such as UNICEF, international 
organisations such as the WHO or WFP and the ICRC, which remains a 
central actor in negotiated access, although it is difficult to gauge the extent 
of its practice due to its principled secrecy. As Zeender explains, the UN 
Security Council has also been involved in engaging armed groups on 
humanitarian issues as the Security Council 'imposed sanctions against 
specific armed groups, for example against the Liberia-backed 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighting against the Sierra Leone 
government, and against UNIT A in Angola' (2005: 105). 
A second category of actors have included NGOs as prominent 
actors for the reasons exposed earlier. These NGOs are both international in 
nature, such as M6decins Sans Frontieres (MSF) but also involves local 
actors. For instance, Geneva Call, a Swiss NGO engaging armed groups on 
the landmine ban, involves local campaigns against landmines in their 
negotiations as it does, for instance, in Colombia with the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) and the help of the Colombian Campaign Against 
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Landmines (Reusse-Decrey, 2005:50). There are a few instances of 
humanitarian engagements involving the European Union or NATO, as it 
was the case in Bosnia in the 1990s; nevertheless, these actors remain 
extremely marginal in the process of engagement with ANSAs on 
humanitarian issues. Finally, some people argue that development agencies 
should start engaging with ANSAs to access target groups, for staff security, 
humanitarian concerns, in conflict transformation and peace process 
(Geneva Call, 2007).13 
The choice of who engages with ANSAs on humanitarian issues may 
appear at first as a non-issue. The setting of this process within the dynamic 
of a conflict makes that choice rather crucial: the problem of conveying 
legitimacy or recognition to an armed group forces the agencies involved to 
think carefully about the consequences of entering such a process (Zeender, 
2005: 1 07). The first principle appears to be that actors need to be 
humanitarian actors rather than political actors. The choice of UNICEF, for 
instance, out of all the UN agencies, reflects this principle rather well. The 
second principle appears to be that actors need to be non-state rather than 
state actors. Beyond the humanitarian/political dichotomy, the distinction 
between NGOs and peacekeeping operations, or NGOs and the European 
Union, comes down to the fact that NGOs are not linked to states whereas 
the European Union or the contingents in peacekeeping operations are. The 
same issue may appear with development agencies which are most often 
I~ Notes from the conference Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed non-
State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, organised by Geneva 
Call, Geneva, 4-5 June 2007. As Chatham House Rules prevailed throughout the 
conference, reference to the author of this quote can not be mentioned. The source, 
therefore, refers to the organiser of the conference. 
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linked to the state. This independence from the state system and fonnal 
diplomacy may be the key to the possibility of practising a different kind of 
"diplomacy" with armed groups. Whether the type of actors involved in 
engaging with ANSAs on humanitarian issues has an impact on how this 
engagement process may trigger a transfonnation in the conflict is not 
known, but is, nevertheless, a valid question. The actors involved in 
engaging should therefore be included in the matrix when assessing the 
possible consequences. 
Purpose of engagement: what issues are ANSAs engaging on? 
The issues at stake in humanitarian engagements with ANSAs are 
important, as they qualify and characterise engagement as humanitarian: 
humanitarian engagements are not humanitarian because they mostly 
involve humanitarian facilitators but because they concern humanitarian 
issues. As outlined earlier, what can be deemed humanitarian does not 
always fonn a consensus. The debate on what constitutes the set of 
humanitarian principles will not be reiterated; rather, the discussion will 
look at what issues have been tackled in the actual practice of engaging 
anned groups on humanitarian issues. 
The practice reveals two types of subject matter: first, what has been 
coined "negotiated access", and, secondly, what can be labelled as 
humanitarian advocacy. In "negotiated access", the engagement aims at 
committing the different sides to the conflict to allow unhindered and safe 
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access to the population in need (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, 2004:20). 
Within this category, the negotiated access can provide different 
humanitarian services including the provision of food, medical services, and 
camps for internally displaced people (lDPS).14 Operation Lifeline Sudan set 
up a complex mechanism to ensure the provision of food in the south of 
Sudan. The Days of Tranquillity in EI Salvador consisted of an agreed 
cessation of hostilities to allow the immunisation of children (Villalobos, 
2005), whereas the cessation of hostilities brokered by former US president, 
Jimmy Carter, in Sudan provided medical assistance for the eradication of 
the Guinea Worm Disease (Interview with Jimmy Carter in Ricigliano, 
2005:12; Lederach, 1997:155). 
In humanitarian advocacy, the agreement consists of a more substantial 
commitment to principled behaviour in the conduct of war or the respect for 
human rights. In this case, the issue is not the practical necessities required 
to carry out humanitarian action; rather, it is an issue of advocating the 
broader principles of humanitarianism, sometimes including, human rights 
principles (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, 2004:20). These types of issues can 
cover a commitment to the Geneva Conventions and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. They can also cover the principles spelled out 
in treaties such as the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child or the principles of the Ottawa treaty on the landmine ban. The 
Ground Rules implemented in Sudan and agreed on with the SPLMI A and 
UNICEF were mostly based on international humanitarian law. The 
14 For more information on humanitarian engagement with armed groups on lOPs, see 
Zeender, G. (2005) 'Engaging armed non-state actors on lOP protection', Refugee Survey 
(juarter(l', 24(3), pp.96-111. 
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SPLMI A made an explicit commitment to the principles enunciated in the 
Maputo Declaration on the Right of the Child (Aleu, 2000:73; Hofmann, 
2004:7). The first agreement of this sort with the FMLN in EI Salvador was 
concerned with respect for human rights (Villalobos, 2005:38). The ICRC 
has played an important role in disseminating the principles of humanitarian 
law and advocate for its application: 
'[The ICRC] has not only carried out food and medical relief 
operations, sometimes on a very large scale, but also and above all 
it has approached the de jure or de facto authorities to draw their 
attention to the humanitarian problems encountered by the 
population and urge them to remedy the situation. [ ... ] The main 
aim of the ICRC's action is thus, above all else, to influence the 
conduct of those who indulge in violence, conduct of which the de 
jure or de facto authorities may not always be aware' (Harroff-
Tavel, 1993: 195-6). 
The work of Geneva Call has taken the same focus on influencing the 
conduct of those who indulge in violence by advocating a total ban on 
landmines to armed groups. 
The issues tackled in engagement characterise the engagement. As 
humanitarian issues are tackled, humanitarian engagement can be 
characterised as apolitical. This characteristic, in many ways, enables the 
engagement to happen within a highly politically sensitive environment 
(although humanitarian relief can still be a variable in internal conflict, as 
any resources can become a weapon of war). Nevertheless, the nature of the 
principles advocated in the process are less sensitive than political issues 
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relating to the conflict and therefore more easily accepted as a basis of 
negotiation between actors of a conflict. Secondly, different humanitarian 
principles can have different success rate with armed groups. For instance, 
Geneva Call has had talks about expanding its mandate to other 
humanitarian issues, such as torture or child soldiers, but has wondered 
whether the mechanism they have used, the Deed of Commitment, a treaty-
like document committing ANSAs to the given principle, can be applied to 
other issues or if the landmine issue is specifically appropriate for the use of 
such mechanism (Geneva Call, 2004:24-8; Geneva Call, 2006:39). The 
purpose of humanitarian engagement may inform the type of engagement 
concluded, and, thus, might vary the possible ways the process of 
humanitarian engagement might impact the dynamic of the conflict. 
What types a/humanitarian engagements are there? 
Humanitarian engagement can take a number of different formats from 
ad hoc and informal agreements to treaty-like agreements. Through 
accounts of past practices in engaging ANSAs on humanitarian issues, a 
number of distinctions can be identified. Agreements can be "formal" with 
the signature of a document or informal with some types of oral consent 
from the parties involved. Agreements may be formatted in a universal 
declaration or flexible in content. Agreements may be multilateral and all-
inclusive (involving all parties to the conflict including different factions, 
the government and humanitarian actors), bilateral (bet\\'een an armed group 
and a humanitarian actor), or unilateral (statements made by ANSAs). 
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Finally, humanitarian agreements may be a part of a larger process of 
negotiations on a general ceasefire or peace agreement. The lessons to be 
drawn from these distinctions are not always clear. The lack of literature on 
the subject as well as the lack of considerations from practitioners on the 
consequences of these different types of humanitarian agreements make it 
rather difficult to understand the possible impact of choosing one type over 
another. Nevertheless, this section will attempt to provide a better 
understanding of the implications, limitations, benefits and advantages of 
the different types of agreements. 
Informal agreements, especially concerning negotiated access, have 
been numerous; formal agreements on humanitarian issues with armed 
groups are less common. As Hay and Sanger note: 'Sudan has [ ... J been 
cited as the first country where two warring parties agreed on a common 
plan of action to protect and feed civilians on both sides of a conflict. In 
neither Lebanon nor EI Salvador was there any formal agreement on cease-
fires' (Hay and Sanger 1992: 167). They explain that in the case of EI 
Salvador, the informality of the agreement was a necessary character for the 
parties involved to support the endeavour. As they write, UNICEF, the UN 
agency leading the process, 'took great care not to refer to the agreement as 
a truce or cease-fire; instead, it coined the phrase "day of tranquillity'" (Hay 
and Sanger, 1992: 164). In this case, one can see that the sensitive 
environment in which humanitarian agreements take place may force the 
humanitarian actors involved to choose informal schemes over formal ones. 
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However, the lack of fonnality may result in an ad hoc implementation 
of the programme, where efficiency and aims of programmes are 
undennined. Operation Lifeline Sudan experienced both fonnal and 
infonnal agreements. After the coup and change of regime in 1989 in 
Khartoum, the delivery of food took on an ad hoc nature as negotiations 
with the new regime did not lead to an agreement. According to Akol, this 
affected the relief operation as 'the [Government of Sudan] slowly became 
the dominant partner, dictating tenns to both the SPLA and the UN. [ ... J' 
and worsening the situation by delaying or cancelling approval for relief 
flights to the south for the needy population located there (2005:54). Indeed, 
Mc Hugh and Bessler argue that: 
'When humanitarian negotiations with anned groups are planned 
and carried out in an unstructured or ad hoc manner they increase 
the risk that: 1. these groups will attempt to playoff humanitarian 
actors against each other; 2. the negotiations will result in sub-
optimal agreements; 3. the anned group may be less willing to 
enter into negotiations and reach agreement in the future; and, 4. 
delivery of humanitarian protection and assistance to those in need 
will face increased constraints because of the factors listed above' 
(2006:45). 
It appears that a thin balance exists between having a fonnal agreement, 
possibly ensuring a better outcome in attaining humanitarian objectives, and 
the constraints put on humanitarian actors involved not to fonnalise a 
humanitarian engagement with the parties of a conflict. 
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When a written agreement exists, the issue of whether the agreement 
should be standardised for universal use or flexible arises. This discussion 
emerged within the landmine community. The landmine ban can be found in 
the form of a treaty, the Ottawa Treaty. The treaty, which can only be signed 
by states, was at the source of inspiration of a new mechanism to engage 
ANSAs on the mine issue. Indeed, the "Deed of Commitment" engineered 
by Geneva Call, a Swiss NGO, resembles a treaty. This standardised 
document can be signed by ANSAs and commits them to adhere to a total 
ban on landmines. Other actors of the anti-Iandmine community have 
advocated for a more flexible framework of engagement. Moser-
Puangsuwan, working in Burma on the implementation of a ban on 
landmines including ANSAs, argues the case for this more flexible 
framework: 
'We are encouraging them [ANSAs in Burma] to write their own 
statements [about a possible agreement in relation to a mine ban], 
a different tactic than Geneva Call is using. We believe, based on 
our expenence, that a prepared statement IS open to 
misinterpretation. Instead, we are encouraging them to study the 
treaty [the Ottawa treaty on the landmine ban] and look at what the 
states have been asked to do. We then ask them to come up with 
their own response. This approach also helps increase the level of 
political sophistication within the NSA groups' (2000:59). 
The Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL) acknowledges that a 
universal statement is useful as 'it can act as a universal guideline'. 
However, they argue that individualised statements 'provide flexibility to 
respond to diverse situations, reflect diverse values (e.g. Marxist or Islamic), 
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and also allow [A]NSAs to be involved in the process more deeply ,thus 
developing a better understanding of the issues' (Swiss Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, 2000: 126). Having a more flexible individualised statement, 
however, can pose a problem for the integrity of humanitarian principles. 
Geneva Call found itself in such a position in Colombia with the ELN: the 
armed group refused to commit on a total ban on landmines but proposed a 
third way by accepting to create a mine-free zone. Geneva Call was faced 
with a dilemma: by accepting the mine-free zone, the NGO was in fact 
trading off its commitment to a total ban on landmines. However, stopping 
dialogue and refusing the proposition made by the ELN meant that nothing 
more would be done to solve the mine problem in Colombia (Reusse-
Decrey, 2005:50). There is no clear answer to this debate, but it is important 
to understand that each type may have its share of advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Humanitarian agreements may engage one armed group, a number of 
armed groups at the same time, or both armed groups and the government. 
Thus, humanitarian engagements can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. 
The agreement is unilateral when it only involves a unilateral declaration or 
statement by an armed group. This was the case, for instance, in November 
1996, when the SPLMI A issued a resolution on the use of anti-personal 
mines (Revai Rupiya, 2000:21). The SPLM/A's commitment to a ban on 
landmine was made bilateral when they signed Geneva Call's Deed of 
Commitment in 2001. Finally, multilateral humanitarian engagements 
involve a facilitating "humanitarian" agency, an armed group and the 
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government "hosting" the armed group. This is often the case when a 
humanitarian engagement is facilitated by a ceasefire, a general ceasefire or 
a humanitarian ceasefire. Operation Lifeline Sudan is another example of a 
multilateral humanitarian engagement, negotiated outside of a ceasefire, that 
involved a number of humanitarian agencies, such as UNICEF and the 
World Food Programme, along with the SPLM/A and the Government of 
Sudan (Aleu, 2000:73). 
Once agam, the lack of reflection on the consequences of these 
different types and approaches to engaging ANSAs on humanitarian issues 
means that it is difficult to understand the implications of each type of 
agreement. One can hypothesise that as the agreement moves from a 
unilateral to a multilateral humanitarian agreement, negotiations between 
parties would be greater and the outcome more formalised and 
institutionalised, therefore increasing the potentiality of a greater impact on 
the conflict and the dynamic amongst the actors involved. 
The commitment of an armed group to certain humanitarian 
principles can also be included in a general ceasefire agreement. In 
November 1997, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an armed group active 
in the Philippines, committed to a ban on landmines in an agreement on 
cessation of hostilities (Revai Rupiya, 2000:21). The inclusion of a 
humanitarian engagement within a general ceasefire has clear advantages. 
Access to the armed group is easy and some of the legal or political 
problems of engaging with armed groups will not arise as the armed group 
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has already been accepted as a valid interlocutor by the government 
concerned. On the other hand, the commitment to a humanitarian principle 
is then dependent on the respect of this particular ceasefire. If the ceasefire 
is broken, the commitment to the humanitarian principles might be deemed 
obsolete by the armed group. Operation Lifeline Sudan started with no 
written agreement but was formalised by a ceasefire in April 1989. When 
the ceasefire collapsed as a result of a coup in Khartoum, the OLS collapsed 
with it: 'The breakdown of the ceasefire led to the breakdown of the 
humanitarian partnership with the [Government of Sudan], (Akol, 2005:54). 
The inclusion of a humanitarian engagement within a ceasefire might 
therefore weaken the humanitarian commitment further than if the 
engagement had been done outside of the ceasefire. Indeed, OCHA, giving 
its guidelines for humanitarian engagements with armed groups, warns that 
'[ ... ] the humanitarian negotiations and their underlying humanitarian 
objectives should remain distinct from political and other negotiations. 
Political negotiations should not incorporate humanitarian provisions that 
are contingent on political actions or agreements' (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 
2006:21). 
The conclusion from this discussion remams elusive in terms of 
lessons learnt. One important aspect to remember appears to be that the 
different variables characterising a type of humanitarian engagement are 
numerous, and until more research is done on the subject, these 
characteristics should be taken into account when evaluating the impact of 
humanitarian engagement with armed groups on conflict. For the moment, 
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the intuition seems to be that the more formal the agreement, the deeper the 
engagement may be, as more negotiations need to be made in order to arrive 
at the signature of a formal document, thus creating a potentially greater 
impact of the engagement process on the conflict dynamic. 
Why do ANSAs accept to be engaged? 
Understanding the motives behind the commitment of ANSAs needs to 
be included in evaluating the process of humanitarian engagement. As the 
logic of humanitarianism is often contrary to the logic of war (Macrae, 
1998:7; Glaser, 2003:4), ANSAs will not commit themselves without 
benefiting from a humanitarian agreement. These benefits appear to be 
summarised in two categories: the gain in resources and an acquired 
"moral" legitimacy. 
Indeed, Fisher states that the SPLMI A agreed to the implementation 
qf Operation Lifeline Sudan because of the following benefits: 
'It brought together disparate factions under the umbrella of a 
common commitment. Secondly, "the movements were keen to 
improve their international credibility and recognised quickly [that 
the agreement] would further it". Lastly, such action brought with 
it recognition and an infusion of international aid to southern 
Sudan' (1999:82). 
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International credibility, recognition and the infusion of aid were key 
motives for the SPLMI A. ANSAs are concerned with their image and their 
perceptions. They are not only motivated by material goods (greed) but also 
by social rewards (Geneva Call, 2007).15 Glaser (2003) and Bruderlein 
(2000) take this argument further and explain that accounting for the 
willingness of armed groups to engage on humanitarian issues is the 
relationship between the armed group and its constituency. 
Bruderlein argues that 'the group's receptivity [to humanitarian and 
human rights standards] appears to be contingent on military, political, 
economic, social and cultural factors' (2000:7). However, he emphasises 
that these factors need to be understood in relation to the bond between the 
armed group and the population under its control: the more dependent an 
armed group is on the civilian population and the greater the proximity 
between the armed group and its constituency, the more willing the group 
will be to abide by humanitarian principles (Ibid.). 
Foster explains that this argument matters greatly when attempting to 
convince ANSAs to renounce the use of landmines (2000:6). In addition to 
this, Foster states that putting the argument in the armed group's own moral 
language can also work (based on regional traditions, ideology or religion 
on which the armed groups is based), but she recognises that 'the interests 
of NSAs can be appealed to, in terms of political credibility gained 
15 Notes from the conference Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed non-
State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, organised by Geneva 
Call, Geneva, 4-5 June 2007. As Chatham House Rules prevailed throughout the 
conference, reference to the author of this quote can not be mentioned. The source, 
therefore, refers to the organiser of the conference. 
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internationally and with own community, of ending loss of own combatants 
and own people, of encouraging opponent governments to stop using mines, 
and of maintaining a healthy land base [ ... ]' (Ibid.). 
Glaser offers a similar account of why the relationship between the 
armed group and the population counts as an important variable which may 
influence the willingness of armed group to commit to humanitarian 
principles (2003 :6). Glaser perceives humanitarian engagement with armed 
groups as 'a balancing act between the internal interest of respectively 
ANSA and humanitarian agencies, expressing a mutual interest to 
accommodate respective (internal) pragmatic goals, such as security for aid 
workers by humanitarian agencies; or control and credibility by ANSA' 
(2003:4). In other words, humanitarian engagement will only be accepted by 
armed groups if it serves their overall objectives (Zeender, 2005: 107). 
Discussing the issues of willingness on the part of ANSAs, Glaser states that 
'the fundamental hypothesis to willingness [ ... ] is: the more supportive 
humanitarian presence is to ANSA's aims the higher the willingness of 
ANSA to engage and oblige the negotiated conditions' (2003:43). The 
support of a constituency can play an instrumental role in attaining the 
armed group's objectives when it is the only source of resources, 
combatants and support. Accordingly, Glaser argues that 'the wider the 
constituency (and the higher the dependency of ANSA on civilians) the 
more responsive ANSA may be to arguments to improve the fate of 
civilians' (2003:27). Therefore, the benefit for the armed group In 
committing to a humanitarian agreement is to keep the support of the 
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constituency, whatever fonn this support may take (logistical, financial, 
political, military) in order to attain their objectives. Glaser concludes by 
stating that legitimacy is crucial for ANSAs and can be bestowed by 
commitment to helping humanitarian relief or a better treatment of the 
population (2003 :30). 
Humanitarian actors need to be sensitised to the fact that anned 
groups will not commit to a humanitarian agreement unless it serves their 
purposes and understands what these purposes are. This awareness is 
especially crucial in avoiding the possible negative consequences of 
humanitarian action in conflict. Conversely, understanding the motives of 
armed groups to enter into humanitarian negotiations may be a key element 
in evaluating the impact of humanitarian engagement on the possible 
transfonnation of conflict. 
Engaging in a challenge: Ethical and Practical issues 
Any process involving anned groups will inevitably involve a number of 
ethical issues. Some would argue that engaging in a dialogue with anned 
groups is by principle unethical. Among the advocates of engagement, 
discussions on the possible ethical and moral dilemmas still arise. There are 
two main ethical issues facing humanitarian actors: the first issue concerns 
the fear of conveying legitimacy, recognising or raising the status of anned 
groups; the second issue reflects the uneasiness of humanitarian actors to 
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enter a dialogue with armed groups who consistently violate humanitarian 
principles. 
The Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines explains that 'any level of 
engagement with NSAs can be perceived as a recognition of their legitimacy 
(i.e. whether or not recognition was intended), (2000: 117). As noted in the 
previous section, armed groups have their own agenda in accepting a 
commitment to humanitarian principles and the recognition of their 
legitimacy is certainly a motivation for engagement (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 
2006:65). This issue is often raised by the opponent governments (an 
interview with Jimmy Carter in Ricigliano, 2005: 12; Hofmann, 2004:2; Hay 
and Sanger, 1992: 164). Humanitarian actors are aware of this problem and 
try to mitigate it by choosing specific types of facilitators for engaging 
armed groups (Hofmann, 2004:2). In EI Salvador, for instance, the choice of 
the Roman Catholic Church was made in part to avoid any kind of 
recognition and legitimacy (Hay and Sanger, 1992:164). Nevertheless, a 
commitment to humanitarian principles can only raise an armed group's 
moral legitimacy. The existence of a process of engagement itself will bring 
more attention to an armed group and might provide them with a platform 
for propaganda (Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2000: 117). These 
issues should be kept in mind and, where possible, mitigated, as with a 
careful choice of the actors involved. Although these ethical problems 
undermine humanitarian engagement with ANSAs, it does not invalidate the 
case for engagement itself. 
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As mentioned earlier, the logic of war, and specially internal war, runs 
contrary to the logic of humanitarianism. Taking this into account, the fact 
that armed groups may have a record of consistently violating humanitarian 
principles or human rights may pose an ethical issue. Can a humanitarian 
actor engage in a genuine dialogue with such armed groups? According to 
Graisse, this question should not stop humanitarian engagement: 
'[ ... ] [H]umanitarian engagement certainly does not mean 
endorsement or political recognition, and we sometimes need to 
engage with actors that we would not wish to endorse. We can cite 
many examples of situations in which we have continued to work 
despite the presence of parties whose policies and objectives 
conflict with our own' (2002:26). 
Nevertheless, similar problems arise when humanitarian actors work within 
certain states where humanitarian and human rights violations are 
widespread. The issue goes back to a broader debate among the 
humanitarian community on whether humanitarian actors should disengage 
themselves in situations where there is an environment of systematic 
humanitarian and human rights violations. 
There are numerous practical issues involved in engaging ANSAs. 
Five important issues have been identified from the literature: the difficulty 
of information gathering and gaining an understanding of armed groups; the 
difficulty of access to armed groups; the problems resulting from lack of 
organisation and clear-cut hierarchy in armed groups; the problems arising 
from working in a politically sensitive environment leading to the 
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possibility of political manipulation from either side; and finally, the 
reluctance of governments to negotiate or allow negotiation with ANSAs 
even if only involving humanitarian issues. 
Information gathering poses a challenge to engaging with armed 
groups. ANSAs can be very secretive and believe that leaking any kind of 
information outside the group may lead to a misuse of the information 
(Foster, 2000:5). The problem of information gathering is furthered by the 
difficulty of accessing ANSAs. 
Access to armed groups might be difficult for different reasons 
(Williams and Ricigliano, 2005: 14-15). The fact that armed groups operate 
in conflict zones can be an important obstacle (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 
2006:6). Proscriptions and legal sanctions may hinder the ability of 
humanitarian actors to gain access to armed groups (Conciliation Resources, 
2004: 14). Access can also be difficult because ANSAs may fear that such 
access may cause them to be tracked down by the government. Conciliation 
Resources mentions 'the ban on L TTE members' movement that affected an 
aid conference in Washington and Japan in 2003, the arrest of the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) leaders on their way to peace talks in Tokyo in 2003, 
and the arrest of the negotiator from one of Colombia's armed insurgent 
movements as he travelled to attend talk in 2004' (Conciliation Resources, 
2004:14). Finally, access may be difficult because, unlike with states, 'pre-
established diplomatic channels may not exist' (Foster, 2000:5). 
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As Foster notes, 'NSAs are generally fluid organisations' (Foster, 
2000:5). It is not always clear who can be a legitimate interlocutor or 
spokesperson in the group. This matter also means that humanitarian actors 
do not always know how much power their interlocutor has within the group 
and therefore what impact the dialogue will have on the ground (Mc Hugh 
and Bessler, 2006:6). As Foster explains: 
'NSA organisations may be decentralised, with distances 
separating political leadership from military command, and some 
troops operating with fairly loose ties to each other - it is not 
always clear who to talk to and how much impact decisions taken 
by the leadership will have' (2000:5). 
Changes m leadership or the creation of factions often means that 
commitment is not carried over, forcing humanitarian actors to have an 
acute awareness of the internal politics of ANSAs (Geneva Call, 2004: 15). 
The sensitivity of the environment in which engagement takes place means 
that there is always a possibility of humanitarian actors being politically 
manipulated. This argument is linked to understanding the motives of armed 
groups in accepting humanitarian engagements but also to the motives 
behind the opponent governments in allowing this dialogue to happen. As 
the Swiss Campaign the Ban Landmines argues, 'any approach to NSAs is 
open to political manipulation by either side and hence must be undertaken 
with caution to (minimally) avoid doing harm' (2000: 117). 
Finally, engagement may be hindered by the reluctance of the opponent 
government to allow humanitarian actors to establish a dialogue with 
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ANSAs or by its reluctance to enter into a humanitarian dialogue with 
armed groups. This problem nearly undermined the humanitarian 
engagement in Sudan as 'it was very difficult for the officials in Khartoum 
to treat revolutionaries in the south on an equal basis [ ... J' (an interview 
with Jimmy Carter in Ricigliano, 2005: 12). Reluctant attitudes towards the 
humanitarian engagement of ANSAs does not only come from governments 
concerned, but also from donor governments that find it counter-intuitive 'to 
pledge money to armed groups', as this was thought to be a major problem 
in Geneva Call's work for instance (Geneva Call, 2004:15). 
Any type of action taken in the midst of an internal conflict will 
encounter such issues and obstacles. Obstacles should be expected and 
actions taken to mitigate problems and find solutions. In spite of these 
issues, humanitarian engagements with armed groups have happened in the 
past and will continue in the future. 
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Table 3.1: Framework of Analysis for Humanitarian Engagements. 
of Humanitarian 
Engagement 
WHO? -I~ 
Who engages? (NGOs, 
UN agencies, Third-Party i 
State, local actors, etc.) 
WHAT? 
Purpose of Engagement 
(negotiated access, 
humanitarian principles, 
etc.) 
HOW? WHEN? 
Types of agreement 
(formallinformal, 
standardisedlflexible, 
. unilaterallbilaterallmultila 
teral, etc.) 
WHY? 
Armed Groups' 
motivations for 
engagement 
CHALLENGES 
Humanitarian Engagement 1 
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As argued throughout this section, the different characteristics of 
engagement looked at might influence the way it may impact conflict. As 
such, the following table will be used in this research to evaluate each 
humanitarian engagement. This framework of analysis will help in 
identifying how each characteristic may separately influence the course of 
conflict. The first column represents the characteristics of humanitarian 
engagements. It regroups all the characteristics of humanitarian 
engagements discussed above: Who engages? What is the purpose of the 
engagement? How and when does the engagement occur? Why does the 
armed group agree to the engagement? And finally, what are the challenges 
of the humanitarian engagement? The second column represents one 
instance of a humanitarian engagement, here labelled "humanitarian 
engagement 1". For each instance of humanitarian engagements, the 
analysis includes an overview of the different characteristics in the first 
column. 
Conclusion 
Examining the concepts and practice relating to humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups reveals a complex reality. Humanitarianism 
and humanitarian action are evolving both in their conceptual and practical 
aspects. The conceptual aspect of humanitarianism changes with the reality 
of humanitarian action on the ground as well as with the evolution of the 
significant debates and discussions surrounding this field. Such issues as the 
relationship between politics and humanitarian action, whether humanitarian 
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action is political or whether humanitarian action includes working towards 
a peaceful transformation of the conflict are salient in the evolution of 
humanitarianism. These debates also shed light on humanitarian 
engagement with armed group as a very specific type of humanitarian 
action, one that appears more political and one that may cause harm or work 
towards peace. 
Reviewing the practice and the literature on humanitarian engagement 
with armed groups raises numerous questions. This chapter has enabled us 
to identify some key issues by highlighting the questions raised by this 
review. The framework of analysis of humanitarian engagements will be 
applied during the analysis of data and will answer some of the questions 
raised throughout this chapter. As the next chapter looks at the possible 
impact that humanitarian engagement with armed groups may have on the 
peaceful transformation of conflict, the issue of the politicisation of 
humanitarian action and the difficult relationship between politics and 
humanitarian action remams one of the key debates surrounding this 
research. 
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Chapter IV: The consequences of humanitarian engagement: 
from humanitarian action to conflict transformation. 
Introduction: 
Humanitarian engagement with armed groups aims at improving the life 
of civilians in conflicts. On the other hand, it has been claimed that 
humanitarian engagement may have a further impact on conflict. 
Humanitarian engagement with armed groups does not resemble the 
traditional activities of humanitarian action. It is in essence a process of 
negotiation. This characteristic, as well as early observations that 
humanitarian engagement may affect positively the likelihood of a peaceful 
political dialogue, support the need to examine whether or not humanitarian 
engagements with armed non-state actors have an impact on the 
transformation of conflict and, if so, how this impact occurs. This chapter is 
a tentative theoretical answer to these questions and will inform the conduct 
of field research and analysis. 
The first section examines the general consequences of humanitarian 
action. A number of negative consequences exist, including the 
instrumentalisation of economic resources, distortion effects and the 
political manipulation of humanitarian action. These have raised strong 
criticisms of humanitarian action in conflict and the re-evaluation of 
humanitarian programmes to secure a principle of "do no harm". On the 
other hand, humanitarian action IS also acknowledged in some 
circumstances to bring about a number of positive consequences beyond the 
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betterment of the humanitarian situation. It is argued that humanitarian 
engagement, in particular, supports the creation of a favourable environment 
for the start of pre-negotiations and negotiations. 
Following this argument, the second section looks at the literature on 
conflict transformation. It is argued that humanitarian engagement can play 
a role in the peacemaking effort. Therefore, the different arguments and 
approaches in peacemaking are examined in order to find some avenues or 
ways that can theoretically explain the positive impact of humanitarian 
engagement. 
Without denying the importance of peacebuilding and post-settlement 
activities for the creation of a sustainable peace, the examination of the 
effects of humanitarian engagement will be limited to the peacemaking 
phase of conflict transformation. Within peacemaking, humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups is believed to have only a limited role to 
play in encouraging or favouring the decision of armed groups to commit to 
starting pre-negotiations or negotiations. In other words, the focus is on how 
to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table. The emphasis 
remains, therefore, at the leadership level of the armed group rather than the 
community level. One also needs to acknowledge that humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups relates to one of many processes among 
different interventions in conflict. The emphasis is on understanding the 
particular ways in which humanitarian engagements with armed groups 
benefit the transformation of conflict towards a peaceful dialogue. 
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Behind this argument exists a strong assumption that humanitarian 
dialogue may have a particular role to playas a less sensitive endeavour 
making this particular "negotiation" process between armed groups and 
humanitarian actors easier and more probable. The last section will bring 
together the preliminary observations made in the literature on humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups with the possible avenues presented in 
peacemaking approaches and theories. As a result, three hypotheses will be 
proposed as a conceptual framework to start from in the empirical part of 
the research. 
The "Do no harm" principle: positive and negative externalities of 
humanitarian engagement in conflict 
Humanitarian action is claimed to impact the environment in which 
it is implemented beyond the intended humanitarian objectives. As this 
impact may be both negative and positive, it has been at the centre of a 
critical examination of contemporary humanitarian action (Anderson, 1999; 
Conciliation Resources, 2004:12; Minear, 2002; Stein, 2000:390; Okumu, 
2003). As a result of this critical examination, humanitarian action has been 
guided by the principle of "do no harm", aiming at implementing 
programmes in such a way that it would not affect the broader context in 
which it takes place. This reflection informs the examination of whether 
humanitarian engagement, a specific type of humanitarian action, impacts 
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the transformation of conflict, as well as understanding how this process 
may impact the conflict in a positive way. 
Anderson's "do no harm" principle will be presented below 
(Anderson, 1999). While examining the reasons behind the salience of this 
principle, the main aspects of this debate will be looked at. Beyond the 
theoretical arguments, the different ways in which humanitarian action has 
been admitted to impact the broader context in which it occurs will be 
explored. I will separate the ways in which humanitarian action may have a 
negative impact and the ways in which humanitarian action may have a 
positive impact. This exploration may not be exhaustive and aims at 
providing a sense of what the humanitarian community has already 
acknowledged as the main unforeseen consequences of their action. 
An introduction to the "Do No Harm" principle: 
At first sight, it seems contradictory to talk of a principle of "do no 
harm" alongside humanitarian action. Indeed, humanitarian action aims at 
relieving the costs of conflict on the civilian population. However, the 
implementation of humanitarian action in situations of violent conflicts 
challenges this assumption. Anderson has articulated in details this 
argument in Do No Harm: how aid can support peace - or war (1999). A 
general overview of Anderson's thesis will be presented before looking at 
the actual negative and positive externalities of humanitarian action. 
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Anderson claims that humanitarian action can impact conflicts by 
either fuelling war or reducing it. This claim has been made by a number of 
authors (Anderson, 1999; Conciliation Resources, 2004: 12; Minear, 2002; 
Stein, 2000:390; Okumu, 2003). She puts forward three main reasons 
behind this statement. First, Anderson explains that 'the context of a violent 
conflict' in itself is a cause of concern: 'When international assistance is 
given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context 
and thus also of the conflict' (1999: 1). This point echoes in many ways the 
issue of the relationship between politics and humanitarian action discussed 
in a previous section. Indeed, humanitarian action happens within a 
politically sensitive environment that results in a number of challenges, not 
only to the principles of humanitarian action such as neutrality or 
impartiality, but also challenges as the context may be sensitive and 
vulnerable (Leader and Macrae, 2000:3). 
The second reason raised by Anderson is the claim that the issue of 
how humanitarian action impacts conflicts is a rather new concern resulting 
from the changing environment in which humanitarian action occurs, in 
other word the changing nature of contemporary conflicts (1999:2). This 
claim has been made most strongly by Kaldor in New and Old Wars (1999). 
The argument that contemporary conflicts have changed in substantial ways 
has received criticisms but is one that humanitarian actors perceive as 
significant and matching a certain reality on the ground (Macrae, 1998:4,7). 
Finally, Anderson highlights the fact that humanitarian actors should be 
concerned by the broader consequences of their actions as many may suffer 
from war but a number of actors gained economically, politically and 
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socially from violent conflicts making humanitarian action vulnerable to 
possible instrumentalisation (1999:13-4). 
From this examination of the situation facing humanitarian actors, 
Anderson argues that 'aid interventions have an opportunity to influence the 
relative prominence of peace or war capacities' (1999:34). She identifies 
five categories of peace capacities, or connectors, and five categories of war 
capacities, or dividers. Peace capacities include: systems and institutions, 
attitudes and actions, shared values and interests, common experience, and 
symbols and occasions (Anderson, 1999:24-31). War capacities include: 
systems and institutions, attitudes and actions, different values and interests, 
different experiences, symbols and occasions (Anderson, 1999:31-3). 
Anderson offers a framework of analysis to enable humanitarian 
actors to gage the impact of their programmes. The framework provides a 
three-step analysis: 
'Step 1 involves identifying the dividers, tensions, and war 
capacities in the context of the conflict and assessing their 
importance. Step 2 involves identifying and assessing the 
importance of the connectors and local capacities for peace in the 
same context. Step 3 involves identifying the pertinent 
characteristics of the aid agency and its program and assessing 
(and reassessing) their impacts on the dividers, tensions, and war 
capacities and the connectors and capacities for peace' (Anderson, 
1999:69-70). 
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Before examining in detail the possible connectors and dividers identified 
by Anderson and a number of other authors, one pitfall in Anderson's 
argument needs to be highlighted. Writing on the unforeseen consequences 
of humanitarian action in Africa, Okumu agrees in many ways with 
Anderson and also provides a detailed examination of the ways in which 
humanitarian action impacts conflicts. However, he relates an argument put 
forward by Shearer: 
'David Shearer, in his defence of HINGOs [Humanitarian 
International Non-Governmental Organisations], argues that relief 
aid from a "more macro perspective ... appears to have had little 
impact on the course of civil wars". And that most conflicts such 
as Sudan's have proved extraordinarily resilient to peace and have 
"continued unrelentingly". In view of the elusive quest for peace, 
"the assertion that aid is fuelling war in Sudan ignores the 
historical realities". In Somalia, Shearer points out, there has also 
been "little observable correlation between amounts of aid and 
levels of violence". Furthermore, it is "impossible", on the micro-
level, to quantify the economic and organisational benefits brought 
to warlords by relief aid' (Okumu, 2003: 130). 
This word of caution certainly needs to be kept in mind. However, 
humanitarian actors would certainly want to mitigate any unforeseen 
consequences of their actions whether the overall impact may not upset the 
situation as much as Anderson seems to claim. 
The negative impact of humanitarian action 
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The ways in which humanitarian aid impacts negatively on conflict 
are numerous. They can be brought together under three main categories: 
instrumentalisation of economic resources, distortion, and political 
manipulation. 
The most widely cited impact is the use of economic resources, 
brought in by humanitarian actors, to buy weapons and therefore support the 
continuation of conflict (Minear, 2002: 157; Conciliation Resources, 
2004:12; Glaser, 2003:51-2; Anderson, 1999:50; Okumu, 2003:122). 
Humanitarian assistance such as food or other valuables are often stolen and 
diverted by the conflicting parties. In addition to that, humanitarian agencies 
may have to pay taxes or a fee to the de facto authority of the territory 
where they work, adding a source of economic revenue for the armed 
groups. As De Waal explains: 
'The diversion or taxation of relief supplies becomes a major way 
for belligerents to provision themselves, and, in time, the very 
command structures and military strategies themselves will come 
to reflect the availability of external aid and the means whereby it 
is delivered. Relief agencies have increasingly accommodated to 
violence, in the context of assistance programmes that are 
integrated into the cycles of violence in internal conflict' 
(1997:146). 
Humanitarian agencies may bring other resources with them. As Okumu 
explains, infrastructure such as reconstructed roads and bridges may also 
become important means in the military strategy of an armed group 
(2003: 125-9). 
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The construction of relief or food centres results in a number of 
negative consequences. First, the belligerents might use the protection of 
these centres and locate their military and training bases near by, in actual 
fact using 'the starving population as shields against attacks' (Ibid.: 125-6). 
Second, these centres may be used as 'reservoirs for "fresh recruits for 
military missions" by both rebels and the governments' (Ibid.:125). Finally, 
by giving an incentive to the population to move to these centres or 'safe 
areas', humanitarian organisations 'can also inadvertently promote one of 
the warring party's military objectives of depopulating the theatre of 
operation' (Ibid.: 126). 
Humanitarian agencies may have a distortion effect on the environment 
In which they implement their programmes. They may distort the 
relationship between different groups by providing aid to a displaced 
population creating tensions with the local communities (Minear 2002: 157; 
Anderson, 1999:39). Humanitarian agencies may distort local markets 
which might reinforce the war economy by pouring exported resources and 
money (Anderson, 1999:39). The provision of food relief may' [ruin] local 
agricultural production, [perpetuate] famine, reducing indigenous people to 
the status of beggars, and [ ... ] [create] a state of dependence that has 
undermined the people's amour propre' (Okumu, 2003:124). Finally, 
humanitarian assistance may distort the relationship between the authorities 
and the civilian population as it relieves 'governments of their 
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responsibilities of providing for the welfare of their populations, "thus 
freeing resources for combat'" (Ibid.:127). 
Finally, humanitarian assistance might provide opportunities for 
political manipulation. The mam Issue tends to revolve around the 
recognition and legitimacy of armed groups. As Okumu argues, 
humanitarian organisations 'have been manipulated not only to provide 
resources used to fuel wars but also to gain access to the civilian population 
in need of humanitarian assistance, and to give de facto recognition and 
legitimacy to warlords and their rebel movements' (2003:127-8). Glaser 
claims that humanitarian aid confers undue legitimacy of armed group and 
opportunities for 'the political abuse of aid' (2003 :51-2). 
Humanitarian actors have taken these issues into account in the way 
they design humanitarian action. Practice and research have found a number 
of ways to mitigate the negative impact of humanitarian aid (Anderson, 
1999:55-66). 
The positive impact of humanitarian assistance 
Humanitarian assistance may have a broader impact than the 
betterment of the humanitarian crisis. As humanitarian action can have 
negative consequences, it may have positive consequences. As Minear 
claims and exemplifies: 
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'Beyond seeking to avoid negative impact, some agencies are 
taking the additional step of designing programs to maximise their 
contribution to peace and reconciliation. One example is the 
initiative to reconstruct the town market in Tskhinva1i, South 
Ossetia, where the resumption of trade has had positive spinoffs 
for both the Georgian and Osset populations in the area. Another 
example, at a higher level and involving reconstruction rather than 
emergency aid, is the funding of national Bosnian railway and 
power grids on the condition that representatives of all three ethnic 
groups jointly administer the grids' (2002: 158). 
There are two main ways in which humanitarian assistance may impact on 
the conflict in a positive way: it can support peace-building at the local level 
through connectors or peace capacities using Anderson's terms (1999:24); 
or, it can support peace-making by creating an environment favourable to 
political negotiations. 
Humanitarian action might support peace-building at the local level 
through carefully designed assistance programmes. Within communities, 
humanitarian assistance may provide opportunities for reconciliation, 
working across enemy lines, reinforcing communication between different 
divided groups, etc. Indeed, Minear argues that 'to date, the most positive 
synergies between humanitarian action and peace appear to have come at 
the local rather than national level. [ ... ] Moreover carefully delivered 
transitional assistance may assist in building sustainable peace' (2002: 158). 
This conclusion is reiterated in Harpviken and Roberts' study on mine 
action programmes that have created incentives for cross-community 
cooperation (2004: 1). The way humanitarian assistance creates these peace-
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building opportunities is very much through the idea of connectors or peace 
capacities advocated by Anderson (1999:24). If humanitarian assistance 
supports the systems and institutions that have peace capacities such as 
interenemy trade, water, communication system, or roads that connect 
warring people, then it will impact the conflict in a positive way (Ibid.:25). 
In the same way, support for peace capacities may be provided through 
reinforcing nonwar attitudes and actions such as conciliatory gestures and 
tolerance (Ibid. :26). 
The second impact humanitarian assistance might have is the 
creation of an environment favourable to a peaceful negotiations and 
settlement. Indeed Minear claims that beyond its immediate benefits, 
humanitarian action has the potential to contribute to creating a climate in 
which negotiated settlements to conflicts are possible' (2002: 159). This 
argument is more often made in relation to humanitarian engagement and 
dialogue rather than simply humanitarian assistance. Hay and Sanger, for 
instance, explain that immunisation cease-fires, a type of humanitarian 
engagement, 'can provide a reason for short-term peace which could help 
build the momentum for the negotiation of lasting peace' (1992: 162). They 
reiterate this claim in relation to Sudan's "corridors of tranquillity" and state 
that 'in Sudan, the "corridors of tranquillity" and the associated relief effort 
have been judged instrumental in paving the way for peace talks which 
began in July 1989. Both parties to the conflict acknowledged that 
Operation Lifeline Sudan has contributed to Peace' (Hay and Sanger, 
1992: 168). The reasons behind these claims are numerous. Some say that 
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'humanitarian gestures help informally, to institute a minimum of dialogue 
between adversaries' (Veuthey, 1999: 116). Others have claimed that 
humanitarian projects 'can sometimes serve as the only acceptable bridges 
to peace' (Cahill, 1999: 10). The Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
is founded on the idea that 'humanitarian issues could actually bring 
conflicting parties together and create confidence between them' (Griffiths, 
2000:93). Griffiths coins the terms 'humanitarian bondings' to explain the 
process of confidence building through humanitarian issues (2000:93). 
Petrasek talks of humanitarian dialogues as a 'door-opener or "entree'" 
(2005:46). 
Conclusion: two-levels of impacts 
This section looked at the consequences of humanitarian action on 
conflicts identified by the literature on humanitarian assistance not 
distinguishing between humanitarian relief as such and humanitarian 
engagement. This distinction will be made as the research will focus solely 
on the consequences of humanitarian engagement as a process of 
negotiation on humanitarian issues. Furthermore, a crucial distinction is 
made in the literature between the impact at the local level and the impact at 
the national or macro-level. The research will focus more specifically on the 
macro-level or leadership level and identify the ways in which humanitarian 
engagements participate to the peace-making effort. This focus means that 
the research will differ in substantial ways from Anderson's conceptual 
framework of connectors and dividers, which focus more on the local 
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impact and peace-building opportunities. The next step is to identify the 
processes of peace-making and the different initiatives from third-parties in 
peacemaking identified in the literature to be able to understand better the 
link between humanitarian engagements and peacemaking efforts and, in 
turn, the potential impact of humanitarian engagements on the positive 
transformation of conflicts. 
Conflict transformation 
For many years sIgnmg peace agreements was termed conflict-
resolution. Today, the labels conflict transformation or conflict management 
are preferred and underlie the processual character of conflict. The 
literature on humanitarian action has highlighted the potential positive 
impact that humanitarian assistance may have by stating that humanitarian 
aid might provide an environment favourable to political negotiations. 
Departing from this idea, we explore conflict transformation strategies in 
order to find potential pathways and similarities that could explain better the 
potential impact of humanitarian engagement on conflict transformation. I 
will first look at conflict transformation and the concepts relating to peace, 
especially peace-making and peace-building. I will argue that it is within the 
process of peace-making that the positive impact of humanitarian 
engagements might playa role. I will then examine the role of track one, or 
official actors, and track-two, or unofficial actors in peace making. Finally, I 
will present the main peacemaking strategies proposed in the literature that 
appear as potentially viable frameworks to understand the influence of the 
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process of humanitarian engagement on the process of conflict 
transformation. 
The term "conflict transformation" is a rather recent one (Spencer 
and Spencer, 1995). In opposition to "conflict resolution", which 
emphasises a definite objective, the term "conflict transformation" 
acknowledges the complexity of conflict as an on-going process. In a 
similar way, terms such as "peace process", which have 'become 
increasingly popular since the 1990s', 'arose primarily from the growing 
recognition that the cycle of activities necessary to produce a just and 
lasting agreement stretches both backward and forward from the actual 
period of negotiations' (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003:256). According to 
Spencer and Spencer, conflict transformation is: 
'a continuous process which can be enhanced by third parties 
having the capacity to create conditions to develop political will. 
The transformation process may involve cultural, political, 
economic, psychological, regional and international elements - all 
of which can be combined and focused to empower parties to 
reframe their differences' (1995: 162). 
The whole idea of conflict transformation embraces rather well the 
perspective that negotiations are a learning process with a number of phases 
(Guelke, 2003:54). Darby and Mac Ginty view this process as having four 
different phases: '(a) pre-negotiation; (b) the management of the process, 
including negotiations and violence; (c) peace accords; and (d) post-accord 
reconstruction' (2003:256). Guelke identifies up to seven phases of the 
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peace process: '(1) the pre-talks phase; (2) an era of secret talks; (3) the 
opening of multilateral talks; (4) negotiating a settlement; (5) gaining 
endorsement; (6) implementing its provIsIOns; and (7) the 
institutionalisation of the new dispensation' (2003 :56). 
The diversity of "peace-related" terms reiterates the "process" 
characteristic of conflict transformation. Peacemaking refers to 'the 
diplomatic efforts to handle conflict' (Boutros-Ghali, 1995 :45-46). It 
includes pre-negotiation, negotiations, peace accords according the Darby's 
and Mac Ginty's phases of a peace process (2003:256); and the pre-talks, 
secret talks, multilateral talks, negotiating settlement of Guelke' s seven 
phases (2003:56). Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement relate to military 
actions, non-coercive and coercive (Boutros-Ghali, 1995 :45-46). Finally, 
peacebuilding relates to 'structure measures to preclude a relapse into 
conflict' (Ibid.). It includes post-accord reconstruction as termed by Darby 
and Mac Ginty (2003 :256); and implementing the provisions of a settlement 
and the institutionalisation of the new dispensation as termed by Guelke 
(2003 :56). 
The literature on humanitarian action presented two main areas in 
which it might have a positive impact on the transformation of conflict. 
Using the "peace-related" terms, these are peacebuilding and peacemaking. 
It was argued in the previous section that humanitarian engagement is 
specifically deemed to favour an environment enhancing the likelihood of 
peaceful negotiations. This preliminary observation supports the choice of 
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peacemaking activities as a first step towards finding a framework to 
understand better the actual linking process between humanitarian 
engagement and conflict transformation. 
Peacemaking involves a number of different "activities". As Guelke 
explains, in difficult cases, pre-talks, secret talks, multilateral talks, and 
finally the negotiating of an actual settlement are all involved in a complex 
process of peacemaking (2003:56). If indeed, humanitarian engagement 
creates an environment favourable to peaceful negotiations, the impact or 
the link between the process of humanitarian engagement and the process of 
political engagement is situated in the pre-negotiations period. The pre-
negotiation period is especially crucial as it is a turning point in helping 
bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table (Rupesinghe, 
1995 :80). Pre-negotiation may involve 'application of designs and strategies 
intended to bring parties into the negotiation process, the outlining of a 
logistical framework and timeframe for negotiations, and the setting of 
ambitious, yet realistic goals for each stage of initial negotiations' (Ibid.). 
Rupesinghe explains that the "strategic intent" of the pre-negotiation phase 
is to 'reduce intractability', 'to formulate and design a process which bring 
parties to the negotiating table', 'to begin trust [".] and confidence 
building' (Ibid.). As Saunders explains it is crucial to 'reach back even 
further and more extensively into the period before that decision to negotiate 
is made, and analyse what can be done to help parties reach that decision' 
(1985 :250). It is within this particular phase of peacemaking that 
humanitarian engagement may playa role. 
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Before looking at the existing strategies and the conditions for 
dialogue that the peacemaking literature has identified, it is important to 
look at the actors involved in the peacemaking process. Indeed, third-party 
intervention and the growing importance of track-two diplomacy in 
peacemaking offers more evidence that humanitarian engagement may 
indeed play a potentially positive role in the peacemaking efforts. Third-
party intervention in peacemaking efforts is often essential (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, 2005: 168). Hostility and conflict escalation can 
easily occur between parties in a conflict. Conflict intervention may 
'dampen the feedback spiral': 
'The entry of a third party, may change the conflict structure and 
allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third 
party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviour 
of the conflictants' (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 
2005: 18). 
Third-party interventions may involve track-one and track-two actors. 
Track-one actors include any type of official actors. The term track-two was 
coined by Joseph Montville in 1982 and is defined as: 
'an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary 
groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public 
opinion, and organise human and material resources in ways that 
might help to resolve their conflict ... [it] is a process designed to 
assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance to manage 
conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and 
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without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for 
advantage' (Montville quoted in Hottinger, 2005:56). 
As Davies and Kaufman explains, second track diplomacy is not 'an 
alternative but complementary system' as it provides 'resources and 
opportunities unavailable at the official level' (2003:4). In fact, a significant 
number of humanitarian international NGOs 'have in the past integrated 
[ ... J conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their portfolios' (Okumu, 
2003:121). 
Galtung argues that conflict can be viewed as a triangle image of 
three elements: contradiction, attitude and behaviours (Galtung quoted in 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005 :9). Contradiction refers to 'the 
underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 
"incompatibility of goals" between the conflict parties' (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:9). Attitudes refers to 'the parties' perceptions 
and misperceptions of each other and of themselves' (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, 2005: 1 0). Behaviour refers to 'cooperation or 
coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility' (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:9). According to Galtung, changes in one of 
these three elements can help bring the conflicting parties to the table. 
This echoes in some ways the process of conflict transformation 
which includes: actor transformation, Issue transformation, rule 
transformation and structural transformation (Vayrynen quoted in Spencer 
and Spencer, 1995: 163). Actor transformation includes 'internal changes in 
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major parties to the conflict, or the appearance and recognition of new 
actors' (Ibid.). Issue transformation focuses on changing the agenda to 'the 
issues on which commonality prevails' from 'the issues on which 
antagonism exists' (Ibid.). Rule transformation aims at changing 'the norms 
which the actors are expected to follow in their mutual relations' (Ibid.). 
Finally, structural transformation refers to a deeper change in the overall 
structure of 'inter-actor relations' (Ibid.). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and 
Miall propose a similar breakdown of the elements of conflict 
transformation adding context transformation, as the social and international 
context of the conflict, and personal and group transformation, which, in 
actual fact, refers to a similar process as actor transformation (2005: 163-6). 
Changes in attitudes, behaviours and contradictions as well as the 
different elements of conflict transformation present a number of conditions 
that favour the likelihood that parties to the conflict will accept to join the 
negotiating table. Miall presents a number of conditions that he deems 
necessary for a peaceful settlement to occur. These can be summarised in 
five important elements. Firstly, he stresses the importance of 
communication channels. This condition may appear rather evident. 
However, channels of communication may not exist as they may be difficult 
to set up in a distrustful environment, especially in internal conflicts where 
governments avoid communication to prevent any recognition of armed 
non-state actors (Miall, 1992:61-2). Secondly, he argues that 'the 
opportunity for parties to air [the parties'] grievances' is essential (Ibid.). 
Thirdly, identifying competent third-parties is necessary to 'relay messages, 
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reduce misperceptions, interpret one party to another and make suggestions' 
(Ibid.). Fourthly, the parties to the conflict need to engage in conciliatory 
gestures in order to be perceived as committed to a peaceful settlement, as 
well as reduce tensions (Ibid.). Finally, a number of "rules of the game" 
needs to be agreed on to structure the proceedings (Ibid.). Recognition of 
the parties involved in the negotiations appears as a most necessary 
condition (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:166). However, as 
recognition also means that parties accept each other as legitimate 
interlocutors, this obstacle may not be easily passed. Saunders points out 
another important element to take into account. He states that, beyond the 
unwillingness to commit to a negotiated settlement, 'the absence on one side 
or the other of representatives with a clear mandate to speak for their side' 
may be a rather important element to take into account (Saunders, 
1985 :254). Conciliation Resources summarises the conditions that 
governments and armed groups voiced in one of their workshops: 
'F or both host government and armed groups, important 
considerations included the level of trust in the other party and the 
perceived depth and sincerity of their commitment to a peace 
process; their absolute and relative strength on the battlefield; 
economic conditions; resource strength; international pressure or 
incentives; their group's goals; and their confidence that a peace 
process will actually produce positive returns for the group and its 
constituents' (2004:9). 
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A number of these elements, as well as the ones stated previously, reiterate 
Zartman's argument that "ripeness" is necessary for parties to a conflict to 
join the negotiating table. 
Zartman presents a rather bold statement on the conditions that are 
necessary for negotiations. He summarises his argument around what he 
terms "ripeness" or ripe moments. Zartman defines ripe moments as 
follows: . 
'Ripe moments are composed of a structural element, a party 
element, and a potential alternative outcome - that is, a mutually 
hurting stalemate, the presence of valid spokespersons, and a 
formula for a way out' (1995: 18). 
Central to the concept of ripeness is the mutually hurting stalemate. Zartman 
states that a number of studies have shown that 'a mutually hurting 
stalemate defines the moment as ripe for resolution' (1995:8). According to 
Zartman: 
'[ ... J [BJoth sides are locked in a situation from where they cannot 
escalate the conflict with their available means and at an 
acceptable costs. Such a stalemate provides a window of 
opportunity that is narrow and highly conditional: it depends on 
perceived rather than objective reality, on a stalemate that affects 
both sides, and on a discomfort (preferably increasing) felt by both 
parties' (Ibid.). 
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In more simple terms, the parties to a conflict will go through a type of cost-
benefit analysis and change from the military options to the diplomatic 
options when the cost of fighting becomes too high (Zartman, 2000:229). 
Zartman acknowledges that the theory presents a number of 
limitations. First, the theory cannot be predictive 'in the sense that it can tell 
when a ripe moment will appear in a given situation' (Zartman, 2000:228). 
Zartman agrees that ripeness theory identifies the necessary elements, but 
these elements may not be sufficient (Ibid.). Secondly, as it is only the 
perception, as opposed to the reality, of a mutually hurting stalemate that 
matters, Zartman proposes a refinement of the theory by asking 'what kinds 
of political conditions are helpful both for perceiving ripeness and for 
turning that perception into the initiation of promising negotiations' 
(2000:235). The proposed areas of further research according to Zartman 
are: 
'More work needs to be done on ways in which unripe situations 
can be turned ripe by third parties so that negotiations and 
mediation can begin, and, of course, the mainstream of negotiation 
research on how to take advantage of ripe moments by bringing 
the parties to a mutually satisfactory agreement needs to be 
continued. The proposed refinements need operationalisation and 
testing. The relationship between objective and subjective 
components of stalemate needs better understanding, as does ex 
ante measurement and evaluation of the ripening process, of the 
[mutually hurting stalemate] itself, and of the escalation process 
leading to it (2000:245). 
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The criticism can be made that Zartman's theory of ripeness does not 
provide a guide for action. It enables us to understand better the necessary 
conditions for a ripe moment to start negotiation. On the other hand, as 
Zartman himself confesses, a more proactive model to ripen situations 
through third-party intervention is needed. Indeed, one can ask: how do 
parties to a conflict come to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate? How 
can parties to a conflict voice this perception and act on it? How is it 
identifiable? Can parties to a conflict be brought to perceive a mutually 
hurting stalemate? What actions can be taken to do so? 
Problem-solving workshops and the concept of interactive conflict 
resolution (ICR) have been attempts at answering some of these questions. 
The idea behind the problem-solving approach is 'to bring representatives of 
parties together in an unofficial setting, to assist them to explore the conflict 
and possible solutions' (Miall, 1992:74; De Reuck, 1990:183; Rupesinghe, 
1995:75; Saunders, 2000:255). The unofficial setting allows participants to 
'explore options in an open, analytical way, outside the framework of 
traditional diplomatic negotiations' (Miall, 1992:74). Interactive conflict 
resolution (ICR) is a term that was introduced in the early 1990s to describe 
the same problem-solving approach (Fisher, 2003 :61). ICR, through small-
group problem-solving workshops, allows conflicting parties to engage in 
'communication, dialogue, analysis, training, or reconciliation with the 
intention of increasing mutual understanding and trust' (Fisher, 2003 :61). 
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There is a strong assumption underlying ICR that 'subjective aspects 
of conflict, such as misperceptions, hostile attitudes and miscommunication' 
need to be overcome in order for parties to commit to peaceful negotiations 
(Fisher, 2003:61). It is believed that the informal, low risk, neutral and 
noncommittal environment provided by ICR and the problem-solving 
approach helps to erase the subjective elements (Fisher, 2005:3). 
The aims and objectives of ICR are limited and, as Rouhana warns, 
not to be confused with the objectives of official negotiations (2000:310). 
ICR contributes to conflict transformation and the peacemaking effort in 'a 
slow but dynamic and potentially important [way] through a number of 
effects that characterise social change but are hard or even impossible to 
measure' (Rouhana, 2000:312). Its main contribution is therefore to a 
changing environment "that makes conflicting parties more ready to enter 
into negotiations, to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, and 
to transform the relationship in the wake of a political agreement''' (Kelman 
quoted in Rouhana, 2000:312). The process of ICR is complementary to 
official efforts, but not a substitute, and can have 'a unique potential as a 
prenegotiation method' (Fisher, 2003:61-2). 
The potential impact of ICR can be traced through "learning" 
(Rouhana, 2000:309; Kelman, 1990) or "transfer effects" (Lieberfeld, 
2005). From his experience in workshops between Israelis and Palestinians, 
Kelman explains that participants will make four important learning 
experiences. First, participants learn that 'there is someone to talk on the 
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other side and something to talk about'. Secondly, participants gain 'some 
insights into the perspective of the other party'. Thirdly, participants learn to 
develop 'greater awareness of changes that have taken place in the 
adversary'. Finally, participants learn about 'the significance of gestures and 
symbolic acts and become more aware of actions they could take that would 
be meaningful to the other' (Kelman, 1990:211-3). 
Lieberfeld identifies three types of transfers: political transfers, 
substantive transfers, procedural transfers. Political transfers foster the 
support for negotiations, as well as support the "diplomatists" on either side 
of the conflict (Lieberfeld, 2005: 121). Substantive transfers include the 
olarification of positions and the generation of options to manage the 
conflict (Ibid.). Procedural transfers relate to the 'changes in the political 
cultures on each side in ways that make the parties more receptive to 
negotiation' (Ibid.). Fisher argues that the transfers can happen at the 
individual and conceptual level. At the individual level, 'new realisations, 
attitudes, orientation and other cognitive changes [ ... ] affect how they see 
the other party'. In addition to this, individual participants acquire a new 
analysis and a new way of describing the conflict'. At the conceptual level, 
the problem-solving workshops can 'produce creative ideas, directions, 
options and recommendations'. Participants may develop a 'changed 
relation with members of the adversaries' and create' structural connections 
with the other side' (Fisher, 2005:216). 
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These transfers, or learning experiences, can only have a political 
impact if they are transcribed and assimilated into political behaviour 
(Rouhana, 2000:309; Fisher, 2005:5). The impact will also be greater 
depending on the stage of conflict. The prenegotiation stage may be the time 
when ICR contributes the most to the peacemaking efforts, mainly through 
the legitimising effect (Rouhana, 2000:314-5). Indeed, the problem-solving 
workshops and ICR approach may legitimise meetings between adversaries 
as well as each other as representatives of each side of the conflict. As 
Fisher argues: 
'The typical process and outcomes of workshops are deemed to 
include more open and accurate communication, more accurate 
and differentiated perceptions and images, increased trust, and a 
cooperative orientation, all of which may be transferable to official 
interactions. Such changes in attitudes and orientations are seen to 
underlie the "perceptual drift" that has to occur for parties to 
consider entering into negotiations' (2005:4). 
Transforming violent conflicts include a number of challenges from 
bringing the parties to the table of negotiations, finding an agreement and 
implementing this agreement in a way that peace can be made sustainable. 
Among these challenges, this section has focused on the conditions 
favouring the opening of negotiations as the process of humanitarian 
engagement has been deemed to provide a favourable environment for this 
development. Looking at approaches advocated in the literature on 
peacemaking, two important theories were put forward: ripeness and 
interactive conflict resolution. These two approaches provide a number of 
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"pathways" glvmg some clues as to what the linkages between the 
humanitarian process and political process may be. 
Beyond "Do no harm": humanitarian engagement as peacemaking? 
Some claims have been made that humanitarian engagement with 
armed groups might have a potential impact on peacemaking (Griffiths, 
2000:93, Conciliation Resources, 2004; Ricigliano, 2005; Hofmann, 2004; 
Hay and Sanger, 1992). Most of these claims remain vague as they do not 
describe the exact mechanism that occurs for this potential impact to 
happen. By looking at the literature on peacemaking, a number of avenues 
were identified. Combining these avenues with some of the arguments on 
the impact of humanitarian engagements on conflict transformation, three 
main hypotheses will be proposed as a loose framework of investigation. 
Humanitarian engagement may induce a change in the internal dynamic of 
the armed group 
Engaging armed groups in a dialogue on humanitarian issues has been 
claimed to affect the armed group itself. Prendergast argues that engaging 
armed groups on humanitarian issues will raise the profile of the moderate 
members of the group (1996:126). This was deemed to be the case with the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in EI Salvador 
(Ricigliano, 2005:7;Villalobos, 2005: 37-9). Villalobos argues that in this 
case the group moved from 'an unregulated violence to a regulated violence 
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to a negation of violence' (2005:39). Furthennore, reiterating Saunders' 
argument that sometimes the unwillingness to join talks may be due to the 
absence of an interlocutor within the group (1985 :254), humanitarian 
engagement may provide an opportunity for the anned group to identify a 
number of people within the leadership to take on that role, as the agency 
engaging with the anned group will need a few key representatives with 
whom to enter into a direct dialogue. These people may then keep this role 
when approached for pre-negotiations or negotiations on political issues. 
This argument reiterates some important aspects of conflict 
transfonnation. Indeed, conflict transfonnation includes actor and group 
transfonnation (Spencer and Spencer, 1995: 163; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
and Miall, 2005: 163-6). By raising the voice of moderate factions within the 
group, humanitarian engagement can potentially encourage these actors to 
guide the anned group towards conciliation. These moderate actors may 
also raise awareness, as it is argued in the literature on interactive conflict 
resolution, that there are representatives of the group who are ready to 
engage peacefully in some kind of dialogues. In the same way, Zartman's 
theory of ripeness mentions the necessity to have a spokesperson identified 
on each side (1995: 18). In tenns of the concept of transfers from ICR, this 
can be linked to the political transfers as the engagement process will 
support the diplomatists within the anned group (Lieberfeld, 2005: 121). 
The question remains as to the way these transfers can be "measured". 
Finding evidence that anned groups have in fact adopted conciliatory 
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strategies after humanitarian engagements occurred may be one way. 
Understanding the dynamic of change within the group and trying to 
evaluate whether humanitarian engagements occurred before important 
turning points may give a sense in which the process of humanitarian 
engagement has indeed had an impact on the group. Interviews with these 
"moderate" members may reveal that their role and position within the 
leadership were enhanced by their involvement in humanitarian dialogues. 
Finally, identifying how the members of the armed group involved In 
humanitarian dialogues may also be involved In prenegotiations or 
negotiations may further support that claim. 
Therefore the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Humanitarian engagement affects the internal 
dynamics of the armed group by raising the voice of 
moderate faction. 
Humanitarian engagement may provide a valuable learning experience 
Humanitarian engagement may offer an opportunity for armed 
groups to ease into the practice of negotiations. Starting political talks may 
be a sensitive decision for armed groups as they are entering an unknown 
arena. Indeed, asymmetries in conflict do not only refer to the power 
imbalance around economic and military aspects but also relate to the 
diplomatic imbalance: 
169 
'When armed groups enter negotiations they are entering an arena 
in which diplomacy and international norms largely dictate both 
the formal and informal rules of behaviours - rule which they may 
initially have little or no familiarity' (Philipson, 2005 :68-9). 
The fear and apprehension of being dominated at the negotiating table 
(Conciliation Resources, 2004:9) may be lowered by the armed group's 
experience in humanitarian dialogue. Humanitarian issues are not sensitive 
enough for armed groups to have the same level of apprehension as for 
political talks. The process of humanitarian engagement resembles in this 
way the characteristics of ICR as it provides a neutral and low-risk 
environment. A positive experience in humanitarian engagement may 
therefore help lower the armed group's apprehension to enter into a political 
dialogue. 
The second hypothesis therefore is: 
Hypothesis 2: By offering the opportunity for the armed group to 
acquire greater knowledge of negotiation procedures 
or other skills necessary in the process of political 
negotiation, humanitarian engagement may help the 
group's apprehension to enter in further negotiations. 
Humanitarian engagement may change the relationships between the 
different actors involved in political dialogue 
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Whether it is in Zartman's npeness theory, Galtung's conflict 
triangle or interactive conflict resolution, perception plays an important role. 
Reality does not always matter as much as how the actors in conflict 
perceive each other or their options. Humanitarian engagement can provide 
a turning point in how the armed group, often the actor that no one wants to 
legitimise or recognise, is perceived by other conflicting parties, including 
the government, but also potential third parties. 
The less sensitive character of humanitarian issues may provide a 
role for humanitarian engagement as a door-opener. As Cahill explains, 
'humanitarian action can open doors to negotiated settlements; even in the 
midst of violence, they can create corridors of understanding that eventually 
become permanent bridges to peace' (Cahill, 1999:6). That first step 
towards dialogue may be a difficult one and humanitarian issues could be 
the first foot in the door. 
The importance of opening the door to a dialogue is significant in 
conflicts where communication is either non-existent or complicated. 
Humanitarian actors may through humanitarian engagement create different 
channels of communication on humanitarian issues that could then be used 
to start pre-negotiations (Ricigliano, 2005:7,15). These communication 
channels are especially important with armed groups to understand the 
group better in order to provide the right incentives for negotiations. Finally, 
communication channels are the only way to build the trust and mutual 
understanding necessary for dialogue. The argument is made with 
engagements on the prohibition of landmines: 
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'The fight against landmines, approached inclusively through the 
parallel engagement of state and non-state actors, has provided 
opportunities for direct and indirect dialogue between the 
Colombian government and the ELN that could potentially help 
build trust and mutual understanding required for future peace 
talks' (Reusse-Decrey, 2005:51). 
Trust and confidence-building can enhance greatly the chances of a 
dialogue. Humanitarian engagement can be seen as a conciliatory gestures 
taken by armed groups working towards the building of this trust and 
confidence (Conciliation Resources, 2004: 11-2, Roberts and Harpviken, 
2004 :33). 
Beyond the trust and confidence-building character, when armed 
groups enter into a dialogue on humanitarian issue and make a commitment, 
the perception of the armed group may be changed significantly. As 
Conciliation Resources explains: 
'[ ... ] If a group takes responsibility for respecting IHL and shows 
the ability to implement these commitments, it strengthens the 
perceived credibility of the groups and shows its potential for 
participating in political negotiations' (Conciliation Resources, 
2004: 11). 
Therefore, humanitarian engagement can change the perception of an armed 
group from an antagonistic to a conciliatory entity, and from a non-credible, 
non-committed actor to an acceptable interlocutor. As Jimmy Carter 
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explains, humanitarian engagements can have a legitimising effect on 
ANSAs in the sense that they are accepted as interlocutors (Jimmy Carter 
quoted in Ricigliano, 2005: 12). 
Finally, in the case of Sudan and the SPLMI A, it is claimed that the 
whole process of humanitarian engagement has made the international 
community 'more willing to facilitate negotiations' (Roberts and Frilander, 
2004: 18). Therefore, not only the way the armed group involved in 
humanitarian engagement is perceived by the other conflicting parties 
changes, but the international community, from which most third-party 
intervention in peacemaking comes, perceives the situation as more 
favourable to a political dialogue and less risky for intervention. 
The final and third hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian engagement allows for a continuous 
communication channel between the different parties 
to the conflict. Humanitarian engagement acts as a 
confidence-building measure affecting the dynamic 
among the different actors (NGOs, lOs, UN agencies, 
ANSAs, Governments). 
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Conclusion 
Examining the literature on humanitarian action as well as the literature 
on conflict transformation has enabled us to find three clear pathways 
through which humanitarian engagement may impact positively the peaceful 
transformation of conflict. These three hypotheses will frame the conduct of 
this research. Although each hypothesis will become a starting point for 
empirical research, it will not become a rigid framework and should allow 
other unforeseen impacts to emerge while conducting empirical research. 
Indeed, in the same way humanitarian engagement may have a positive 
impact on the peaceful transformation of conflict, it may potentially have a 
negative impact on the conflict situation. It is therefore paramount that this 
research allows space and flexibility to allow a thorough understanding of 
the impact that humanitarian engagement may have on the conflict. 
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Chapter V: Researching humanitarian engagements with 
ANSAs 
Introduction 
There are numerous issues and problems ansmg from research in 
political science. Researching humanitarian engagement with armed non-
state actors and carrying out research in a conflict or post-conflict 
environment tend to make such issues more problematic. This chapter will 
address these issues as well as provide a discussion on the methodology that 
will be used to carry out the research. 
This thesis exammes whether or not humanitarian engagement with 
armed non-state actors has an impact on the transformation of conflict, and, 
if so, how this impact occurs. The theoretical and conceptual chapters 
highlighted a number of effects that different humanitarian engagements had 
in a number of conflicts on the transformation of the conflict, which 
includes a number of positive effects on the peaceful transformation of 
conflict (Griffiths, 2000:93; Conciliation Resources, 2004; Ricigliano, 2005; 
Hofmann, 2004; Hay and Sanger: 1992). The research therefore focuses on 
examining these effects, understanding them in terms of quality and value. 
In other words, this research aims to understand what these effects are and 
how these effects transform from being unintended results of humanitarian 
engagements to being a factor in transforming the conflict. This 
understanding needs to further include an examination of whether the 
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general impact is a negative one or a positive one. In other words, it is 
paramount to understand whether humanitarian engagement with armed 
groups transforms the conflict situation to heighten tension or transforms the 
conflict situation towards a peaceful transformation of conflict. 
In the previous chapter the following theoretical propositions were put 
forward to guide the evaluation of the question at stake: 
• Hypothesis 1: Humanitarian engagement may affect the internal 
dynamics of the armed group by raising the voice of a moderate 
faction (may affect power distribution and decision-making 
procedures) . 
• Hypothesis 2: By offering the opportunity for the armed group to 
acquire greater knowledge of negotiation procedures or other 
skills necessary in the process of political negotiation, the 
process of humanitarian engagement might reduce the group's 
apprehension to enter further negotiations. 
• Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian engagement may allow for a 
continuous communication channel between the different parties 
to the conflict. Humanitarian engagement may act as a 
confidence-building measure affecting the dynamic among the 
different actors involved in peace negotiations (NGOs, lOs, UN 
Agencies, ANSAs, Governments). 
The theoretical underpinnings of the research will be discussed in 
relation to the research question and the theoretical propositions. The 
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ontological and epistemological positions highlight the researcher's beliefs 
about the nature of the social world (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 1). By 
emphasising political processes and 'how' these political processes evolve, I 
will argue that this research is inscribed within an interpretivist 
understanding of the social world. Interpretivism understands the social 
world not as 'governed by law-like regularities', but as 'mediated through 
meaning and human agency' (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:17). I will argue that 
this theoretical position is necessary in researching political processes in 
conflict as actors' perceptions and the meaning that actors which are 
involved in conflict construe on political processes informs their behaviour 
much more significantly that "objective" truth or facts. Consequently, 
interpretivism leans towards qualitative research methods rather than 
quantitative research methods in order to capture the quality of these 
perceptions and meanings. Finally, the research is inscribed in an 
explorative and descriptive approach as it documents and describes different 
political processes as well as exploring a relationship between a 
humanitarian process and a conflict transformation process (Neuman, 
2003:29). 
Different approaches can be taken to answer the research question. It 
will be argued than a single case study approach is better suited for this 
research in comparison to a comparative analysis of two or more case 
studies due to the topic, scope and time constraints of the research. In light 
of a discussion on the necessary criteria to choose a case study, it will be 
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argued that the case of Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005) appears as the 
most appropriate choice. 
Within the single case study approach, a number of information 
gathering techniques can be used. Within the specificity of this research, 
semi-structured interviews provide the most appropriate method of 
gathering data. This method will be applied during field research in Sudan 
as the research takes a single-case study approach, as well as during more 
general interviews gathering further data to triangulate the findings gathered 
in Sudan. The choice of respondents or sampling method will be addressed 
as well as conceptual and practical problems or issues with semi-structure 
interviews. This discussion will provide further insights from field research 
and will reflect on the limitations that problems encountered during field 
research bring. 
The problems and issues that may arise in carrying out the research 
will be addressed, encompassing some of the prevalent ethical issues that 
this research encounters. An emphasis will be put on the difficulties of 
researching armed groups as well as doing research in conflict or post-
conflict environments. Finally, a discussion of personal bias and the role of 
the researcher will highlight further such ethical issues and difficulties. 
Theoretical underpinnings 
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According to Snape and Spencer, a researcher's beliefs about the nature 
of the social world and what can be known about it (ontology) as well as the 
nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired (epistemology) influence 
the way research is carried out (2003: 1). Along a similar line of argument, 
Korf argues that 'only after we are clear about our own ontological and 
epistemological position, can we discuss methods' (2006:460). Following 
these two arguments, the ontological and epistemological underpinnings 
behind the research will be examined before discussing other conceptual 
and more practical issues involved in research. 
The research question may come first and influence the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of a research project, as well as the choice 
between qualitative and quantitative methods. It may also be that the 
ontological and epistemological biases of the researcher influence the types 
of research questions asked. The choice of qualitative or quantitative 
research may also inform the ontological and epistemological preferences. 
The question asked in this research provides a clear indication of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research. The research question focuses on 
an in-depth understanding of processes, the process of humanitarian 
engagement and the process of peaceful political dialogue, and how these 
two processes might affect one another. Most importantly, the research 
question leads us to ask how actors involved in these processes and their 
actions have been affected. These highlight important characteristics found 
in the interpretist tradition. As March and Furlong explain, 'a researcher 
within the interpretist tradition is concerned with understanding, not 
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explanation [and] focuses on the meamng that actions have for agents' 
(Marsh and Furlong, 2002:21). 
Whereas positivism claims that 'the social world can be studied in terms 
of invariant laws just like the natural world' (Snape and Spencer, 2003:6), 
interpretivism embraces a more complex constructed reality. Following 
Weber's argument, in the natural world, the aim is to 'produce law-like 
propositions'. However, the social sciences aim at 'understanding 
subjectively meaningful experiences' (lbid.:7). The theoretical propositions 
outlined in the introduction emphasise the role of the actors' interpretations 
and subjective experiences of humanitarian engagement. By focusing on the 
change of beliefs within the armed group (Hypothesis 1), the importance of 
the subjective feelings of the armed group by looking at their apprehension 
towards dialogue (Hypothesis 2) and attitudes towards other parties 
(Hypothesis 3), this research seems to lean towards an interpretist tradition 
and qualitative research. 
There is a strong assumption behind the interpretive approach that 
'people mayor may not experience social or physical reality in the same 
way' (Neuman, 2003:77). Therefore, interpretive research emphasises 
people's subjective perceptions of a reality rather than the reality itself. 
Indeed, interpretivism rests on the belief that 'social reality has a meaning 
for human beings' and that people 'act on the basis of the meanings that 
they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others' (Bryman, 2001: 14). By 
focusing on the beliefs, feelings and the subjective experiences of the 
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different actors involved in the processes of humanitarian engagement and 
peace negotiations, the researcher aims at gaining an understanding of these 
actors' behaviours through their own perceptions rather than understanding 
the processes independently of the actors' subjective experiences (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003:3). This research does not seek to uncover the 'Truth' but 
rather it seeks to understand how the perceptions of the different actors 
involved in the process informed their actions. It is important to encompass 
this constructed subjectivity or perceived reality to really understand 
motivations leading to decisions and change of behaviour. 
The choice of qualitative methods seems to naturally apply to 
interpretive research (Snape and Spencer, 2003; Marsh and Furlong, 
2002:21). In concordance with interpretivism, qualitative research provides 
'a greater opportunity to explore beliefs and attitudes' (Harrison, 2001 :79). 
In this way, qualitative research can 'explain "why" and "how" rather than 
just "what''' (Ibid.). In order to uncover the subjective perception of 
respondents, the research needs to focus on depth and quality, rather than 
quantity. As Snape and Spencer argue, 'there is a fairly wide consensus that 
qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with 
understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, 
decisions, beliefs, values, etc.) within social worlds' (2003:2). Furthermore, 
with a strong emphasis on processes in this research, qualitative research 
appears as a strong option as it 'tends to view social life in terms of 
processes' and is concerned 'to show how events and patterns unfold over 
time' (Bryman, 2001:279). 
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Single case study or comparative analysis 
Within qualitative research, different approaches can be taken to 
answer the research question. This section will discuss the reasons for 
choosing a case study approach. Within a case study approach, one can opt 
for a single case study or a comparative analysis of two or more case 
studies. While the benefits of a comparative analysis make it a good option, 
it will be argued that resources and time constraints within this research 
make comparative analysis difficult and would result in a superficial 
analysis. A second section will focus on establishing the criteria for 
choosing a case study. It will be argued that Sudan's second civil war 
(1983-2005) and the different humanitarian engagements that occurred 
throughout the conflict provide a valid case study for this research. Finally, 
further criteria will be discussed to isolate a few humanitarian engagements 
within the pool of humanitarian engagements that occurred during this 
conflict. 
In order to identify which strategy is suitable for a research project, 
Yin provides three criteria for evaluation: '(a) the type of research question 
posed, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural 
events and, (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events' (1994:4). Using these three criteria, I will argue that a case study 
strategy is best suited for this research project. 
The type of research question posed informs to a great extent the 
character of the research. In this research, I ask what the effects, if any, are 
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of humanitarian engagement with armed groups on the conflict 
transformation and how this relationship occurs. Yin categorises questions 
in "who", "where", "how", "why" and "what" (1994:5). He argues that 
"what" questions can sometime be exploratory and any strategies can be 
used in this case (Ibid.). In asking "what effects", the research concentrates 
on a "what" question and therefore can be termed exploratory. Furthermore, 
the research also asks a "how" question as it aims to uncover how the 
relationship or the link takes form between processes of humanitarian 
dialogues and processes of conflict transformation. In asking "how", Yin 
argues that the research is 'likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories 
and experiments as the preferred research strategies' 16 (1994:6). 
The second and third criterion help refining this choice among case 
studies, histories and experiments. The second criteria examines the degree 
to which the research can manipulate or control actual behavioural events 
(Yin, 1994:5). In this research, there is no control or ability to manipulate 
behavioural events. Consequently, an experimental strategy that emphasises 
control or manipUlation cannot be used. The third criteria examines the 
degree of focus on historical past events or contemporary events (Ibid.). 
Where a research deals with the past, historical study is the best suited 
strategy for research as these events involve actors and information that very 
often cannot be created as they belong to the dead past. Following this last 
two criteria, the case study strategy appears as best suited for this 
exploratory research which examines behavioural events that the researcher 
16 Yin extends this claim by stating that 'this is because such questions deal with 
operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence' 
(1994:6). 
183 
has no control over and contemporary events (Yin, 1994:8). As Yin 
explains: 
'In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or 
"why" questions are being posed, when the investigator has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomena within some real-life context. Such "explanatory" case 
studies also can be complemented by two other types -
"exploratory" case studies and "descriptive" case studies' (Yin, 
1994:1). 
Beyond the three criteria for evaluation proposed by Yin (1994), the 
case study strategy benefits this research in other ways. Jorgensen argues 
that case studies 'stress the holistic examination of a phenomenon, and they 
seek to avoid a separation of components from the larger context to which 
these matters may be related' (1989: 19). This research aims at uncovering 
and understanding a relationship between two processes. The examination 
of this relationship involves understanding the different factors that may 
playa role in making this relationship a positive, negative or non-existent 
phenomenon. In understanding the relationship between humanitarian 
engagement and the transformation of conflict a number of possible 
underlying conditions and factors arise, including the characteristics of an 
armed group, the characteristics of the humanitarian engagement itself and 
the nature of the conflict. The case study approach enables this holistic 
investigation. As Denscombe explains further: 
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'The main benefit of using a case study approach is that the focus 
on one or a few instances allows the researcher to deal with the 
subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations. In 
particular, it enables the researcher to grapple with the 
relationships and social processes in a way that is denied to the 
survey approach. The analysis is holistic rather than based on 
isolated factors' (Denscombe, 2003:38). 
As with every research strategy, case studies come with a number of 
limitations. Two main limitations arise. Case studies can be seen as biased 
and subjective as 'the greatest concern has been over the lack of rigor of 
case study research' (Yin, 1994:9). Yin explains that case studies have been 
perceived as providing 'equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the 
direction of the findings and conclusions' (Ibid.). Demonstrating reflexivity 
is therefore paramount and some mitigating measures can be put in place. 
Showing awareness of possible biases helps the researcher understanding 
and mitigate the source of bias. Triangulating data and demonstrating a 
wealth of data allows claims to be made on a stronger stance. 
A second strong criticism of case studies questions the ability to 
generalise from such kinds of research. As Denscombe explains, 'the case 
study approach is most vulnerable to criticism [ ... ] in relation to the 
credibility of generalisation made from its findings. The case study 
researcher needs to be particularly careful to allay suspicions and to 
demonstrate the extent to which the case is similar to, or contrasts with, 
others of its type' (2003:39). Demonstrating the use of criteria to choose a 
case study allows a better understanding of the "type" of case study and 
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therefore the limits to which generalisation can be made. Furthermore, the 
in-depth understanding of the subtleties and intricacies of a phenomenon 
and its environment allows a better understanding of when the findings can 
be applied to another case and when they cannot apply. Yin answers this 
criticism by stating that 'case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, 
the case study is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation 
and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation), (1994: 10). 
A case study strategy can take two main different forms: a single-
case study and a comparative analysis. The next section will evaluate each 
approach examining the advantages and problems of each one. I will argue 
that a comparative analysis would be a valuable technique for this research, 
but due to time constraints and limited resources, a comparative analysis 
would result in a superficial account of multiple cases rather than an in-
depth account. 
Comparison offers the political researcher the possibility to gain a 
better understanding of a process. As Sartori stresses, 'we need to compare 
in order to control the observed units of variation or the variables that make 
up the theoretical relationship' (Sartori, cited in Pennings et aI, 2006:23). 
However, for comparison to work, one needs to start from a strong 
theoretical understanding: 
'An important step in all of these replication procedures is the 
development of a rich, theoretical framework. The framework 
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needs to state the conditions under which a particular phenomenon 
is likely to be found (a literal replication) as well as the conditions 
when it is not likely to be found (a theoretical replication)' (Yin, 
1994:46). 
This research raises a number of questions which defines the nature of the 
research as exploratory. The exploratory nature of this research means that 
the theoretical framework, while having developed a set of hypotheses, does 
not provide a full understanding of the conditions when the phenomenon is 
likely to be found or not. The research aims at understanding better the 
different factors involved in the equation. This situation means that a careful 
selection of multiple cases would be difficult as the criteria to decide on the 
elements of comparison and contrast have not been theoretically predicted. 
As Yin explains, in multiple case analysis, 'each case must be carefully 
selected so that it either ( a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or 
(b) produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical 
replication)' (1994:46). On the other hand, a single case study approach 
enables a rigorous analysis of a complex situation. 
There is a further important obstacle to comparative analysis as 
conducting research in two or more locations and on two or more case 
studies may not be feasible in the time and with the resources allocated for 
this research. As Yin argues, 'the conduct of multiple-case study can require 
extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student or 
independent research investigator' (1994:45). If a comparative approach 
was endorsed, it may lead to a superficial understanding and account of the 
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processes studied leading to a "wide-spread" analysis rather than the "in-
depth" analysis necessary in qualitative research. Indeed, 'focusing on 
comparison detracts from the intensity of single case description and thus 
can lead to less precision' (Stake quoted in Lewis, 2003:50). 
The choice of a multiple case study or comparative approach therefore 
appears problematic. However, the choice of a single case study approach 
offers a number of limitations as well. Conducting a single-case study 
research means that one loses the advantages of comparison. The danger of 
using only one case-study is that the data may be specific to that instance of 
the subject researched rather than telling us something that can be 
generalised to other instances. According to Yin, there are 'several 
circumstances' under which a single case study is appropriate (1994:38): the 
single case represents a 'critical case in testing a well-formulated theory,17 , 
the case represents an' extreme or unique' case, the case is a revelatory case 
as there is 'an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible to scientific investigation' (Yin, 1994:38-40). In the case of this 
research, none of the above seems to apply as there are a number of possible 
cases for the research. 
Yin provides a further scenario where a single case study may apply. 
Yin explains that in the case of exploratory research, 'the single-case study 
17 'One rational for a single case is when it represents a critical case in testing a well-
formulated theory[ ... ]' The theory has specified a clear set of propositions as ell as the 
circumstances within which the propositions are believed to be true. To confirm, challenge, 
or extend the theory, there may exist a single case, meeting all of the conditions for testing 
the theory. The single case can then be used to determine whether a theory's propositions 
are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant.' (Yin, 
1994:38). 
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may be conducted as a prelude to further study, such as the use of case 
studies as exploratory devices or as such as the conduct of a pilot case of a 
multiple-case study' (1994:40-1). This approach would enable a first 
refinement of the theoretical framework through the findings of an in-depth 
single case study. Jorgensen (1989) argues that the choice of a single case 
study can be conducted, leaving matters of comparison and theory 
refinement to further study: 
'Scholarly definition of the problem generally provides a logic 
justifying study of a single case. The phenomenon, for instance 
may be sufficiently important or unique to justify intensive 
investigation. Whether or not, or to the extent to which, the case is 
representative of some larger population may be regarded as not 
especially relevant, or this matter simply may be left to further 
study' (Jorgensen, 1989: 19). 
However, a single case study may still provide an opportunity for 
comparison. In this research, while a single case study approach seems the 
most appropriate, the nature of the research enables comparison at a sub-
unit of analysis (Yin, 1994:41-2). This is what Yin calls 'an embedded 
design' (1994:44). The case study will be defined by the conflict and the 
actors involved. In other words, conflict A involving armed group A and 
government A will constitute a case study. Within this case study, the 
phenomenon examined, i.e. humanitarian engagements with armed groups, 
can be divided up into sub-units of analysis. So within conflict A involving 
armed group A and government A, there are humanitarian engagements 1, 
2, 3 and 4 that can be researched. This would allow comparison on one 
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factor that may play an important role in deciding the occurrence of the 
causal relationship or not. By keeping this examination within one case 
study, the researcher can control for other factors while comparing 
humanitarian engagements and how they effect the relationship between 
humanitarian processes and political negotiation processes. 
With the choice of a single case study and in spite of the ability to 
compare at a sub-unit of analysis, the external validity, or the ability to 
generalise the findings, will be limited. It is important to keep in mind this 
limitation when drawing conclusions from the case study. Nevertheless, as 
the research is exploratory and tries to identify the possible ways of making 
a more systematic approach of the topic in future research, this will not 
undermine the veracity of the findings. 
Choice of single case study 
Two avenues are chosen to evaluate which case study is most 
appropriate for this research. The first avenue will identify a number of 
criteria drawn up from the research question and the conceptual framework, 
as well as taking into account the more practical issues at stake in the 
research in order to identify the necessary logistical criteria. The second 
avenue will provide a justification for the case study chosen, presenting the 
single case study in the light of these criteria. It will be argued that Sudan's 
second civil war (1983-2005) is the most appropriate case study among the 
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population of possible case studies. Finally, the possible limitations of this 
case study will be discussed. 
From the literature, a few cases can be isolated as being significant 
instances of humanitarian engagements and how conflict dynamics have 
been affected. Operation Lifeline Sudan was at the end of the 1980s a 
groundbreaking operation involving both the main armed non-state actor in 
the conflict, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the 
Government of the Sudan under the coordination of the United Nations 
(Loane, 2000; Medley, 2000; Prendergast 1997; Glaser, 2003). In EI 
Salvador, engagement on human rights issues as well as negotiated Days of 
Tranquillity in 1985 to immunise children paved the way towards a 
comprehensive dialogue between the main armed non-state actor, the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Government of 
EI Salvador (WHO, 2001; Hay and Sanger, 1992). The 2000-2001 
Humanitarian Pause in Indonesia became the turning point for peace 
between the separatist Aceh armed group GAM and the Government of 
Indonesia (Huber, 2004). The work of Geneva Call in Colombia, a 
humanitarian NGO engaging armed groups in the landmine ban, opened the 
door for a renewed dialogue between the Colombian Government and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) (Reusse-Decrey, 2005). 
Such instances of conflicts where humanitarian engagement, 
dialogue or agreement with armed groups occurred, provide relevant cases 
to understand whether and how humanitarian engagement with armed 
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groups may impact upon political dialogue and the transformation of the 
conflict. There are two ways to choose a case study in this situation: one is 
to provide a list of necessary criteria that the case study should fulfil; the 
second is to argue why one case stands out as more appropriate to achieve 
the aims of the research. 
There are numerous criteria to take into account when considering a 
case study for this research. Both the substantive and the logistical aspects 
of a case study needs to be examined in order for the research to 
successfully answer the main question asked. Starting from the research 
question to draw the principal necessary criteria as well as looking at the 
logistical constraints of field research, a table with a list of criteria to choose 
the case study will be drawn up. 
Intellectual criteria 
The research question poses the main criteria for the case study. It 
asks the possible effects that engagement with armed non-state actors in 
humanitarian dialogues may have on the transformation of conflict and how 
this engagement may have a positive impact on the likelihood of a peaceful 
political dialogue. There are three important aspects in this question: 
"engagement in humanitarian dialogue", "armed non-state actors", 
"transformation of conflict". The three principal criteria therefore become 
these three aspects: the case study needs to be an instance of an engagement 
in a humanitarian dialogue; it needs to be an example where this 
humanitarian dialogue occurred with an armed non-state actor; and finally, 
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the case study needs to incorporate a conflict which has experienced a 
peaceful transformation. 
While the research examines one case study, a comparison within the 
case study is possible. Indeed, a good case study would enable a comparison 
between different humanitarian dialogues that occurred with the same armed 
non-state actor in the same conflict. This would enable the researcher to 
expand on how the different characteristics of each humanitarian dialogue 
have a different impact on the transformation of conflict as other factors, 
such as the character of the armed group or the character of the conflict, are 
controlled. Therefore, a case study with two or more instances of 
humanitarian dialogues would be best suited for this research. Furthermore, 
the different humanitarian dialogues in the conflict must enable a 
comparison. Therefore each engagement needs to present different 
characteristics: different actors involved in each engagement, different 
humanitarian or human rights issues being targeted, different types of 
agreements, etc. 
The case study is defined in this research as an internal conflict. 
Defining the case study, or the primary unit of analysis, as a conflict offers a 
coherence for analysing and researching processes of conflict 
transformation (Yin, 1994:21). Taking the conflict as the defining aspect of 
the case study may provide some difficulty as one conflict may present a 
multitude of armed non-state actors with sometimes a loose organisation 
and the multiplication of factional groups. This would render the 
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examination of the research question problematic if not impossible. On the 
other hand, taking the armed group as a defining aspect of the case study 
may be an issue as other actors in the conflict may be overshadowed by the 
focus on a single group. 
In order to answer this problem, an appropriate case study should 
provide a conflict where a single armed non-state actor or armed group is 
predominant throughout the conflict. This criterion is necessary to 
understand the evolution of the armed group alongside the evolution of the 
conflict from the beginning of the war until the peace agreement is signed. 
In such a case, the armed group is not only the predominant actor in the war, 
it is also a predominant actor in the peace dialogue. This would enable a 
better understanding of how each humanitarian dialogue may have 
influenced or impacted the armed group throughout the conflict. Finally, the 
armed group in the case study chosen should qualify as such according to 
the definition of the term: (1) use violence as a way to attain given 
objectives; (2) have a political agenda; (3) act outside of state control. 18 
In order to evaluate whether and understand how humanitarian 
dialogue with armed groups may affect the peaceful transformation of 
conflict, one needs to examine a case study where the conflict had two 
necessary characteristics: firstly, the conflict was an internal, intra-state 
conflict as it needs to have involved an armed non-state actor, and, 
secondly, the conflict experienced a peaceful transformation. Experiencing a 
18 This issue of definition is discussed further in Chapter II. 
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peaceful transformation means that either the conflict experienced a 
sustainable cease-fire with on-going substantive peace talks or that a peace 
agreement was signed. In a comparative study, it would have been useful to 
compare a case where humanitarian dialogues with armed groups have 
occurred and where a peace agreement has been signed with a case where 
humanitarian dialogue has occurred but no peace negotiations materialised. 
With a single case study, it seems better to opt for the case where the 
peaceful transformation of conflict has occurred in order to understand 
whether there is a link between humanitarian dialogue and the 
transformation and if so how this link operates. By taking the case where the 
outcome is positive, it enables the researcher to examine further the 
processes by which humanitarian dialogues with an armed group has had a 
potential impact on the possibility of peace negotiations, which is not 
possible where the peace negotiations have not occurred. As Denscombe 
explains, 'the rationale for choosing a specific case, then, can be that it 
contains crucial elements that are especially significant, and the researcher 
should be able to predict certain outcomes of the theory holds true' 
(2003:33-4). 
In addition to this, it would seem a better test of the main thesis if the 
conflict experienced a difficult peaceful transformation. If the case study 
chosen presents a short violent conflict that had an easy peaceful 
transformation, where peace negotiations came early in the conflict with the 
cessation of hostilities, it may appear as if with or without humanitarian 
dialogue, the conflict had a more straightforward peaceful development. 
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Where a conflict lasted for many years and where a peaceful political 
solution was postponed, examining the possible impact of humanitarian 
dialogue in such an environment seems to give a better challenge to the 
main thesis and therefore provides a better and stronger understanding of the 
possible ways humanitarian dialogues may help a peaceful transformation of 
conflict. 
Finally, it is not only necessary that the case study presents a conflict 
where the road to peace was challenging, but it is also necessary that the 
case study presents a conflict characterised by a difficult humanitarian 
situation. By examining a conflict where there was a humanitarian crisis and 
where humanitarian and human rights credentials were poor, the case study 
will also provide a further understanding of how the parties to a conflict 
agree to such a dialogue and are convinced by an engagement on such 
Issues. 
Practical criteria 
Although the substance of the case study remains paramount, a case 
study cannot be chosen if the logistics of field research are too challenging 
or impossible to materialise. Berg (2004) argues that the following criteria 
should be taken into account when deciding the location of the research: 
'1. Entry of access is possible. 2. The appropriate people (target 
population) are likely to be available. 3. There is a high probability 
that the study'S focuses, processes, people, programs, interactions, 
and structures that are part of the research question(s) will be 
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available to the investigator. 4. The research can be conducted 
effectively by an individual or individuals during the data 
collection phase of the study [ ... J' (2004:32). 
Denscombe agrees with Berg and explains that 'in the practical world of 
research, with its limits and resources, the selection of cases is quite likely 
to include a consideration of convenience' (2003:34). Denscombe argues 
that these 'pragmatic criteria' can only provide a basis for choice when 
'faced with alternatives which are equally suitable' (Ibid.). Then only is it 
'reasonable for the researcher to select the one(s) which involves the least 
travel, the least expense, and the least difficulty when it comes to gaining 
access' (Ibid.). For this research, access is a critical aspect in choosing a 
case study. Access can be approached under a number of different aspects 
such as physical access, access to the interviewees, access to information, 
etc. Regarding the possibility of conducting research effectively, issues of 
infrastructure and language appear as the most important in this research. 
Access needs to be available on different levels. Physical access to 
the place of the field research needs to be possible. Access must be granted 
by political authorities whether it is regarding a visa or a different permit 
delivered to travel to the field work area. Beyond this, physical access is 
only possible if personal security can be guaranteed. Even though the field 
work will be taking place in a post-peace agreement environment, security 
may still be volatile as weapons availability is high and small political crises 
may be frequent in a post-war environment. 
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Access also includes access to the subjects of the field work (Berg, 
2004:32). Regarding armed groups, conducting research after a peace 
agreement may entail that the armed group has disintegrated. Then, the 
location of the members of the armed group may be difficult to track as they 
have left that structure. Furthermore, official access and permission to 
interview people needs to be made possible. If the armed group has 
disintegrated, no structure could give this official access or permission. The 
guarantee that interviewees would not suffer from any negative 
consequences from former members or other entities cannot be guaranteed 
in the case where not official access or permission has been granted. 
The location of the field work also needs to provide a certain level of 
infrastructure to make field work possible. Frequent flights, 
accommodation, sanitation, the availability of communication tools such as 
phones and internet as well as small logistical matters such as finding a car 
and or a driver are all necessary components for the success of the field 
work. Finally, where language may be a problem, the researcher needs to 
guarantee that a translator that can be trusted and work professionally is 
made available. 
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Table 5.1,' Criteria for choosing the case study. 
A. From the research question: (1) Humanitarian dialogues. 
(2) Armed non-state actor. 
(3) Peaceful transformation of conflict. : 
_______________________ -------1 _____________________________ _ I 
B. Humanitarian dialogues: (4) Different humanitarian dialogues: 
within the single case study. 
------- ------------ ----- --------------------------
C. Armed non-state actor: (5) Single predominant armed non-; 
state actor throughout the conflict. . 
(6) Match definition: use of violence 
as a way to attain given objectives; :: 
have a political agenda; act outside. 
of state control. 
________ ---1 _______________________________ _ 
D. Conflict: (7) Peace negotiations or peace-
agreement. 
(8) Intra-state conflict. 
(9) Protracted conflict. 
(10) Humanitarian crisis. 
C. Logistical matters: (11 ) Access. 
(12) Infrastructures. 
(13) Language or translator 
available. 
Table 5.1 shows thirteen necessary criteria that a good case study 
should have for this research. The literature on humanitarian engagements 
presents a number of different cases. Reviewing briefly the cases found in 
the literature, the case of the second civil war in Sudan which lasted 
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between 1983 and 2005 involving as the two main parties to the conflict the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) appears as the best case fulfilling most of the thirteen criteria 
presented above. 
Apart from the Sudanese case, the literature covers a number of 
other cases which do not fulfil all thirteen criteria. The Humanitarian Pause 
in 2003 in Darfur would only provide on instance of a very specific 
humanitarian engagement and might be too recent for this study (Slim, 
2004). From the literature, this would also seem to be the case for the 
conflict involving the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or the National 
Democratic Front in the Philippines (Geneva Call), Aceh in Indonesia 
(Huber, 2004), in Angola with UNITA, etc. The singularity and brevity of 
these cases make them unsuitable for an in-depth study method. 
A few cases stand out as being very interesting. The conflict in EI 
Salvador between the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front and the 
Government of EI Salvador presented a multitude of different humanitarian 
engagements that, according to the literature, have played a role in 
facilitating a peace dialogue (WHO, 2001; Hay and Sanger, 1992). UNICEF 
was involved in a campaign against landmines engaging directly armed 
forces within EI Salvador. An engagement on humanitarian law and the 
treatment of prisoners with the FMLN was made. An agreement on basic 
principles of human rights provided the necessary confidence for political 
talks. Finally, an important immunisation campaign was organised by 
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UNICEF with an informal but extensive engagement with the FMLN. The 
issue with this case study is principally that as the peace agreement was 
signed in 1992 and it would seem difficult to track down the relevant people 
to interview in order to gather the necessary data for this research. 
A second interesting case would be the L TTE in Sri Lanka as this 
long-lasting conflict has involved a number of different humanitarian 
engagements (Hofmann 2006; Kleinfeld, 2007). If the research had 
endorsed a comparative approach, this case would have been chosen as a 
case where humanitarian engagements did not have a positive impact on the 
conflict transformation. Indeed, the peace negotiations in Sri Lanka have 
failed so far despite numerous humanitarian engagements. 
Finally, the case of the National Liberation Front (ELN) in Colombia 
and Geneva Call's work on engaging the armed group in a ban against 
landmines would have been a very interesting case study as this very 
specific humanitarian engagement has triggered a significant change in the 
possibility of a peace dialogue between the ELN and the government 
(Reusse-Decrey, 2005). As these negotiations are on-going, this case study 
might present a number of difficulties, especially in terms of the availability 
of the interlocutors. Furthermore, this case does not enable a cross-
comparison of different humanitarian engagements as significant 
humanitarian engagements have not occurred outside of the issue of 
landmines. Finally, the conflict in Colombia does not only include this one 
armed group but a multitude of other significant main actors which would 
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not be taken into account in the case study and therefore may be giving a 
distorted picture of the conflict. 
Case study: Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005) 
This section will argue that Sudan appears as the best choice both in 
terms of the history of conflict and humanitarian engagements and in terms 
of practical realities for field research. Sudan, more specifically the 
humanitarian engagements that occurred during the conflict between the 
southern faction, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement I Army 
(SPLMI A) and the national Government of Sudan, is certainly the most 
important case study cited in the literature on humanitarian engagement 
(Loane, 2000; Medley, 2000; Prendergast 1997; Glaser, 2003). Sudan 
experienced a 22-year long internal conflict between the SPLM and the 
northern Government between 1983 and 2005. Despite the presence of a 
number of different armed non-state actors involved in the conflict, the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement remained the main rebel faction 
throughout the conflict enabling the study of this particular group as part of 
the research on humanitarian engagements. Furthermore, the long-lasting 
conflict in Sudan presented a situation where peaceful conflict 
transformation and peace were difficult to attain offering a real challenge to 
the overall thesis of this research. This case study also appears very 
attractive as it offers numerous cases of engagements differing in terms of 
the types of engagements, the actors involved and the issues at stake. As 
well as offering different types of engagements, humanitarian negotiations 
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in Sudan occurred within the context of gross violations of human rights and 
humanitarian principles from both sides of the conflict and within the 
context of some of the worst humanitarian situations experienced in an 
internal conflict. In other words, humanitarian engagement in Sudan seemed 
a challenging endeavour and researching this process in Sudan can provide 
the relevant answers to the questions asked in this research. 
It appears that the context and history of the conflict provide a rather 
good case study to research, but it is necessary to evaluate the feasibility of 
research and access in Sudan and especially in South Sudan. As a peace 
agreement was signed in January 2005, access to the South is not difficult 
any more and the security situation has remained stable since January 2005. 
The presence of numerous international NGOs and the UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) in the Southern Capital, Juba, ensures a number of 
necessary infrastructures such as accommodation, internet, frequent flights 
and security guarantees. Access to armed groups after a peace agreement 
may be difficult as the transition to peace may entail the disintegration of 
the group. In the case of the SPLMI A, the structure remains through the 
establishment of the Government of South Sudan in Juba and the transition 
from an armed group to a recognised political party. In addition to this, 
personal contacts and links in South Sudan facilitated access and 
authorisation for research within the leadership of the SPLMI A. 
Two important limitations of this case study remaIn. One of the 
criteria for choosing a case study for this research is that a single 
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predominant armed non-state actor is present throughout the conflict. 
Although the SPLM/ A was the predominant armed group throughout the 
civil war, other armed groups were present at different stages of the conflict. 
These other armed groups were mostly disorganised and unstructured. Their 
formation was volatile and sometimes short term. It is therefore difficult to 
identify these small groups. Very often these groups were presented under 
the umbrella terms Anyanya 2 or White Army (Rolandsen, 2005:9).19 
In addition to this, SPLM/ A factions emerged in the 1990s. The main 
break-away faction emerged as a result of an internal leadership crisis at the 
beginning of the 1990s and has changed its name from SPLM-United, 
SPLM-Nasir to South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). It 
represented mostly the Nuer tribe, historically a tribal enemy of the Dinkas 
who were a majority within the leadership of the SPLM/A. The faction 
~ame under the leadership of Riek Machar and Lam Akol (Madup-Arop, 
2006:272-5). There were allegations that this faction 'was quickly brought 
under some unconventional friendship with Khartoum supplying arms to the 
movement' (Keen, 2000:92). Riek Machar signed a peace agreement in 
1997 with Khartoum alongside 5 other southern factions before joining its 
forces once again with the SPLM/ A soon before the start of the substantial 
peace negotiations in 2003. As explained earlier, the SPLM/ A remained the 
most prominent armed non-state actor in the conflict. This was 
19 The Anyanya 2 takes its name for the Anyanya 1, the southern armed group that fought 
against the Government of Sudan in Sudan's first civil war (1955-1972). The Anyanya 2 is 
an umbrella name representing a number of different armed groups 'formed in the South 
before and after the second civil war' (1983-2005). Part of these groups joined the SPLM/A 
while others eventually allied with the National Islamic Front, the ruling party in the 
Government of Sudan (Rolandsen, 2005:9). 
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demonstrated by the absence of other armed groups at the peace 
negotiations as most factions came under the umbrella of the SPLMI A. 
Nevertheless, this can be seen as a limitation of the case study. 
A second limitation concerns the Government of Sudan as the other 
party to the conflict. In the case of Sudan's second civil war, the 
Government of Sudan experienced a number of regime changes. This means 
that the Government of Sudan cannot be seen as one actor but a number of 
actors ruling at different times throughout the conflict. In 1983, Colonel 
Jaafar an-Nimeiri had ruled Sudan since 1969 and was the Sudanese 
President who signed peace with the South in Addis Ababa in 1972. Despite 
a rather secular rule, Nimeiri turned towards a more Islamic regime at the 
end of his rule in order to 'guarantee political stability' (Johnson, 2000:49). 
In the face of rising discontent and protests in Khartoum, Nimeiri was 
replace by Sadiq al-Mahdi during the 1985 elections (Peterson, 2001: 185). 
The most radical change occurred at the end of the 1990s with the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) taking power in a coup. The new regime, led 
by Bashir, radicalised politics in Sudan (Peterson, 2001). Most importantly, 
the coup came at a time when peace was thought to be possible. With the 
new regime, peace was out of the question and the conflict experienced a 
significant turning point as war by proxy, religious ideology and terror in 
the whole of Sudan became new aspects of the conflict (Peterson, 2001: 174; 
Keen, 2000:84, 92; Johnson, 2000:63). 
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The change of regimes in Sudan brings a further variable in the case 
study. The case of a conflict where the Government remains the same 
throughout allows a continuity of actors. This would enable the analysis to 
move away from the changing regimes as a factor in bringing or hampering 
peace and focus on understanding the effects of humanitarian engagements 
on the transformation of conflict. Nevertheless, as the peace agreement was 
signed 15 years after the coup, a significant part of the conflict occurred 
with the same regime in Khartoum and allows us to move away from the 
regime change factor. 
Choice of humanitarian agreements 
Within the case study, a sub-unit of analysis exists. During the 
conflict, a number of different humanitarian engagements occurred. A 
choice of specific humanitarian engagements needs to be made for a number 
of reasons. As for the choice of case study, the time constraints and the 
limited resources available for this research meant that not all humanitarian 
engagements could be examined (Berg, 2004:32; Denscombe, 2003:34). 
Furthermore, not all humanitarian engagements presented valid cases to be 
examined for this research. The first part of this section will discuss why 
certain cases are not valid, while the second part of this section will present 
the humanitarian engagements that were examined in the research. 
It is difficult to draw a comprehensive list of all possible cases. 
Dialogue on humanitarian issues with armed groups in a conflict often 
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occurs on a daily basis in an informal way. Consequently, there is little 
record of the actual humanitarian dialogue with the armed group. In the case 
of Sudan, it is more difficult to draw up this list, as one humanitarian 
agreement encompassed a number of those more informal dialogues. 
Indeed, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) encompassed the humanitarian 
activities of a number of UN agencies, international organisations, and 
NGOs. This agreement was first signed in 1989 with the SPLMI A, the 
Government of Sudan and the UN, and continued throughout the conflict. 
Among the humanitarian engagements that have a formal record, the 
list of possible cases remain small. Operation Lifeline Sudan was a historic 
operation where the UN brokered in 1989 a formal agreement between an 
armed group, the SPLMI A, and a government, the Government of Sudan. 
This agreement set up a framework for humanitarian action in Sudan 
allowing access routes and providing a number of humanitarian principles 
for all actors to adhere to. In 1995, the Carter Center, a US-based 
organisation, brokered a humanitarian ceasefire between the SPLMI A (as 
well as a number of SPLM/A factions) and the Government of Sudan to 
allow the treatment of Guinea Worm disease in the conflict zones. In 1996, 
the SPLMI A made a unilateral commitment to a ban on the use of 
Landmines (Landmine Monitor, 1999). An informal agreement or 
cooperation between UNICEF and the SPLM/A allowed the demobilisation 
of 3 500 child soldiers. In 1999, a humanitarian ceasefire was brokered in 
the Bahr Al Gazal region in Southern Sudan to allow further OLS activity to 
take place. In 2001, the SPLMI A signed a formal agreement, the Deed of 
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Commitment, with Geneva Call, allowing a more formal ban on the use of 
landmines. This formal commitment was followed in 2002 by the 
establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of Sudan, the SPLMI A and the UN regarding United Nations 
Mine Action Support to Sudan. In 2002, a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains 
was signed allowing the Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict 
Transformation (NMP ACT) which allowed capacity building, sustainable 
agriculture and market revitalisation, alongside conflict transformation and 
peace building (Pantuliano, 2005). 
A number of those cases present limitations. The Nuba mountains 
ceasefire and the NMP ACT programme only concerned a small region of 
Southern Sudan. This regional constraint meant that it would be difficult to 
grasp the impact of these engagements on the overall conflict 
transformation. Whereas it is possible to examine the impact of these 
engagements on the Nuba mountains region, it may be invalid to infer this 
impacts beyond the region in question. The informality of the UNICEF 
demobilisation programme and cooperation with the SPLMI A meant that 
researching that process would have been difficult as information might 
have been extremely difficult to gather. The SPLMI A's unilateral 
Moratorium on Landmines in 1996 would not have allowed the hypothesis 
to be tested as the unilateral character of this humanitarian commitment 
meant that no negotiations, dialogues or engagements actually occurred. The 
1999 humanitarian ceasefire in Bahr Al Gazal did not only provide regional 
limitations but was very much a part of Operation Lifeline Sudan. 
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Comparison between different humanitarian engagements can be 
made between most similar cases or between most different cases 
(Druckman, 2005 :21 0). Sampling or choosing cases can therefore follow 
one or the other as a criteria. In choosing most similar cases, the comparison 
allows the confirmation of hypothesis as each case should provide similar 
results. In choosing most different cases, 'a small number of cases [are 
chosen] in order to examine "typical" cases with contrasting profiles of 
variable' (Ibid.). By emphasising the difference between the humanitarian 
engagements, one can start refining the hypothesis and examining how the 
different profiles of variable provide different results. In doing so, the 
research will allow a deeper understanding of how different aspects of 
humanitarian engagements may factor in defining the impact that 
humanitarian engagements can have on conflict transformation. Choosing a 
Most Different Research Design (Druckman, 2005:215) appears best suited 
to allow the refinement of the hypothesis and helps narrow down further 
research on humanitarian engagements to explore other variables that may 
affect the impact of humanitarian engagements on conflict transformation. 
Taking into account the validity of the cases and the most different 
research design, the following cases appear best suited. Operation Lifeline 
Sudan (OLS) started in 1989 and continued throughout the conflict. OLS 
was a wide-spread humanitarian operation facilitated by UNICEF and other 
UN agencies. It was a formal agreement between an armed group, a 
government and the UN. It allowed a number of dialogues on issues of 
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access for humanitarian relief and commitments to humanitarian principles. 
Differing from OLS, the 1995 Guinea Worm Disease Ceasefire took the 
form of a humanitarian ceasefire. It was brokered by the Carter Center, a US 
based NGO which aimed at establishing a health campaign to treat guinea 
worm disease as well as a more wide-spread immunisation campaign. 
Finally a commitment taken by the SPLM banning the use of landmines 
through a Swiss NGO, Geneva Call, and their Deed of Commitment in 2001 
allows a bilateral engagement to be examined. This humanitarian 
engagement was an engagement on humanitarian principles rather than on 
humanitarian services or action. It did not involve formally or directly the 
Government of Sudan and was formally agreed upon by the signature of a 
standard document. Each of these engagements concern different 
humanitarian issues, involved very different actors, at different time in the 
conflict and with different levels and types of commitments. 
Information gathering techniques 
The information gathering took place during two field research periods 
and consisted of gathering information through interviews. The first field 
research period lasted from January to March 2007 and took place in Juba, 
South Sudan, the location where the conflict occurred and Khartoum, 
Sudan, where Government officials reside. The second field research period 
lasted from July to August 2007 and took place in Khartoum, Sudan. In 
addition to this, a number of interviews were carried out by phone or in 
Geneva (the headquarter of Geneva Call and a 'humanitarian capital'). 
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Interviews were carried out with three different types of respondents: 
government officials, armed non-state actors and international actors 
involved in humanitarian dialogue through their work with non-
governmental organisations and United Nations agencies. The research 
focused on a single-case study, the second civil war in Sudan (1983-2005), 
and aimed at triangulating the data from the case study with more general 
interviews that were not case-specific. 
This section will examine different qualitative methods available and 
why the choice of semi-structured interviews is made. Sampling methods 
will then be discussed. Qualitative research rarely relies on probability 
sampling and it will be argued that snowball sampling, or referral sampling, 
appears as the most appropriate technique. Finally, some of the issues that 
may arise from using semi-structured interviews and snowball samplings 
will be discussed. 
Discussion of choices between qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods include a number of different techniques such as 
focus groups, ethnographies, participant observation, interviews, etc. Three 
techniques are identified as being potentially appropriate for gathering data 
in this research: focus groups, participant observation, and interviews. The 
arguments for dismissing focus groups and participant observation will be 
put forward as well as the reasons for choosing semi-structured interviews 
rather than structured or unstructured interviews. 
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The focus group technique consists of orgamsmg small-group 
discussions and gathering data from the interactions of the participants. The 
focus of this technique is on encouraging group interaction and being 
attentive to group interaction for analysis (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999:20). 
The particularity of the focus group technique is to emphasise 'the 
importance of paying attention to group interaction; to group dynamics and 
to the activities engaged in by the group' (Barbour, 2007:3). Lewis argues 
that focus groups offer a number of specific advantages (2003). Focus 
groups, through interaction, give participants 'more opportunity to refine 
what they have to say' (Ibid.:58). Lewis explains that focus groups are 
'useful where what is required is creative thinking, or solutions and 
strategies' (Ibid.). Most importantly, focus groups provide 'a social context 
within which the phenomenon is experienced, and they display the way in 
which context can shape people's views' (Ibid.). 
Within the context of this research, focus groups seem to pose a number 
of problems. The first and most important limitation in using focus groups 
in researching the subjective experiences of state and armed non-state actors 
involved in the processes researched would be the power relationship it 
would create within the focus group. Even if each cluster of respondents 
were to be separated, the power relationship, especially within the 
leadership of the armed group, might hinder interactions. As a result, the 
point of view of the hierarchically highest respondent might silence other 
opinions or perspectives, thus, weakening the depth of information. 
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In addition to this, practical matters may prevent the organisation of 
focus groups as the different respondents may not be in the same place at 
the same time. As the people involved in the humanitarian engagements as 
well as the peace talks are mostly high level and elite actors, the 
practicalities of organising a focus group with such actors may be 
impossible. In gathering information from such actors, the researcher has to 
be flexible with location, timing of meetings and length of meetings. 
Finally, focus groups emphasise the importance of interaction among 
participants. However, this research emphasises the importance of the 
actor's subjective attitude and experience of a process. The research's aim 
differs substantially from the characteristic of the focus group technique. 
Therefore, focus groups do not appear as an appropriate information 
gathering technique. 
Participant observation would provide an invaluable insight into the 
process of humanitarian engagement and peace negotiations. Harrison 
recognises the advantage of participant observation as providing an 
opportunity to witness directly what is researched rather than relying on the 
actors involved to recount their experience, as a way to understand the 
process as it happens as well as grasp the context in which it occurs 
(200 I :80). Indeed, 'observing political behaviour can prove to be more 
illuminating than a formal interview' (Harrison, 2001:81). Jorgensen argues 
that participant observation is especially useful when 'little is known about 
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the phenomenon' and when 'the phenomenon is hidden from public view' 
(1989: 12-13). These two situations apply in researching humanitarian 
processes and peace talks. 
While pointing to the advantages of such a technique, Harrison 
recognises that gaining access may often be impossible (2001:82). If the 
possibility of doing participatory, or non-participatory, observation for 
humanitarian negotiations and peace negotiations was available, this method 
would provide rich data that could be appropriately used to evaluate the 
theoretical proposition and answer the research questions. Unfortunately, 
s,uch processes are not easily opened to researchers. In addition to that, these 
processes occur over an extensive period of time, restraining the possibility 
of doing research in such a way. As Jorgensen explains, participant 
observation is most appropriate when 'the phenomenon is sufficiently 
limited in size and location to be studied' (1989: 13). 
While participant observation seems an unfeasible option, interviews 
enable data to be gathered a posteriori on processes that are not easily 
observable or where participant observation is not possible. There are two 
main reasons for choosing interviews in qualitative research: interviews 
'provide informati0n that may not be recorded elsewhere' (Harrison and 
Deicke, 2001:94); interviews grasp the subjective experience and point of 
view of actors in the process. Denscombe suggests that the need to gather 
data based on experiences and data based on privileged information are two 
legitimate reasons to choose interviews as a data-gathering technique 
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(2003:165). As Burnham et al explains, 'the majority of work by political 
scientists is concerned with the study of decision-makers and hence a key 
research technique for political scientists is what is known as elite 
interviewing' (2004:205). As this research is concerned with the possible 
impact of humanitarian engagement on the attitude and decisions of the 
parties to a conflict to enter into a political dialogue, the use of "elite" 
interviews in studying decision-making seems appropriate. 
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. 
Structured interviews are less used in qualitative research especially when 
the research is exploratory. Structuring interviews too rigidly might distort 
the data gathered by influencing too strongly the respondent in one direction 
and not letting the respondent speak about unforeseen but highly relevant 
issues. Where to position the types of interviews to be carried out on the 
continuum between unstructured and semi-structured is not clear-cut. Some 
kind of structure was used as the research departed from some clearly stated 
theoretical propositions. Evaluating these theoretical propositions was 
necessary. Nevertheless, space and time was given during the interviews 
and more general questions were asked to trigger a more informal 
discussion enabling the respondents to voice more freely some observations 
that were not covered by the theoretical propositions. Bryman explains that 
'if the researcher is beginning the investigation with a fairly clear focus 
rather than a very general notion of wanting to do research on a topic, it is 
likely that the interviews will be semi-structured ones, so that the more 
specific issues can be addressed' (2001 :315). Barakat warns against the use 
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of rigid interviews when carrying out interviews and research on conflict as 
'respondents are commonly affected by fear and suspicion, structure or rigid 
semi-structured questionnaires/interviews, for instance, may appear 
threatening and thus prove an inappropriate means of soliciting data' 
(Barakat, cited in Barakat et ai, 2002:993). Taking these two arguments into 
account, it appears that semi-structured interviews would enable the 
research to evaluate the theoretical propositions that were formulated prior 
to the field research as well as provide flexibility for the respondents to 
elaborate on unforeseen issues. 
Choice of respondents for interviews 
In order to evaluate whether humanitarian engagement with ANSAs 
might have any impact on political engagement, the interviews were carried 
out with actors involved in the humanitarian engagements and to a certain 
extent in the political negotiations. These interviews thus involved members 
of armed groups, government officials as well as any third-party involved, 
such as NGOs, mediators, facilitators, and local actors. The aim of 
interviewing all the actors involved in each humanitarian engagement 
examined in this research is certainly not feasible and this limitation needs 
to be taken into account. The number of interviews conducted was 
restrained by the time available and by whether access was possible or not. 
In addition to this, the initial number of possible interviewees was limited as 
the same actors seem to be involved in different negotiations. 
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Indeed, access undeniably appears to be the most significant obstacle in 
carrying out this research. However, the difficulties seem to be different 
with each cluster of respondents. Access to government officials is difficult 
in the same way any access to an elite might be. The sensitivity of the 
research derived from the context of internal conflict or post-conflict 
environments heightens the difficulty. As Rivera et al argue, 'respondents in 
more politically unstable environments may be a good deal more suspicious 
about the goals and purpose of the research project' (Rivera et aI, cited in 
Burnham et aI, 2004:208-9). Access to the third-parties involved may not 
appear to be as difficult a priori, except when it includes agencies or 
organisations that endorse a principled low-profile or a tradition of secrecy 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, the reality 
during the field research appeared different. Access to third-parties involved 
in the different humanitarian engagements was difficult. This was caused by 
the fact that most organisations and the United Nations have a high turnover 
of personnel. When leaving an organisation or a UN agency, these people 
are then difficult to track. 
Access to the members of the armed group involved in the processes 
seemed a priori to be the most problematic. Indeed, the main issue with 
armed groups is to initiate a first contact or even locate the leadership. The 
identification of gatekeepers seems to be the first step towards trying to gain 
access. There are three ways gatekeepers can be identified in this case: (i) 
some armed groups are highly organised and identifying the armed group's 
spokesperson may not be that difficult; (ii) some armed groups have an 
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extensive diaspora in Europe including "foreign representatives" who can 
provide further contacts within the group; (iii) personal contacts obtained 
through working with an NGO could also facilitate initial contacts with 
members of armed groups. 
In addition to this, the research expanded on the number of interviews 
through snowball sampling. This sampling method identifies a few initial 
respondents who will then refer other potential respondents to the researcher 
(Berg, 2004:36). As Burnham explains, this technique is usually used in 
elite interviewing (Burnham et at, 2004:207). Lee suggests that this 
technique is even more relevant when researching sensitive topics or 
involving difficult to reach populations (Lee, cited in Berg, 2004:36). As the 
researcher may not be able to cover all the populations of relevant 
respondents, a 'saturation point', 'where each interview is adding relatively 
little to the stock of information or understanding', will define the end of the 
data gathering (Burnham et at, 2004:208). 
The preparation of the field research consisted mostly of gaining this 
access by contacting personal contacts as well as contacts from any network 
that I belong to, such as university alumni, former work colleagues, etc. One 
contact leading to another, I was able to gather some practical information 
in order to organise the complicated logistics of the field work as well as a 
number of contacts who were able to direct me towards the relevant people 
that I aimed to interview. This preparatory method is illustrated in the 
network diagrams in Appendix 2. In a certain way, I did not secure access 
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through one gatekeeper but through a complicated network of contacts 
leading to one person or another and so on.20 A number of difficulties arose 
when e-mails and phone numbers were out of service or there were no 
replies. It appears that having as many different contacts as possible is 
necessary in order to reach the information needed. 
Access during the field work in Juba, South Sudan, in January and 
February 2007, where I focused on interviews with the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM)21, the armed non-state actor cluster of my 
sample, took on a different meaning. I was never denied an interview once I 
requested one, but the process of getting to the person was always 
complicated by a number of factors, affecting the data gathered. The first, 
and most critical, obstacle was to find the location of people and their 
offices. The creation of a Government of Unity in Khartoum after the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, 
and an autonomous Government of South Sudan in Juba as well as the 
recognition of the SPLM as a political party means that the former 
leadership of the SPLM has been appointed to these three different entities. 
In addition to this, the death of John Garang, the historical leader of the 
SPLM, shortly after the signing of the peace in July 2005 and the 
consequent appointment of Salva Kiir to the post of President of South 
Sudan and head of the SPLM has caused a number of resignations, changes 
in hierarchy, and some forced departures. Finally, the lack of maps and 
20 For a more detailed overview of the contact network that led me to the relevant people to 
be interviewed see Appendix 2. 
21 Following the signing of a peace agreement in January 2005, the Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Movement was granted a certain degree of autonomy and established the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in Juba, South Sudan. 
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directions within the city meant that locating the different ministries and 
organisations where the interviewees were, was sometimes challenging, 
especially when communication through phones and e-mails is either poor 
or non-existent. 
The second obstacle I met was time. Most of the people interviewed 
were high level people within the Government of South Sudan and, as a 
consequence, their time was very limited. Access was therefore granted but 
with a time constraint, which meant that some interviews were rushed 
through affecting the quantity and quality of data gathered. My time was 
also limited in Juba mostly due to the costs of living in a post-conflict 
environment populated by expatriates from UN agencies and international 
NGOs. This meant that I could not secure follow-up interviews when 
necessary. Furthermore, the use of snowball sampling was greatly affected 
by the time constraint during interviews as I was not always granted the 
time to ask the respondent for referrals at the end of the interview. 
These obstacles were in many ways reduced by the help of "facilitators". 
As mentioned above, I did not identify one gatekeeper but gained the 
necessary logistical help through a number of different contacts. Among 
these, I was helped daily by a group of former child soldiers active in post-
war reconstruction activities who facilitated through their existing network 
the hiring of a car and a driver, as well as directed me around Juba to locate 
the interviewees. 
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The second period of my fieldwork focused on the Government of 
Sudan. This fieldwork took place in Khartoum in July and August 2007 as 
all the main government offices and the ministries are situated there. A first 
attempt in February 2007 to contact the key people to be interviewed within 
the Government had failed as I did not secure the necessary contacts and 
realised the necessity to have a gatekeeper in order to reach government 
officials in Khartoum. Being in Khartoum, I could also interview the SPLM 
members who were now part of the Government of Unity working in 
Khartoum. Once again access to the SPLM members was never denied but 
busy ministerial schedules meant that this process was slow and 
complicated. 
In regards to the Government of Sudan (non-SPLM) officials, the 
experience was rather interesting. I had secured access through an alumni 
student from my department who facilitated contact with a friend in 
Khartoum. This person then facilitated all contacts throughout my stay in 
Khartoum. Relying on only one gatekeeper presented some issues as I did 
not have any other options but to go through this person to secure 
interviews. There were times when the gatekeeper had to leave town or was 
not reachable and this meant that I could not do any work for a few days. In 
the middle of my stay in Khartoum, I spent one week trying to reach that 
person and not getting through to him and therefore not getting any 
interviews for that week. Having more that one gatekeepers or relying on a 
wider network of people while in Juba had enabled me to initiate different 
ways of securing interviews. In Khartoum, I relied both on one gatekeeper 
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for the SPLM members In Khartoum and one gatekeeper for the 
Government officials and this slowed down significantly the pace of 
interviews I was getting. Relying on one gatekeeper for each group of 
interviews presented a further problem as I was using referrals to build-up 
my sample. When the first interview takes time to be set, it is the whole 
process that is delayed. This situation forced me to extend my stay in 
Khartoum involving an expensive, stressful and time-consuming process to 
extend my visa. 
Whereas access was never denied with the SPLM, I was told that certain 
sections of the Government of Sudan would remain inaccessible. It is 
important to note that aspect, as I felt that I interviewed a very specific 
section of the Government, namely the "humanitarian" wing. A large 
majority of interviewees from the Government side had worked or were 
working within the Humanitarian Aid Commission, the official Government 
Commission set up to coordinate humanitarian aid in Sudan. My cluster of 
interviews for the Government side therefore only reflects a section of the 
government that remains slightly detached from the real politics and that is 
more accustomed to the humanitarian discourse of my research. I also felt 
that this section of the Government was more self-critical and open to 
confess violations on the part of the Government. Some interviewees, even 
when working within a government ministry, referred to the more political, 
military and security agents of the governments as "they", clearly detaching 
themselves from the Presidential bureau. This attitude was not reflected 
among SPLM interviewees. Finally, it was surprising to find non-SPLM 
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Government officials inviting me and encouraging me to contact the SPLM 
in order to have "the other side of the story". In that sense, I feel that, 
although access to the key people involved in the humanitarian dialogue 
examined in my research was secured, I could only gather a very specific 
part of the political scenery. 
Disadvantages/issues with interviews 
This section will discuss the main disadvantages that interviews as a 
data gathering technique present. Three main problems can be identified in 
using semi-structured interviews for this research: bias, the use (or not) of a 
tape-recorder, access and the use of gatekeepers. This list is not a 
comprehensive one but this list of issues applies in this research. Whereas 
language and the use of a translator can be an issue, the case study chosen 
did not necessitate the use of a translator and language was not an obstacle 
as all the interviewees spoke English daily in their professional 
environment. Finally, the section on bias will be limited to discussing bias 
relating to the use of interviews as a research method and will not cover 
other problems related to biases that may arise in the research.22 
The problem of bias often arises in using interviews especially with elite 
interviewing. As Harrison and Deicke suggest: 
22 This issue of other possible biases arising from the researcher's personal characteristics 
such as gender, nationality, or attitudes towards the parties to the conflict will'be discussed 
in a latter section. 
223 
'The reliability of interviewees is something we should always 
consider. While information may be inaccurate for very genuine 
reasons (memory lapse), interviewees may also be unreliable for 
ulterior reasons (because they have an axe to grind or wish to 
portray themselves in a positive light)' (2001 :95). 
The problem of bias is exacerbated by the conflict history. The researcher 
needs to be aware of the possibility that government officials, armed group 
leaders and even third-parties may use interviews as a forum for some sort 
of propaganda. Denscombe suggests that 'the research should make efforts 
to corroborate the interview data with other sources of information on the 
topic [ ... ]' (2003: 187). By using the three different clusters of respondents, 
according to the different status and roles that each may have had in the 
processes of engagement, the research uses this type of triangulation to 
evaluate when a respondent is recounting his subjective experience and 
when the respondent is consciously distorting reality. However, as explained 
previously, the perceptions of the interviewees remain the important focus 
of the research and therefore, bias should only be taken into account as far 
as it may not represent the perceptions of the actors at the time. As Schafer 
experienced in researching the conflict in Mozambique, 'stories people tell 
in the post-war period are very different from those they told while the war 
was still raging' (Schafer, 2001 :217-8). The fact that the interviews were 
carried out after the signing of the peace agreement had a certain impact on 
the interviews as the issues of post-war reconstruction, the sustainability of 
peace and trust and reconciliation in the post-conflict period were often a 
forced agenda in the interview. 
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During my interviews with the SPLM especially, I often had to 
redirect the respondents towards the topic of my research during the 
interviews. In addition to this, I was often met with a lack of enthusiasm for 
the research topic as many considered humanitarian negotiations as a 
subject of the past. My questions on trust and confidence-building between 
the conflicting parties during humanitarian negotiations often started a vivid 
discussion on the part of SPLM members on the existing lack of trust after 
the peace agreement. This led me to believe that triangulating between the 
different clusters of respondents on every side of the story was very much 
necessary to ensure that the analysis of the data would detect political 
accusations or propaganda from the real experience of the respondent. 
Surprisingly, Government interviews were not as tainted by the post-
war politics. The issue of trust post-agreement did not emerge. I was 
encouraged by non-SPLM members of the Government to meet with the 
SPLM. Their accounts of the different humanitarian engagements examined 
were often self-critical. On the other hand, this cluster of respondents was 
always careful to divert questions that were too political or that regarded 
peace issues to concentrate on humanitarian issues. The respondents often 
defined themselves as humanitarians and not politicians and distanced 
themselves from the more political and military sections of the Government. 
The use of a tape-recorder might pose a problem. The option of 
using a tape-recorder was put forward for each interviews as it facilitates the 
gathering of data, transcription and analysis. Nevertheless, if the use of a 
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tape-recorder is felt as a hindrance to the way the interview is conducted, it 
should not be subsequently used. Finally, the recording only took place with 
the informed consent of the respondents. The general attitude towards the 
use of the tape recorder was very welcoming and positive. It never appeared 
as an issue as respondents would often tell me themselves that it was a very 
useful way of recording the information from the interviews. A number of 
high level SPLM officers as well as Government officials have PhDs, which 
might explain their understanding towards the use of a tape-recorder. There 
were a few interviews where I did not use a tape-recorder either because I 
felt that the interviewee seemed more comfortable without a tape-recorder 
as it gives a more informal tone to the interview or because the location of 
the interview was very noisy and I was worried that the quality of the 
recording would not be good. 
As necessary as gatekeepers may be, one needs to be aware that 
gatekeepers may bring in their own bias. They may only open the doors to 
certain people, distorting the perception that the researcher will acquire. The 
gatekeepers may reduce and control access to such an extent that the results 
of the research may be skewed (Burnham et ai, 2004:259). As a number of 
different "facilitators" were used in the first period of field research in Juba, 
one person did not control access and therefore the research may not have 
been affected by this issue. As mentioned previously, the use of just one 
gatekeeper in Khartoum for each clusters of interviews presented some 
issues when that gatekeeper was not reachable. It appears that relying on a 
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network of facilitators rather than one gatekeeper is a better option when it 
is possible. 
Finally, access may be denied to such an extent that the data 
gathered may not be sufficient to draw conclusions from. The choice of elite 
interviews means that the sample of interview may already be small as only 
a limited number of people are usually involved in an elite-level process. 
Whereas access did not appear as a significant issue with the SPLM, access 
to certain sections of the Sudanese Government were clearly out of reach. 
This includes the military, intelligence sections as well as any officials close 
to the presidential office. As much as I gained access to the key people 
involved in the humanitarian engagements, I feel that the perspectives on 
certain issues concerning humanitarian engagements such as security issues 
for instance are missing. My fieldwork in Khartoum raised the issue of the 
non-homogeneity of a government apparatus as I feel that the perspective on 
humanitarian engagement that I gathered through my interviews only 
reflects a very specific section of the Government. More importantly not 
securing these interviews with other sections of the Government means that 
the number of interviews carried out with the SPLMI A is higher that the 
number of interviews carried out with the Government. The depth and the 
range of the different high-level SPLM/A interviews means that the research 
provides a better understanding of the SPLM/A's attitudes. Unfortunately, 
as much as I am aware of this pitfall, securing interviews with the military, 
security or intelligence sections of the Government was impossible and has 
to be taken as a limitation in this research. 
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Challenges of researching armed groups: ethical issues and further 
problems 
Researching armed groups in internal conflict or post-conflict situations 
Horgan points out the paucity of publications on methodological 
issues related to the study of "terrorism" and political violence (Horgan, 
cited in Feenan, 2002: 148). Indeed, researching armed groups intuitively 
raises a number of issues and yet the literature does not address such 
problems. This section will look at some of the potential issues that can 
anse m researching armed groups and engagement process in internal 
conflict. 
Smyth claims that 'researching guerrilla movements [ ... J and 
establishing and maintaining the trust and confidence of respondents creates 
a whole range of practical ethical and legal dilemmas for researchers' 
(2001:6). The issue of trust is certainly a central one. Armed groups will be 
suspicious of research. As Black explains, 'research' can be seen as military 
or strategic intelligence gathering, particularly if it is focused on political 
issues surrounding war-making and peace-building strategy' (2003: 102). 
Feenan explained that as a result of this attitude, there is a need to use 
'openness and transparency in dealing with individuals and groups who 
have been (and continue to be) in conflict with, and retain a measure of 
distrust towards, each other' (2002: 155). Hermann explains that conducting 
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research in violent conflicts might reqUire the researcher to have 'the 
appropriate political credentials in order to receive cooperation from the 
subjects of the study' (2002:84). Hermann notes that this condition is 
'clearly not in line with the neutrality dictated by the rules of positivists 
research', although the present research does not embrace the positivist 
principles (2003:84). 
An informal authorisation is gIven to researchers by the SPLM 
through the process of gaining a travel permit to South Sudan from the 
SPLM Nairobi office. The process of application is a rather simple and 
straightforward one. I had to meet an SPLM official before getting the 
permit to discuss briefly my research. The person asked me the topic of my 
research, how the data would be used, and how the research could benefit 
the SPLM. The last question was slightly more sensitive. I replied that the 
research would highlight the humanitarian commitments of the SPLM 
which could only be seen as benefiting them. 
Barakat argues that the issue of trust might be heightened in conflict 
situation as 'the short time often made available to carry out field-based 
research in conflict-affected sites does not permit a close relationship to 
develop' (2002:993). I found that a relationship of trust did not need to be 
built in the case of the SPLM. Research has been carried out on the SPLM 
and with the SPLM and, therefore, the SPLM is used to academic research. 
This may also have been due to the fact that I was accompanied by former 
SPLM child soldiers during my field research in Juba. 
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The issue of trust is closely linked to problems of access discussed 
earlier. Barakat adds that the problem of access may be greater in 
researching conflict as 'the main protagonists, who, by definition, do not 
accept the legitimacy of their opponent's case, any association with the 
'other side' can be interpreted as a hostile act' (2002:992). However, this 
problem is mitigated by the fact that a peace agreement has been signed in 
Sudan. This was very clearly demonstrated by the Government of Sudan 
encouraging me to meet with the SPLM during my fieldwork. 
Leader points out the problem of bias in researching a process in 
conflict. He explains that his research on humanitarian agreements with 
armed groups has highlighted that the different actors involved in the 
process report very different pictures of the same process meaning that there 
was 'partial and distorted reporting by some actors (Leader, 2000:9-10). 
Leader stresses that this makes 'the usual problems of establishing causation 
particularly complex' (Leader, 2000:9-10). Barakat reiterates this point: 
'[ ... ] Respondents may be motivated by what they perceive to be 
the researcher's intentions or potential usefulness. They may 
mistrust the aims and credibility of the process or they may seek to 
use it for their own purposes. In either case, the information they 
give is likely to be false or incomplete' (2002:993-4). 
Barakat identifies another issue: the motivation of respondents in agreeing 
to take part in the research. The researcher has to be aware that research 
cannot be neutral in such an environment. The researcher needs to be aware 
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of the possible hidden agenda in interviewing ANSAs, governments and 
third-parties. Although, the three different sources of information help 
mitigate the bias, it does not prevent an instrumentalisation of the research. 
As Black stresses: 
'[ ... J [AJlthough research could hardly be seen as 'fuelling' the 
war, as it is principally an extractive process rather than a 
supportive one, it is undoubtedly the case that once analysed and 
interpreted, research can represent an object of value to factions in 
just the same way as food is of value' (2003:102). 
The researcher needs to be aware that the research could be used as positive 
publicity for one or more parties to the conflict. The researcher should not 
allow the research project to become a forum for propaganda. 
Feenan stresses an important ethical issue when researching political 
violence. He explains that 'undertaking qualitative research required 
interviews with informants who may personally and/or through the 
organisations they represent condone, actively support or have engaged in 
political violence in the mast' (Feenan, 2002: 154-5). As a result Feenan 
included a statement establishing the commitment of the project to 'non-
violent alternatives to personal assault, threats and shootings' (Ibid.). 
Feenan also warns against the risks that 'the researcher may empathise with 
the insurrectionist tropes of bravery, protectiveness, toughness, and fighting 
for the cause of the under-dog in an unjust 'war" (Ibid.). On the other hand, 
he stresses that 'the researchers were mindful to guard against expressing 
repugnance of interviewees whose behaviour/actions they may have found 
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anathema [as] this is unlikely, in any event, to secure co-operation of 
respondents in data gathering' (Ibid.). 
Smyth takes the stand that 'neutrality in researching violently divided 
societies was not achievable' (2001 :8). Smyth argues that the best code of 
conduct for a researcher is to identify the bias and aim at conducting 
research 'as comprehensive, rounded and detached or objective manner as 
possible' (Ibid.). Hermann agrees that as researchers witness directly or 
indirectly the 'emotional baggage' that accompanies conflicts, it is difficult 
not to feel 'involved' in one way or another (2001 :79). According to 
Hermann, most researchers are indeed 'involved outsiders': 
'One who is personally connected to the conflict by virtue of 
belonging to one of the national religious or ethnic groups 
involved in it, or because of an identification with a general 
political stance such as anti-racism, anti colonialism or non-
violence that is relevant to the analysis of the specific conflict' 
(Ibid.). 
The period of fieldwork made bias a very significant issue. The first phase 
of the field work was carried out in the Southern capital Juba surrounded by 
current SPLM/A people or former SPLM/A. Spending my days with former 
SPLM child soldiers, who, despite their fate, retain the utmost respect and 
loyalty to the SPLM, meant that objectivity became an almost impossible 
standpoint. In addition to this, the general discourse coming from UN and 
NGO workers in Sudan remains anti-Government and can be summarised 
by: 'the SPLM are not angels, but the Sudanese Government is far worse'. 
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This position IS also one that can be found in Khartoum where rising 
criticism of the Government is very present. The second period of fieldwork 
in Khartoum somehow mitigated this bias as I met with a very critical, 
open-minded, humanitarian-oriented section of the Government of Sudan. 
This demonstrates the importance of spending time on both sides of the 
conflict. 
In a politically sensitive environment, Feenan also warns political 
researchers on the sensitivity of language as the 'use of politically 
insensitive language could have restricted access of given the impression of 
bias' (2002: 156). Feenan explains that certain terms were not used in his 
research on paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland, such as replacing 
'punishment' with 'mutilation attack' or not using the terms 
'terrorism/terrorists' (Ibid.). But Feenan also point out that certain terms or 
names such as 'Northern Ireland' needed to be replaced by the 'Six 
Counties' when interviewing nationalists and replaced by 'Ulster' when 
interviewing the unionists (Ibid.). Preparing the field work involved 
meetings with people who have either worked with or carried out research 
on the conflicts and armed groups and provided further information on this 
Issue. 
Five Basic Ethical problems in political research 
Burnham et al identify five basic problems in conducting research: 
, I. Beneficence or the avoidance of harm [ ... ]; 2. Veracity or the avoidance 
233 
of deception [ ... ]; 3. Privacy or autonomy: individuals have a right to limit 
access to infonnation about themselves; 4. Confidentiality[ ... ]; 5. Consent 
[ ... ]' (2004:253). 
Neuman identifies different types of hanns to respondents: 'physical 
hann, psychological abuse and legal jeopardy' (2003: 120). Physical hann 
and psychological abuse do not appear as significant ethical issues in this 
research. Legal jeopardy may arise as an issue in carrying out the research. 
As Feenan suggests, 'the risk of arrest and possible confiscation of materials 
could have substantially detrimental impacts for the researchers, host 
institution, programme funders, and access for further contacts' (2002: 159). 
I would add to this list that the confiscation of materials might be an issue if 
the researcher acquires certain infonnation that may put the respondents in 
jeopardy. The researcher has to ensure that any sensitive data is protected or 
put away in a safe place. 
Consent, the avoidance of deception and respecting the choice of 
limiting access are inter-linked. The researcher needs to address these 
problems prior to carrying out the field research through the identified 
gatekeepers. The gatekeepers and the subsequent respondents should be 
informed of the aim and purpose of the research. The need for translation 
and choice of translators, as well as the use or not of a tape-recorder should 
be addressed during the initial contacts with the gatekeeper and respondents. 
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The issue of confidentiality and anonymity IS an important one. As 
Harrison and Deicke stress: 
'When interviewing party officials in their function as officials, or 
in cases where an interviewee's position in the party or public like 
is vital to what they are saying but makes them identifiable - there 
is, for example, little sense in giving the local party chairman a 
codename if a quote reveals his position - you should send them 
copies of the interview transcripts or the quotes you will be using 
and give them the option of deciding whether there are any 
passages which, with insight, they would rather were treated as 
'off-the-record' remarks' (2001:103). 
This problem should be discussed with all the respondents to try and find a 
solution when problems arise. All interviews were coded according to their 
organisation and a number. For instance, the second SPLM/A interview is 
coded as SPLM02. 
During the field research, I was actually surprised by the lack of 
suspicion from respondents. As noted earlier, recording interviews was 
never an issue and issues of anonymity and confidentiality never arose. 
While making interaction during the interview easier and free of distrust, I 
expected that the real motivation for this non-problematic access was to use 
interviews for propaganda. However, the data gathered during the 
interviews does not seem to qualify as propaganda. On reflection, I came to 
assume that being a young white woman might have reduced apprehension 
as I may have appeared non-threatening to respondents. In addition to this, 
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as the research concerns past events, the research may not have been 
perceived as being a sensitive issue despite the conflict history. 
The role of the researcher 
Beyond the epistemological and ontological assumptions behind this 
research, it is important that the researcher identifies any other biases that 
may intervene while carrying out the research. As noted above, I take 
Smyth's point of view that neutrality and objectivity in researching conflicts 
and divided communities may never be achievable (2001 :8). I worked for 
Geneva Call, a Swiss NGO engaging armed groups on the ban on 
landmines, between September 2004 and September 2005. The experience 
of working as a research and administrative assistant within this 
organisation has certainly impacted my views on the processes of 
humanitarian engagements with armed groups. While retaining 
independence from this NGO as well as academic objectivity, I cannot 
assume that no bias will come into play while carrying out this research. 
In addition to this, my personal academic interests may be perceived as 
bias as it remains focused on the understanding of armed groups in general. 
Therefore, my academic curiosity leads me towards interacting with armed 
groups more than with government officials. During the first phase of my 
field trip in Southern Sudan, I spent time not only with former SPLM child 
soldiers but also with current Sudan People's Liberation Army officers and 
current Government of Southern Sudan officials (former SPLM officials). 
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Research in the field is also affected by the identity of the researcher. 
I realised that access to high-level people within the SPLM and the 
Government of South Sudan was significantly facilitated by my personal 
attitude and the fact that I was a young white female researcher. As 
Devereux and Hoddinott explain, 'showing a willingness to live among the 
community also breaks down barriers and reduces the extent to which the 
fieldworker is perceived as an outsider' (1992: 12). Access was facilitated by 
informal meetings with SPLM people around a drink in the evening. My 
general openness and curiosity was very much appreciated and noticed, 
especially in an environment where the expatriate community commonly 
stays away from SPLM and Government of South Sudan officials. 
The second important factor was my status as a white female 
researcher. I was more noticeable in offices among a majority of black men, 
which often meant that secretaries and office managers would come to me 
first, allowing me to get appointments faster than other people. My age 
allowed some secretaries and office managers to be more informal with me, 
which facilitated access and contacts. I was sometime approached by people 
due to my "exotic look", who then facilitated access to the relevant people 
for interviews. 
Being a young white female researcher also presents some 
difficulties. As Easterday et al explains 'one of the problem a young single 
female researcher has to deal with is "hustling'" (1982:64): 
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'It often appears that the researcher has only two options. She can 
totally reject the advances of the hustler and risk his feeling that he 
has been rejected, or she can welcome his advances and allow the 
female-male relationship to develop. However, either can have 
detrimental effect on the research. An informant who feels rejected 
as a person is not likely to be a wealth of information and co-
operation. In some instances he can disrupt her relationship with 
other informants, and possibly even have her ejected from the 
setting' (Ibid.). 
I experienced a number of tricky situations regarding male-female 
relationships with younger administrative personnel within the Government 
of South Sudan. In my case, rejection was always adopted as the only 
possible solution but, for the reasons mentioned above, it was never a 
straightforward process. I often resorted to lying about my status as a single 
woman and inventing a partner in Europe in order to reject certain 
propositions from men. While my decisions were always respected and the 
decision to remain "friends" accepted, I always remained worried that it 
may effect access to certain people. 
The analysis of qualitative data 
In this research the data was gathered through interviews. The 
analysis of this qualitative data aimed at relating the subjective perceptions 
of interviewees in an analytical way in order to answer the main research 
question. This research examines whether or not humanitarian engagements 
with armed non-state actors have an impact on the transformation of contlict 
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and, if so, how this impact occurs. The research started with three clear 
hypotheses. The analysis thus involved a transcription of the interviews and 
the coding of the transcripts using the three hypotheses as a guide for 
analysis. Further open coding was done in order to identify any findings that 
were not covered by the three hypotheses, thus including all the possible 
answers to the research question. 
A majority of interviews were recorded on a digital recorder. The 
transcription of these interviews was then straightforward as the whole 
interview had been recorded. In some cases, the digital recorder was not 
used as it was deemed inappropriate or the interviewee asked not to be 
recorded in that manner. In these cases, the interviews were transcribed 
from notes taken during and straight after the interview. In some cases, 
direct quotes were noted during the interview when the interviewee 
articulated a crucial idea. 
Deriving an analysis from the transcripts necessitates a strategy for 
analysis. Yin argues that 'the first and more preferred strategy is to follow 
the theoretical propositions that led to the case study' (1994: 103). As the 
research had articulated a clear set of hypotheses, these hypotheses were 
used extensively in a first coding process. The data that related to each 
hypothesis was copied and pasted into a new document in order to provide a 
better organised data for analysis. As Flick explains, coding is 'the 
operations by which data are broken down, conceptualised, and put back 
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together in new ways' (2006:296). This is, according to Flick, 'the central 
process by which theories are built from data' (Ibid.). 
A second round of open coding allowed the data to reveal other 
categories not taken into account in the hypotheses. This second round of 
open coding appears crucial as it allows the researcher to acknowledge the 
data that differs from the conceptual framework. The analysis then moves 
away from the conceptual framework to offer other possible answers to the 
research question. 
In analysing the coded transcripts, Yin proposes the approach of 
pattern-matching (1994: 1 06). Following this approach, the researcher 
'compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or several 
alternative predictions)' (Ibid.). Having all the data for each hypothesis 
organised in one document enabled this pattern-matching approach (Flick, 
2006: 1997 -9). By comparing the empirical data with the theoretical 
predictions, the researcher can analyse when the empirical data matches the 
theoretical predictions and when the empirical data contrasts with the 
theoretical predictions. Finding contrasts between the empirical data and the 
hypotheses enables the researcher to discard a hypothesis or to refine it. 
Conclusion 
This research relies significantly on an interpretivist approach 
allowing the researcher to emphasise the importance of subjective 
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expenences and seemg a phenomena through the eyes of the actors 
involved. The use of a single case study allows the research to gather in-
depth data and therefore provides an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon researched. This approach appeared crucial in researching 
humanitarian dialogues and peace negotiations as decisions in such sensitive 
processes are made on a subjective understanding of the situation rather than 
on a set of objective truths. Finally, the use of elite interviews enabled the 
recording of a process through the perception of the actors involved. 
This research highlights the difficulties and issues of conducting 
research in a post-conflict environment. The logistical intricacies of the 
research as well as the sensitive circumstances caused by the context of a 
long-lasting civil conflict provide a complex and challenging environment 
for research. In addition to this, the methodology highlights the difficulty of 
researching armed groups. 
In spite of these difficulties, field research was carried out 
successfully. The data gathered was rich and provided an in-depth 
understanding of the process of humanitarian engagement as well as the 
impact that it has on conflict transformation. Furthermore, field research 
provided enough data to conduct an in-depth analysis and evaluate the 
veracity of the hypotheses as well as address the research questions. 
2-l1 
Chapter VI: Analysing Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005) 
Introduction 
Sudan's second civil war was the longest-lasting conflict in Africa when 
peace was signed in 2005. The conflict, which involved mainly the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLMI A), started in 1983. Despite numerous peace initiatives, which 
occurred as early as 1988, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), that 
formally ended Sudan's second civil war, was only signed in 2005. The 
difficult peaceful transformation of the conflict left a population in a 
constant humanitarian crisis. The death toll rose to 1.5 million by 2005 
(Balencie and De La Grange, 2005: 185). The 1987 and 1998 famines, due to 
a great extent to the conflict, were a principal cause of deaths. By 2005, 
there were an estimated 4 million refugees and displaced (Ibid.).23 Raids and 
tribal violence facilitated mass displacements. The 1991 Bor Massacre, 
resulting from tribal tensions in the South, left 2,000 people dead and 
100,000 people displaced (Peterson, 2001:218). An estimated 17,000 child 
soldiers were involved in the war and 20,000 "Lost Boys,,24 wandered alone 
throughout the conflict. Table 6.1 summarises the turning points of Sudan's 
second civil war. This civil conflict presents a challenging case to 
23 The population of Southern Sudan was estimated to be between 8 million people (Luk, 
1992:42) and 11 million people. It is therefore an estimated 50% of the population 
displaced during the conflict. 
~4 The "Lost Boys" is the term attributed to the young Sudanese children that found 
themselves separated from their family or orphans. Thousands of children were wandering 
in Southern Sudan and between refugee camps as a result of the conflict. 
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understand how humanitarian engagements occurred and the impact that 
they might have had on the peaceful transformation of the conflict. 
Table 6.1: Sudan's second civil war in a glance. 
-,- 1980s --- 1990s 
--12000-2005 
Conflict Onset of the conf1ic~1 Escalation of violence 
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: SPLM/A 
- ------------- - -,----------------- --- ---- -Consolidation Factionalism 
1983- 1989 1991-2000 
-- --r-Ni~~i~i AI-
Mahdi 
1985-
1989 
Bashir 
1989-Present ! Government of : 1969-1985 
. Sudan 
Humanitarian 
situation 
1987 Famine 
- -
1.5 million deaths 
- ____ • ____________ . ____________ ._0-
4 million refugees and displaced 
-----------.------ --- ------ - -.------
17 000 child soldiers 
Road to peace 
Unified 
diplomatic 
road to peace. 
2000-2005 
------ _. - -
1998 Famine 
Peace 
Initiatives 
Late 1980s peace 
initiative 
"Talking ~hile~ghttng;;-~ I 
. Kokadam declaration 
March 1986 
Sudanese Army 
demands peace 
1989 
Abuja IGAD 
I and 1994-2005 
II 
• 1992-
94 Peace Khartoum 
initiativ Peace 
es 1995 Agreement 
(Carter 1997 
Center, (Governmen 
I Iran, t of Sudan 
j Libya, and six 
Malawi, southern 
South factions) 
: Africa) 
. Comprehensiv 
e Peace 
I Agreement 
IGAD 
Naivasha, 
Kenya 
January 2005 
The Republic of Sudan acquired its independence in 1956 from 
Great Britain. The largest country in Africa, Sudan shares borders with 
Egypt and Libya in the north, Eritrea and Ethiopia in the East, Kenya, 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African 
Republic in the south, and Chad in the west as Map 6.1 shows. 
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Map 6.1: Map of Sudan and neighbouring countries (Jyob and Khadiagala, 
2006). 
Sudan hosts a myriad of religions, cultures and languages . With a 
population estimated at 20 million in 1983 (around 40 million today) at the 
onset of the war, it is believed that there are over 100 languages and 300 
tribes (UNDP, Sudan 2008). The main di visions in the population remain 
between the majority of Africans (around 60%) and a minority of Arabs 
2-+4 
(30%) (Albino, 1970: 1-4). Sudan is a land of diversity and perhaps the 
mismanagement of this diversity explains its conflictual nature. Indeed, as 
the second civil war started in 1983, Sudan had been slowly recovering from 
a first civil conflict (1956-1972) between the South and the North. 
The economy, greatly damaged by this first conflict, was at the onset 
of the second civil war, crumbling under debts, a declining agricultural 
output, a negative annual growth rate (-5.7% in 1980) and an external debt 
of $6.3 billion (Johnson, 2000:49). With arid desert prevailing in the North 
despite the Nile flowing from north to south and a tropical climate in the 
South, Sudan's main resources come from agriculture and petroleum. A 
majority of the Sudanese population still live on farming and herding and 
'agriculture, including livestock herding, remains the main income source 
for 80% of Sudan's population' (UNDP Sudan, 2008). A failed strategy of 
mechanised agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s decreased the potential for 
Sudan to become a major agricultural producer in the region (Johnson, 
2000:49). Oil exportation, which started in 1999, plays a major role in the 
booming economy today (UNDP Sudan, 2008). The discovery of oil in 
Sudan in the 1970s could also be seen as a trigger to past and existing 
conflicts in the country. Resources in Sudan are scarce and therefore 
valuable. From water, arable lands, and minerals, the resourceful south has 
been exploited by the arid north for its survival throughout history. 
Unfortunately today, the benefits of economic growth are only felt in and 
around Khartoum and to some extent in the Southern capital Juba, a pattern 
of economic discrimination that has been prevalent throughout Sudan's 
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history (Ibid.). Life outside these capital cities remam primitive where 
illiteracy is great, access to potable water problematic and malnutrition still 
prevalent. 
The political economy, geography, demography and history of Sudan 
provide a complex environment in which to understand how the second civil 
war started, continued and ended?5 This chapter aims to analyse the conflict 
by examining the actors of the conflict, the causes of the conflict, its 
continuation and finally its impact. Any research examining a process of 
humanitarian or peace negotiations that occurred within a conflict needs to 
gain an understanding of that conflict. Therefore, in order to understand the 
possible impact of humanitarian engagements or dialogue that occurred 
during Sudan's second civil war on the peaceful transformation of that 
conflict, it is necessary to understand the conflict in question. 
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the two main 
actors of the conflict, the Government of Sudan and the SPLMI A. These 
two actors were the main belligerents throughout the conflict, the main 
actors involved in the humanitarian engagements researched, and the two 
actors that were necessary to sign a sustainable peace agreement. Regarding 
the Government of Sudan, an emphasis is made on the Bashir regime (1989-
Present) as it is under Bashir that most of the conflict unfolded. The 
25 Brusset speaks of the "striking geography" of Sudan: 'Seen historically, it is region in 
which the interests of different empires - modem day Ethiopia, Egypt, Chad and Uganda-
have overlapped as it has at different times fallen within various countries' spheres of 
influence. All the neighbours share a little of the Sudanese identity. Sudan can also be 
described as centred on the basin of one of the most strategic water systems in the world, 
the Nile, which has been vital to the life of Egypt. It has a significant agricultural potential, 
and contains deposits of oil and gold, even if of a low quality' (Brusset, 2000: I 32). 
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SPLMI A was the main southern anned group. A number of small factions 
and militias were active throughout the conflict. However, these groups 
were not the main actors of the conflict or the peace and therefore will not 
be the focus of this analysis. In order to understand the SPLMI A as an 
anned non-state actor, the framework of analysis presented in Chapter II 
will be taken as a basis for analysis. 
The second section of the chapter will focus on analysing Sudan's 
second civil war (1983-2005). A theoretical discussion on conflict analysis 
will argue that Brown's flexible and encompassing framework (1997) 
provides the best framework for analysing Sudan's second civil war. In 
addition to this- framework, the role of natural resources, oil in particular, as 
well as the flawed peace process that ended the first civil war will be 
examined as possible triggers of Sudan's second civil war in 1983. 
Whereas the causes of the conflict will be examined using Brown's 
framework, the last section will examine the reasons for the continuation of 
the conflict, the evolution of the conflict and the peace initiatives that were 
made throughout the conflict. Understanding the causes and the reasons 
behind the continuation of the conflict brings into perspective the possible 
impact or the role that humanitarian dialogue may have played in helping or 
favouring a more peaceful transfonnation in the conflict. 
Finally, grasping the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis and violations 
that resulted from the conflict provides a better idea of the challenges and 
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importance of engaging the actors of the conflict on humanitarian issues. 
Understanding the humanitarian context and impact of the war enables a 
better understanding of the humanitarian engagements that occurred, how 
they occurred and why and this is therefore a central aspect of this analysis. 
The Actors of the conflict 
The second civil war in Sudan involved a number of different actors. 
On one side the Government of Sudan and on the other armed non-state 
actors. Throughout the conflict, changes in both the Government of Sudan 
and armed non-state actors occurred. The Government of Sudan faced in the 
1980s a period of change with the ousting of Col. lafaar an-Nimeiri (1969-
1985), the ruling of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1985-1989) and finally, the taking-over 
of Omar al-Bashir (1989-Present). These changes highlight the sometimes 
violently competitive environment within the traditionally Arabic Muslim 
political, and at times military, elite in the North. 
In 1983, Col. laafar an-Nimeiri had ruled Sudan since 1969 and was 
the Sudanese president who signed peace with the South in Addis Ababa in 
1972. Despite a rather secular rule, Nimeiri turned towards a more Islamic 
regime at the end of his tenure in order to 'guarantee political stability' 
(Johnson, 2000:49). Nimeiri's increasing tyranny and religiosity 
exemplified by his unilateral abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement that 
ended the first Sudanese civil war and the imposition of the Sharia Law 
were early signs of his coming fall (Peterson, 2001: 179). In the face of 
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rising discontent and protests in Khartoum, Nimeiri was replaced by Sadiq 
al-Mahdi during the 1985 elections (Peterson, 2001: 185). 
Sadiq al-Mahdi presented a programme of further Islamisation and 
claimed to implement the "true" Islamic values in Sudan (A dar, 2001:92). 
The end of Sadiq al-Mahdi's regime was marked by the mounting pressure 
from the Sudanese army to start substantial peace negotiations with the 
Southern armed group (lyob and Khadiagala, 2006:90). While these talks 
were on-going, a military coup staged by Gen. Omar al-Bashir ousted Sadiq 
al-Mahdi and put a forceful Islamic regime at the head of the Sudanese 
government. As the Bashir regime saw the most part of the conflict, the 
humanitarian engagements, as well as the peace process, the analysis of the 
state actor will focus on the Bashir regime. 
Numerous southern Sudanese factions were active throughout the 
war. The main armed non-state actor active throughout the conflict was the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). There were three 
different clusters of armed group also active during this conflict. The first 
cluster consisted of armed groups emanating from the first civil war and the 
main armed group in the first civil war, Anyanya I. Anyanya II is often 
described as the members of Anyanya I who did not endorse the Addis 
Ababa Agreement in 1972 and continued an armed struggle throughout the 
"peaceful" years. This loosely organised group still existed in 1983 when 
the SPLM/A was formed. Part of Anyanya II joined the SPLM/A in 
Ethiopia, but some members remained antagonistic to John Garang, the 
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leader of the SPLMI A, and attempted to remam an independent and 
influential armed group with meagre success (Human Rights Watch, 1993). 
The second cluster of armed groups in southern Sudan consisted of 
locally organised defence forces such as the White Army and the South 
Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) (Human Rights Watch, 1993; IRIN, 2006). 
While the White Army was never an identifiable and organised entity, the 
SSDF played a more significant role during the conflict as its integration 
with the SPLMI A after the peace agreement demonstrates. Defining the 
SSDF remains a controversial step. There were allegations that the SSDF 
was a Khartoum-funded local militia aiming to undermine the SPLM/A. 
This alleged alignment with the government of Sudan is often deemed to be 
a purely strategic move on the part of the SSDF which needed to secure 
supplies.26 The SSDF members have claimed to be a continuation of 
Anyanya II fighting against the SPLM/A as they did not embrace Garang's 
ideology. The SSDF remained a loose organisation as different "SSDFs" 
existed in different states throughout the war (SSDFO 1). 
The final cluster of armed groups that can be identified during the 
conflict consisted of break-away factions of the SPLM/A. The main faction 
emerged as a result of the split between John Garang, the leader of the 
SPLMI A, and Riek Machar in 1992. This faction, which has changed its 
~6 There is a certain bias towards presenting the SSDF as a very independent Southern 
Sudanese movement by former SSDF members in the present post-war environment as the 
SSDF has recently joined the SPLM/A. On the other hand, the Government of Sudan wants 
to highlight the cooperation of Southern factions during the war as a way to undermine the 
SPLM/A when Khartoum's control over Southern factions was never extensive and always 
seemed to be a desperate measure by Southern factions to survive at certain difficult 
moments in the war. 
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name from SPLM-United, SPLM-Nasir to South Sudan Independence 
Movement! Army (SSIM/ A), represented mostly the Nuer tribe, historically 
a tribal enemy of the Dinkas who were a majority within the leadership of 
the SPLM/ A. Once more, there were allegations that this faction 'was 
quickly brought under some unconventional friendship with Khartoum 
supplying arms to the movement' (Keen, 2000:92). Riek Machar signed a 
peace in 1997 with Khartoum alongside five other southern factions before 
joining forces once again with the SPLM/ A soon before the start of the 
substantial peace negotiations in 2003. 
The analysis will focus on the two mam actors of the second 
Sudanese civil war: first, the Bashir regime (1989-Present); secondly, the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army led by John Garang. This 
choice is made for two main reasons. Firstly, these two actors were the key 
to peace. A peace without the government or without the SPLM, as the 1997 
Khartoum Peace Agreement shows, would be a theoretical peace rather than 
a real peace. Secondly, the SPLM and the regime of Omar al-Bashir were 
the two main actors involved in the processes of humanitarian engagement 
that this research focuses on. Finally, the SPLM remained 'the major 
challenger' of the Government in Khartoum throughout the conflict, while 
the Bashir regime remained throughout the conflict the longest lasting 
government in Khartoum and the most forceful (Adar, 2001 :90-1). 
The analysis of the SPLM/ A will use the framework of analysis 
presented in Chapter II. As this research emphasises the engagement of 
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armed non-state actors in humanitarian dialogue, it is paramount to analyse 
and understand the SPLMI A as an armed non-state actor. 
The analysis of the data gathered can only occur with a prIor 
understanding of the SPLMI A. Furthermore, the armed group engaged may 
play an important role in deciding whether humanitarian engagements have 
an impact on conflict transformation and whether this impact if positive or 
negative. This section will start with an overview of the Bashir Regime 
(l989-Present) as the state actor involved in the conflict and then provide an 
analysis of the SPLMI A following the framework presented in Table 2.1. 
The Bashir Regime 
The 1989 military coup staged by Omar al-Bashir proved to be a 
continuation in some ways, but mainly a rupture from, previous regimes in 
regards to the civil conflict. According to Peterson, 'General Bashir, with 
the blessing of fundamentalist clerics, began an Orwellian transformation 
that aimed to create a police state replete with Allah' (2001: 181). The 
ideology of the regime differed from previous regimes and new aims and 
objectives for the war seemed to arise. The military strategy of previous 
governments was intensified especially in regards to the use of tribal 
militias. Finally, the human rights and humanitarian records of Sudan 
worsened and consequently isolated Sudan which became a pariah state in 
the 1990s. 
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The ideology behind the Bashir regIme IS represented by the 
National Islamic Front (NIF). The NIF is an Islamist movement established 
by Hasan Abdullah al-Turabi which actively supported the military coup 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:90, Petterson, 2003:21). Bashir embraced the 
Islamist ideas and enforced a strong policy of Arabisation and Islamisation, 
which resulted in halting the peace negotiations that were on-going between 
al-Mahdi's government and the SPLM/A. Consequently, the war became a 
holy war, a Jihad, calling on all the devout Muslims to fight the infidel 
southerners. Bashir did not try to talk peace as he believed that a military 
solution was the only solution. The Bashir regime impacted the war as it 
hardened the discourse of war and religion. As Peterson states, 'when the 
civil war first began more than 45 years ago, religion was hardly a factor. 
But over time, religious aspects have turned into red lines, even a casus 
belli. In the past decade, the war has been transformed that way' (2001: 174). 
The war for Bashir had a number of different aims. The mam 
objective remained to defeat the SPLMI A militarily and re-gain de facto 
control of the South. However, Bashir also aimed at cleaning the oil fields 
of any civilian population which might rebel against his rule. The Sudanese 
army therefore was not only fighting against the SPLMI A, but also 
fomented instability and violence in areas where the oil fields were, to force 
the civilian population to move away from oil fields and resulting in large 
forced displacements. Finally, with the new government, war was not any 
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more restricted to the South, as the Northern population became greatly 
affected by the military COUp.27 
Bashir retained certain military strategies from prevIOUS 
governments. The arming of local militia had started before the COUp but 
was intensified by the Government in the early 1990s. This strategy offered 
strategic advantages as it freed the Sudanese army from fighting a guerrilla 
war. It also provided a political advantage as the Khartoum government was' 
fighting a war by proxy and could then define the war as a South-South 
conflict appearing as the third party trying to protect the people of South 
Sudan from this tribal violence (Keen, 2000:84, 92). The Khartoum 
government went as far as arming the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a 
fundamentalist Christian armed group fighting in neighbouring Northern 
Uganda, which often came to Southern Sudan for raids and safety (Peterson, 
2001:213). 
A second important development was the formation of paramilitary 
units, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) as 'Bashir did not trust his 
military' (Peterson, 2001: 187). The PDF soon became an indoctrination tool 
where all young people of university age were forced to train and fight 
before being allowed to join university. The political indoctrination in the 
27 'General Bashir, with the blessing of fundamentalist clerics, began an OrweIlian 
transformation that aimed to create a police state, replete with AIIah. Purges of the army 
started immediately: within months 3,000 to 4,000 officers and some 11,000 soldiers were 
expelled. Universities were "cleansed" of liberal elements, and unzealous civil servants -
apparently 80% - were replaced' (Peterson, 2001: 181). 
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PDF training camps was mostly religious and presented the southerners as 
an enemy of Islam that had to be eliminated?8 
Both the use of militia and the use of a young indoctrinated force 
resulted in disastrous violations of human rights and humanitarian norms for 
the civilian population. The PDF was known for their 'mindless tactic of 
mass onslaught', waging war by 'burning villages and killing civilians' 
(Peterson, 2001: 187). The use of tribal militias had been consistent 
throughout the conflict and 'their impact on creating famine and spreading 
human rights abuses have been well documented' (Johnson, 2000:63). The 
policy of forced displacement away from oil field resulted in food insecurity 
and starvation for the large Internally Displaced Population (IDPs) in South 
Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2003). More generally, Bashir's policy 
worsened the situation for the civilian population both in the South and in 
the North. As Peterson testifies, 'The pile of Amnesty International reports 
in my Sudan file, detailing detention and human rights abuses against 
vacillating Muslims, from poets to veterinary lecturers, grew thicker with 
each passing week' (2001: 181). The emergence of "Ghosts Houses" in 
Khartoum where torture was carried out became a strong symbolism of the 
regime's policies (Ibid.). 
28 'A unit of Sudan's new Islamic militia, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), paraded past. 
This was the vanguard for PDF forces, that with reserves would soon number 100,000 -
both zealots and conscripts - the Islamic "shock troops" that that year were beginning to 
replace the regular army on the front line. This platoon was young, carried Korans, and 
worn khaki unifonns donated by Iran. The PDF was heralded as God's scourge on the 
rebels, who dreamed of going to Heaven to join the ranks of the martyrs' (Peterson, 
2001:174). 
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The reluctance of the government under Omar al-Bashir to talk 
peace and the belief that a military victory would bring the conflict to an 
end played a major role in the continuation of the conflict. The human rights 
and humanitarian records of Sudan under Bashir coupled with a policy of 
Islamisation that resulted in providing a safe haven for a number of well-
known international "terrorists" isolated the regime on the international 
scene as Sudan earned the label of pariah state in the 1990s?9 It is often the 
case in civil war that governments, because of their internationally 
recognised status, enjoy more legitimacy than rebel groups. In the case of 
Sudan, it has not been the case. Sudan has very often and for a long time 
been treated as a pariah state suffering sanctions from both the United States 
and the UN (Peterson, 2001:184, Jok, 2007:13). 
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
29 'Since [1989) the NIF [ ... ] has become widely known as a regime that has successfully 
used civilian atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide as instruments of domestic political 
repression with impunity. It has ruled with an iron fist and critics have been tortured, 
detained indefinitely without trial, or exiled: it goes without saying that the NIF has a 
dismal human rights record. The use of Arab militias, the Popular Defense Force, to effect 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians accessed of abetting opposition forces in the south, slave 
raiding, the summary execution of twenty-eight high-ranking army officers without trial in 
1989 on trumped-up charges of disloyalty, the execution of business executives on charges 
of illegal currency dealing under the revamped Islamic Law (shari'a), the imprisonment of 
political leaders an exile of others [ ... ], the denial of food aid to displaced persons due to 
allegations that they were supporters of the opposition armies and suppression of basic civil 
liberties like freedom of association, freedom of the press and the persecution of critics who 
pointed out the state's failure to provide services, were all abuses decried by the Sudanese 
public' (Jok, 2007:13). 
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Table 2.1 : Analytical Framework For Armed Non-State Actors. 30 
Name of armed group: 
-- --
History: date formed, important ~ 
turning point. 
Political profile: 
ideology 
aims ~~d-r What ~do~s the armed-lioup try tci~~chieve-th~ough the u~eof 
• violence? 
What are the motivations behind the choice to use violence? ,) ~ 
• Are aims political, economic in character, or both? 
· Is the group ideology a reflection of a particular minority, 
identity, religion, culture? 
Are the aims and ideology shares by all members of the 
group? 
Have the aims and ideology or any answers to the above 
i questions changes since the beginning of the conflict? f 
---f-------~~---- .----------- ------ --~- - -, 
and ! Is there a distinct political leadership? Is there a distinct - , 
, military leadership? What is the relationship between the 
1 Leadership 
, organisation: 
! Military structure: 
I 
: two? 
· What is the hierarchy and organisation of the armed group? c' 
• Is there a decision-making process? Is this process 
• democratic (open) or authoritarian (closed)? 
i Is there effective command and control over all the 
· membership of the armed group? 
-----~~ -------._------
Is there a clear chain of command?What-isthe chaT~oT 
command? 
What is the military strategy? How does the armed group ~ 
i conduct warfare? What is the military capacity and the 
: means of warfare? 
, How many combatants are there? Who make up the armed 
i force: men, women, children, identity? What are the reasons 
; for joining the armed group? Is recruitment voluntary or ' 
: forced? 
; Relationship with ~ Who is defined as the armed g~oup's constituency? 
i constituency: 
. Resources: 
. Territory: 
; Policy towards 
humanitarian and human 
, rights principles, and 
! peace negotiations: 
i What is the relationship between the armed group and its 
,constituency? What factors shape relations between the 
I armed groups and the constituency? 
-"- - ----- -.. - --.~-- ------- -_. --~.--- -------~ --------- ---~~--
How does the armed group obtain the necessary resources 
: for its economic survival? Who "sponsors" the armed , 
I 
group? 
: Does the group benefit from the war economy? 
, Does the armed group have territorial aspirations? 
I Does it have de facto control over a territory and ' 
! population? 
[ How is this control exerted? 
: What activities does the group carry out in this territory? 
What is the humanitarian and human rights record of the ., 
: armed group? 
· Has the group taken any commitment toward the respect of 
these principles? 
, What are the justifications for taking up arms and how does 
, it effect the group's position towards peace negotiations and 
political dialogue? 
What is the group's negotiation history? 
How does the ideology and aims of the groups relate or 
i effect their policy towards peace negotiations? 
30 The characteristics of armed groups presented in this section as well as the analytical 
framework proposed are mainly drawn from the following sources: Mc Hugh and Bessler 
(2006), Petrasek (2000), Williams and Ricigliano (2005). The framework proposed is also 
based on a working document used by Geneva Call to understand anned groups they 
engage in the ban against landmines. 
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A brief history and important evolutions in the SPLMIA 
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Anny (SPLM/A) was 
formed in 1983 and soon came under the leadership of John Garang de 
Mabior. John Garang was a high ranking military in the Sudanese Army, 
educated in Khartoum and abroad, from the Bor Dinka tribe. There are three 
important evolutions in the history of the SPLMI A: consolidation of the 
movement, factionalism, reformation. 
In 1983, when the war started, the SPLM/A joined its forces in 
neighbouring Ethiopia. The first few years of the movements were marked 
by a forceful consolidation of the movement under the rather strong 
leadership of John Garang. Clashes between the SPLM/A and the remaining 
members of the first civil war's rebel movement, Anyanya II, were common 
and aimed at weakening the Anyanya movement to allow the prosperity of 
the SPLM/A (Johnson, 2000:59). Assassinations of high ranking military 
leaders were perceived as a "necessary" step for Garang in order for the 
Movement to succeed. 
Consolidation seemed a success as the end of the 1980s were marked 
by numerous military victories. But in 1992, the dictatorial methods of John 
Garang were the grounds on which two high-level SPLM/A members, Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol, decided to split away from the SPLMI A. Machar 
and Akol were hoping to overthrow Garang's leadership and rally support 
for a more democratic movement. Their defections resulted in the creation 
of another SPLM faction settled in Upper Nile and representing mostly the 
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Nuer tribe. The consequences of the split were dear for the civilian 
population which suffered from the tribal conflict that ensued. The 
consequences were also harmful to the Southern cause as the Khartoum 
government could not hope for better but to play with historical tribal 
divisions in South Sudan. 
The third important evolution in the movement was the 1994 
National Convention that brought together hundreds of SPLM/A members 
with the aim to discuss and reform the movement. This Convention 
drastically changed the SPLMI A into a "Guerrilla Government" (Rolandsen, 
2005). The SPLMI A created a clear division between its military wing and 
its political wing, as well as developed a civilian administration in areas 
under its control. Whether these reforms spearheaded with Machar's and 
Akol's criticisms and defections, or whether it was a very strategic move 
from the SPLMI A to embellish its image for the benefit of the international 
community, is not clear. 
Aims and ideology: fighting for New Sudan 
The SPLM/A's ideology focuses on the Southern Problem. Its 
existence is only embedded in the Southern struggle rather than in a political 
or religious ideology. The Southern Problem according to the SPLM/A is a 
national problem as economic development, political and economic powers 
as well as resources are not granted to a majority of the Sudanese 
popUlation: 
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'Yet this reality has been ignored, swept aside, by all the 
governments that have come and gone in Khartoum since 
independence in 1956. These governments have failed to evolve a 
Sudanese identity, a Sudanese commonality, a Sudan 
commonwealth, that includes all Sudanese, and to which all 
Sudanese pledge undivided loyalty irrespective of their religion, 
race, or tribe. Instead, all the governments of post-colonial Sudan 
have emphasised only two parameters of our reality - Arabism and 
Islam - on which they attempted and continue to attempt to base 
the unity and development of the country, only to be confronted 
with rebellions and wars' (SPLM a). 
The SPLMI A presented the Southern Problem as a Sudanese problem that 
was also encountered by other regions in Sudan. As Johnson states, ' 
"Revolution", rather that separation, became the SPLM/SPLA's announced 
goal' (2000:58). This position aimed at rallying other regions in Sudan to 
the fight of the SPLM/A (Ibid.). 
This ideological or motivation for war created a division within the 
movement between those whose objective was to create a New Sudan, and 
those whose objective was to fight for an independent Southern Sudan. John 
Garang's insistence that the "New Sudan" was to become the rallying cause 
earned him many criticisms throughout the history of the Movement and 
created important ideological divisions within the high level members of the 
Movement. Fighting for a New Sudan rather than independence aimed at 
rallying internal support but also at guaranteeing external support (Johnson, 
2000:57). Indeed, the SPLM depicted the conflict as 'being more about 
cultural, economic, and political marginalisation of the peripheries than race 
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and religion' (Jok, 2007: 14). As Jok explains, 'this appealed to a large 
northern population who began to either join the south or set up their own 
regional rebellions against the Arab-run state' (Ibid.). Furthennore, 
Neighbouring states who could become potential supporters of the 
Movement would not align themselves to secessionist movements very 
often fearing secessionist movements in their own country. International and 
regional organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the African 
Union (AU) embraced the status quo of borders in Africa and could not be 
sympathetic to a secessionist struggle. The objectives of creating a New 
Sudan, right to self-detennination, national consciousness and common 
purpose became the rational behind the SPLMI A struggle (SPLM). 
Leadership 
The SPLMI A started as a military movement with a strong 
Commander in Chief, John Garang, at its helm. In the first ten years, the 
movement remained mostly a military movement with a small political 
leadership representing the SPLMI A during the different peace initiatives. 
Although the Movement was always ruled by some kind of Politico-Military 
High Command or some Council, John Garang as both the Commander in 
Chief and the Chainnan of the SPLMI A ruled the Movement in a rather 
dictatorial manner (Madut-Arop, 2006). 
The SPLMI A in a way did not match the chaotic, loosely organised 
image that an anned group may nonnally give. The SPLMI A was a very 
complex military and political organisation. There were three principal 
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branches of the movement: the SPLA, or the military branch, the SPLM, or 
the political branch and the South Sudan Relief Agency (SSRA) (Balencie 
and de la Grange, 2005: 186). 
The SPLA counted approximately 25,000 combatants, divided in 6 
different zones (Ibid.). Each zone had a Zonal Commander reporting to the 
High Military Command headed by Garang. The hierarchy within each zone 
seems to have been more flexible and differed under different commander. 
The SPLA operated both as a guerrilla and a conventional army. The 
military strategy seemed to combine both aspects. 
It was only after the National Convention in March 1994, also know 
as the Chukudum Convention, that real reforms were made within the 
Movement and' an agenda for creating civil structures and reforming the 
movement' was established (Keen, 2000:86). The Movement became 
distinct from the Army, and the civilian administration in liberated areas 
allowed the SPLMI A to acquire a new standing as a de facto government. 
The humanitarian wing of the Movement played a major role in the 
history and development of the SPLM. It is through this wing that most 
contacts with international NGOs and UN agencies were made. The 
humanitarian wing of the SPLM, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association (SRRA)31, was at the centre of the UN led humanitarian 
31 The humanitarian organisation of the SPLM/A has changed names a few times. It is 
mostly referred as the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), but also the 
South Sudan Relief Agency (SSRA) and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
(SRRC). 
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programme Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). This humanitarian wing will 
be an important focus of research for the thesis as it was the mam 
interlocutor in humanitarian engagements. There have been some 
allegations that the SRRA worked to intercept humanitarian relief and divert 
it to the SPLA and its involvement as a humanitarian actor in the OLS has 
always been controversial. 
The economy of the SPLMIA: foreign sponsors and constituency 
The question of resources is always critical for an armed group. The 
SPLMI A found resources in different ways. The SPLMI A had secured from 
its start an important source of supply with the Mengistu regime in 
neighbouring Ethiopia. Choosing a strategy of "revolution" for a New 
Sudan rather than separatism was partly made to conform to Ethiopia's 
interest as the regime was fighting its own separatists (Johnson, 2000:57). 
The fall of Mengistu in 1991 was thus a significant blow to the SPLMI A as 
it lost 'protected bases, secure supply lines, and a source of supply for non 
military as well as military goods' (Johnson, 2000:66). The SPLM/A turned 
to Uganda for new support but also diversified its source of revenue. 
Foreign sponsors are often the main source of support for an armed 
group, but as the fall of Mengistu proved, an armed group needs to secure 
other lines of supply. The South Sudanese diaspora was mostly a refugee 
population and did not have the means to support the Movement from 
outside. The SPLMI A turned to its constituency for support, but this support 
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was never fully voluntary throughout the conflict. A "racketing" strategy 
was therefore put in place as the imposition of a food tax on the population 
'generally freed the civilian population from arbitrary seizures' (Johnson, 
2000:63). Tax was also imposed by the SRRA on all organisations working 
in Southern Sudan. Allegations of food diversion from humanitarian relief 
have been numerous. According to Peterson, 'trainees were "entirely 
dependent on relief food" that flowed unaccountably in the "refugee" 
camps" (2001 :203). It is often claimed that the SPLM/A benefited greatly, 
directly or indirectly, from the "humanitarian business". 
The Movement relied on the population for food but also for 
fighters. With frequent raids on villages by Arab militias, recruitment was 
very often voluntary as Southern Sudanese enrolled in the SPLMI A as an 
act of rebellion against these raids. The shortage of adults, however, in the 
late 1980s, started a less cooperative recruitment of children. The SPLMI A 
would "capture" young children who were taking care of their cattle outside 
villages by promising to provide education for them. Education turned out 
to be military training for most of these children when they managed to 
survive the long walks to the SPLM/A camps (Former SPLM child soldier 
01 ). 
The relationship between the SPLMI A and its constituency, the 
Southern Sudanese people, is a difficult one to define. The SPLMI A 
articulated the grievances of the Southern Sudanese people and in many 
ways was supported by its constituency as they shared this commonality. In 
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that sense, the relationship could be described as symbiotic. With the 
appearance of factions and the loss of Ethiopia as a supplier, this 
relationship worsened. Food taxation and recruitment are strong signs of a 
parasitic relationship and as Prendergast argues these actions were the 
SPLMI A's primary links with the community (1997:57). 
Love and hate relationship: humanitarian principles, human rights, peace 
and the SPLMIA 
The SPLM/A's policies towards international humanitarian norms 
and human rights is controversial and confusing. On one hand, there have 
been many attacks on the SPLMI A for breaches of human rights and its 
attacks on civilians (Johnson, 2000:63). The early years of the Movement 
were very often shadowed by the killing of any SPLMI A members who 
dared to disagree with John Garang (Brusset, 2000: 137). African Rights 
notes that the SPLM/A 'inculcated a callous attitude towards civilians [ ... J 
Of course atrocities happen in many wars; but from the beginning, the 
SPLM/A failed to show a determination to eliminate such actions' (African 
Rights quoted in Peterson, 2001 :203). 
On the other hand, the SPLM has taken many steps towards 
enforcing these norms. Multiple moratoria on landmines and child soldiers 
were made unilaterally, although their implementation did not always 
follow especially in the case of child soldiers.32 Their involvement in the 
J2 Recruitment of child soldiers: 'Reports indicated continued abductions of children by the 
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Demobilisation of children stagnated and 
UNICEF estimated that 7,000-8,000 children remained with the SPLA. Reports indicated 
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OLS and other instances of humanitarian dialogue provides further evidence 
of their commitment to these norms. Official documents and programmes 
clearly state the Movement's commitment towards international norms: 
'The SPLM shall work to promote the national interest of the New 
Sudan and shall respect international law [ ... ]. The Movement 
stands in support and respect of international Conventions on 
human rights and similar international protocols on human rights' 
(SPLM b). 
The discrepancy between certain actions of the Movement makes one 
ponder on the real motivations of the SPLMI A. The SPLMI A understood 
rather well the necessity of speaking the language of the UN and certain 
powerful states to be accepted and recognised. As stated earlier, the 
SPLMI A had at times a parasitic relationship with its constituency and at 
times a more symbiotic one. The contradictory nature of the SPLMI A's 
relationship with its constituency reflects the contradictory nature of its 
humanitarian and human rights credentials. The SPLMI A's position towards 
humanitarian and human rights norms seems therefore to be both one of 
pragmatism and one of genuine concern. This aspect is a central one in 
understanding the possible impact that humanitarian engagements with the 
SPLMI A had on the transformation of conflict and thus will be a significant 
point for analysis. 
that the recruitment and new recruitment of child soldiers occurred frequently' (Human 
Rights Watch, 2004). 
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Regarding peace and dialogue, the SPLM/A seems to always have 
encouraged dialogue and pushed for a political resolution early on. The 
change of regime in 1989 as well as a history of constant violation of 
commitments by the Government in Khartoum has certainly played a role in 
raising apprehension and distrust on the side of the SPLMI A. In its 15 point 
programme in 1998, the SPLMI A clearly pledges a commitment towards 
'peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration among African states, as violent settlement only leads to 
destruction of lives and property and suffering of innocent people, and lost 
development' (SPLM b). The development of a clear political wing and 
civil administration, especially in the mid-1990s provide clear evidence of 
an armed group that aimed at transforming itself into a political and 
governing force rather than a fighting entity. Through this development, the 
SPLMI A also showed their political capacity and presented an armed group 
that was organised, educated and able to negotiate. 
Humanitarian engagement and peace talks involved these two actors. 
Both the SPLMI A and the Bashir regime can be blamed for grave violations 
of human rights and humanitarian norms. These actors were thus 
challenging partners in an engagement on humanitarian and human rights 
norms. The development of the SPLMI A towards a civilian administration, 
as well as its organisation, facilitated dialogue between the SPLMI A and 
different international actors such as the UN. On the other hand, Sudan's 
status as a pariah state meant that both humanitarian and peace dialogue had 
to overcome the diplomatic isolation of Sudan. Sudan's obsession with the 
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possibility of defeating the SPLM/A militarily and the armed group's 
distrust towards the Khartoum government made that the signing of peace 
agreement a most difficult objective. 
Sudan's second civil war: causes, continuation and impact 
This section aims to examine the circumstances that brought about a 
second civil war in Sudan in 1983. Lasting 22 years, it is necessary to 
understand the reasons behind the continuation of the conflict. Finally, this 
section will examine the impact that the conflict has had on the civilian 
population demonstrating the necessity of humanitarian diplomacy in Sudan 
during the war. 
Causes a/internal conflicts and the case a/Sudan's second civil war 
The causes of the second civil war In Sudan are numerous. Brown 
challenges the idea that the causes of internal conflicts are 'simple and 
straight forward' (Brown, 1997:3). Finding a general theory of internal 
conflicts causation remains difficult as on-going debates around the 
prevalence of underlying and proximate causes, greed and grievances, 
internal and external causes still emanate from the literature (Hanlon, 2006). 
As Brown argues, 'it is important to recognise that there are many different 
types of internal conflict each caused by different things' (Brown, 1997:4). 
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Following his argument, Brown presents a flexible framework aimed at 
helping to categorise and organise the multiple causes of conflict. The 
framework consists of two main types of factors: underlying factors or 
permissive conditions and catalytic factors or proximate causes (Brown, 
1997). Within the underlying factors, Brown distinguishes between 
structural, political, economic and social, and cultural and perceptual factors 
(Brown, 1997:5-12). Among the proximate causes, Brown separates causes 
into two categories: '(1) whether they are triggered by elite-level or mass-
level factors; and (2) whether they are triggered by internal or external 
developments '(1997: 15). 
Brown's approach differs from a more traditional inclination to provide 
one fundamental cause. Hanlon highlights the problems with approaches 
that emphasise combatants and leaders alone without mentioning justified 
grievances (Hanlon, 2006:73). Analysing conflict through the sole lens of 
economic arguments (Lukham et aI., 2001; Collier, 1999), or the sole lens of 
ethnicity, simplifies the reality of internal conflicts missing the critical 
reasons behind the location and time of the emergence of a conflict. As 
Hanlon states: 
'We have already noted that ethnic wars were not particularly 
common and that ethnic division could not be used to predict war. 
But combining increasing poverty, grievance and group identity 
does seem to provide some explanation' (2006: 130). 
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Addison and Murshed attempt to take on this criticism. While emphasising 
the lack of construction of a right social contract in Africa as a fundamental 
cause of conflict, they highlight the necessity to look at leadership and 
group organisation in explaining the emergence of a war (Addison and 
Murshed, 2006: 155). 
As Brown's framework allows us to analyse in a more systematic 
way the causes of an internal conflict while allowing a certain flexibility, his 
approach will be applied to identifying the causes of Sudan's second civil 
war while highlighting the shortcomings of his framework. The causes will 
be looked at in two distinct categories following Brown's underlying factors 
and catalytic factors. Two important factors not emphasised by Brown, the 
role of oil (resources) and the failure to resolve previous conflicts and 
implement peace agreement will be added. 
Underlying factors 
Brown highlights four types of permissive conditions: structural, 
political, economic and social, cultural and perceptual (1997:5-12). In the 
case of Sudan, these four conditions are at the heart of setting up a situation 
where conflict became highly possible. 
Structural 
According to Brown there are three main structural factors affecting 
the likelihood of an internal conflict: ethnic geography, weak state, intra-
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state security concerns (1997:5). Ethnic geography in Sudan plays a crucial 
role in creating a conducive environment for conflict. Sudan is more or less 
clearly divided in terms of ethnicity and geography: mostly Arab Muslims 
in the North of the country and mostly African Animists and Christians in 
the South. This clear division allowed Britain to implement two different 
rules in Sudan during its colonisation. The Southern Policy introduced by 
Britain separated South Sudan from the rest of the country as Britain 
implemented a different course of development, education, and governance. 
As Adar explains this policy remained after independence with negative 
consequences: 
'The marginalisation of the southern Sudanese and the Nuba is not 
a recent phenomenon. It was practised by the British colonialists 
and thereafter maintained by the post-independence administration 
in Sudan, and thirdly, there is the ongoing discrimination, 
oppression and repression of the black Sudanese. History therefore 
constitutes one of the prima facie determinants of conflict and 
ethnic polarisation between the north and the south' (2001 :82). 
This ethnic polarisation IS entrenched within a traditional discourse of 
di visi on. 33 
33 'Thus, bi/ad as-Sudan (land of the blacks), the traditional Arabic designation for the non-
Arab lands of Africa, was both a geographic and ethnic terminology bequeathed by 
medieval Arab geographers. The Arab invasions and the transformation of Islam into the 
political ideology, which divided the umma (domain of the believers of Islam) into dar al-
Islam (abode of peace) and dar ai-hard (domain of war, domain of the unbelievers). The 
umma itself is an abstract representation of a transnational community within which 
members of the Islamic faith are embraced as equals. [ ... ] The geography of conflict in the 
Sudan is inscribed in the gaps between the idea of the umma and the ideology of its 
proponents pursuing hegemonic policies of Arabisation and Islamisation as justification for 
the territorial expropriation of their conationals (denigrated as "nominal Muslims", kafirs 
[unbelievers] and abids [slaves]) and the maintenance of a political system premised on the 
logic of conquest. [ ... ] The conflicts in Sudan have been rooted in both the expropriation of 
vast tracts of territories by a dominating group as well as by the superimposition of 
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Britain granted independence to the whole of Sudan in 1956 as 
controversies about South Sudan's right to self determination were raging. 
As Sudan's accession to independence was peaceful, there was no need to 
appeal to a nationalist feeling or organise a popular uprising. The Sudanese 
colonial elite were free to create a country without having to secure a strong 
national consensus or identity. As Johnson states the politics of the 1950s on 
deciding the future of the South led to the outbreak of the first civil war in 
the 1960s and 'remains at the centre of Sudanese politics' (2000:47). Iyob 
and Khadiagala agree that an essential factor leading to conflicts in Sudan 
remains two unresolved fundamental questions: 'would the new state be 
federal or unitary, and would it be officially secular or Islamic in character?' 
(2006:80). 
The pattern of colonisation as well as the pattern of ethnic 
geography, both in its physical aspect and the discourse attached to it, 
impacted the lack of social contract in Sudan, which, according to Addison 
and Murshed is a critical factor in creating the underlying conditions for 
conflict (2006). Rather than focusing on the issue of a weak state as 
proposed by Brown (1997), the lack of social contract seems to depict a 
significant structural factor in creating the permissive conditions in 1983 for 
the start of the war. The relationship between the people and the state, or 
social contract, in Sudan is a problematic one. According to Prendergast, 
governance prior to the nineteenth century created 'groups of people with an 
theological geography that continues to demarcate boundaries between self-defined 
members of the polity and those consigned to the domain of war, destined to become 
objects of violence, pillage and servitude' (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 46). 
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ambiguous status in relation to the state' (1997:4). Britain's colonial rule 
emphasised this issue by dividing the country into two. The very specific 
treatment that South Sudan received may explain the reason why war 
emerged in South Sudan and not in other marginalised areas in Sudan. 
The lack of social contract in Sudan may also be explained by 
established patterns of violent economic exploitation. Johnson argues that 
since the Turco-Egyptian invasion in the nineteenth century, the economic 
exploitation of the south mainly through slave trades and ivory has become 
a sad characteristic of Sudanese life (2000:45). This exploitative power 
relationship between the North and the South present itself through 
continued violence and pillage. Village raids by Arab militias in the South 
are often cited as the reason for Britain's Southern policy in order to protect 
the Southern Sudanese from violence, Islamisation and Arabisation. This 
history of violence has created genuine grievances among the Southern 
population, grievances that helped the emergence of an organised armed 
group in 1983. 
These intra-state security issues heightened with the first civil war 
which lasted from the 1956 until the 1972 signing of the Addis Ababa peace 
agreement between the Anyanya, Southern rebel movement, and the Nimeiri 
regime. Brown's framework for analysing internal conflicts cites intra-state 
security as a factor contributing to conflict (1997), but fails to emphasise the 
extent to which a flawed peace process, peace agreement and the failure of 
implementation plays a major role in contributing to the start of the conflict 
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as well as its continuation. It is difficult to state whether the failure of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement should be categorised as a catalytic or underlying 
factor. Nevertheless, this failed process highlighted the lack of resolution of 
the underlying factors leading to the first civil conflict in Sudan, and 
eventually to the second civil war in 1983. As Prendergast notes, the 'failure 
to obtain a national consensus in either the north or the south in the 1970s 
concerning national unity, regional development, and the balance of power 
between the central and regional governments' was critical for the start of 
the second internal conflict (1997 :4-5). The first civil war was very much a 
result of the long-term causes, especially the rejection of the South's right of 
self-determination, and then of an independent Sudan with a federal system. 
The end of the first civil war (1953-1972) and the Addis Ababa Agreement 
in 1972 failed to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. Many felt 
cheated by the peace agreement and on the eve of peace, some were already 
talking about resuming the fighting. But as Johnson explains, the Addis 
Ababa Agreement was not only unable to fulfil the aspirations of the 
Southern Sudanese people, its implementation was never complete.34 
Political 
Brown cites two important political factors increasing the possibility 
of internal conflicts: discriminatory political institutions and exclusionary 
national ideologies (1997:8). These two factors seem interlinked in many 
ways, and are certainly so in Sudan. The political elite in Sudan was 
34 'The Addis Ababa agreement, negotiated in February 1972, between the government and 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) brought peace to Sudan but failed for 
two main reasons: (1) its ternlS were never fully implemented, and (2) it failed to address, 
and therefore to resolve, many of the fundamental causes of the war' (Johnson, 2000:48). 
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commonly represented by the Arab Muslim elite living in the North of the 
Country. The discrimination came from the exclusionary national ideology. 
Militant Islam was introduced in the nineteenth century 'which sharpened 
the divide between persons with and without full legal rights within the 
state' (Prendergast, 1997:4).35 This is what Khalid refers to as the issue of 
dualities in Sudan, which, he argues, explains the emergence of internal 
conflicts (2003). What has come to be done as a policy of forced 
Arabisation and Islamisation has created a system where Sudan's complex 
diversity of cultures, languages, tribes, origins was threatened to disappear 
as no political, legal or economic space was granted for its survival. As 
Adar explains: 
'At the core of the civil war are the inherently exclusive ethno-
religious-centred policies, namely Islamisation and Arabisation 
pursued in various ways by successive Sudanese administrations 
since the 1950s. The persistent derogation of the linguistic and 
religio-cultural practices of the southerners and non-Muslims in 
general by the Arab-speaking Muslims, continues to impose 
limitations on the drive to establish a durable consensus on the 
Sudanese national identity. [ ... J The policies of Islamisation and 
Arabisation, with their cultural dimensions and implications, have 
remained the central mobilisation force and rallying point for the 
political survival of the Sudanese ruling elite' (2001:81). 
35 'A narrowly based nationalist movement in the Sudan which did not adequately ad~ress 
the issues of the Sudan's diversity and unequal development, but [ ... ] attempted to build a 
national identity base on the principled of Arab culture and the religion of Islam' 
(Prendergast, 1997:4-5). 
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This exclusionary national ideology can be regarded without a doubt as one 
of the fundamental and crucial underlying factor of the conflict, its 
continuation and its difficult resolution. 
Economic and Social 
With a weakened economy in the 1970s, Sudan's economIC 
problems could be presented as an underlying cause of the war (Prendergast, 
1997:5). But the twin issue of a discriminatory economic system and 
development issues played a more fundamental role in creating genuine 
grievances among the Southern population and the Southern elite. South 
Sudan has historically been a place of economic exploitation for the benefit 
of an estranged elite in the North. The national interest, narrowly defined by 
the interest of the ruling Arab Muslim elite in Khartoum, has been to keep a 
high degree of underdevelopment in Southern Sudan in order to secure 
cheap resources for the development of the North. 
The discovery of oil in the mid-1970s in South Sudan brought this 
~conomic and social underdevelopment to the forefront. As the Southern 
population saw an opportunity for real development in the South, whereas 
the North was already making plans to pipe out the oil to the North. The 
Nimeiri regime even decided to redraw the boundary of the South to include 
the oil fields in the Northern Region of the country (Prendergast, 1997:5-6). 
As Prendergast argues, the struggle for control over valuable natural 
resources also have been a critical element in Sudan's civil war' (1997:5). 
Oil, water, and agricultural land are three crucial resources for Khartoum, 
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without which the survival of the Sudanese economy would be meagre. 
These aspects are important in understanding the reluctance of Khartoum to 
provide autonomy or self-determination to the South, which eventually led 
to the second civil war. There are also crucial in understanding Khartoum's 
policy of forced displacement throughout the war as a strategy to secure 
access to natural resources. Finally, these factors are significant in 
understanding the difficulty of power and income sharing agreements during 
the peace negotiations as well as the sensitivity of their implementation. 
The policy of underdevelopment that the North undertook towards 
the South played a fundamental role in creating genuine grievances and 
therefore should be highlighted as a significant factor in the generation of 
the conflict. Despite Brown's omission of the role of natural resources, 
coupled with an already existing system of economic discrimination, in 
providing a significant cause of conflict, the discovery of oil in Sudan and 
the issue of natural resources in an already discriminatory system should be 
regarded as critical developments in the building-up to the start of the 
second civil war. 
Cultural and Perceptual 
As stated above, the national ideology of Arabisation and 
Islamisation has failed to recognise and respect the cultural diversity in 
Sudan. As Brown states, 'group's perceptions of themselves and others' 
playa significant role here (1997: 12). The SPLMI A justified its struggle by 
pointing out the grievances of the Southern population and presented the 
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fundamental problem of Sudan as the conflict between a country of diversity 
and governments that uphold an orthodox ideology: 
'The Sudanese state is essentially an alien political system with an 
institutional framework that excludes the vast majority of its 
citizens. The African Sudanese have been excluded from the 
centre of state power since 1956 while they constitute 69% of the 
population! How can there be peace? [ ... J We call this political 
dispensation the "Old Sudan" based on religion (Islam) and race 
(Arabism). Some analysts have described the problem of Sudan as 
"Double Apartheid" or racial and religious apartheid' (The Official 
New Sudan Site). 
Catalytic factors 
Most of the underlying factors stated above are shared by a number 
of disenfranchised communities in Sudan. Three important factors are 
specific to South Sudan: the colonisation rule with the Southern Policy that 
treated South Sudan as a separate entity from the rest of Sudan creating a 
single consciousness of belonging; the first civil war from 1956 until 1972 
that reinforced this specific status of South Sudan as well as increased the 
possibility of a better future; and finally, the development of a South 
Sudanese perception of its own history and struggle. Nevertheless, to 
explain the emergence of a conflict at a certain time and in a certain location 
catalytic factors need to be examined. 
Brown presents two ways of categorising catalytic factors or 
proximate causes of internal conflicts: elite-level or mass-level movement; 
internal or external developments. In the case of the second civil war in 
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Sudan it is rather difficult to decide whether the catalytic factors can be 
defined as elite-level or mass level. However, one can clearly state that the 
catalytic factors reflected internal developments rather than external 
developments. 
At the internal and elite level, a number of clear developments 
occurred between the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement ending the first 
civil war in 1972 and the start of the second civil war in 1983. There are 
three inter-linked factors that played a major role as short-term causes as 
they explain why the conflict started in 1983: the economic downturn 
creating controversies about the sharing of resources, the discovery of oil 
which added fire to these controversies, and the redefinition of boundaries 
between north and south within South Sudan linked in part to the discovery 
of oil. 
Sudan experienced at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s an important economic downturn. Part of this economic downturn 
was due to the failure of Sudan's 'bread basket' policy of mechanised 
agriculture. As a result, the resources and the development of the region 
promised by the Addis Ababa Agreement did not materialise As Johnson 
explains: 
'The impact of Sudan's financial CrISIS on state-generated 
development was disastrous. Of the $225 millions allocated for 
development in the Southern Region for the 1977-83 6-Year Plan, 
only $45 millions had been paid by 1982' (2000:49). 
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The tensions arising from this situation were furthered by the controversy 
around the discovery of oil in the South, in Bentiu, in 1978. The South 
already hosted the main resources of Sudan with water and fertile soils and 
the regional administration emerging from the peace agreement aimed at 
controlling the management of these resources (Iyob and Khadiagala, 
2006:88). The discovery of oil brought a further opportunity for the regional 
administration but the Khartoum government under Nimeiri 'moved quickly 
to exclude the regional government from oil affairs' and was followed by a 
policy that could only trigger a new conflict.36 Nyot Kok argues that 'oil 
was to be a test case of the central government's intentions' and that a 
collisions was 'inevitable' as the Khartoum government was for 'exclusive 
contra I' (1992: 107). 
These events added to the already fragile and controversial peace and 
as Johnson argues the demise of the Southern Regional Government came 
by the beginning of the 1980s: 
'By 1980 the most important issues which confronted the regional 
government, and which would eventually lead to its demise, were: 
(1) conflict with the central government over the Southern 
Region's border (as raised in the Addis Ababa Agreement), (2) the 
36 'The government introduced the Regional Government Bill of 1980 that sought to redraw 
the borders of the south, contrary to the 1972 agreement. The bill was vehemently opposed 
by the south and, to deflect the opposition to the new boundaries, Numeiri announced 
retention of the 1956 borders. As a compromise, the government decreed the creation of a 
new entity called the Unity region to administer the oil field. Amid mounting misgivings in 
the south about Numeiri's economic intentions, one of the ministers in the Alier [the south 
regional administration] administration tried to exert control over economic policy, 
precipitating Numeiri's dissolution of the quasi-autonomous southern institutions, in 
October 1981' (Iyob and Khadiagala,2006:88). 
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role of the Southern Regional Government in developing the 
region's resources, and more particularly the benefits that were to 
accrue to it though the exploitation of oil fields, (3) the growing 
confrontation in regional politics between the 'Equatorians' and 
the 'Nilotics' (particularly the Dinka), (4) Dissatisfaction within 
the region over the fate of the Anyanya guerrillas absorbed into the 
national army' (2000:49). 
I would certainly argue that the flawed peace of 1972 is the crucial 
element that explains the resuming of fighting in 1983. The peace left a part 
of the Southern elite that was aware that the Addis Ababa Agreement did 
not solve any of the long-term causes of conflict between the South and the 
North, dissatisfied. Nevertheless, the difficult implementation of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, the slow demise of the Southern Regional Government 
and the policy of Nimeiri towards oil and the redrawing of the map also 
played a major role in explaining the re-emergence of the conflict in 1983. 
The proximate causes can be defined as elite-level factors as it is the 
behaviour and decision of the Khartoum government as well as the failure 
of the Southern Regional Government which triggered the emergence of a 
new military and political elite in South Sudan that eventually led the 
second civil war through the SPLMI A. As Addison and Murshed argue, the 
organisation of a leadership is very often a critical difference deciding the 
location and time for the emergence of a conflict (2006: 155). 
However, the presence of genuine mass-level grievances allowed the 
SPLMI A to find support within Southern Sudan. There were no real 
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obstacles within Southern Sudan for a new war as many felt cheated by the 
Addis Ababa agreement. This situation allowed the SPLMI A to form an 
important military force. 
Although most of the developments that led to the start of the 
conflict were internal, there is one external aspect that needs to be 
highlighted. Indeed, the presence of Mengistu's Ethiopia as a supporting 
neighbour to the SPLMI A made the creation of an armed non-state actor 
possible at that time. As Jackson highlights, 'the notion of purely civil 
conflict or internal wars is no longer sustainable; most African wars are 
actually regional conflict formation' (2006:20). This analysis is particularly 
relevant as Mengistu's support came as revenge against the Sudanese 
government for its support of Eritrean independentists (Johnson, 2000:56). 
Sudan, supported by the US administration, was also in the 1970s 'a major 
counterweight to Soviet encroachment in the Horn of Africa' with which 
Mengistu's Marxist regime was associated (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:87). 
This regional conflict formation analysis helps us understand, throughout 
the conflict, the patterns of supporters and enemies, especially in relation to 
the conflict between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA). 
One could say that the conflict in Sudan is a conflict over resources 
whether it is oil, water or fertile soils supporting the "greed" account of 
internal conflict. Brown's framework allows us to uncover the complexity 
of caus~s while highlighting the fundamental conflict that exists in Sudan 
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over the definition of Sudan as a country, whether it is regarding its 
constitution (with or without South Sudan), or the rules of the game (a 
federal system versus a centralised system). Unlike when Sudan acquired its 
independence in 1956, Sudan and all its people need to define the essence of 
the country if the Sudanese internal conflicts are to be put to rest. 
Continuation, developments and transformation 
The conflict between the North and the South in Sudan was one of the 
longest running conflicts in Africa. This section aims at highlighting the 
main turning points throughout the 22 years of the fighting in order to 
convey a better idea of how the conflict unfolded. The first few years of the 
war were marked by the consolidation of the SPLMI A as the main fighting 
opposition group in the south and political instability in the North. The year 
1989 offered the first real opportunity for peace, unfortunately shattered by 
the overthrow of the government. The 1990s were characterised by an 
escalation of violence, factionalism in the South, the isolation of Sudan on 
the international scene, and yet on-going peace initiatives, first through the 
Nigerian government in Abuja in the first half of the 1990s and then through 
the regional organisation, IGAD from 1994 until 2005. 
Consolidation o/the SPLM 
The mutiny of Battalion 105 in 1983 is often taken as the beginning of 
the second civil war in Sudan as it offered the opportunity to transfer 
Southern battalions to Ethiopia to create a rebel army. Some members of the 
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Southern elites, including John Garang de Mabior who was to become the 
leader of the SPLMI A, had already started organising themselves in 
Ethiopia. The events following the mutiny favoured the dissatisfaction of 
the Southern population and therefore the support for a renewed conflict: 
'The final nail was driven in the coffin of the Addis Ababa 
agreement in 1983, when Nimeiri imposed his version of Islamic 
laws - the notorious September Laws. The injection of religion 
into a long list of government policies abhorred by the majority of 
the southern population intensified the south's feeling of alienation 
and estrangement and fanned the flames of the civil war, which 
was launched again by the SPLM [ ... ]' (Ali and Matthews, 
1999:209). 
Although former members of the Anyanya re-organised themselves at the 
beginning of the second civil war to form the Anyanya II, the SPLMI A 
managed to consolidate its power and incorporate slowly a number of 
Anyanya II members. The main division between the two movements 
regarded their position towards the future of Sudan: Anyanya II claimed to 
be fighting for southern independence, whereas the SPLMI A observed a 
discourse of revolution where the South, the North and all the marginalised 
regions of Sudan could work together in a democratic system. 
One of the aims of the SPLMI A was obtained early in the conflict. 
Indeed, the SPLMI A aimed at overthrowing the Nimeiri regime seen as the 
source of so many problems in Sudan. In 1985, Nimeiri was ousted and 
replaced by Sadiq al-Mahdi. The fall ofNimeiri was the result of a popular 
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uprising in April 1985 which 'was spearheaded by the National Alliance for 
National Salvation [ ... ]' (Johnson, 2004:70). The change of regime brought 
good and bad news for peace in the country. Indeed, the new regime started 
relying more heavily on a particular war strategy where, to circumvent the 
army that al-Mahdi felt he lacked control of, the new regime encouraged the 
creation of tribal militias in the South, playing historical tensions between 
different groups. This eventually resulted in 'gross human rights violations 
against the civilian population' (Johnson, 2004:81). On the other hand, the 
National Alliance, which played an important role in overthrowing the 
Nimeiri regime, opened the door to the SPLMI A which eventually 'bore 
fruit in the Koka Dam meeting in Ethiopia on 20-24 March 1986 [ ... ]' 
(Johnson, 2004:71). The meeting in Ethiopia brought together different 
actors from Khartoum, unions, associations, political parties willing to enter 
into a dialogue with the SPLMI A (Ali and Matthews, 1999:211). The Koka 
Dam Declaration offered the first opportunity towards peace but was left as 
'a dead letter rather than a working document' by al-Mahdi (Johnson, 
2004:72). According the Johnson, the main obstacle to peace at that time 
was al-Mahdi's uncertainty regarding the issue of the Sharia and religion in 
general (2004:80). 
Despite the regime's new war strategy and escalation of violence in 
the second half of the 1980s, SPLM/A offensives and the army's difficulty 
to counter-act these offensives re-opened the possibility of peace in 1989 as 
the army demanded that the regime starts talking peace with the SPLMI A 
(Johnson, 2004:84). Peace was not a Northern consensus in 1989 as the 
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National Islamic Front (NIF) refused 'to accept any terms that disqualified 
heir goal of an Islamic state' and as result boycotted the talks (Johnson, 
2000:64). This was followed by a coup in June 1989 and the peace process 
was brought to a halt. The year 1989 was certainly a turning point in the 
history of the conflict. At the eve of the signing of peace and ending the 
conflict, the Northern Regime was overthrown. The new regime in place did 
not seem to provide an avenue of peace. As Peterson explains, the coup was 
followed by army purges, repression in intellectual circles and extreme 
religious zeal (2001: 181). Beyond the wave of religious zeal, the purge of 
the army and universities could only worry the SPLMI A fighting for a New 
Sudan where such police state had no place. The NIF facilitated a further 
escalation of the conflict as they legitimated war as Jihad or holy war (Jok, 
2007:14). 
Factionalism and escalation 
The 1990s were marked by a number of events: factionalism among 
the SPLMI A, a further escalation resulting from factionalism, the 
international isolation of Sudan and a number of peace initiatives. 
Factionalism among the SPLMI A was very much a result of 
Mengistu's fall in 1991. With the loss of its main sponsor, the SPLMI A 
found itself in a vulnerable situation. Discontent within the movement about 
Garang's leadership started: 
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'Two commanders who did raise the issue of accountability and 
the need for a more democratic procedure with Garang in 1990 and 
1991 were the two senior commanders of Upper Nile: Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol. Both had been promoted by Garang over 
the heads of longer-serving SPLA officers and had been appointed 
alternate (non-voting) member of the PMHC [Political Military 
High Command]' (Johnson, 2004:93). 
These two commanders founded the Nasir group in August 1991, 
denouncing 'Garang as a dictator, call[ing] for greater democracy in the 
SPLM/SPLA command structure, and pledged themselves to a greater 
respect for human rights, especially in regard to the release of political 
prisoners, and a halt to the recruitment of 'child soldiers" (Johnson, 
2004:97). The Nasir group was later accused of receiving support from 
Khartoum. Whether this move was tactical or not, the mainstream SPLMI A 
saw the faction as orchestrated by Khartoum (Johnson, 2004:99). 
Factionalism furthered violence in the south to an unforeseen level. 
As factionalism took an ethnic connotation with the SPLMI A Nasir of 
Machar and Akol regrouping the Nuer tribe and the SPLMI A mainstream of 
Garang regrouping the Dinka tribe, the war took an anarchic turn involving 
civilians against civilians. The Bor Massacre was an unfortunate example of 
this. In 1991, 'Nuer warriors marched on the Dinka heartland at Bor and 
Kongor to recapture lost cattle, chanting their battle cry: "We will make you 
Dinka drink your own blood" (Peterson, 2001 :218). This raid resulted in so 
many deaths that 'the death count was stopped after reaching 2,000' 
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(Ibid.).37 The Nuer leader Riek Machar claimed to have 'never intended 
such a vicious onslaught' (Ibid.). Factionalism not only brought extreme 
suffering on the civilian population, it also allowed the government to 
recapture two-thirds of the south (Ibid.). 
The escalation of violence cannot only be attributed to the rise of 
factionalism in the south. Bashir reinforced the use of tribal militias in the 
South. In addition to this, Bashir motivated popular recruitment through the 
creation of the Popular Defence Forces and a discourse of Jihad 
"legitimising" the war against the Southern factions and the targeting of the 
non-Muslim civilians in the South. Beyond the North-South divide, the war 
was also slowly spreading through the whole of Sudan, as Johnson explains: 
'By 1991 the war in the Sudan could already be described as a 
network of internal wars, whether within sub-regions or among 
specific peoples. Some Nuer tribes provided recruits 
simultaneously to the Anyanya-2 and the SPLA, and other 
Southern peoples such as the Mundari and Toposa were similarly 
divided between the government and the guerrillas. Misiriyya 
groups sought military patrons in the political parties, the army, 
and Chevron oil company. One thing which clearly distinguishes 
the current war from the civil war of the 1960s is that it has not 
been confined to the South: fighting has taken place in Darfur, 
Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and, most recently, Qallabat, 
37 'People were speared and shot, bound with ragged belts and knotted cord, strangled, and 
burned. Three boys were tied to a tree and clubbed to death. Men were castrated and 
disembowelled. The region was depopulated as 100,000 Dinka fled south into the swamps 
to survive or die on a diet of leaves and water lilies. Food stores left behind were put to the 
torch, and tens of thousands of head of precious cattle were spirited away by the marauders' 
(Ibid. ). 
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Kassala and Red Sea - all parts of the 'Muslim' North' 
(2004: 127). 
In addition to this the regional politics came into playas Sudan started 
engaging in proxy wars with its neighbouring countries. Prendergast 
explains that the civil conflict became regional involving the governments 
of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, the Lord's Resistance Army and other 
militias and concludes that 'it is not an exaggeration to foresee the 
possibility of a major regional war developing over ideology and 
resources' (1997: 19). 
Peace initiatives 
Despite the escalation of the conflict, the 1990s were also marked by a 
number of peace initiatives. The failure of the 1989 peace opportunity did 
not close the door to talks. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, there was on both 
sides a contradictory "talking while fighting" strategy (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 125). 
From 1992 until 1994, The Abuja I and II peace initiatives, organised 
by the Organisation of African Unity and led by Nigeria took place. The 
Abuja talks occurred at a difficult moment in the conflict as the SPLM/A 
had just experienced a major schism. Surprisingly, the talks started in 1992 
with the two factions of the SPLMI A cooperating and putting aside their 
differences. Unfortunately, the government 'refused to budge on key 
provisions of its agenda, insisting on an Islamic state and the unity of the 
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Sudan', ending the first round of talks (lyob and Khadiagala, 2006:95). The 
resumption of the talks in April 1993 did not bring further hope. Not only 
substantial issues remained stumbling blocks in the talks, but factionalism 
among the southern opposition presented a major obstacle.38 The second 
round of the Abuja talks in 1993 ended with no communique or agreement 
and were never started again. 
In 1994, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Development, later renamed IGAD, presented itself as a new forum 
presenting Sudan with a hope of peace. IGAD is an eastern African forum 
and 'convenes regularly at the Ministerial and working level to discuss 
regional issues' (Brusset, 2000:140). According to Brusset, IGAD 'merged 
slowly at the most permanent framework in the region for the negotiations 
between the parties (Ibid.). 
The first round of talks in January 1994 aimed at 'gradually [forcing] 
a compromise around specific items' (lyob and Khadiagala, 2006:104). The 
SPLM/A mainstream and SPLM/A Nasir proposed three items for 
negotiations: 'a cease-fire to facilitate humanitarian relief; the right of self-
determination through a referendum [ ... ]; and comprehensive interim 
arrangements for the transitional period' (lyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 1 04-
5). The government was reluctant to include cease-fire negotiations and self-
38 'But when the talks resumed in April 1993, the parties could not find common ground on 
the contentious questions of secularism, the structure of political relationships between 
north and south, and the interim arrangements. Strengthened by additional military victories 
over the SPLA, the government was less inclined to budge from its previous positions. To 
emphasise its growing confidence, in May 1993, the government engaged in parallel 
negotiations in Nairobi with Machar's faction, further deepening the southern split' (Iyob 
and Khadiagala, 2006:95). 
290 
determination in the basket. The outcome of the first round focused on the 
formation of a subcommittee for the provision of humanitarian affairs.39 It is 
interesting to note that the first round of the IGAD peace process which 
eventually led to the signing of the peace started in substance on 
negotiations on humanitarian relief. 
In 1995 regional tensions brought the peace process to a halt. 
Although many benefits came from the fact that IGAD is an Eastern African 
organisation, the mid-1990s were marked by the involvement of neighbours 
in the war, rising tensions between Sudan and its neighbours and the use of 
proxy wars. This vacuum was soon filled by a number of other peace 
initiatives from the Carter Center, Iran, Libya, Malawi, and South Africa, 
competing against each other and slowly eroding the chances of peace for 
Sudan (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:107-8). 
The resolution of the conflict took a new tum in 1997. The 
government signed a peace agreement with six southern factions but not the 
SPLM/A mainstream. Using factionalism to its advantage, Khartoum 
appeared as the peace-maker. A further development in the IGAD peace 
process was seen as the government of Sudan finally accepted in July 1997, 
the Declaration of Principles adopted by the IGAD group since 1994. 
Among the principles adopted in this declaration, separation of religion and 
39 'Nonetheless, the first round secured agreement on the formation of a negotiating 
subcommittee of SPLA factions, the government, and the UN to deal with issues of relief 
aid. In April 1994, the subcommittee, in a confidence-building measure, agreed to open up 
aid corridors to seventy-three relief sites, create five land passages, and immunise children 
in the war zone' (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 1 04). 
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state, the principle of self-determination for the South and the recognition of 
Sudan as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country appeared as major steps 
towards a resolution of the conflict. 
It was only in 2002 that real progress could be seen with the signing 
of the Machakos protocol and a renewed Memorandum of Understanding on 
cessation of hostilities brought a real opportunity for substantive peace talks. 
Despite being slow, the IGAD process succeeded in bringing a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 between the SPLM/A of 
John Garang (re-united with SPLM/A Nasir in 2002) and the government of 
Sudan. 
The process of conflict resolution in Sudan was slowed down by a 
number of factors. Among the major obstacles to peace was the problem of 
factionalism among the southern groups. Even though the southern factions 
cooperated at times as during the Abuja talks, the government of Sudan 
exploited factionalism in 1997 and widened the gap between the different 
southern leaders. As Keen explains, this created agreements between allies 
rather than an agreement including the principal political and military 
opponents of the government' (2000:91). Keen also points out that cease-
fires were not always seen as steps towards peace as they were perceived to 
be advantageous to the government using the time to regroup and re-arm 
(2000:92). Furthermore, this lack of genuine commitment to a cease-fire and 
good will is also highlighted by Ali and Matthews as they argue that the 
government was often entering peace talks without wanting peace: 
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'The regime continues to capitalise on the popular yearning and 
international sentiment for peace talks, as long as they remain just 
talk. Once discussions move to substantive issues, and negotiations 
are about to begin, the process come to a halt. This is the lesson of 
all past "talks'" (1999:214). 
Prendergast goes even further and argues that 'no one [had] a vested interest 
in a peaceful outcome' (1997:63). By keeping the South in conflict, the 
government maintained its hegemony over the country. One has to keep in 
mind that the government in Khartoum was very much under the pressure of 
the wider Northern elite not to give in to Southern demands. With a history 
of political instability and numerous coups, Bashir also needed to play the 
Northern elite to stay in the game. On the other hand, the SPLMI A benefited 
from such recognition and legitimacy around the world that its leadership 
was already enjoying the life ofa de facto government (CC 01). 
Unfortunately, a few other factors added to the slow resolution of the 
Sudanese conflict. The IGAD peace process in itself appeared as an issue 
when the regional situation became tense. Prendergast even argues that the 
four government members of IGAD, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
'have seen their relations deteriorate enough with the Khartoum regime as a 
result of the latter's meddling in their internal affairs' to want to see regime 
change in Khartoum (Prendergast, 1997:63). Furthermore, the IGAD 
process was sometimes claimed to lack 'adequate clout and leverage' (lyob 
and Khadiagala, 2006: 101). The emergence of competitive initiatives added 
to the situation and slowed the process further. 
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Finally, some would argue that oil prevented a faster resolution of 
the conflict. As Adar argues, 'to a large extent the countries and oil 
companies involved in the production of oil in Sudan [ ... ] are undermining 
conflict resolution efforts in the country' (2001:95). Indeed, Adar explains 
that the oil revenues since 1999 have allowed Sudan to support its war 
effort. As he explains, 'the oil revenue spent by the government of Sudan 
totals $1 million per day, is equal to the amount which the government of 
Sudan spends on arms per day' (Adar, 2001 :96). Furthermore, the presence 
of oil in the country also means that financial pressures cannot be exercised 
on the Sudanese government as a leverage for the peace process. 
The question that remained to be answered is why peace then. The 
first reason seems to be that both parties came to the realisation that there 
was no unilateral military solution to the conflict (Balencie and de la 
Grange, 2005: 185). Secondly, the involvement and support of the US 
administration for the peace process appeared as a major incentive. Indeed, 
September 11 and the 'War on Terror' forced Sudan to cooperate with the 
international community from fear to be next on the list after Afghanistan 
and Iraq (Balencie and de la Grange, 2005: 185). 
How long the peace will last remains to be seen. With an escalating 
conflict in Darfur and smaller conflicts still unresolved throughout Sudan, 
the motivations behind the government's signature of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement can be questioned. The death of Garang in July 2005, only 
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SIX months after the signing of the peace, may have also changed the 
aspiration of the newly-created Government of South Sudan. On the second 
anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the President of South 
Sudan and Vice-President of Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit already accused 
the Khartoum government of continuing arming tribal militias in the south. 
Impact of conflict 
The impact of the conflict cannot solely be mirrored by the number 
of dead combatants on both sides. As Peterson writes in 2001, 'Even if the 
war stopped today, the south would not be able to feed itself for years. 
Instead of seeds, southern Sudan has been sown with hundreds of 
landmines' (2001:200). Such a sustained civil war could only leave deep 
scars in South Sudan. Part of this was due to the type of violence used 
during the war, but also the extensive human right violations and man-made 
humanitarian crisis. 
The conflict has claimed the lives of 1.5 million people from the start 
of the conflict in 1983 until the signature of the peace agreement in 2005 
(Jackson, 2006:18). The internally displaced populations (IDPs) are 
estimated as high as 4 millions according to the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2007). The post-peace agreement 
repatriation programme (200S-ongoing) aims at helping the half a million 
South Sudanese population dispersed in six different countries in East 
Africa (UNHCR, 2007). The South has suffered two dramatic famines in 
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1988 and 1997 in great parts caused by the war. There are no clear estimates 
of the number of child soldiers throughout the war. However, the SPLMI A 
through a UNICEF led programme had demobilised 15,000 children by 
2005 (IRIN, 2006). The amount of children that fought the war on either 
side can with no doubt be multiplied by two if not three. Adding to this 
morbid list, landmines have been scattered all over South Sudan and the 
socio-economic environment of South Sudan has been forever damaged. It 
is sometimes said that guns have replaced cattle in South Sudan as the new 
source of power and pride. In order to understand the depth of the conflict in 
Sudan, one has to look at the way the war was fought, in other words, the 
types of violence that was used throughout the war. 
The war between the North and the South has been fought on many 
grounds and in different ways. Over the years, the conflict became more 
complex with new fronts, or new wars, starting in Sudan. Uprisings against 
the government were not only found in the South but also in the eastern 
regions of Sudan, in Darfur, as well as in Khartoum itself. Regimes in 
Khartoum have always been prone to coups and this was the case during the 
North-South conflict. After Bashir's take over in 1989, the atmosphere in 
Khartoum became one of suspicion and fear. The infamous Ghost Houses 
where people perceived as threats to the regime were tortured became the 
prime source of fear for the northern population and Khartoum's 
inhabitants. War was at one time or another present all over Sudan. Whereas 
a regime of terror developed in the North, the brunt of the fighting remained 
in the South where the population suffered extensively from forced 
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displacement, starvation, disease, and raids on villages where houses were 
burnt, cattle stolen, and people taken, some of them to be slaves for 
Khartoum's elite. The extent of the population's suffering can be understood 
when one looks at the characteristics of the war: the use of tribal militias by 
the Government, tribal factionalism within the rebel movement, and proxy 
wars with neighbouring rebels and governments. 
The North-South conflict has been shaped by the Government's war 
strategy. Indeed, the Government applied a policy of "proxy war" in the 
South, a tendency that was greatly intensified with Bashir's rule. Proxy war 
was implemented in two ways: by exacerbating existing tribal divisions in 
the South and by supporting neighbouring rebels. 
The existing tribal divisions in the South provided the Government with 
opportunities to fight the war through different means. The population in the 
South is divided in a number of different tribes: Dinka, Nuer, Shilluks, 
Acholi, Lotuhu to name only a few. By arming antagonistic tribes, the 
Government provided the means for anti-SPLA tribes to fight its enemy. 
This tendency grew with Bashir's take over as Bashir did not trust his army 
(Peterson, 2001: 187). The incentives for such a policy were numerous. This 
was a cheaper way of conducting a war, an economic incentive that was 
much needed in an impoverished Sudan. In addition to this, by using tribal 
tensions and historical tribal conflicts within the South to fight against the 
SPLA, the Government created further evidence to its claim that the war 
was a South-South conflict and not a North-South conflict. This argument 
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was aimed to distance the Government from the conflict raging in the South, 
allowing its disengagement from peace initiatives as an outsider of the 
conflict. When this policy failed to achieve military victories, the Bashir 
Regime created a new wing of the army, the People's Defence Force (PDF). 
This Force was made of young adults who before being allowed to go to 
university had to enrol themselves in the PDF. The PDF was accompanied 
by a strong religious discourse of Holy War and promises of redemption 
(Peterson, 200 I: 187). 
In the 1990s, waging war by proxy took another tum. As the SPLA 
found in Uganda a strong supporter after Mengistu's fall in Ethiopia, the 
Sudanese Government welcomed the presence of the Lord's Resistance 
Anny (LRA), a rebel movement fighting against the Ugandan Government, 
in South Sudan. The LRA provided a strong support to Sudan's other war 
strategy, sometimes considered a war aim: the displacement of the 
population in Southern Sudan mostly through the growing fear of militia 
raids in villages. Historically, the relationship between the North and the 
South has been one of raiding and extorting resources. The North used to 
take the "Three Golds" in the South: White Gold as Ivory, Black Gold as 
African slaves, and Yellow Gold as Gold. This relationship underlies the 
causes of the war where water, agricultural land and oil have replaced the 
"Golds". In this endeavour, population was seen as an obstacle to the 
North's projects. Through the tribal militias, the LRA and the PDF, the war 
took the form of small raids on villages.40 The impact of the conflict on the 
40 'The PDF practised the mindless tactic of mass onslaught, which provided innumera~le 
martyrs but rarely brought victory. Diplomats in Khartoum joked that these were "atrocIty 
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civilian population was very much dictated by these strategies. There is no 
such thing as a clean war and the two conflicting parties have had their fair 
share of human rights and humanitarian violations. Nevertheless, the 
Government's strategy meant an exacerbation of these violations. The PDF 
was not a well-trained professional army. The LRA is well-known for its 
consistent violations of human rights and humanitarian principles. Tribal 
militias acted without Government control or any type of accountability in a 
highly tensed environment. These factors explain why the civilian 
popUlation remained a constant target during the war. 
One last factor was instrumental in increasing the targeting of the 
civilian population. In 1991, the split between John Garang (a Dinka) and 
Riek Machar (a Nuer) involved the popUlation further in the fighting. As the 
SPLMI A was now divided along ethnic lines, attacks on the population from 
the rebels became more frequent. Dinkas belonging to the SPLMI A 
mainstream (Garang's faction) started targeting Nuer villages. Nuers 
belonging to the SPLMI A Nasir (Riek's faction) started targeting Dinka 
villages. The Bor massacre in 1991, allegedly carried out by members of 
Riek's army on Dinkas, forced thousands of Dinkas to run from the tribal 
imbalance (Human Rights Watch, 2003). According to Johnson, 'the split in 
the SPLA reintroduced fighting into areas which had been relatively free 
from violence for some time' (Johnson, 2004: 114). The split was a source of 
battalions", because when they pushed the Sudan People's Liberation Anny out of an area, 
then they "moved down all the civilians. It is probably the only role they are qualified to 
play', said one. [ ... ]With Islamic battle cries, the PDF waged war in its own way, burning 
villages and killing civilians. Along the battlefront, unlucky innocents were often caught up 
in the conflict, and the abuse of fellow human beings was systematic. Southerners of course 
knew these acts as ethnic cleansing. Certainly blackened shells of huts and abandoned 
villages, left behind by northern troops, were no different from the "cleansed" towns of 
Croatia and Bosnia in the Balkans' (Peterson, 2001: I 87). 
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further violence as 'not only did the two factions of the SPLA fight each 
other, they encouraged civilian involvement' (Ibid.). The division between 
the two factions was not resolved until 2003. 
In many ways, Sudan's second civil war provides a sad example of 
how many human rights and humanitarian principles can be broken in an 
internal conflict. The constant targeting of the civilian population explains 
the long-lasting humanitarian crisis raging in South Sudan. The impact of 
the war on South Sudan can only be estimated, but the scars from the war 
will take a very long time to heal with 1.5 million lives claimed by the 
conflict, approximately 4 million internally displaced (IDPs), 500,000 
refugees, 20,000 orphans who wandered alone during the war, and an 
estimated 17,000 child soldiers41 involved in the war (http://www.child-
soldiers.org/document get.php?id=952). 
The fear of violent village raids among the population forced most 
Southern Sudanese to find refuge away from their villages into IDP camps. 
By the end of the war, the displaced population was estimated to reached 3.7 
million IDPs and 500,000 refugees (OCHA-IMU: South Sudan IDP and 
Refugee Return Population Projections for 2006, 19 September 2005). This 
represents almost 50% of the estimated 11 million Southern Sudanese 
population. Such an important internal migration impacted greatly on food 
security as cattle grazing and agricultural activities could not follow its due 
course. As Human Rights Watch reported: 'In the underdeveloped south, 
41 This estimation varies according to different reports. 
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war, flood, drought, disease, and mismanagement have rendered useless 
ordinary survival strategies, and made millions wholly or partially 
dependent on emergency food assistance provided by the United Nations 
[ ... J and foreign agencies [ ... J' (Human Rights Watch, 1993). For years, the 
population of Southern Sudan survived and relied on humanitarian aid to 
survive, especially during the famines in the late 1980s and late 1990s 
which were of biblical proportions. The consequences of such a situation for 
post-war reconstruction are alarming. Furthermore, it pinpoints the 
invaluable necessity of humanitarian action during the conflict. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the historical agreement on humanitarian action 
between a rebel movement, a government and the UN through Operation 
Lifeline Sudan occurred during Sudan's second civil conflict. The 
humanitarian crisis resulting from war necessitated extensive humanitarian 
aid. The Operations Lifeline Sudan agreement was also meant to reduce the 
problem of food diversion and insecurity for humanitarian actors in South 
Sudan. Both sides in the conflict diverted important amounts of 
humanitarian aid before and after the OLS agreement. Humanitarian actors 
also found themselves in extremely dangerous situations where they 
became, as the civilian population was, targets, a clear violation of 
humanitarian principles. 
Indeed, the conflict provided numerous examples of human rights 
and humanitarian principles violations beyond the targeting of humanitarian 
actors and the diversion of humanitarian aid. The use of child soldiers was a 
norm rather than an exception, especially within the SPLMI A who, after a 
301 
few years in the conflict, implemented a systematic policy of child 
recruitment by tricking children grazing goats outside of villages to follow 
them to Ethiopia to get "an education". A former child soldier explains, 
education for the SPLMI A consisted of knowing how to handle a gun 
(Former SPLM child soldier 01). Children as young as 8 years old were 
taken within the rebel army.42 Torture was also common. SPLM/A prisoners 
of war taken by the Government forces were either killed or tortured, even 
when those were child soldiers.43 The constant targeting of the population as 
a war strategy remains the main violation of humanitarian laws. 
Conclusion 
This conflict analysis highlights a number of critical aspects for this 
research. In order to understand better the process of engagement with 
armed non-state actors on humanitarian issues, it is necessary to understand 
the actors involved in the engagement. The first section on the actors of the 
conflict sheds light on the two main actors of the conflict, the SPLMI A and 
the Bashir regime. These two actors were the principal and key decision-
makers in a number of humanitarian agreements but mainly with regards to 
peace in the country. The analysis emphasised the attitude of these two 
42 For a more detailed and specific account of the life of a child soldier within the SPLA see 
E., Maendeh, Child Soldier (2006). 
43 Maendeh provides an example in his book Child Soldier of child soldiers experiencing 
torture after their capture by the Sudanese army. The author heard this story while doing 
research for the book with former child soldiers in South Sudan: 'They [Government 
soldiers] tied them to poles using barbed wires which pierced the boy's skins resulting in 
unbearable pain. Some of the boys were ironed with hot iron box on their backs and all over 
their bodies. It seemed in the whole that this camp was meant for torture. There were some 
holes dug which were enough to take all the body except the head, and those who survived 
the ironing were placed in these holes and the Arab soldiers would pour in hot oil' 
(Maendeh, 2006:56). 
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actors in regards to human rights and humanitarian norms and the treatment 
of the civilian population caught in the middle of the atrocities of conflict. 
Both the government and the armed group have directly caused the suffering 
of the civilian population and violated numerous human rights and 
humanitarian obligations. Despite this, both have entered into humanitarian 
negotiations and signed humanitarian agreements throughout the war. As 
the last section emphasised, the conflict has been partiCUlarly traumatising 
for the civilian popUlation. This situation has in many ways pushed the 
boundaries of humanitarian action and imposed the necessity of 
humanitarian diplomacy. Finally, the history of the conflict has 
demonstrated the difficulty of dialogue, confidence-building, trust necessary 
to arrive at a peace agreement between the Bashir regime and the SPLMI A. 
This makes Sudan a challenging but most puzzling case study to examine 
whether humanitarian engagement with armed groups effect peace 
processes. 
This conflict analysis provides a first basis for the following chapter, 
which analyses the data gathered during field work in Sudan. The analysis 
of the SPLMI A is particularly paramount in understanding and evaluating 
the extent to which humanitarian engagement impacted the evolution of the 
Movement and therefore played a role in peaceful conflict transformation. 
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Chapter VII: Analysing the steps from humanitarian to 
political engagements: armed non-state actors and 
humanitarian engagements as underlying factors 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two analysis chapters. Whereas the next 
chapter will focus on answering the main research question, this chapter will 
examine the wider issues and questions raised in this research. In particular, 
this chapter will examine how the different characteristics of armed groups 
and humanitarian agreements may playa. role in whether and how 
humanitarian engagements impact upon the conflict situation. 
A first section will emphasise the role played by the different 
characteristics of armed groups, drawing conclusions from the case of the 
'SPLMI A. The aim is to highlight the possible factors emerging from the 
SPLMI A and its characteristics as an armed non-state actor to better 
understand their impact on the relationship between the humanitarian 
engagements and the conflict situation. It will be argued that the objectives 
and aims of armed groups, the leadership and power structure, and finally, 
the relationship with their constituency and control over territory impact 
upon the effect that humanitarian engagements with armed groups have on 
the conflict situation. 
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The second section will focus on understanding how the characteristics 
of humanitarian engagements may also playa significant role in defining the 
relationship between humanitarian engagement and conflict transformation. 
In the case of humanitarian engagements, a comparative analysis can be 
made between the three engagements researched, namely Operation Lifeline 
Sudan, the 1995 humanitarian ceasefire brokered by the Carter Center, and 
the Deed of Commitment with Geneva Call. This comparative analysis will 
enable a refined understanding of how the different characteristics of 
humanitarian engagements may favour or constrain the impact on the 
conflict situation using the framework developed earlier in the research. 
Each engagement will first be examined using this framework by asking the 
questions: Who engages? What is the purpose of the engagement? Why the 
armed group agrees to the engagement? And finally, what are the challenges 
faced? It will be argued that the timing and length of the engagement playa 
significant role, as well as the amount of negotiations and the inclusion or 
not of all parties to the conflict. 
Characteristics of Armed Non-State Actors as underlying factors 
A number of factors come into play in analysing the effect that 
humanitarian engagement with armed groups may have on the 
transformation of conflict. In the case study presented, the humanitarian 
engagements that occurred throughout the second Sudanese civil war had 
some indirect impact on the possibility of peace talks between the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of 
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Sudan. One may wonder how the characteristics of the SPLMI A impacted 
the relationship between humanitarian engagements with the SPLM/A and 
the start of the peace talks that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
in 2005. This section aims at examining how different characteristics of 
armed groups may be important underlying factors that provide the 
necessary conditions for humanitarian engagements with armed groups to 
further the possibility of peace talks. 
A number of difficulties arise in attempting to answer this question. The 
first is that this research was not a comparative research and therefore it is 
difficult to isolate the characteristics of an armed group that may be a factor 
in this equation. The second difficulty results from knowing what 
characteristics of the armed group originate from the armed group and what 
characteristics result from the occurrence of humanitarian engagements. A 
lot of the literature on the SPLMI A was written after Operation Lifeline 
Sudan started. The interviews conducted in South Sudan during my field 
research articulated certain ideologies or policies that may have resulted 
from a socialisation process that the armed group experienced through their 
engagements on humanitarian issues. Nevertheless, a number of 
characteristics present in the SPLMI A may have played a role in favouring 
or allowing humanitarian engagements to have a positive impact on the 
peaceful transformation of conflict. 
The political profile of armed groups: objectives, aims, structure 
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An important part of the understanding or analysis of an armed 
group is uncovering their objectives and aims. There may be a number of 
reasons why an armed non-state actor takes part in an armed struggle. These 
objectives and aims playa significant role in understanding the impact that 
humanitarian engagements with armed groups may have on the conflict 
situation. In the case studied in this research, the SPLMI A had a clear 
political aim: creating a New Sudan, a united Sudan where people of all 
creeds, ethnicity, cultures would enjoy the same rights and opportunities 
(SPLM a). "'Revolution" rather then separation [was] the SPLM/SPLA's 
announced goal' (Johnson, 2000:58). 
Why are the objectives of an armed group important in creating a 
favourable environment for humanitarian engagements to impact positively 
on the conflict situation? The objectives of an armed group dictate the 
behaviour of the group in many ways and tell us how the armed group is 
positioning itself in relation to its environment. For instance, The New 
Sudan approach chosen by the SPLMI A does not only inform of the 
SPLM/A's goal in fighting the war but also reflects on what position the 
SPLMI A adopted in relation to the international community and 
neighbouring state. This ideology was chosen over independence in order to 
be acceptable by the international community which upholds the values of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was also aimed at neighbouring 
states, which were themselves faced with independentist groups such as 
Ethiopia and the Eritrean independence movements, to ensure their support 
(Johnson, 2000:57). The SPLMI A's discourse reflects an adoption of certain 
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norms and concerns of the international community and shows that the 
SPLMI A wanted to position itself in a positive rather than a conflictual 
relationship with the international community. 
Petrasek argues, armed groups that aim at becoming the head of a 
state will be 'more sensitive [ ... J since they will understand that a certain 
conduct is expected of states that join the international community' 
(2000: 16). The SPLMI A through their New Sudan policy aimed at one day 
taking an active, if not exclusive part, in governing Sudan and as Petrasek 
explains, the SPLMI A was aware of the expectations that they had to meet. 
This first quote exemplifies the awareness the SPLMI A had of what was 
required for them to be seen as a government: 
'We were the Government, we the SPLM, because we had the 
three conditions that constitute a government. We had the people 
of the South [ ... J; we had a territory called Southern Sudan; we 
were a structured SPLM government' (SPLM 01). 
It is difficult to know whether this awareness came as a result of a learning 
process through humanitarian agreements rather than as original knowledge 
on the part of the SPLMIA that these expectations existed. Nevertheless, this 
shows that because the SPLMI A wanted to acquire international status as a 
state, the armed group cared about creating a positive image of themselves 
among the members of the international community. Zahar argues that 'the 
more general the objectives (in the sense that they seek to improve society at 
large), the more likely it will be that the international community will find a 
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way to engage combatants on the issues of civilian protection' (2001:56). 
Zahar's argument is supported by the experience of the SPLM/A. 
As humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A in South Sudan have 
impacted positively the perception that international actors in Sudan had of 
the SPLMI A, creating a wider support base and legitimacy for the SPLMI A 
during peace talks, one wonders whether this results from the fact that the 
SPLM/A's aims and objectives necessitated a positive engagement with the 
international community. In other words, the outcome relating to the third 
hypothesis proposed could be extended to state: 
• Humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A impacted on the 
conflict situation by changing the perception that different actors had 
of the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A's aim to govern a New Sudan 
favoured this outcome as this objective necessitated a positive 
engagement with the international community. 
As an SPLM interviewee stated: 
'It is a big challenge to be recognised. And that is why many 
movements go for a different option. One of taking hostages and 
extremes. Another one is to get engaged positively with the 
international community. [ ... J And I think the SPLM chose to use 
a positive engagement and policy in affecting the good aspects and 
the values of the movement' (SPLM 06). 
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This extended hypothesis also reflects on the way the SPLM/A justified the 
fact that it was engaged in an armed struggle. As the SPLMI A was aware 
that the use of force was frowned upon by the international community, a 
justification of its involvement in an armed struggle was necessary: 
'When you are fighting a war and you have desperate people 
needing assistance you have to appreciate the situation. Wars are 
fought because society are not happy with the government that is 
governing them. That is the reason for war. Some communities 
feel aggrieved and when they cannot put their cases in parliament 
or through institutional arrangements then they resource to arms. 
So we were fighting for ajust cause' (SPLM 01). 
This justification for why the SPLMI A took up arms was very often cited in 
other interviews. Williams and Ricigliano explain that the wayan armed 
group accounts for the fact that it is armed is a critical factor as it helps 
understanding how the group might prioritise between continuing an armed 
struggle and finding a peaceful solution (2005: 17).44 The SPLM interviewee 
above justifies the armed struggle, but suggests that it was a solution of last 
resort. Most of the interviews carried out with the SPLMI A mentioned that 
44 Williams and Ricigliano argue that the anned group's perceptions of negotiations is an 
important factor in analysing armed groups: 'Does the group have a positive vision for a 
peaceful future [ ... ]? Do they have a realistic understanding of the value of not negotiating? 
[ ... ] Do they have a clear vision of what it means not to negotiation a solution [ ... ]? [ ... ] 
Do they feel it is legitimate to talk to the other sides? Believe that it is in their interests to 
talk? Do they envision a possible negotiated solution? [ ... ] Do they have the resources [ ... ] 
and ability to negotiate [ ... ]? (2006: 17). The second hypothesis proposed in this research 
examines how humanitarian engagements with anned groups provide a learning-by-doing 
experience. This learning experience will certainly have a greater impact when the anned 
group is more isolated internationally. As this interviewee explains: '[Humanitarian 
engagement] is also opening up as you sayan understanding of what the requirements are 
at the international level. So it opens up an awareness of what the international community 
is concerned about and making them start looking at their own policies and procedures. 
[ ... ] With the smaller groups, it works that way. With the larger groups they are much more 
aware' (GC 03). 
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the SPLMI A was for peace from the beginning. Again, it is difficult to judge 
whether this discourse is used as a result of a socialisation process and 
within a post-peace agreement context or if it reflects a genuine policy 
within the Movement. On the other hand, for the SPLM/A to create a New 
Sudan and attain its goal, peace was necessary. Therefore, it may be the case 
that humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A had a positive impact on 
the conflict situation and the start of peace negotiations because the 
SPLMI A wanted peace in the first place and aimed at creating a positive 
image of the Movement resulting in their desire to establish a positive 
relationship with the international community. 
The fact that the SPLMI A aimed at being a state or a government 
furthered their desire to use humanitarian engagements in a political way 
and in a positive way. They used that platform to publicise themselves. 
They agreed to be socialised in the norms and behaviours of the 
international community. They agreed to learn and put in practice what they 
learnt through that process. This willingness, on the part of the SPLMI A, 
certainly meant that humanitarian engagements could have a positive impact 
on the conflict. The socialisation process that humanitarian engagements 
provided for the SPLMI A, which resulted in favouring the start of 
successful peace talks, was accepted and instrumentalised by the SPLMI A 
to help them attain their aims. Since their aims necessitated a peace 
agreement, this instrumentalisation made a positive step towards the 
peaceful transformation of conflict. 
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Leadership and structure 
Zahar argues that the structure of an anned group is a facilitating 
factor in engaging anned groups on the issue of civilian protection 
(2001:56). Without implying a necessary link between structure and the 
protection of civilians, Zahar believes that the least challenging anned group 
t6 engage with on humanitarian issues would be one where the objectives 
are broad and a clear structure exists (2001 :56-7). One may wonder whether 
the structure may be a second factor that may favour the positive impact of 
humanitarian engagements with anned groups on the conflict situation. 
The previous chapter examined the status, role and power of actors 
that were directly involved in humanitarian engagements. One of the 
conclusions was that the humanitarian wing of the SPLMI A, the SRRA, did 
not appear very strong and did not have 'the power on the ground' (UN 02). 
An interviewee states that the SRRA 'had to go back to the military 
structure on certain issues, such as the issue of hostages, as the SRRA did 
not have the clout to move things forward' (UN 02). The power structure of 
the group meant that the people who were directly involved in the 
humanitarian engagements did not have a special status or a powerful role 
from which they could influence the important political and military 
decisions. The power structure undennined the impact of humanitarian 
engagements on the conflict situation in this case. 
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The first hypothesis stated that humanitarian engagements may 
change the internal working of the armed group by raising the voice of a 
more moderate faction. This hypothesis seems to be reversed. As an 
interviewee explains, who your interlocutor is in a group is dictated by the 
group (GC 03). The power structure of the group is imposed on the 
organisation engaging an armed group on humanitarian issues (GC 03). It is 
therefore a constraint that may affect whether humanitarian engagements 
has a positive impact on the conflict situation. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
reversed: 
• It is not the case that humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A 
triggered a change in the internal dynamic of the group, but the 
power structure or a change in the internal dynamic of the SPLMI A 
enabled and affected humanitarian engagements and the impact that 
they may have on the conflict situation. 
This is exemplified by the political shift that occurred in 1994 as a result of 
the Chukudum Convention, which brought together eminent members of the 
SPLMI A to discuss issues relating to the leadership and power structure of 
the Movement: 
'After the convention in 1994, because we put our house in order 
politically, because we elected our leadership, this was the 
beginning of a process of democratisation [ ... ]. Because of the 
democratisation within the movement it was easier for us to 
discuss the issue of the ceasefire [1995 Guinea Worm Ceasefire]' 
(SPLM 07). 
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This confinns Zahar's argument (2001 :56) that a clear structure enables 
humanitarian engagements. 
It is difficult to judge the extent to which different power structures 
and political organisations may affect the possibility that humanitarian 
engagement with anned groups impacts the conflict situation. Further 
comparative research would provide stronger grounds. Nevertheless, the 
power structure within the SPLMI A and the political organisation of the 
leadership was at times an enabling feature, at other times a constraint. 
Armed group - constituency relationship: an economic approach 
The relationship between the anned group and its constituency may 
impact greatly on the position that the anned group adopts regarding the 
treatment of civilians, humanitarian principles and human rights (Zahar, 
2001). The basis for this relationship often comes down to economic 
relations (Weinstein, 2007) and identification. According to Zahar, 'the 
higher the perceived identification between a militia and the civilian 
population that it controls (in-group), the lower the likelihood that the 
militia will hurt this population' (2001 :58). The SPLM/A highly identified 
itself with the Southern Sudanese population under its control and vice 
versa. The 1991 split along ethnic lines complicated the situation to a certain 
extent. Nevertheless, the SPLM/A articulated the grievances of the Southern 
Sudanese people and in many ways was supported by the population under 
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its control as they shared this commonality. In that sense, the relationship 
between the SPLMI A and the population under its control could be 
described as symbiotic. 
Zahar argues that 'various forms of economic relations affect the 
incentives for militias to uphold international norms of conduct vis-a-vis 
civilians' (2001:48). As an armed group becomes more dependent on the 
population for food, soldiers and shelter, this population will be treated well 
as to ensure their compliance. The more independent the armed group will 
be from the population, the less incentives it will have to apply certain rules 
to its attitude towards the population (Petrasek, 2000:23). Inversely, 'the 
higher a militia's symbiotic dependence on the civilian population, the less 
likely it is that the militia will harm the civilians' (Zahar, 2001:56-7). This 
symbiotic dependence is expressed in other words by an SPLM interviewee: 
'When you have a movement fighting for the rights of the people 
supported by the people, you have to make concessions in terms of 
trying to save life for them. Of course, as a guerrilla movement, 
you know the concept of a guerrilla is like just the relationship 
between the population and the movement is just like fish and 
water. That is why the movement survives within the community. 
So it has to also address the need of the community, issues like 
food and other' (SPLM 02). 
The relationship between the SPLMI A and its constituency was not always 
like "fish and water". The relationship between the South Sudanese and the 
SPLMI A as well as between the SPLMI A and the remaining of the 
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Sudanese population evolved over time. It is difficult to isolate this 
evolution with the potential impact of continuous humanitarian 
engagements with the SPLM/A. One major turning point in the changing 
nature of this relationship remains independent of humanitarian 
engagement: the loss of the SPLMI A maj or state sponsor in 1991 changed 
the economic reliance that the SPLMI A had on their constituency and thus 
forced the SPLMI A to change its behaviour towards its constituency. 
The SPLM/A relied heavily on Mengistu's regIme for resources, 
arms, foods, training camps, safe havens, etc (Johnson, 2000:60). When 
Mengistu's regime fell, the SPLMI A found itself faced with a desperate 
situation: a lack of resources coupled with a disgruntled constituency in 
Southern Sudan. The 1994 Chukudum Convention was very much a re-
evaluation of the SPLM/A's policies towards the civilian population in 
South Sudan as the need to form a strong relationship with its constituency 
became urgent (Keen, 2000:80). The changing nature of the relationship 
between the SPLMI A and its constituency meant that humanitarian 
engagements would help the SPLMI A in wining the hearts and minds of its 
people and in this sense, certainly helped in convincing the SPLMI A that 
humanitarian engagements were paramount in supporting the SPLMI A in 
this endeavour (Duffield, 2000: 126; Luk, 1992:45). As one interviewee 
stated: 
'I would say our main objective was to mitigate the effect of war 
and means for the international community and the organisations 
to be able to reach the needy people. And the basis for this for us is 
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the very values that made us to engage the Government of Sudan 
in the first place in the way. In a sense we rebelled against the 
denial of our rights as citizens, our human rights as human beings, 
and the rights of our people, our movement as an organisation is 
nothing but an organisation of volunteers who step forward when 
our people in the millions lived in abject oppression and poverty 
and were marginalised. So yes, we wanted to pursue the war but 
with the least humanitarian cost as possible' (SPLM 05). 
The quote reflects rather well the general answers of different interviews 
with the SPLM: war was fought for the people of Southern Sudan, we were 
here to help the people of Southern Sudan, and they were here to help us in 
this struggle. The reality was in many ways different: as Johnson (2000:63) 
and Prendergast (1997:57) argue the relationship between the SPLM/A and 
its constituency is a parasitic relationship. On the other hand, the 
interviewee expresses, in a politicised or instrumentalised discourse, the fact 
that the SPLMI A was dependent on the people of Southern Sudan as much 
as the fate of the people of Southern Sudan was dependent on the success of 
the SPLMI A. This dependence, whether parasitic or symbiotic, has certainly 
played an important and crucial role in shaping the SPLM/A's attitude 
towards humanitarian engagements. 
In addition to this, having a population under its control meant that 
the "humanitarian" impact of humanitarian engagements could be more 
easily seen and therefore politicised and instrumentalised. In actively 
showing that the group was taking care of its constituency, the SPLMI A 
could aspire to greater legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the 
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international community and ensure an equal partnership for the SPLMI A at 
the negotiation table. Humanitarian engagements have impacted the conflict 
situation in Sudan by changing the perception that other actors had of the 
SPLMI A. Being able to exemplify its commitments through the betterment 
of its relationship with its constituency was paramount for the SPLMI A to 
change these perceptions. On the other hand, a situation where an armed 
group is engaged on humanitarian issues but does not have control over a 
population cannot aspire to utilise the engagement in the same way. 
Following this argument, the SPLM/A's effective control over a 
large territory helped them to go further in the implementation of 
humanitarian accords and demonstrate to the international community their 
state-like qualities and capabilities. Without a controlled territory and 
population, the humanitarian engagements that occurred with the SPLMI A 
may have had less of an impact on the perception of the international 
community and would have not put the Government of Sudan in a position 
where negotiations with the SPLMI A became inevitable. 
Zahar's arguments on the impact that the nature of the relationship 
between an armed group and the population under its control may have on 
the success of engaging armed groups on humanitarian and human rights 
issues have certainly been confirmed by this research in Sudan. 
Furthermore, this argument can be extended: a symbiotic dependence 
between the SPLMI A and the Southern Sudanese facilitated the 
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humanitarian engagements as well as their implementation and impact on 
the wider conflict situation. 
It is difficult to draw wider conclusions on whether and which 
characteristics of armed groups may play a role in favouring the positive 
impact of humanitarian engagements on the conflict situation. A 
comparative research would enable a clearer conclusion on this matter. 
Nevertheless, drawing on the literature and the data gathered throughout this 
research it appears that three characteristics may be an underlying factor in 
enabling or undermining the positive impact of humanitarian engagements 
on the conflict situations: the objectives and aims of armed non-state actors, 
the leadership and power structure of the armed group, and their relationship 
with their constituency and control over a territory. 
Humanitarian engagements and the SPLM/A: the case of three 
engagements 
The case study chosen for this research included three distinct 
humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A. In this section, each 
engagement will be examined specifically using the analysis framework 
presented in chapter IV and answering the simple questions: Who? What? 
How? Why? And finally describe some of the challenges faced in the 
process. After a chronological examination of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the 
1995 Guinea Worm Ceasefire, and the Deed of Commitment, a comparative 
analysis will aim at highlighting the characteristics of humanitarian 
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engagements that provided underlying factors favouring the positive impact 
that humanitarian engagements had on the conflict situation in Sudan. 
Operation Lifeline Sudan: Humanitarian relief 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is the name gIven to a UN 
programme started in 1989, which included a number of negotiations with 
the Government of Sudan and the SPLMI A to ensure the safe delivery of 
relief during the conflict. This programme brought together a number of UN 
agencies and NGOs working in South Sudan under one umbrella. Using the 
framework discussed previously, this section will describe this long-running 
humanitarian engagement by asking: Who? What? How? Why? And finally 
describe some of the challenges. 
Who? Who engaged? 
Operation Lifeline Sudan was mainly coordinated by the UN. In 
order to keep the low-profile as well as the non-political character of the 
humanitarian engagement, the main actor of this engagement was UNICEF 
(Akol, 2005:54). Although OLS regrouped a number of NGOs and UN 
Agencies, 'the most important humanitarian officials negotiating the OLS 
agreement were Julia Taft of OFDA, and James Grant of UNICEF' 
(Medley, 2000: 179). The process was spearheaded by them in 1989 and 
continued throughout the 1990s with the central involvement of the UN and 
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more particularly the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) created in 
1992. 
What? Purpose of engagement 
The purpose of the engagement evolved throughout the conflict. Its 
main endeavour was to provide a safe and secure environment for NGOs to 
deliver humanitarian relief in South Sudan and therefore its main focus was 
on operational conduct. As Peterson explains, 'since 1989, OLS had made 
possible the distribution of tens of thousands of tons of relief food in the 
south, negotiating "corridors of tranquillity" [ ... J' (2001 :232). OLS I (April-
December 1989) included the following points: 
'1. The UN has to deal with all the parties to the conflict that 
control territory through which relief items pass or to which they 
are delivered. 
2. The parties to the conflict commit themselves to the safe and 
unhindered passage and delivery of relief items to the needy 
population. 
3. The UN, as a neutral body, was to co-ordinate the operations 
with the parties to the conflict' (Akol, 2005:54). 
Committing the warring parties to the safe and unhindered passage and 
delivery of relief items remained the central purpose of the OLS I, II and III 
throughout the conflict. 
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There was also an initial peace-building and peacemaking purpose 
(Loane, 2000:26). It was believed that OLS, by providing a unique 
opportunity to provide aid across the front-line, could provide a 'tool to 
create a framework of negotiation' (Brusset, 2000:135). In 1989, when 
peace seemed to be possible, OLS was seen as 'a novel [ ... J relief 
programme that served to bring the warring parties together [ ... J 
constituting a form of humanitarian diplomacy' (Duffield, 2000: 113). The 
Ground Rules in 1994 were very much seen in the same light providing a 
more formalised approach to humanitarian agreements by having a written 
and signed humanitarian agreement, as 'their intention, or at least, how they 
became to be used, was not to make humanitarian aid conditional, they were 
more concerned with ameliorating the dynamics of conflict in South Sudan' 
(Duffield, 2000:124). 
With the nearly complete collapse of the OLS at the beginning of the 
1990s due to the coup d' etat in Khartoum, the programme aimed at bringing 
a further commitment to the conditions of providing humanitarian aid in 
conflict. The Ground Rules of the OLS incorporated a commitment to a 
code of conduct as well as other humanitarian principles such as the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child45 . As Duffield 
explains: 
'Spurred by the deaths of aid workers, this issue was tackled 
through the development of the Ground Rule concept. A set of 
requirements were developed aimed at minimum standards of 
conduct, to be agreed between the UN and the opposition 
45 See appendix 4 for the agreement on the Ground Rules. 
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movement; agreement on these standards would render the 
movement, or at least its humanitarian wing, eligible for OLS 
assistance. While the Ground Rules would incorporate 
humanitarian principles in 1994, when they first appeared in early 
1993 they were mainly concerned with improving the security of 
aid workers' (2000: 124). 
The Ground Rules helped the emergence of important humanitarian wings 
within the different SPLMI A factions, which, in turn, made parts of the 
SPLMI A factions significant humanitarian actors throughout the conflict. 
There were three important humanitarian organisations emanating from the 
warring parties: the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was the 
Government's humanitarian agency, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association (SRRA) was the SPLM-mainstream's humanitarian agency, and 
the Relief Association of Southern Sudan (RASS) was the SPLM-united's 
humanitarian agency. As Prendergast explains: 
'From the beginning of OLS, there were attempts to minimise the 
external nature of the relief intervention by strengthening the 
capacity of the RRC and the SRRA. The RRC received staff 
members and other support from OLS. The SRRA, which started 
from scratch in early 1989, received funds, vehicles, management 
training, and other support from the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) and NGOs' (1997:58-9). 
The Ground Rules also provided the commitment of the SPLMI A factions to 
a number of humanitarian principles which was not the case in earlier OLS 
agreements. 
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How? When? Types of agreement 
At the end of the 1980s, reports on the war in South Sudan focused 
on the humanitarian crisis crippling the Southern Sudanese. Facing such 
reports, the UN convened representatives from UN agencies, donor 
countries, NGOs and the Government of Sudan to an international 
conference on Sudan Emergency Relief in March 1989 in Khartoum to 
address the crisis (Akol, 2005:52). The conference aimed at organising a 
relief operation in Sudan under the leadership of James Grant, Executive 
Director of UNICEF. Grant first proposed that the warring parties come to 
an agreement on a six-month cease fire to allow for the delivery of food to 
stop the number of people dying from war-induced famine, already reaching 
500,000 people in 1988 according to some sources (Akol, 2005:52; Iyob et 
aI., 2006:92). Even though the SPLM/A was not convened to the 
conference, John Garang, SPLMI A Chairman, sent a letter to the conference 
'expressing the SPLM/A's readiness to co-operate with the organisations 
and agencies meeting in Khartoum in assisting the needy populations' 
(Akol, 2005:52). Although the SPLM/A was not ready to agree to a 
ceasefire agreement, the Movement was open to 'explore other modalities 
for the relief operation' (Akol, 2005 :53). According to Akol, this 
announcement was followed by a series of meetings with the US Embassy 
Staff led by Bob Frasure which eventually led to the creation of 'ceasefire 
axes "Corridors of Tranquillity'" (2005:53). This first agreement was 
tenned OLS I and lasted from April 1989 until December 1989. 
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OLS I was not a written agreement (Akol, 2005:54). This agreement 
consisted of an informal, oral consent from the SPLMI A and the 
Government of Sudan to agree to the basic principles of the relief operation 
given by UNICEF. OLS I allowed the delivery of food in areas in Southern 
Sudan controlled by the SPLMI A and areas controlled by the Government 
of Sudan. The delivery of food was made by river, rail and air and, as a 
result, 'improved health conditions among the population became 
noticeable' (Akol, 2005:54). 
The coup d'etat in 1989 forced OLS I to come to an end. A plan for 
OLS II was discussed but no clear consent was given by the actors involved 
in the Operation. It was, nevertheless, used to continue relief operations in 
the South in a semi-legitimate way (Medley, 2000: 180). OLS II took an ad 
hoc nature as 'the [Government of Sudan] slowly became the dominant 
partner, dictating terms to both the SPLA and the UN', thus interfering in 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance by cancelling and delaying 
authorisations for relief flights (Akol, 2005:54). 
In 1991, an attempt to formally establish OLS III failed agam 
(Medley, 2000: 180). Relief operations continued despite this failure. The 
first agreement on OLS relief to be signed again was achieved 'as a by 
product of peace talks sponsored by the IGADD regional group of states' 
(Medley, 2000: 180). In this case, it appears that peace talks led to a 
humanitarian agreement rather than a humanitarian agreement favouring the 
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start of peace talks. The March 1994 agreement proposed the following 
principles: 
'- The delivery of relief assistance to all needy populations 
regardless of their locations. 
- Humanitarian assistance shall benefit only civilians, and shall not 
be used by warring parties. 
- All humanitarian actions and activities shall be transparent and 
carried out with the full knowledge of all parties' (Medley, 
2000: 180-1). 
The March 1994 agreement, however, did not include all the warrmg 
parties. Following the 1991 split within the SPLM/A, the UN under-
secretary General, James Jonah, refused to sign an agreement with both 
factions of the SPLMI A, preventing as a result the delivery of humanitarian 
relief items to areas under the control of the SPLM-United (Akol, 2005:55). 
The mid-1990s saw a turning point in the working of the OLS. The 
Ground Rules mark a formalisation of the humanitarian engagement among 
the parties to the OLS. The Ground Rules put in place a rare system of 'a 
rule-based approach based on document signed by the UN and non-state 
opposition movements' (Duffield, 2000:124). Whereas consent was given 
informally in previous OLS agreements, the Ground Rules offered a written 
agreement signed by the southern opposition movements, i.e. the factions of 
the SPLM/A then renamed the "SPLM/A mainstream" with John Garang 
who signed in July 1995, the SPLM-United with Lam Akol who signed in 
May 1996, and the SSIMI A (the South Sudanese Independence 
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MovementiAnny) with Riek Machar who signed in August 1995. Duffield 
emphasises the important development towards a more fonnal agreement 
with the Ground Rules (2000: 124). Despite the fact that the OLS Ground 
Rules comprehensively included all the SPLMI A factions, the Government 
of Sudan, on the other hand, was not a signatory to the Ground Rules 
agreement (Duffield, 2000: 127). 
The OLS proposed a number of different types of agreements. OLS I 
included all the parties to the conflict, the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLMI A, to an infonnal agreement with no written or signed document. 
OLS II and III provided ad hoc provisions where the consent of the different 
parties were not always clear. In addition to this, OLS II and III failed to 
manage the rebel's factionalism and excluded important factions, denying 
food to a number of areas. Finally, the Ground Rules provide the most 
formal agreement within the OLS system as it provided a signed consent to 
a written document. Unfortunately, as much as it included all the important 
factions in the South, it failed to incorporate the Government of Sudan. 
Why? Motivation of armed group and government 
The motivation of the warrmg parties to join the OLS and the 
Ground Rules are numerous, but not always straightforward. It is difficult to 
judge the hidden agenda in joining the humanitarian dialogues. As both 
sides of the conflict are to blame for diverse violations of human rights or 
humanitarian principles, one cannot easily explain the engagement of the 
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warrmg parties as motivated solely by their eagerness to uphold such 
principles. This section is a tentative answer to why the SPLM/A, as well as 
other factions, and the Government of Sudan engaged themselves in this 
humanitarian process. 
To answer the question of what motivated the warrmg parties, 
humanitarian relief needs to be thought of as bringing in resources in the 
conflict zone. As Loane explains, 'it was money which provided the last 
hurdle in the negotiation of the 1989 OLS agreement with the Government 
of Sudan' (Loane, 2000:23). The Government of Sudan accepted the 
agreement on the condition that a preferential exchange rate be agreed on. 
Similarly, the OLS brought some resources to the opposition groups. 
The Operation brought infrastructure in the South as well as food relief. 
Unfortunately, a large amount of the humanitarian relief brought in the 
South was diverted by the armed factions. This relief was certainly used by 
these factions to feed their members. The possibility of acquiring food and 
other humanitarian relief items from the OLS was certainly a motivation in 
joining the agreement. 
For both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A factions, the 
OLS brought another important type of resource. It offered a forum whereby 
the warring factions could acquire international sympathy, support and 
legitimacy. By entering into this humanitarian process, the warring factions 
could portray themselves as the "good guys" attracting international media 
328 
attention, favours from the UN, good relations with donor countries and 
other governments around the world. This moral grounding was especially 
important for the Government of Sudan in the 1990s as it slowly became a 
pariah state. This "moral legitimacy" also appears important in relation to 
the warring parties' constituencies. 
Challenges 
A number of challenges were faced in negotiating for the OLS as 
well as implementing the OLS. Obstacles came from a variety of sources 
and actors in the OLS. 
One of the main obstacles to the OLS was the perception of the 
Government of Sudan that the OLS was a breach of its sovereignty. In 
effect, the OLS appeared as a transfer of sovereignty to the UN in South 
Sudan (Loane, 2000:23). The Government of Sudan seemed to perceive the 
OLS as an indirect way for an external intervention in its internal affairs 
(lyob et aI., 2006:96). 
The political volatility on either side of the conflict also made the 
OLS agreements difficult. The 1989 coup led to the breakdown of the 
ceasefire and was followed by the breakdown of the OLS I agreement 
(Akol, 2005:54). The factionalism among the Southern groups in the 1990s 
also caused confusion in the OLS. As much as the OLS wanted to be all 
inclusive and engage with all the different SPLMI A factions, it seemed 
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afraid of causing further factionalism and fuelling the internal Southern 
conflicts. 
The lack of clear agreement and consent resulting from this political 
volatility led to a more ad hoc implementation of the OLS at the beginning 
of the 1990s. With a looser framework of implementation, manipulation of 
aid and food diversion became the most publicised characteristic of the 
OLS. Loane reports up to 80% of relief food 'being sequestered by the 
Government forces in Juba' (Loane, 2000:25). Food diversion was also 
prevalent on the side of the SPLMI A and consequently antagonised the 
Government who perceived the OLS as 'feeding its enemies' (Akol, 
2005:54). The lack of an accountability framework for breaching the 
agreement or, as Duffield tenns it, 'an active framework of consent 
maintained by donor pressure', brought the OLS to a near collapse in the 
mid-1990s (2000: 114). In addition to these diversions, the OLS saw its 
implementation challenged by the continuous banning of OLS flights by the 
Government of Sudan (Keen, 2000:92-3). These unfortunate events are at 
the source of attacks against the OLS arguing that the OLS ended up 
fuelling the conflict (Loane, 2000:26; Peterson, 2001 :233). The diversion of 
food and manipulation of aid relief was certainly a significant negative 
effect of the Operation. How much these issues played into fuelling the 
conflict remains a matter of perception. 
The Carter Center: Guinea Worm ceasefire 
"0 JJ 
The Carter Center, an American NGO working under the leadership 
of former US President Jimmy Carter, brokered in 1995 a six-month 
ceasefire to allow the treatment of specific diseases and the immunisation of 
children trapped in the South Sudan conflict46• 
Who? Who engaged? 
The involvement of the Carter Center in Sudan dates back to 1986 
when the Center was involved in an agricultural project helping farmers to 
improve crop yields (Carter Center). Through its Conflict Resolution 
Program, the Center has been involved in trying to negotiate peace between 
the warring parties. The Center was involved in an attempt to rekindle the 
peace process in 1989 after the coup d'etat (Iyob et aI., 2006:92). The 
Center also brokered the 1999 Nairobi Agreement between Uganda and 
Sudan to ease tensions in the region as 'the governments pledged to stop 
supporting rebels acting against each other' (Carter Center). The Center also 
provided conflict resolution training for both sides of the conflict as part of 
the IGAD peace process which resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement. The long involvement of the Center in Sudan as well as 
Carter's personal relationships with both Sudanese President Bashir and 
SPLMIA leader Garang made the signing of the Guinea Worm ceasefire 
possible. 
46 G' W See appendix 5 for the press release from the Carter Center on the umea orm 
ceasefire. 
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The Carter Center is involved in a number of activities. These 
include a Conflict Resolution Program, a Health Program, and the 
monitoring of elections. It is interesting to note that the Carter Center is not 
solely a "humanitarian actor" and its involvement in Sudan reflects this 
dichotomy. Carter's first involvement in the 1989 peace initiative was made 
possible through its involvement in health and humanitarian issues in Sudan, 
which then made the signing of the humanitarian ceasefire possible. 
What? Purpose of engagement 
The 1995 ceasefire was aimed at providing a safe environment for a 
campaign to eradicate the Guinea Worm disease. It included 'the treatment 
of Guinea worm disease, [ ... ] efforts against river blindness, and [ ... ] an 
opportunity for children to be immunised against polio and other illnesses' 
(Carter Center). The purpose of the engagement was very focused and 
provided six-month of peace to provide much needed health care. 
How? When? Types of agreement 
Through his personal links with Bashir and Garang, which Jimmy 
Carter maintained since 1986, the Guinea Worm cease-fire was made 
possible. The cease-fire was signed by the Government of Sudan, the 
SPLM/A and the SSIM/A, including the main parties involved in the 
conflict at the time. 
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This humanitarian agreement took the form of a ceasefire. According 
to the Carter Center, the ceasefire was 'the longest cease-fire ever achieved 
in civil-war-torn Sudan' (Carter Center). Unlike OLS which negotiated safe 
relief while the fighting continued, this humanitarian engagement is 
significant in bringing an end to the fighting for six months on the ground of 
humanitarian action. 
Why? Motivation of armed group 
On both sides of the conflict, the motivation for signing the Guinea 
Worm Ceasefire in 1995 that was voiced by interviewees was humanitarian. 
The Government, as the sovereign power, wanted to protect its people from 
the disease and the SPLMI A, as it claimed to be fighting for the protection 
of the rights of the people in the South, felt that it was only natural to sign 
an agreement that would help the people of South Sudan. 
'Well [the Ceasefire] was made because of the Guinea Worm 
campaign in Southern Sudan. Of course due to the war and lack of 
facilities, people were suffering. That decision had to be accepted 
by the SPLM on the initiative of the Carter Center because we 
believe that we are fighting for our people and if people are 
exposed to such terrible diseases then there is a need for us to 
accept that' (SPLM 02). 
In addition to the humanitarian concerns of the SPLMI A, the Ceasefire was 
seen as a political asset: 
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'We didn't see Guinea Worm as a big priority. But I think 
politically it was very important. For somebody like Carter to 
come and champion this, it was really important. And engaging the 
Americans also. So it was really the focus to have somebody like 
Carter to get the Americans to know more what is happening in 
Sudan' (SPLM 06). 
Geneva Call and the Deed of Commitment: The landmine ban 
Geneva Call is a Geneva-based NGO working towards the universal 
ban on landmines. Geneva Call argues that a universal ban on landmines 
includes a framework to ban the use of landmines by armed groups. As a 
result, this NGO came up with a standard document called the Deed of 
Commitment through which armed groups engage themselves by signing 
this Deed of Commitment. The SPLMI A was their first engagement47 . 
Who? Who engaged? 
Geneva Call is a humanitarian NGO and places its work within the 
humanitarian principles. It is a specialised NGO working solely on 
landmines (although there are talks of expanding their activities). Geneva 
Call's mandate cannot be solely reduced to engaging armed groups for the 
signature of the Deed of Commitment as its work includes a larger mine 
action mandate with armed groups such as mine ban education workshops 
as well as facilitating the implementation of the Deed of Commitment, 
which include, for instance, demining. Geneva Call is based at the centre of 
47 See appendix 6 for Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment signed by the SPLM/A. 
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the "Humanitarian Capital", Geneva, working very much within the 
humanitarian network and the "International Geneva" which includes the 
UN. 
What? Purpose of engagement 
Geneva Call's engagement with the SPLMI A aimed at supporting 
the SPLMI A prior engagement on the issue of landmines through their 
unilateral Moratorium on Landmines in 1996. Geneva Call works with a 
standard document which commits the SPLMI A to the ban on the use, 
production, transfer of landmines and mine action activities such as 
demining. 
How? When? Types of agreement 
The SPLMI A was approached by Geneva Call through the 
facilitation of the Kenyan Campaign Against Landmines and another 
Kenyan partner in Nairobi. Geneva Call's first meeting was with Operation 
Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), a humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A already 
involved in demining in South Sudan (GC 02). Geneva Call invited the 
SPLM/A to join their Pioneering Conference in Geneva in March 2000 
where the NGO was officially launched. Commander Lino, SPLMI A 
Director for External Security and Member of the New Sudan Authority on 
Landmines and Commander Aleu, the Executive Director of OSIL joined 
Geneva Call at the Pioneering Conference where they manifested a desire to 
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sign the Deed of Commitment. Both Aleu and Lino were responsible for 
lobbying the SPLM/A internally (GC 02) especially the Chairman, John 
Garang. All the negotiations with Geneva Call were done by Nyal Deng 
Nyal with the presence of Commander Lino, a high level military figure 
(GC 02). 
The signing of the Deed of Commitment always occurred in Geneva 
III one of the Canton of Geneva's official venues. In the case of the 
SPLM/A's signature of the Deed of Commitment, Nyal Deng Nyal signed 
on behalf of the SPLMI A in the presence of the Government of Sudan 
represented by its Ambassador to Geneva in October 2001. By highlighting 
the humanitarian side of the agreement, the presence of both SPLMI A 
officials and Sudanese Government officials was made possible (GC 01). 
Geneva Call mentions, retrospectively, that sIgnmg with the 
humanitarian/political wing of the movement may have hindered the 
implementation of the engagement as the military wing of the SPLMI A did 
not automatically recognise and accept the signing of the Deed of 
Commitment by the humanitarian/political wing (GC 02). 
Even though the Government of Sudan was not a signatory of the 
Deed of Commitment which is reserved for armed non-state actors, Geneva 
Call has a policy of working in transparency with the government hosting 
the armed group. In the implementation of the Deed of Commitment, a few 
workshops were organised in South Sudan by Geneva Call, who always 
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announced to the Khartoum authorities their intentions without mentioning 
the exact dates and places for security reasons (GC 01). 
Three important characteristics need to be highlighted. Geneva 
Call's engagement is very particular as it has a standard document that is 
signed by all their signatories. This makes Geneva Call's engagement rather 
formalised. In addition to this, the signing of the Deed of Commitment in 
Geneva opens the possibility for armed groups to connect with the 
international community of UN agencies and NGOs in Geneva. Indeed, the 
SPLM/A was contacted by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to draw 
up a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Sudan. The 
meeting took place in Geneva following the SPLMI A's signature of the 
Deed of Commitment. Finally, Geneva Call's engagement process is very 
much focused on the armed group. In Sudan, Geneva Call's has mostly been 
in contact with the SPLMI A whereas its contact with the Government of 
Sudan is very much limited to its Ambassador in Geneva. 
Why? Motivation of armed group and reaction of the Government of 
Sudan 
The SPLM/A's engagement in the signature of the Deed of 
Commitment was very much a result of the work of Commander Lino and 
Commander Aleu as well as a few other SPLMI A members involved in the 
humanitarian/political side of the Movement. As mentioned earlier, there 
was a period of internal lobbying to convince the rest of the leadership. The 
issue of landmines was, however, already seen as a problem by the SPLM/A 
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as the Movement had already issued a Moratorium on landmines in 1996. 
As Commander Aleu explained during Geneva Call's workshop in 2003 in 
Kapoeta, South Sudan: 
'''As freedom fighters, we first considered mines as good weapons 
because we did not know the consequences of their use. Then we 
started to realise that mines are not of strategic or tactical 
importance. As an active commander, I saw what they did to my 
own soldiers." Aleu challenged other fighters at the meeting, "I do 
not think anyone of you here can tell me of a single objective 
denied to the government forces by landmines. Not one'" 
(International Campaign Against Landmines, 2004:752). 
The commitment of the SPLMI A was very much an acceptance of the 
principles of the Deed of Commitment. 
In addition to this, there was a certain concern among the SPLMI A 
leadership about the difficulty of post-war reconstruction in a land 
contaminated by, at best, 500,000 landmines, at worst, up to 2 million 
landmines: 
'SPLM/A Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, Dr; John Garang 
de Mabior, opened the workshop, and stressed the urgent need to 
implement the mine ban in order to facilitate Sudan's recovery 
from 20 years of civil war and in support of the ongoing peace 
talks ' (Geneva Call, 2003: 1). 
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In order to support Sudan's recovery, Geneva Call was seen, especially by 
the deminers of OSIL as an opportunity to acquire resources and help in 
demining South Sudan (GC 02). 
Challenges 
The process of engagement was a straightforward process. Geneva Call 
highlights that the Government of Sudan has been cooperative throughout 
the engagement process (GC 01). Geneva Call's engagement with the 
SPLMI A was, in fact, welcomed by the Sudanese Ambassador in Geneva 
(GC 01, GC 02). 
As mentioned earlier, Geneva Call felt that it should have ensured the 
commitment of the SPLMI A as a whole not solely relying on the 
humanitarian/political wing of the movement and engaging with the military 
wing of the SPLM/A more pro-actively from the beginning (GC 02). 
This may explain the few allegations of mine use after the signing of the 
Deed of Commitment (International Campaign Against Landmines, 
2004:752). This alleged use reflect 'the need for an education campaign 
directed at [the SPLM/A's] rank and file' as the SPLM/A pointed out 'the 
challenges of changing the behaviour of its military and the practical 
difficulties in disseminating its policy over the vast and remote areas under 
its authority' (Geneva Call, 2003: 1). 
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Characteristics of humanitarian engagements as underlying factors 
The section above laid out the principal characteristics of each 
engagement researched. Where comparing characteristics of anned groups 
is not possible because of the focus on a single anned group, this case study 
provides an opportunity to compare and contrast the three humanitarian 
engagements examined. Analysing the data independently for each 
engagement enables us to highlight the characteristics that affected the 
relationship between the process of humanitarian engagement and the 
process of conflict transfonnation. Not all characteristics of humanitarian 
engagements seem to impact on the possible effect that humanitarian 
engagement may have on conflict transfonnation. Thus, this section 
emphasises the "who" and the "how and when" .48 
"Who" matters 
Who engages with anned non state actors on humanitarian issues 
matters in tenns of the wider impact that an engagement will have on the 
conflict situation. This factor affects the potential for the creation of a 
platform for communication between the parties to the conflict as well as 
amongst different important actors in the international community that may 
as a result, change their perception of an anned group. The outcomes of a 
process of socialisation with the international community impact the wayan 
48 Whereas "why" the anned groups engages in humanitarian engagements also matters, 
this has already been discussed in the section on the characteristics of anned groups. 
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anned group may be perceived as well as their capacity and status during 
peace talks. 
In the case of the SPLMI A, the largest platform created resulted 
from Operation Lifeline Sudan. OLS was an historical tripartite agreement 
between the UN, a government and an armed group. The forum that OLS 
provided for the SPLMI A played a significant role in shaping the SPLMI A 
diplomatic skills, in publicising the SPLMI A's propaganda, and in creating 
sympathy, almost support, for the SPLM/A during the peace talks. Most 
interviewees took part to some extent in OLS. The wide-spread knowledge 
of the process among the higher strata of SPLMI A members proves that 
OLS had a significant impact on the Movement. The fact that the UN was at 
the forefront of this engagement gave OLS a wider dimension. On the other 
hand, the 1995 Guinea Worm ceasefire brokered by the Carter Center and 
the Deed of Commitment with Geneva Call were perceived as smaller 
engagements and seemed to have had a smaller impact as not every 
interviewee was knowledgeable about these engagements. 
However, the 1995 Guinea Worm ceasefire brokered by the Carter 
Center had a very specific impact in terms of how it helped the SPLMI A in 
their search for recognition and status at the negotiation table. 
'We didn't see Guinea Wonn as a big priority. But I think 
politically it was very important. For somebody like Carter to 
come and champion this, it was really important. And engagement 
with the Americans also. So it was really the focus to have 
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somebody like Carter to get the Americans to know more what is 
happening in Sudan' (SPLM 06). 
This quote was used in the previous section to show that the SPLM/A's 
agreement to the Ceasefire was motivated by political reasons. Indeed, the 
fact that the ceasefire was brokered by a former US President seemed to 
have played a significant role in creating a network between the SPLM/A 
and the United States. This network became an important political asset 
when it came to supporting the SPLMI A in the peace talks. 
'[the Ceasefire J also helped us to open up and increase contacts of 
the SPLM with the United States. [ ... J These connections became 
very useful. [ ... J All the same, we benefited from some important 
contacts in the Christian Right so it helped us. It gave us some 
techniques, we trained our people through different organisations, 
short courses, a week or two weeks, in conflict resolution. It 
opened up a lot of avenues' (SPLM 07). 
The engagement on the issue of Landmine through the Deed of 
Commitment with Geneva Call certainly appears less significant in terms of 
the actors involved. Contrary to the symbolic institution that is the UN and 
the presence of a former US President, Geneva Call is a small NGO and as 
such the engagement on landmines appears to have had less political impact 
on the general conflict situation than OLS or the Ceasefire. 
The literature on the Issue of who leads the humanitarian 
engagement emphasises the benefits of low-key non-government 
organisations (Hofmann, 2004). This argument supports the claim that such 
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low key actors are necessary to avoid recognition and legitimacy (Hottinger, 
2005:58). In terms of the extent to which humanitarian engagements with 
armed groups affect the wider conflict situation, this research shows that the 
higher the status of the actor engaging with the armed group, the greater the 
impact on the political and conflict situation is. 
"How and when" matter 
A second important factor in understanding the different conditions 
for humanitarian engagements to impact the wider conflict situation is when 
and how the engagement happens. One of the reasons why the Deed of 
Commitment with Geneva Call did not seem to have played a significant 
role in impacting the conflict situation is that the engagement occurred in 
2001 at the very end of the conflict when the possibility of successful peace 
talks was already palpable. Operation Lifeline Sudan occurred early in the 
conflict and this timing can also explain why it has had such a significant 
wider impact. 
A second aspect relating to how and when humanitarian 
engagements occur is the length of the engagement. One interviewee from 
the Government side was asked after claiming that 'without the OLS, the 
war would still be going on' (HAC 02) why, even though the OLS started as 
early as 1989, the peace talks that led to the peace agreement started in 
2002. His answer to this was because it was a social work and it needed a 
long time to know each other (HAC 02). In other words, the longer the 
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engagement the more impact it has on the conflict situation because the 
impact that humanitarian engagements have on the conflict situation 
partially happens through a socialisation process. This explains why OLS 
seems to have a more significant impact than the Guinea Worm ceasefire or 
the Deed of Commitment. 
The length of the engagement often entails that the engagement has a 
long implementation period. This aspect favours a more significant impact 
on the conflict situation as a post-humanitarian agreement implementation 
period means further negotiations and a crucial learning experience in 
resolving through dialogue issues that may arise as a result of this 
implementation. Again, OLS started in 1989 and carried out its work 
throughout the conflict. As an interviewee explained: 
'When you want to implement an agreement, you are going to face 
a lot of problems here and there. [ ... ] This is why [ ... ] the UN and 
the Government and the SPLA agreed that they have to improve 
the Operation Lifeline Sudan. This is why they agreed that every 
year, they draft an agreement that they start with. All these 
agreements are targeting the improvement of the humanitarian 
assistance' (HAC 01). 
The continuous negotiations that the OLS required favoured the building of 
a working relationship between the Government of Sudan and the SPLMI A 
and as such had a more important impact on the possibility of successful 
peace talks. 
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However, a long implementation period may also heighten tensions 
between the parties to a conflict. Indeed, in the case where continuous 
violations occur, mistrust and negative perceptions of the other may result 
from the implementation of humanitarian engagements. Despite stating that 
'humanitarianism brought the Comprehensive Peace Agreement', an 
interviewee from the Government of Sudan highlights that Operation 
Lifeline Sudan had a negative impact because of violations and the belief 
that 'rebels were using relief to feed soldiers' (HAC 02). An interviewee 
from the SPLMI A also mentions violations of the agreement as an issue 
raising tension: 
'Every time they [the Government of Sudan] can deny certain 
areas of flights and services .... and by then there were no roads so 
the only way is by air and unless the place is cleared by Khartoum 
from the Southern Sector it would not fly to Southern Sudan. 
Q: Do you think that raised tensions between the SPLM and the 
Government? 
Well, of course, there was no trust by then' (SPLM 03). 
It is surprising that even though violations of Operation Lifeline Sudan were 
mentioned systematically by both sides during interviews, the general 
opinion remained that Operation Lifeline Sudan had created a number of 
spill-over effects that favoured successful peace talks. One explanation 
could be that Operation Lifeline Sudan allowed both sides to react to 
violations and broken agreements putting into place a general peaceful 
conflict resolution dynamic between the two sides and testing this working 
relationship. 
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In addition to this, the occurrence of actual negotiations matter in 
understanding whether or not humanitarian engagements may playa role in 
favouring the start of peace talks. In the case of the Carter Center's 
Ceasefire, one interviewee strongly agreed that the negotiations for the 
ceasefire has been 'a school for negotiation' (SPLM 05): 
'It [the humanitarian Ceasefire] played a role because it was 
negotiated and that constituted a school for the negotiations that 
we conducted later at the ceasefires as well as also for really 
negotiations the ceasefires for the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and for negotiating the very body of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (SPLM 05). 
On the other hand, in the engagement with Geneva Call, a standard 
document is proposed and therefore there are not negotiations between the 
armed group and the NGO. As an interviewee from Geneva Call explained, 
'we are not really negotiating. We are making a proposition. We are saying 
take it or leave it' (GC 03). 
The aspects of humanitarian engagements described above relate to 
the timing and length of the engagement. The final aspect that favours the 
impact of humanitarian engagements with ANSAs relates to whether or not 
the engagement is bilateral (between an organisation and a party to the 
conflict), multilateral (between an organisation and two or more parties to 
the conflict) or unilateral (engagement made unilaterally by one party to the 
conflict). Among the three engagements examined in this research two are 
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multilateral and one is bilateral. Operation Lifeline Sudan and the Guinea 
Worm humanitarian ceasefire involved the Government of Sudan, the 
SPLM/A (as well as other factions of the SPLM/A) and the UN and 
different NGOs for Operation Life Sudan and the Carter Center for the 
Ceasefire. Geneva Call's engagement with the signing of the Deed of 
Commitment only engaged the SPLMI A. 
As the impact that humanitarian engagements with armed groups 
may have on the conflict situation works through a number of indirect 
processes, whether the engagement is unilateral, bilateral or multilateral 
affects these processes. Indeed, as the changing communication patterns, the 
changing perception of actors, trust building and strengthening a working 
relationship playa significant role in how humanitarian engagements impact 
on the conflict situation, any characteristic that may affect these processes 
will also affect whether or not humanitarian engagements impact the 
transformation of conflict. 
One can hypothesise that as a humanitarian agreement moves from a 
unilateral agreement to a multilateral engagement, a greater number of 
negotiations and therefore more dialogue will occur, a more formalised and 
institutionalised agreement will become necessary, thus increasing the 
potentiality of a greater impact on the conflict and the dynamic amongst the 
actors involved. This research supports this argument as Operation Lifeline 
Sudan, which was more formalised and more encompassing of all the actors 
of the conflict, had a greater impact than the Carter Center's engagement. In 
347 
the same way, the Carter Center's engagement, which engaged actors from 
both sides of the conflict and was more formalised than Geneva Call's 
engagement, had a greater impact in changing certain patterns and dynamics 
in the conflict, thus favouring a peaceful transformation of the conflict. 
Indeed, Operation Lifeline Sudan had a greater impact as the two 
sides of the conflict were to meet more regularly due to the implementation 
of the agreement and the constant need to ensure the agreement of all sides. 
As one interviewee explained: 
'We used to have regular meetings on humanitarian [issues], 
almost twice a year in Geneva or Oslo. [ ... ] That is usually headed 
by people at the level of ministers on our side, the senior army 
representatives of the SPLA as well as the intelligence 
representatives. It used to be 5 each side. We used to have almost 
every six months these meetings and we used to talk about issues 
related to all these activities' (HAC 04). 
In opposition to this, Geneva Call's work focused on the SPLM and the only 
communication with the Government of Sudan aimed at guaranteeing their 
principle of working in transparency with governments. As an interviewee 
from Geneva Call mentioned, 'we are not creating communication between 
the two parties. We are not bringing parties together' (GC 03). The formal 
inclusion of a government and an armed group forces dialogue, in certain 
situations even creates dialogue. This has more impact on the 
communication pattern between the parties to the conflict. 
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McHugh and Bessler argue that the way humanitarian negotiations 
occur may affect the willingness of an armed group to 'enter into 
negotiations and reach and agreement in the future' (2006:45). One 
interviewee states that 'the elements negotiated in humanitarian agreements 
condition future peace talks' (Expert 02). These two arguments support the 
belief that it is not only the occurrence of humanitarian engagements that 
may affect the conflict situation but it is also the characteristics, elements, 
and the way humanitarian negotiations occur that affect the impact that 
humanitarian engagements may have on the conflict situation. This research 
enables us to start drawing certain conclusions about these characteristics 
and how they may affect the relationship between humanitarian 
engagements and peace processes. 
The first conclusion is that the earlier the agreement in the conflict 
the greater the impact. Secondly, the longer the implementation period of 
the humanitarian agreement the greater is the impact on the conflict 
situation, although this impact may be negative if violations are not dealt 
with or positive if it furthers the establishment of a good working 
relationship. Thirdly, the more negotiations there are during the engagement 
process, the greater the impact is on the peaceful transformation of conflict. 
Fourthly, the more the humanitarian engagement encompasses the different 
actors involved in the conflict and in the possible peace process, the greater 
the impact on the conflict dynamic is. 
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Conclusion 
Examining how the characteristics of armed groups and 
humanitarian engagements may playa role in favouring or constraining the 
impact that humanitarian engagements have on the conflict situation help to 
provide the underlying factors affecting this relationship. This first analysis 
chapter concludes that an array of different factors come into play in order 
to provide favourable underlying conditions for this relationship or impact 
between a humanitarian process and a political process to occur. 
Despite the absence of comparison, the findings highlight that a 
number of characteristics of armed groups are factors in understanding how 
and when humanitarian engagements have a wider impact on the conflict 
situation. Three general conclusions can be made. First, humanitarian 
engagements with the SPLMI A impacted the conflict situation by changing 
the perception that different actors had of the SPLM/A: the SPLM/A's aim 
to govern a "New Sudan" favoured this outcome as this objective 
necessitated a positive engagement with the international community. 
Secondly, it is not the case that humanitarian engagements with the 
SPLMI A triggered a change in the internal dynamic of the group, but the 
power structure or change in the internal dynamic of the SPLMI A enabled 
and affected humanitarian engagements and the impact that they may have 
in the conflict situation. Finally, a symbiotic dependence between the 
SPLMI A and its constituency facilitated humanitarian engagements as well 
as their implementation and impact on the wider conflict situation. 
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The comparative analysis made between the three humanitarian 
engagements researched highlight a number of characteristics that factor in 
the relationship between humanitarian engagements and their impact on the 
conflict situation. Despite claims made in the literature that low-key non-
government organisations facilitate humanitarian engagements, the opposite 
becomes true when evaluating the impact that humanitarian engagements 
have on the conflict situation as this research shows that the higher the 
status of the actor engaging with the armed group, the greater the impact on 
the political and conflict situation is. Secondly, the earlier the humanitarian 
engagement occurs in the conflict and the longer the implementation period 
of this engagement, the greater the impact is on the conflict situation. The 
more negotiations occur in the process of engagement, the greater the 
impact of the humanitarian engagement on the conflict situation is. Finally, 
the more the humanitarian engagement encompasses the different actors 
involved in the conflict and in the possible peace process, the greater is the 
impact on the conflict dynamic. 
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Chapter VIII: Humanitarian engagements in the second civil 
war in Sudan: Analysing the steps from humanitarian to 
political engagements 
Introduction 
This chapter is the second of two analysis chapters. Whereas the 
previous chapter examined the characteristics of humanitarian engagements 
and armed groups as underlying factors, this chapter focuses on answering 
the main research question through the three proposed hypotheses in 
relation to the case study. The research question asks whether humanitarian 
engagement with armed non-state actors impact upon the possibility of 
peace talks and if so how does this process of impacting on peace talks 
happen? The three hypotheses outline the possible ways in which this 
process or link can be conceived. The first hypothesis examines the possible 
impact that humanitarian engagement may have on the internal working of 
an armed group: 
Hypothesis 1: Humanitarian engagement may affect the internal 
dynamics of the armed group by raising the voice of a moderate 
faction (may affect power distribution and decision-making 
procedures ). 
The second hypothesis examines whether humanitarian engagements may 
provide a "training" opportunity for armed non-state actors to acquaint 
themselves with negotiations skills and the diplomatic know-how that could 
be needed in future peace talks: 
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Hypothesis 2: By offering the opportunity for the armed group to 
acquire greater knowledge of negotiation procedures or other skills 
necessary in the process of political negotiations, the process of 
humanitarian engagement might reduce the group's apprehension 
to enter in further negotiations. 
Finally, the third hypothesis exammes the possibility that humanitarian 
engagements help to build a positive environment for peace talks by 
encouraging communication, a more positive perception of the actors 
involved and creating confidence between the parties: 
Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian engagement may allow for a 
continuous communication channel between the different parties to 
the conflict. Humanitarian engagement may act as a confidence-
building measure affecting the dynamic among the different actors 
involved in peace negotiations (NGOs, lOs, UN Agencies, 
ANSAs, Governments). 
This chapter will follow the structure of the three hypotheses. Each of these 
hypotheses will be examined in the light of the presentation and analysis of 
the data gathered during the fieldwork in Sudan. It will evaluate whether the 
statements made in the hypotheses have been proven on the basis of the 
fieldwork. This evaluation will enable each statement to be reformulated in 
the light of the analysis. 
The final section of the chapter will present and analyse the data that 
does not fall into the three hypotheses. Special attention will be given to the 
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data highlighting the negative impact that humanitarian engagements with 
armed non-state actors have had on the possibility of peace talks. This 
analysis will enable us to provide an informed answer to whether 
humanitarian engagements with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement! 
Army (SPLMI A), that occurred throughout the second civil war in Sudan, 
have had a positive impact on the peace talks that led to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in 2005. 
Analysing the impact of humanitarian engagements on the internal 
dynamics of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army 
The first hypothesis examines whether humanitarian engagements 
have an impact on the internal dynamic of armed groups. This hypothesis 
relies on the assumption that the members of armed groups involved in 
humanitarian engagements represent a more moderate trend in the group. A 
second assumption behind this hypothesis is that through their involvement 
in humanitarian negotiations and agreements, the profile of these more 
moderate factions is raised and their power or influence heightened. The 
research has therefore focused on identifying the type of people involved in 
humanitarian agreements by asking the simple questions: who was 
involved? What were the contacts within the armed group that facilitated 
meetings with organisations? Identifying the power structure within an 
armed group is not an easy task, therefore the research focused on 
attempting to understand how decisions were taken within the groups, how 
the armed group arrived at the agreement, what types of negotiations were 
there, especially within the group m terms of internal lobbying and 
advocacy. 
These simplistic assumptions proved to relate to a more complex 
reality in the case of the humanitarian engagements that occurred in Sudan 
with the SPLMI A. The data gathered incorporated four main themes relating 
to this issue: whether technical personnel rather than political were 
involved; was there high involvement of military and intelligence personnel; 
were the people involved in the humanitarian negotiations involved in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations; and finally, whether the 
history and evolution of the SPLMI A made it possible for humanitarian 
engagements to occur, while these engagements furthered the already 
existing trend of moderation within the Movement. While the hypothesis 
focuses on changes within the armed group, the research seems to extend 
the issue of people involved and evolution of the organisation to both parties 
involved, the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. 
The assumption that humanitarian engagements may involve more 
moderate factions of the parties involved is believed to come from the 
humanitarian character of humanitarian engagements: because humanitarian 
engagements are humanitarian in character, the assumption is that actors 
involved in humanitarian engagements on the side of the government and 
the side of the armed group are moderate, more prone to peace and more 
attentive to humanitarian principles. In the case of Sudan, there were 
specific organisations involved, organisation that were sometimes created as 
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a result of the humanitarian engagements. The Government of Sudan 
established in the late 1980s and early 1990s the Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (HAC) to coordinate all humanitarian efforts in the country. 
The SPLMI A also created a humanitarian wing within its organisation, the 
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). These two 
organisations were involved in the three different engagements researched, 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Guinea Worm Ceasefire and the Deed 
of Commitment. The majority of the fieldwork interviews for this study 
were carried out with people who worked in the HAC and the SRRA. 
The interviews carried out on the side of the Government of Sudan 
revealed an interesting trend: in the Government of Sudan, there seems to be 
a very clear separation between humanitarians, who consider themselves 
technical personnel, and the "political" sphere, which, according to the 
"Humanitarians", include the intelligence, security and military apparatus of 
the state. For instance, one interviewee mentioned: 'I am not a political 
person. 1 am a technical person' (GoS 06); while another stated: 'We are not 
politicians, we are technicians. [ ... ] Me, myself, 1 am a humanitarian 
worker' (HAC 01) [ ... ]. Very often these statements were triggered by the 
more "political" questions 1 asked regarding the possible impact of 
humanitarian dialogue on peace processes. One of the interviewees 
extended his answer to explain where his career started and how he came to 
be Commissioner in charge of aid and humanitarian relief for the 
Government of Sudan: 
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'If I go back [to] my field expenence, originally I am a 
veterinarian. I worked for the Ministry of Animal Resources. I 
went to Libya. Then I came back in 1980 something. In 1983, I 
worked for an NGO in the South for 5 years. Then I joined what 
they used to call the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
[renamed Humanitarian Aid Commission later on]. That was the 
Commission which was in charge of the OLS Operation. Since that 
time I was first at the Department of Rehabilitation, I also worked 
as Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner of this Relief and 
Rehabilitation [Commission] for some times' (HAC 03). 
It is indeed very clear that one cluster of people who were involved in 
humanitarian dialogue remained technical humanitarian workers or civil 
servants for the Government of Sudan. This is confirmed by a UN worker 
who was involved in the OLS, as he stated that the mandate and profession 
of his interlocutors in the Government of Sudan were humanitarians (UN 
02). 
As a result, the relationship between the "Humanitarians" and the 
more political actors in the Government of Sudan seems ambiguous. On one 
hand they are part of the Government of Sudan, while, on the other hand, 
they feel that their technical nature allows them to take on a more neutral 
role. The interviews revealed that lobbying between the different sections of 
the Government took place: 
'Before the meetings, we meet here together. We orgamse 
ourselves, sometimes, in most cases, we would meet high decision 
makers, high policy makers in order to put issues like policies and 
other issues like security issues, military issues [ ... ]. We 
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concentrate on the humanitarian issues. Sometimes, while you are 
talking about humanitarian issues, security issues come up. Then 
military issues come up. So we try always the way it is for 
humanitarian assistance [sic]. We try to suppress the military and 
security issues. [ ... ] Their thinking is always the war because they 
are thinking in military and security terms always and we try to 
suppress that. This is why we raise the humanitarian assistance 
rather than this [sic]' (HAC 01).49 
The interviewee refers here to the internal preparation that took place before 
the OLS meeting which comprised of the UN representatives and 
representatives from either side of the conflict. The language used confirms 
the division between the humanitarians and the other sectors of the 
Government involved: 'we' the "Humanitarians" is opposed to 'they' the 
military and security people. Another interviewee, who was a Commissioner 
of the HAC at the time of these humanitarian engagements, explains that he 
facilitated meetings between the UN in Khartoum and the security and 
intelligence sections of the Government in Sudan in order to 'improve the 
humanitarian access and facilitation for humanitarian workers' as without 
this, 'it would have been very difficult to convince the security then' (HAC 
04). These two examples inform us that not only lobbying between the 
"Humanitarians" and the military and security agents took place within the 
Government of Sudan but that there was a need to convince a seemingly 
more powerful influential section of the Government made of the military 
and security organs of the Government. Whereas the HAC and the 
49 The italics were added by the author as an emphasis for the purpose of the analysis. 
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"Humanitarians" within the Government apparatus appear less powerful, 
they used this "Humanitarian" status to take a mediating role. 
'Planes [carrying relief] from Lokichiogo [northern Kenya] were 
refused by the military in the Government of Sudan. The UN had 
to threaten to take the issue to the Security Council. The HAC 
negotiated between the UN and the military' (HAC 02). 
The hypothesis did not take into account the impact that humanitarian 
engagements could have on the Government of Sudan by focusing on the 
armed group only. The data gathered demonstrates that a whole section of 
the Government of Sudan emerged and developed due to the amount of 
relief and humanitarian aid organisations and agencies working in Sudan 
during the Second Civil War between the North and the South. This new 
section of the Government defines itself as technical and humanitarian in 
opposition to political. While it appears as less influential and a weaker 
party of the decision-making process, it takes on a "neutral" role for the 
betterment of humanitarian work, facilitating and mediating relations 
~etween the UN and the security and intelligence apparatus of the State. 
On the side of the SPLM/A, a clear division between "humanitarians" 
and military and political organs of the armed group did not appear. The 
SPLMI A consisted of two main organs: the SPLM, which was the political 
steering organ; and the SPLA, which was the army. This was a clear 
division within the armed group. As one of the interviewees mentioned, 
there was in the SPLM/A 'elements of a benign dictatorship but evolving 
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towards a less militaristic approach' (UN 02). The leadership consisted very 
much of John Garang and few trusted people. This leadership had power 
over both the SPLM and the SPLA. Within the SPLM or what came to be 
the Civil Administration, the SRRA represented the humanitarian wing of 
the armed group. Whereas the relationship between the leadership, the 
SPLM and the SRRA was clearly a hierarchical one, it is more difficult to 
understand the type of relationship that the SRRA had with the SPLA or 
military side of the armed group. 
The people involved in the humanitarian engagements on the 
Government side were adamant to define themselves as "humanitarians". 
This was not the case regarding the interviews with the SPLM/A. One of the 
interviewees stated that 'in the SRRA, we did find some people who did not 
have a military background' and that there was 'a very deliberate effort to 
put a humanitarian face in SRRA' (UN 02). This expression 'putting a 
humanitarian face' reflects very much the opinion that the SPLM had a 
political rather than a humanitarian agenda regarding the humanitarian 
engagements (Expert 01). In the case of the engagement with Geneva Call, 
while their interlocutors were working within the humanitarian wing of the 
SPLMI A (GC 01, GC 02), an expert on Sudan and the SPLM actually 
pointed out in his interview that the two main actors involved in the Deed of 
Commitment with Geneva Call had been 'central pillars of the external and 
internal security apparatus of the SPLM', wondering 'How humanitarian is 
that?' (Expert 01). This clearly refutes the assumption that the actors 
involved in humanitarian engagements are necessarily more moderate and 
360 
"humanitarian". On the other hand, it reinforces the statement that 
humanitarian engagements for the SPLM were very much political in nature 
rather than grounded in humanitarian interests. 
The data gathered also pointed to the presence of internal 
disagreements within the SPLMI A. Similarly to the way the HAC had to 
defend its humanitarian space, lobbying and advocacy regarding the 
decision to enter into a humanitarian dialogue occurred within the SPLMI A. 
Geneva Call explained that the two actors they engaged within the SPLM 
carried out a long lobbying process with the leadership, and John Garang 
more specifically, and that negotiations within the SPLM/A took place 
before signing the ban on the use of landmines (GC 02): 
'We should have gone on the ground to acqUIre a greater 
understanding of the different trends within the Movement in order 
to ensure a more widespread internal adherence. Looking back, 
[ ... J we should have gone there to meet Garang as well as different 
Commanders' (GC 02). 
Another interviewee mentioned that there were some disagreement 
regarding the SPLM's adherence to the Ground Rules agreement linked to 
OLS, and that 'some senior commander [ ... J felt that the Ground Rules were 
tying one hand of the SPLA on their back' (UN 01). 
Without a clear humanitarian entity to engage, the question of whom to 
engage with within the armed group is a potent one. Geneva Call mentions 
that if they had to do this humanitarian engagement again with the SPLMI A, 
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they would certainly engage with the political wing and the military wing 
separately (GC 01). One of the lessons learnt from Geneva CaU's 
experience is the necessity to 'enter into the intimacy of the armed group to 
understand how decisions are taken, who is influential on who, who is more 
diplomatic' (GC 02). An SPLM member attempts to relate the difficulty of 
decision-making in the SPLM regarding their humanitarian engagements: 
'Y ou know the Guinea Worm and Landmines are smaller issues 
but they are also related to the war. To be able to deal with this 
issue of Guinea Worm in a war zone, you first of all have to get 
the Administration to accept it. Then you have to have the military 
people to respect it. And then, you have to mobilise your people 
[ ... J' (SPLM 09). 
Lobbying and negotiations took place internally regarding the signing of the 
humanitarian engagements. The humanitarian character of the SRRA was 
put into question by some people interviewed. The complexity in 
understanding how decisions are taken, the relationship between the military 
and the political and how the SRRA positioned itself within this relationship 
makes it hard to confirm or refute the hypothesis that more moderate 
factions are involved in humanitarian engagements. More importantly, one 
should look at whether the SRRA was influential within the movement. As 
it was the case for HAC within the Government of Sudan, it appears that the 
SRRA did not hold a position of strength and influence with the SPLMI A: 
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'There were people from outside50 appointed by Garang [to the 
SRRA]. But they were not necessarily the people that had the 
power on the ground. [They] had to go back to the military 
structure on certain issues, such as the issue of hostages, as the 
SRRA did not have the clout to move things forward. The SRRA 
was useful but not necessarily strong' (UN 02). 
From my own observations during my field research, it appears that 
members of the SRRA were either retired military from the SPLA or 
'people from outside'. The SRRA did not seem to involve a technical 
humanitarian elite although it meant to have a clear humanitarian mandate 
as an organisation. The SRRA also appeared as a fayade for international 
actors in Sudan. Decision making was at the leadership level which 
remained throughout the conflict, and despite attempts at changing, very 
much dictatorial. Lobbying could only be successfully done by individuals 
trusted and close to John Garang, who remained the final decision maker 
and the only influential "implementer". 
The humanitarian wings of the Government of Sudan, HAC, and the 
humanitarian wing of the SPLMI A, SRRA, were not the only 
representatives of the parties involved in the humanitarian engagements. 
Governments, especially in a time of conflict, and armed groups are mostly 
political and military organisations and not humanitarian organisations. In 
the case of Sudan, the military and intelligence apparatus of the Government 
of Sudan and the SPLMI A were very much involved in humanitarian 
negotiations, especially in the case of OLS. The implementation of OLS 
50 Here 'people from outside' refers to Southern Sudanese who came from abroad where 
they had studied rather then the "bush" or a military background. 
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comprised of numerous meetings and committees to ensure the due 
implementation of the agreement. These different committees included a 
representation from the military and security people: 'One of the constraints 
is that because it is a war zone area, the Technical Coordination Committee 
was in fact a lot of military and security people here' (HAC 01). As 
mentioned above, the HAC had to mitigate the military and security issues 
and the presence of military, security and intelligence personnel was felt 
like a constraint by the HAC. Another interviewee explained that there were 
a multitude of actors involved: 
'And then the Operation was of course supervised by the 
Government and the United Nations and when they come to issues, 
they have a committee for the Government and the United Nations 
and they used at that time what they call the Operation Supervisory 
Group. This Group was formed from the Government of Sudan. It 
was headed by the Commissioner [of the HAC] and then the 
members were the head of the UN offices here, for example the 
head of WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP and then the United 
Nations presented to these members. Then along the Government 
side, you have the Ministry of Foreign affairs, Ministry of 
Defence. And you have [from] the Ministry of Defence, mainly 
they are [sic] the intelligence people and the Intelligence 
Department' (HAC 03). 
AlI humanitarian meetings seem to have involved important representations 
from the security and intelligence people in and outside of Sudan: 
'And then the other thing is that we used to have regular meeting 
on humanitarian [issues], almost twice a year in Geneva or Oslo. 
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On humanitarian issues. That is usually headed by people at the 
level of Ministers on our side, the seniors army representatives of 
the SPLM as well as the intelligence representatives. [ ... ] It was 
not only humanitarian representation. It was very serious 
representations from both armies, from both intelligence service, 
from politicians' (HAC 04). 
In the midst of an internal conflict, one should expect to have an 
involvement of the military. Nevertheless, the 'serious representations' of 
the security and military organs of the Government and the SPLMI A 
certainly reflect a security worry related to humanitarian dialogues, as well 
as a more political or strategic approach of humanitarian dialogues rather 
than a humanitarian one. As one interviewee stated, 'I came to feel that all 
the leaders were not interested in their people's issues as much as 
maintaining their personal power' (CC 02). It is to be noted that, during my 
field research, I did not have any interview with the military, security or 
intelligence organisations as I was told by my gatekeepers that it would be 
impossible. I had been informed by a researcher and expert on Sudan that 
humanitarian issues were considered rather political in Sudan and therefore 
a lot of suspicion remained around the topic (Expert 01). 
It appears that the assumption made in this hypothesis regarding the 
possibility that moderate actors have their voices raised and more influence 
as a result of their involvement in humanitarian engagements is rather 
challenged by the data gathered during these interviews. Surprisingly, the 
actors that were involved in the humanitarian dialogues were also involved 
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in the peace talks that resulted in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005. 
On the side of the Government, the team of negotiators with OLS 
was the same as the team of negotiators for the peace negotiations (HAC 
02). This might be explained by the fact that the IGAD process of 
negotiation, that successfully brought about the peace agreement in 2005, 
started with negotiations on humanitarian issues (HAC 02). One interviewee 
even stated that 'it is humanitarians that brought the CPA' (HAC 02). 
Another interview pointed out the helping role of individuals who had been 
in contact with the other sides during the humanitarian negotiations as 
facilitating the peace process as 'individuals who have got confidence [and] 
who have a wavelength with the other side' (HAC 05). Similarly, my 
observations confirm that the people interviewed on the side of the SPLMI A 
and who were personally involved in the different humanitarian talks were 
also playing an important role in the negotiating team during the peace 
process. 
The hypothesis states that humanitarian engagements may affect the 
internal dynamic of an armed group. The data demonstrates that this 
relationship is more of a circular one rather than a cause-effect direct 
relationship. Indeed, it seems that the SPLM evolved in a way that enabled 
the humanitarian engagements while at the same time, each engagement 
reinforced that evolution impacting the SPLM to move towards a more 
important civil administration and democratisation ofthe movement. 
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'It [the humanitarian ceasefire of 1995] came at a very difficult 
time. You know in 1991, there was a split. After the split [ ... ], we 
had a lot of problems. We were fighting among ourselves and 
there was no cease fire at all. The Government [of Sudan] at that 
time thought that the SPLM was weakening. Until we had our 
convention in 1994. After the convention in 1994, because we put 
our house in order politically, because we elected our leadership, 
this was the beginning of a process of democratisation in 1994, 
which gave us a good image [sic J. 1995 was a transition. Because 
of the democratisation within the movement, it was easier for us to 
discuss the issue of the ceasefire. It would have been very difficult 
to discuss that before 1994. The Convention and the humanitarian 
ceasefire were great important phases in the history of the 
Movement. It gave confidence in ourselves. We had reorganised 
politically, even militarily. So we were confident that we could do 
business with the Government of Sudan' (SPLM 07). 
The interviewee refers to very important turning points in the evolution of 
the SPLMI A. At the beginning of the 1990s, the SPLMI A faced two radical 
changes. The first one was the fall of the Ethiopian President, Mengistu 
Haile Mariam, who was the primary sponsor, financially and logistically, of 
the SPLMI A. His fall meant that the SPLMI A had to leave their safe haven 
in Ethiopia and settle their headquarters in South Sudan. With this move 
came the realisation that the Southern Sudanese population had grown 
hostile towards the SPLMI A due to forced recruitment of children, village 
raids and looting. With no powerful sponsors behind them, the SPLMI A 
also had to ensure that the population in South Sudan would provide some 
support to them. The Chukudum convention in 1994 was very much a 
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response to these problems: democratisation and the improvement of the 
relationship between the SPLMI A and their home community became the 
new battle of the SPLMI A. 
A second event changed the face of the SPLMI A in 1991. With the 
fall of Mengistu, John Garang's position could potentially be overthrown as 
it was not supported by a state sponsor vital to the SPLMI A. Some members 
of the leadership led by Riek Machar, a powerful Nuer leader in the 
SPLM/A, and Lam Akol, attempted to overthrow John Garang. When this 
failed, they split away from the main SPLMI A group. 
These events triggered and led to the Chukudum convention that 
started the creation of a civil administration in SPLMI A controlled area but 
that also clarified the decision-making within the political wing of the 
SPLMI A. The interviewee explains that these changes were certainly 
paramount in explaining the possibility of a humanitarian ceasefire in 1995. 
In other words, the hypothesis is reversed: it is not the case that 
humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A triggered a change in the 
internal dynamic of the group, but a radical change in the internal dynamic 
of the SPLMI A enabled those humanitarian engagements. 
Rather than being a simple cause-effect relationship, it seems that the 
Chukudum convention and the enabling of humanitarian engagements 
through the democratisation of the SPLMI A created a spiral of events. Once 
the decision to create a civil administration came, humanitarian 
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engagements and agreements with the SPLMI A provided some support and 
help in furthering this development from a less militaristic organisation to a 
governing entity. 
'And it is all because there was this agreement [OLS], there were 
basic services going on and where there was some relative peace. 
The SPLM started putting on the ground some civilian 
administration' (SPLM 09). 
The establishment of the civilian administration with the support of OLS 
seems to have gone a long away in building confidence in the SPLM that 
they would make a transition from an armed group to a "government". 
'I suppose it [OLS] helped us building confidence in ourselves: try 
to set a system, assisting our policy [sic]. It [OLS] helped us 
engage in other sectors, for example health and education. So we 
start laying down the foundation of our governance. For me, it was 
good to build people's confidence in themselves. Creating a 
meaning for peace, a sustainable way of creating peace. I think 
Operation Lifeline Sudan did a good work' (SPLM 06). 
In light of this analysis, the hypothesis should be revised to a great 
extent. In general, the data has not confirmed the hypothesis. The data does 
not support the argument that humanitarian engagements affect the internal 
dynamic of armed groups by raising the voice of moderate factions within 
the movement. Nevertheless, the data supports the fact that humanitarian 
engagements of armed groups have a certain impact regarding the internal 
working or evolution of the parties involved and that the people involved in 
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humanitarian engagements from both parties to the conflict found a new role 
to play, although not necessarily an influential or powerful one. 
In the case of Sudan, the different humanitarian engagements 
researched have enabled and furthered the development of a civil 
administration in the SPLMI A held areas during the conflict. This had a 
powerful impact in giving the SPLMI A the confidence that they could 
govern themselves and go to the peace-talks with this strength. 
The humanitarian engagements enabled the creation of a 
"humanitarian elite" in the Government of Sudan that lobbied and 
advocated for humanitarian principles. This "humanitarian elite" proved to 
be an important technical support during the peace talks as well. Indeed both 
with the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan, the teams that were 
involved in the humanitarian engagements were present and involved in the 
peace talks that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This 
individually built confidence, channels of communication and a better 
understanding, which enabled certain issues to be solved more easily during 
the talks. On the other hand, these individuals did not see their profile raised 
due to their involvement in the humanitarian engagements as the hypothesis 
stated and their position remained a weak one in the decision making 
process of either parties. 
The data highlighted the fact that organisations should not be 
perceived and analysed as homogeneous entities. There are different trends 
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and beliefs within these entities and there is a need for external actors 
involved in engaging governments and armed groups on humanitarian issues 
to understand these dynamics and the power relationships within these 
organisations. 
Finally, the hypothesis should have not just included armed groups 
as being potentially impacted by humanitarian engagements. The 
assumption that governments are not impacted because they are more 
structured and formal organisations does not hold. Therefore, a revision of 
the hypothesis should include taking into account the possibility that both 
parties involved in humanitarian engagements might be impacted by their 
involvement in humanitarian engagements. 
Analysing the impact of humanitarian engagements on the reduction of 
the SPLM/A's apprehension to enter into peace talks: are humanitarian 
engagements a learning-by-doing experience for armed groups? 
The second hypothesis focuses on humanitarian engagements as a 
process of negotiations. This hypothesis relies on the assumption that 
humanitarian negotiations appear less threatening and their success less vital 
to armed groups due to their humanitarian character. As such, negotiating 
for a humanitarian agreement provides a "test-case" for armed groups where 
they have nothing to lose and everything to gain in terms of their 
experience. Indeed, the main gain for armed groups would be to test, acquire 
and confirm their knowledge of negotiation procedures and improve their 
negotiating skills. This would impact the possibility of a peace process 
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positively as the armed group would feel more confident and less threatened 
to enter peace talks. The hypothesis focused on armed groups taking into 
account that armed groups are often the weaker parties in negotiations as 
they tend to be marginalised diplomatically. This is mostly not the case with 
governments who already have a ministry of international affairs, embassies 
and a technical civil service that works in different setting to negotiate for 
state's interests. The research therefore focused on understanding how 
negotiations happened and if it builds capacity to negotiate within the armed 
group. 
'[Humanitarian agreement] does help prepare for negotiations' stated 
an expert mediator involved in a number of mediations with the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLMI A (Expert 02). On the surface the data 
seems to confirms this hypothesis that humanitarian engagements had a 
positive impact in Sudan in preparing for negotiations. Asked about the 
humanitarian ceasefire in 1995 and the formality of the agreement, an 
interviewee stated: 
'Definitely, it played a role because it was negotiated and that 
constituted also a school for negotiations that we conducted later at 
the ceasefires as well as also for really negotiating the ceasefires 
for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and for negotiating the 
very body of the Comprehensive peace Agreement. 
Q: What do you mean by a school for negotiations? 
It was a school in the sense that the parties practised their skills for 
negotiations and they definitely learnt lessons. They also learnt 
insight into understanding the adversary that they were seating 
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with. And that also definitely made them gain insights and skills 
which I am sure have been very useful' (SPLM 05). 
The quote strongly supports the claim made in the hypothesis5 I. This was an 
opportunity to ask whether the SPLMI A as an armed group perceived some 
difficulties in being recognised as an equal party at the negotiations. 
'It has always been the case. In the beginning, the Government has 
always entered the negotiations with an advantage of being the 
recognised party, as a state actor, while we are not state actors. As 
non-state actors, we will always be seen even in terms of protocol 
that the other side is senior to this side. They will always listen to 
the Government more than us. Because basically the Government 
of Sudan is a member of their club. And we are not a member of 
their club. We are basically guests into, actually disdain guests 
sometimes. But because we entered, we turned tables as sometimes 
against the Government of Sudan and we earned the respect 
through the way we handled ourselves and through the way we 
negotiate' (SPLM 05).52 
This second quote emphasises the issue with armed groups and peace talks: 
there is a clear perception that they are at a disadvantage. It seems therefore 
a rather important impact if humanitarian engagements enable armed groups 
to gain confidence and capacity for negotiations. In the case of the Sudanese 
conflict, it appears even more paramount as there was a strong feeling that 
51 This quote was used in the previous chapter to demonstrate that the occurrence or not of 
negotiations will impact the way a humanitarian engagement will impact the conflict 
situation. 
52 The quote continues: 'and sometimes there has been a lot of disadvantage in the sense 
that the UN and indeed all the other countries and states, they will always think that, you 
know they have got some sense of hidden solidarity towards the sates. And they consider 
those who rise against the states as outlaws who should be, they are always, we are seen to 
be the side that should concede. You know because they assume we are the wrong and we 
have to prove that no we are right. We need and we have to be strong' (SPLM 05). 
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the Southern Sudanese had been cheated in the last peace agreement 
between the Government of Sudan and Southern rebels in 1972. 
This perception was not only shared by the SPLM but also by 
organisations who have been involved in negotiations with the SPLM for 
humanitarian purposes. 
'It [humanitarian negotiation] is for them to exercise and learn. 
They were quite acute and smart, less ideologically driven than the 
Government, but they were the weaker party as not the recognised 
government. They learnt throughout the process. [We] could see 
an evolution in the negotiations with the UN, [they] were looking 
at the bigger picture' (UN 02). 
Another UN interviewee reiterates this observation but with a strong word 
of caution: 
'They learnt about compromise, not to always take take take. It 
[OLS] helped them engage with the UN and NGOs in a different 
way. [It was] not always positive because it also gave them the 
knowledge of what language to use, how to manipulate language. 
They learnt what language worked' (UN 01). 
In other words, it may appear as a negative consequence that the SPLMI A 
did not only acquire the knowledge and skills to negotiate but also the 
knowledge and skills to manipulate through their discourse. Humanitarian 
engagements provided the SPLMI A with the opportunity to socialise 
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themselves with the international community through the UN, NGOs and 
donor Governments. 
'Q: Do you think that the process of negotiating for the 
humanitarian ceasefire helped the SPLM learn about processes of 
negotiations in general? 
Yes of course. Definitely, it did. [ ... ] We learnt, we leant, we 
learnt. We learnt about the international community responding to 
issues of humanitarian concerns or the concerns of people like 
[former US President] Carter and there are many of them in the 
world. And we learnt to respond to each and every concern. It was 
important. It also helped to open up and increase contacts of the 
SPLM with the United States, with local groups in the United 
States. Whether the Congress, State Department, National 
Security, or some institutions in the United States or people who 
are very very influential in the policy formation. It helped us to get 
connected' (SPLM 07). 
One UN interviewee mentioned that there were real concerns on the part of 
the SPLM/A for the people in Southern Sudan and this was certainly a 
reason for their engagement, but it was also the case that 'they perceived 
their engagement as being something good for them to get international 
support especially for Garang vis-a-vis the US. Also, it was a way to get the 
knowledge of governments involved' (UN 02). This was reiterated in 
another interview: 'All along the SPLM had taken this idea "we are trying to 
try to look good for the international community. [There was] a deliberate 
strategy to play for international support' (Expert 01). There was a clear 
instrumentalisation of the process of humanitarian engagement to get the 
knowledge and understanding of international actors who would possibly be 
375 
involved in supporting or mediating the peace talks in the future. As a 
mediator explains, 'The SPLM did not come thinking that they knew how to 
negotiate but that they had the support of the international community and 
that Khartoum had no choice but to negotiate' (Expert 02). 
The data has confirmed that humanitarian engagements in Sudan 
provided an opportunity for the SPLMI A to gain and improve their 
negotiation skills. Nevertheless, the hypothesis does not go far enough as a 
second type of learning-by-doing occurs. Indeed, the SPLMI A smartly 
instrumentalised humanitarian engagements as a forum where they could 
acquire a better understanding of the international community, the UN, 
influential donor Governments, NGOs. This opportunity for socialisation in 
the international system has been positive in building confidence in the 
SPLM/A's capacity to negotiate for a "fair" peace agreement. On the other 
hand, the political instrumentalisation of a humanitarian process could be 
perceived by many humanitarian actors as detrimental to humanitarian 
action in general. As such, this consequence of humanitarian engagements 
with armed groups could be qualified as a negative one. 
Analysing the impact of humanitarian engagements on improving 
communication, confidence-building and a changed relationship 
between parties to the conflict in Sudan 
The third hypothesis focused on understanding whether and how 
humanitarian engagements could impact on the dynamic of conflict by 
creating a space for communication, confidence-building and an evolution 
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of the relationship between the parties to the conflict as well as the mUltiple 
actors involved both in humanitarian engagements and peace processes. 
This hypothesis has proved to be very central in all the interviews 
conducted. In many ways, the data has confirmed that, in the case of Sudan , 
humanitarian engagements provided a space for communication, created 
some sort of confidence-building and impacted upon the perception of the 
different actors involved of each other. On the other hand, the data has 
highlighted that the hypothesis is not one but three very distinct ways in 
which humanitarian engagements may impact upon the transformation of 
conflict. Briefly, these are confidence-building measures, space for 
communication, and changed perception of actors involved. 
Confidence Building 
Three different themes emerge from this hypothesis. The first relates to 
the impact of humanitarian engagements on the transformation of conflict 
through confidence building. In the case of Sudan, humanitarian 
engagements created some confidence building and were qualified as 
confidence building measures by some interviewees. However, the 
confidence building that it created was a specific type of confidence: the 
confidence that the parties could work together; the confidence that each 
party could commit to the agreement despite violations from both sides. 
Indeed, humanitarian engagements may not have provided an 
opportunity for building a general feeling of trust between the parties. 
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However, the data shows that humanitarian engagements provided an 
opportunity for both parties to prove to each other, and the international 
community, their willingness and ability to commit to an agreement on 
humanitarian issues 
'Definitely, you cannot just bring people for the first time to come 
and sit and then come to an agreement. There has to be to have 
such joint activities for a long time. We used to have these joint 
meetings on humanitarian issues and there were the only meetings 
between the Government and the SPLM [ ... ]. And everyone was 
competing to show that they were committed to this more than the 
other. I think it was a very strong drive and very essential for the 
peace process for the whole peace process' (HAC 04). 
There was a realisation from both sides that it was important to be the party 
that could commit, the party that had the will to stick to its decisions and 
agreements. According to one interviewee, humanitarian agreements were 
an opportunity to build that capacity and learn to commit. 
'So it really found basis first of all for the two parties to learn how 
to respect rules that they have signed' (SPLM 09). 
As stated before, one of the perceived reasons for the beginning of the 
conflict was the abrogation of the 1972 peace agreement and the lack of 
commitment to this agreement. Honouring what you agree on was a 
significant step to take to build some king of confidence between the two 
parties (SPLM 09). As an expert mediator stated in one of the interviews: 
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'Sometimes these humanitarian agreements are a test of tasting the 
water. Each one is trying to test the other's Willingness to commit' 
(Expert 02). 
The confidence that the parties could work together and agree to 
commit to an agreement was made possible very much because of the 
humanitarian nature of the agreement. 
'[ ... ] When people talk from a humanitarian point of view, they 
will agree on all the things. They will agree for the sake of Sudan, 
for the sake of the children, for the sake of women. And this itself 
paved the way for this political agreement' (HAC 03). 
According to the Government interviewees, humanitarian engagements 
were made possible because of their humanitarian character. As another 
interviewee stated, 'We are talking about others, not about ourselves' (HAC 
01). Indeed, 'at the time, the only agreement possible was on humanitarian 
issues and yes, it built confidence' (HAC 02). One observer from the UN 
explained that he frequently chaired meetings 'where people were political 
enemies but negotiated around the table on humanitarian issues' (UN 01). 
The character of the engagement being humanitarian provided a sense of a 
non-threatening agreement as well as an agreement that would not harm any 
parties to the conflict. There was a sense that it was something beneficial for 
both parties to be engaged in these processes and come to an agreement on 
humanitarian issues. 
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The ability to commit to an agreement is rather important. As one 
expert stated: 
'In a peace process, you do not build trust. It is not trust that you 
build, but a way of working with each other' (Expert 02). 
Having the ability to commit to humanitarian agreements provided an 
opportunity for the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan to work with 
each other on humanitarian issues. 
'The good thing about this approach is that we have certain things, 
a neutral kind of things, that we all agreed to have enough food, 
water, health and medication for the people of the South [sic]. And 
this is an agreed target. So we are working under the supervision 
and the support of the international community. So also the 
approach of putting an agreed and mutual target and then asking 
the parties to work together, [ ... ] that also helped seeing that each 
other, from the other side, from the South, and working together. 
So I think that also really helped. It is confidence building and 
building the approach of partnership between ourselves because 
we now are partners. But now, after those meetings, we start 
seeing each other, talking about general issues, not how to fight 
but how to work together our points of difference' (HAC 04). 
This feeling was more present on the side of the Government of Sudan than 
on the side of the SPLMI A. The reason for this certainly relates to the fact 
that the people involved in humanitarian engagements on the Government 
side were "technical humanitarians". If indeed a peace process aims to find 
a way for both parties to work together, humanitarian engagements certainly 
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provide a test-case during the conflict for both parties to see the possibility 
as well as the limits of a possible partnership. 
The SPLMI A interviewees, on the other hand, voiced a similar 
feeling when stating that humanitarian engagements created a feeling that if 
an agreement on humanitarian issues was possible, an agreement on 
political issues might also be possible. 
'So if we could talk peace and accept an agreement that allows 
somehow the alleviation of catastrophe and crisis in Southern 
Sudan and other parts, then why don't you go beyond and talk 
about the real issues about peace. [ ... ] So I think OLS was crucial 
and critical. Everybody realised that we could talk peace in the 
aspect of humanitarian action, why could we not talk peace III 
respect to a global peace settlement' (SPLM 01). 
This realisation was made by the parties to the conflict as well as mediators 
involved. 
'To bring the parties and agree they can hold war for them to then 
to give the opportunity for international organisations and local 
NGOs to reach to the people and take care of their health problems 
it was very good. And actually, the 1995 Guinea Worm was 
followed by many other ceasefires. [ ... ] And indeed, it made it 
possible also to the mediators to the warring parties that it is 
possible to solve problems [sic]. So that built an experience that 
made them actually to be convinced that it is possible to resolve 
the conflict despite the fact that it was very complex' (SPLM 05). 
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Humanitarian agreements indeed built a positive experience that transmitted 
a strong feeling that peace was possible. 
'It is the time when people realised that it is possible to go in the 
agreement. [ ... ] It created confidence and it made the parties 
realise that yes peace is possible. At least if we can sign a ceasefire 
or a cessation of hostilities for that matter [immunisation and 
medical aid against the Guinea Worm disease], then if we can 
respect it, then there is a possibility of us reaching peace' (SPLM 
03). 
The fact that humanitarian engagements can be a source of trust and 
build confidence is limited by violations of the agreements. Indeed, most 
interviews mentioned that humanitarian engagements in Sudan were 
violated by both sides. The Government of Sudan accused the SPLMI A of 
'misusing the food to feed its forces' (HAC 04). On the other side, the 
SPLMI A mentioned that lack of cooperation of the Government of Sudan as 
relief flights were cancelled as 'the Sudan Government tried and attempted 
to use the access for humanitarians as a tool for pressure on the SPLM and 
use it as an act of war' (SPLM 05). My questions relating to trust and 
confidence between the parties to the conflict tended to fire a long 
monologue in the SPLM interviews about how little trust there is today even 
after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
'It [OLS] helped as it actually started the building of trust and 
confidence. This is where the parties came to know that yes if we 
come for the peace agreement then maybe it could be respected. 
For us, in the SPLM, we do not believe that the Government of 
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Sudan can sign an agreement and respect it. And even after now, I 
do not believe that when it was signed the Government was 
genuine' (SPLM 03). 
Humanitarian engagements in Sudan provided an opportunity to "taste the 
water" for either side. Humanitarian engagements built experiences where 
commitments were made and agreements respected to a great extent. The 
parties to the conflict found a way to exercise the possibility of working 
together and partnership. Humanitarian agreements planted a peaceful seed 
in creating a situation where the different parties would ask themselves if 
we can agree on humanitarian issues why not try to agree on the political 
issues. In that specific way, the data has supported the hypothesis that 
humanitarian engagements provided a flourishing environment for peace 
talks to occur in Sudan between the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan. 
Space for communication 
The second theme relates to the impact of humanitarian engagements on 
the transformation of conflict through the creation of a space for 
communication. This theme relates to the above one as this space for 
communication was necessary to create opportunities for trust and 
confidence building. In the case of Sudan, humanitarian engagements 
created a space, even a forum, where different actors could interact regularly 
as the implementation of those engagements required further consultations. 
This forum offered a place for socialisation for the different actors involved. 
The Government of Sudan had a non-threatening controlled arena to taste 
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the water with the SPLM and understand their adversaries better. There was 
very much a process of socialisation for both parties to the conflict. The 
SPLM used this forum to socialise with the UN, Governments, and NGOs. 
The international community used this forum to engage with both parties 
without putting pressure on possible peace talks. As one expert explains: 
'In modem warfare, communication with each other is as 
important as fighting. It can build a minimum level of trust on 
some issues but not on the hard issues. They level the ground in 
such a way that they know what they can share with others and 
what they cannot' (Expert 02). 
Operation Lifeline Sudan created a platform where communication was 
made possible between the two parties to the conflict. The rationale for 
communication was "technical", concerning the implementation ofOLS and 
humanitarian action and as such provided a more neutral ground to talk. The 
UN was also there to normalise communication between the two parties: 
'The UN is playing the role of the mediator and without the UN 
there, I don't think that it would have been possible. If there are 
any problems then the UN is there to meet, call for meetings, to 
start discussions and so on' (HAC 01). 
This enabled the two parties to 'break the barriers' (HAC 01) and it built 
confidence as 'it opened communication' (HAC 02). 
Continuous channels of communication between the two parties enabled 
the parties to understand each other better. 
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'I think because there was ground for communication [ ... ]. Before 
that people were not able to sit together. We sat and we talked. It is 
a lot of communication. It is a matter of getting to know each 
other' (HAC 03). 
It also enabled the creation of platforms or networks for both sides of the 
conflict, but more importantly the SPLMI A, which was, as an armed group, 
marginalised from other existing international diplomatic networks. These 
networks enabled further engagements and humanitarian action to be carried 
out as well as more substantial dialogues to occur. The UN found that OLS 
and the ground rules, 'provided an operational platform': 
'We could negotiate for certain things that would not have been 
possible without it. For example, the demobiIisation of teachers 
from the SPLA. We were able to negotiate and do that because of 
this agreement on principle' (UN 02). 
The interviewee continued to explain that the SPLMI A used these networks 
and platforms very effectively to show their positive engagement and using 
these humanitarian engagements internationally as 'something to show' 
(UN 02). The interviewee concluded that 'the communication was fair and 
open' and 'this permanent relationship helped' (UN 02). 
The 1995 Guinea Worm humanitarian ceasefire that was brokered by the 
Carter Center and Former President Carter himself, provided an invaluable 
385 
opportunity for the SPLMI A to extend their "diplomatic" network to the 
United States. As one interviewee from the Carter Center explained: 
'The idea behind President Carter's involvement was also to 
demonstrate that the Carter Center was working in a neutral, non-
obstructive way, equally with each side of the conflict, in the hope 
that when the decision to start negotiation was taken, the Carter 
Center would be recognised as having had the right attitude' (CC 
01). 
Following this comment, the interviewee explained that President Carter 
kept the contact with President Bashir and John Garang throughout the 
conflict. This was the only "official" link with the United States and this 
connection became useful when the peace talks started and the United States 
wanted to get involved (CC 01). One interviewee from the SPLM/A 
explained that Guinea Worm disease eradication was not necessarily a 
priority but they saw an opportunity in engaging with the Carter Center in a 
positive way, in a way that could benefit engagements on bigger issues. 
'We didn't see Guinea Worm as a big priority. But I think 
politically it was very important, for somebody like Carter to come 
and champion this. It was really important. And also engaging the 
Americans. So it was really the focus to have somebody like 
Carter to get the Americans to know more about what is happening 
in Sudan. We know that Carter was very assertive from that 
aspects in terms of founding the humanitarian company and then 
an outreach. [ ... ] Carter managed to use that one as a platform to 
engage on bigger issues and that was very positive. So the link is 
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not per se the humanitarian work, but it has welcome people like 
President Carter to be engaged in the peace' (SPLM 06). 
This quote was used previously to note the political motivation behind the 
SPLMI A's engagement in the Guinea Worm issue. The SPLMI A 
understood very well the opportunities offered to them with the creation of 
such platforms and channels of communication and used these opportunities 
to their political advantage. 
In the case of Geneva Call's engagement with the SPLM/A on the 
issue of landmines, this engagement in Geneva triggered a number of other 
connections which led to the Joint Demining project in the Nuba Mountains. 
Geneva Call opened the door for the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to 
engage with both parties in Geneva and sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding to establish a common mine action programme. 
'This meeting [with UNMAS] that we initiated, I think that each 
time we manage to make people talk, it is an element that can 
build peace. The worst for peace is when people do not talk to 
each other any more' (GC 01).53 
Geneva Call has been a forum for the SPLMI A to also meet with mine 
action organisations from the North of Sudan. In one workshop organised 
by Geneva Call in Sudan, for the first time a representative from the 
Sudanese Campaign Against Landmines who was a Northerner met with the 
53 Quote translated from French by the researcher; 'Cette rencontre [avec UNMAS] gu'on 
a initie,je pense que chaque fois gu'on arrive a faire en sorte que des gens se parlent, c'est 
un element en tout cas constructeur de paix. Le pire pour la paix c'est quand les gens ne se 
parient plus' (GC 01). 
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SPLM/A in South Sudan. As Geneva Call stated, 'It is interesting that a 
small NGO like ours can start creating links between people. [ ... J It is small 
actions like this that help go beyond stereotypes' (GC 01).54 Another 
member of Geneva Call explained that through their engagement on 
landmines with Geneva Call, the SPLMI A networked with other 
humanitarian organisations in Geneva on issues such as human rights and 
child soldiers, as well as Governments (GC 02). Building this platform or 
network, explained the interviewee, enabled the SPLMI A to create their 
own diplomatic setting where they could communicate and build a sense of 
confidence between them and some influential international actors (Ge 02). 
The data confinns that humanitarian engagements opened channels 
of communications and offered a platfonn where parties to the conflict 
could interact with others. These platforms were also used by the SPLMI A 
to create their own diplomatic channels in Geneva, the United States and 
with different organisations involved in South Sudan. As the weaker party 
in the negotiations, the SPLMI A used these networks to fish for support and 
legitimacy. Continuous channels of communication provide a way to gain a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics of the conflict and become a helpful 
tool to avoid missing opportunities for peace. If we agree with Zartman's 
theory of ripeness (1995), these continuous channels of communications and 
the creation of such platfonns enable third parties to find out when the 
conflict is ripe for resolution and when opportunities for mediation arise. 
S4 Quote translated from French by the researcher: 'Au deuxieme workshop, ils avaient 
invite Ie responsable de la campagne soudanaise du nord et c'etait la premiere fois que 
quelqu'un du nord debarquer la-bas. C'est interessant qu'une petite ONG, tu peux 
commencer a creer des liens. C'est aussi par des petits trucs comme ~a, [que tu peux] 
detruire des cliches' (GC 01). 
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Changing perceptions 
The third theme brings together the above two themes and relates to the 
evolution of the perceptions of the different actors involved in the process of 
humanitarian engagements. Through the socialisation and the confidence 
building, humanitarian engagements impacted the perception of actors 
involved. The Government of Sudan acquired a better understanding of the 
rationale behind the formation of the SPLMI A and their continued struggle. 
The Government of Sudan discovered, through the processes of 
humanitarian engagements, 'that the SPLA was genuine about what they 
were fighting for': 
'Through the humanitarian engagements, the Government of 
Sudan had a better idea about why and for what the SPLA was 
fighting and through this the Government of Sudan realised that 
this was not just a mere rebelling faction but a very genuine 
movement' (HAC 02). 
Following this statement, I asked the interviewee the reason why 
humanitarian agreements, which started as early as 1989, did not bring 
peace in Sudan earlier. The interviewee explained that it was a social work 
and it needed a long time to know each other and change the perception they 
had of each other (HAC 02). As another interviewee explained: 
'It developed a better understanding between North and South, 
between the lines of conflict. We built more of a personal 
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relationship, which really helped in getting a better understanding 
of each other' (HAC 04). 
From my observation during interviews, I believe that there was a real 
change of perception in the sense that through these humanitarian 
engagements the Government of Sudan realised the extent to which the 
SPLMI A was representing genuine grievances within the Southern 
population. The Government of Sudan came to understand also the extent to 
which the SPLMI A was a structurally strong organisation. The Government 
of Sudan has been faced with many rebellions within its boundaries and has 
felt powerful enough to resolve the problem militarily or to offer an "unfair" 
peace agreement. From the interviews with the members of the Government 
of Sudan, I felt that this realisation was genuine. On the other hand, I 
believe that having the interviews in the post-agreement period has tainted 
some interviews to become biased towards a general feeling of 
reconciliation and acceptance towards the SPLMI A. As a UN worker stated 
in one of the interviews: 
'[The perception] was neither better nor worse. These people knew 
each other. They were not strangers to each other. OLS was not 
big enough or long enough to change a perception or the 
knowledge that was there many years before' (UN 02). 
This VIew may be a bit cynical. However, it relates to an important 
parameter. The leadership of the SPLMI A and the leadership of the 
Government of Sudan very often had encountered each other during military 
training before the conflict started. There were not indeed strangers. On the 
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other hand, I do believe that the interviews with the Government of Sudan 
reflect a genuine reality when stating that the humanitarian engagements 
enabled a better perception of the reality through continuous encounters as 
well as changed the perception of the Government of Sudan who strongly 
believed until the mid-1990s that the SPLMI A could be dealt with militarily. 
The interviews with the Government of Sudan do not support to a 
significant extent a change in the Government's perception of the 
international community, governments involved, the UN, and NGOs. As 
mentioned in one interview: 
'There was a lack of trust as both sides saw OLS as biased. There 
was no trust that it would do a fair and impartial job. Over the 
years that trust grew and OLS was more respected' (UN 02). 
The Government of Sudan remained through the 1990s, and some could 
argue today, a marginalised government in international diplomacy as 
accusations of providing a safe haven for international "terrorists", as well 
as a radicalisation of religious politics, slowly turned Sudan into a pariah 
state. The Government of Sudan has always perceived humanitarian 
intervention as a breach of their sovereignty. However, one interviewee 
mentioned that the presence of an expatriate community in Khartoum 
provided an opportunity to 'develop an international dimensions, the 
understanding of humanitarian action, [ ... ] it changed mentalities as people 
started thinking about peace' (HAC 02). 
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The SPLMI A went from being another guerrilla movement in Sudan 
to the realisation that the SPLMI A was representing a large part of the 
Sudanese population, both in Southern Sudan and the rest of Sudan. The 
Government of Sudan's perception of the SPLM/A was changed by their 
socialisation with them in the processes of humanitarian engagements. The 
image of the SPLMI A changed as well. The international community 
perceived the SPLMI A very differently in 1989 when the first OLS 
negotiations occurred and in 1995 when the negotiations of the Ground 
Rules within the OLS started. 
'The ceasefire [humanitarian ceasefire in 1995] gave the SPLM 
more legitimacy and created a perception that they were ready to 
be more in control of humanitarian assistance coming into their 
areas. [ ... ] I think the SPLM benefited from the ceasefire more 
than the Government of Sudan' (CC 02). 
The engagement of the SPLMI A by the international community in 
Operation Lifeline Sudan has often been qualified as a historical move by 
the UN. As an interviewee explained, 'it is a first step, a form of 
recognition, but at the same time putting the other in an uncomfortable 
position because they have to accept that you exist' (Expert 02). The UN 
was always worried of sponsoring some kind of political recognition of the 
SPLMI A (UN 01). Whether OLS did or did not give political recognition to 
the SPLMI A is debatable, but what is more important, as the interview 
above stated, is that by engaging the SPLMI A in OLS the UN recognised 
the fact that the SPLMI A was in control of a territory and of a population. In 
other words, the rationale behind the SPLM/A being involved in the OLS 
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appears very much to be that without the SPLMI A on board, humanitarian 
action in Southern Sudan may not have been made possible. Beyond this, as 
one interviewee recalls, there was a general feeling of hope among the 
Governments and donors involved in the OLS and the signing of the Ground 
Rules in the mid-1990s, that the SPLMI A would change and behave 
differently as a result of the humanitarian engagements and took the 
SPLM/A's engagement in the OLS as 'an encouraging sign' (UN 01). 
In my interviews with the organisations involved in humanitarian 
engagements, respondents were always careful in answering the question of 
whether their perception of the SPLMI A changed as a result of the 
humanitarian engagements. This caution reflects a general attitude of not 
seeming to have given some undue recognition or legitimacy to an armed 
group through humanitarian engagements. 
The answers of the SPLMI A regarding this question supported the 
feeling that the international community came to see them in a different 
light during these humanitarian engagements. 
'In fact, they [the UN] pretended at first not to recognise us. That 
we were a rebel movement and why the hell they had to talk to us, 
but we told them "how do you go to Southern Sudan without us". 
[They said] "no, on moral grounds, your people are dying and 
therefore you are rebels that are not considerate of the life of your 
people". [ ... ] They realised that Khartoum, nobody could 
influence us, but we were shafted from the UN system. They told 
us you are murderers, you are warmongers. [ ... ] When they came 
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they realised and James Grant, the executive director of UNICEF , 
who first made an agreement with us [sic]. [ ... J They recognised 
that we were not from the jungle, that we had a system and that 
was important. [ ... J From this very rebellious, illegal movement, 
we were recognised as a structure that could not be wished away' 
(SPLM 01). 
Another interviewee explains: 
'In the beginning, the discussion started by a strong impression 
from the UN as seeing the SPLM as a rebel movement and 
recognising the Government in Khartoum as the law enforcer and 
the protector of rights. So even though it started with the 
Government having more leverage and more respect, it ended with 
the SPLM gaining more recognition and more status as a result of 
the outcome of the implementation and continuous negotiations' 
(SPLM 05). 
One could say that these answers are part of a well rehearsed propaganda. 
While there must be an element of it, the relationship with the SPLMI A and 
the UN improved through the implementation of OLS. The Ground Rules in 
the mid- I 990s engaged the SPLMI A as well as other Southern factions, but 
did not engage the Government of Sudan. It appears that the UN managed to 
establish a ground for further humanitarian negotiations with the SPLMI A 
by the mid- I 990s. As one interviewee explained: 
'I think it polished our image in many different circles that 
branded the SPLM as not terrorists as such but just a military 
organisation that was thirsty, killing people, burning villages, 
violence. So it helped improve our image in UN circles, the circles 
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of the human rights organisations. Because before that, we had 
some problems with certain human rights organisations. [ ... ] 
These people started asking questions: "these people are serious 
people that are concerned with humanitarian issues, maybe they 
have genuine problems and let us talk to them". [ ... ] We start to 
open up to areas that were not accessible before, started dialoguing 
with human rights organisations who later became friends really, 
because they started to understand us better' (SPLM 07). 
Whereas the Government of Sudan could use the General Assembly of the 
UN and other international fora to explain themselves to the international 
community, the SPLMI A could not. They found in the forums created by 
humanitarian engagements a platform to communicate their side of the 
story. Furthermore, while nobody could claim that the SPLM/A are 
"angels", my personal observation during my fieldwork was that expatriates 
working for the UN, NGOs and Governments are more vehement in 
criticising the Government of Sudan than the SPLMI A. 
The SPLMI A, as stated before, manipulated their engagements in 
humanitarian agreements rather smartly to their advantage and were very 
much successful in changing the international community's perception of 
them. The SPLMI A was very much an active rather than a passive part of 
this process as their perception of the Government of Sudan did not change 
much. On the other hand, their understanding and knowledge of the 
international community deepened and the SPLMI A mastered the 
"humanitarian discourse" to their advantage. 
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'We actually entered these agreements that were humanitarian and 
nobody likes to be seen to be in flagrant violations of human rights 
and humanitarian principles. Of course these agreements provided 
food, shelter, water, medicine and services to the people. And if 
you stand against it domestically and internationally you lose to 
credibility. This is why none of the parties objected to the signing 
of these agreements' (SPLM 03). 
As another interviewee explained: 
'It is a big challenge to be recognised. And that is why many 
movements go for a different option: [ ... ] taking hostages, 
extremes. Another one is to get engaged positively with the 
international community. [ ... ] I think the SPLM chose to use a 
positive engagement and policy in affecting the good aspects and 
the values of the movement. [ ... ] It was a question of engagement 
to be in good care with the international community. [ ... ] You 
have to use it [humanitarian engagement] positively' (SPLM 06). 
Gaining this international credibility seemed paramount for an armed group 
who wanted to be accepted as an equal and strong partner at the negotiation 
table. 
'Of course, the new credibility became a huge political card that 
was very useful to relating to the international community, relating 
to the UN system. So it was very useful. It also created a strong 
ground for negotiations' (SPLM 05). 
The SPLM/A's perception that they had acquired more credibility, whether 
they did or did not, through these humanitarian engagements made the 
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SPLMI A more confident that they could enter peace talks with more support 
from the international community and therefore be in a strong position to 
negotiate a "fair" peace agreement. As one interview demonstrated: 
'Well it is the perception of the Government that the SPLM after 
1991 [the split] was weakened. [ ... ] It was only a perception. It 
was the same agenda that we discussed in 2004 that we started in 
1991. [ ... ] They wanted us to sign a cheap agreement at that time 
because they thought we were weak' (SPLM 07). 
Some kind of recognition and changing the perception of the Movement 
clearly appeared as a political objective of engaging on humanitarian issues 
with international organisations. 
'We managed to impose the recognition of our authority as a 
warring party and we actually improved our credibility and what 
we are in practice and the way we conduct ourselves. Like for 
example, more UN agencies and organisations representing many 
countries of the world came to be operating on our areas and 
behind our lines and they were finding more cooperation and more 
freedom and more protection that what is being offered by states 
themselves. And we also started to impose our regulations to them. 
They would not recognise us at the beginning, but in the end they 
recognised us' (SPLM 05). 
Another interviewee explained how humanitarian engagements played a 
role in this process of recognition: 
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'Well of course from the very beginning they [the Government of 
Sudan] used to call us terrorists. [ ... ] For that matter they were, 
they had not been ready to talk. But there were pressures from the 
international community, they had to succumb to the signing of the 
agreement [OLS] and after signing of the agreement ultimately, it 
paved the way to the peace talks. Because after all, they have 
already entered into a contract, reached an agreement with us and 
signed it. It means that they do recognise us, that there is a body 
here called the SPLM' (SPLM 03). 
The SPLMI A wanted to be perceived as more than a mere guerrilla 
movement and found in the humanitarian engagements a platform for 
propaganda. 
'Yes. That agreement [OLS] made it. It made the SPLM to be seen 
different from other group and therefore it made it, it gave the 
SPLM the opportunity to be seen as a movement that was fighting 
for values and for objectives. At the centre of them, as I said, we as 
a movement, the core values is the fight to return the basic rights 
and freedom of our people. [ ... ] The SPLM has shown the 
international community through the UN that it is committed to 
defend and promote the rights of the people and to provide them 
access while the Government of Sudan proves itself to be an anti-
human rights system and always obstructing the access of 
humanitarian assistance and not caring about the rights and the 
lives of the people in Sudan' (SPLM 05). 
Humanitarian engagements have brought about change in the perception 
that different actors in humanitarian engagements had of each other. 
Whereas the Government of Sudan became a pariah state in the 1990s, their 
perception of the SPLMI A as a mere guerrilla movement that could be 
398 
wished away by a coerCIve and militaristic operation changed to a 
realisation that the SPLMI A represented a disgruntled Southern population 
who had genuine grievances. The SPLMI A on the other hand 
instrumentalised their socialisation with the humanitarian organisations and 
the UN agencies working in Southern Sudan to acquire the recognition of 
the SPLMI A as more than a mere guerrilla movement, but a movement that 
aspired to statehood and had the capacity to negotiate a peace agreement in 
their favour. 
This third hypothesis can be re-written into three different 
conclusions regarding the case of Sudan. Humanitarian agreements have 
provided a space for the creation of a humanitarian elite in the Government 
of Sudan that played a mediating role in humanitarian action and in the 
peace process. Humanitarian agreements with the SPLMI A supported their 
effort to establish a civilian administration and change the SPLMI A from a 
militaristic dictatorial movement into a de facto authority on the ground. 
Humanitarian engagements provided a space, a platform and continuous 
channels of communications between the parties to the conflict. 
Humanitarian engagements provided a positive engagement with different 
parties that would play a role in the peace process that allowed an 
opportunity to understand each other better and change their perceptions of 
each other. 
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Analysing the negative impact that humanitarian engagements had on 
the Sudanese conflict 
The three hypotheses presented in the conceptual chapter focused on the 
possible positive impact or ways that humanitarian engagement with anned 
groups could impact on a positive transfonnation of the conflict. The data 
has supported strongly that there is a positive link between humanitarian 
engagements and a peaceful transfonnation of conflict. Nevertheless, 
humanitarian engagements do not only have a positive impact. In the case of 
Sudan, the positive impacts have over powered the negative impacts. 
However, there are negative impacts of humanitarian engagements that pose 
serious concerns: violations of the humanitarian agreements hann a 
possibility of trust and confidence building; the platfonn created by 
humanitarian agreements is another battle ground for the parties to the 
conflict; finally, the political instrumentalisation of a humanitarian process, 
as the SPLMI A has done, remains a serious concern for humanitarians and 
their neutral, non-political standing. 
Violations 
The overall result remained that humanitarian engagements created a 
possibility for the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan to find a way to 
work together in partnership. It was an opportunity to build that confidence 
that if a peace agreement were to be agreed on, a partnership in 
implementation could work. The analysis of the data has also pointed out 
the importance of showing that the parties could commit to and honour their 
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agreements. However, throughout the implementations of humanitarian 
agreements, there were serious violations on both sides. 
In almost every interview, the SPLMI A voiced their concerns with the 
serious violations of the agreements with the Government of Sudan. The 
issues of the cancellation of flights by the Government of Sudan came up 
very often. 
'What was really unfortunate is that during the implementation of 
the agreement of OLS, the Sudan Government tried and attempted 
to use the access for humanitarians as a tool for pressure on the 
SPLM, and use it as an act of war. And this is documented. Planes 
have been denied, routes have been denied, access to humanitarian 
convoys ... ' (SPLM 05) . 
. On the other hand, the Government of Sudan raised concerns over the 
manipulation of food aid by the SPLMI A to feed soldiers. 
'At that time there was a question of whether this OLS operation 
prolonged the war in the South. Some people say because there 
was misuse of food by the rebels, and misuse of giving to the rebel 
soldiers' (HAC 03). 
Some government interviewees said that OLS had a negative impact 
because of the manipulation of food (HAC 02). Third party interviewees 
explained that there were violations on both sides of the conflict (UN 02). 
One interviewee mentioned that as his work was to build capacity in the 
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South, there was a 'feeling that they were building capacity for them [the 
SPLM/A] to know how to manipulate relief later' (UN 01). 
The data reflects very well the on-going debate in the humanitarian 
community about Do No Hann and the issue of humanitarian action being a 
cause for continuation of the conflict rather than benefiting the conflict. 
Humanitarian engagements occurred in a highly sensitive environment and 
such violations could be a trigger of further animosity and distrust. In the 
case of Sudan, these violations remained very much a sensitive issue as the 
occurrence of the topic in interviews demonstrate. However, it has not been 
qualified as preventing the feeling from both parties that humanitarian 
engagements provided a good test of what type of partnership would be 
possible in the future between the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan. 
A very high level of distrust remains between the two parties post-peace 
agreement and was voiced during the interviews. 
A Space/or a "moral" battle 
The communication space and the platfonn created by humanitarian 
engagements in Sudan was captured by both parties to the conflict as 
another battle field, although this time a battle of words and actions. As one 
Government interviewee explained, 'everyone was competing to show that 
they committed to this more than the other' (HAC 04). Humanitarian 
engagements were used by either side to fire at each other and fight on 
moral grounds. As one expert on Sudan stated, 'Humanitarian 
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[engagements] is a propaganda and a strategic asset' (Expert 01). In 
interviews with the SPLMI A, they would explain that the Government of 
Sudan did not sign those humanitarian engagements genuinely but because 
of pressures: 
'I think they [the Government] agreed because for the first time the 
international community through the UN had come in the face of 
the huge humanitarian crisis to pressure on the Government of 
Sudan to allow this operation [ ... ]' (SPLM 05). 
When the members of the SPLMI A were asked during interviews to state 
their motivation for war, it would typically start a long answer explaining 
that the SPLMI A had started the war to free the people of Southern Sudan 
and Sudan in general and therefore it followed that they should do anything 
in their power to help the people caught up in the violence. These answers 
felt like a well-rehearsed propaganda. 
'So I would say that our main objective was to mitigate the effect 
of war and means for the international community and the 
organisations to be able to reach the needy people. And the basis 
for this, for us, is the very values that made us to engage the 
Government of Sudan in the first place in the war. In a sense, we 
rebelled against the denial of our rights as citizens, our human 
rights as human beings, and the rights of our people. Our 
movement as an organisation is nothing but an organisation of 
volunteers who step forward when our people in the millions 
rejected the economical and social economic conditions that were 
prevailing. Our people had lived in abject oppression and poverty 
and were marginalised. So yes, we wanted to pursue the war but 
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with the least humanitarian cost as possible. And OLS as an 
organisation came in to pursue these goals, to prosecute the war 
and providing attention to the needs that arise as a result of war 
itself (SPLM 05). 
The SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan claimed that their humanitarian 
engagements were entered into on moral grounds and on matters of 
principles. Each wanted to demonstrate that they had the well-being of the 
people at heart and that they were the entity that enabled the improvement 
of people's lives during the conflict. 
The Government of Sudan claimed, as the SPLMI A did, that the 
rebels entered the humanitarian agreements as "a face lifting operation": 
'They [the SPLM/A] needed a face lifting operation. They had if 
you were a rebel movement you are bound to step off of the human 
rights principles. Because at the time they were needing soldiers I 
think they were accused of conscribing children in the villages 
under age children, child soldiers. All these are human rights 
operation. Some say they had put under fire. So they needed a face 
lifting operation. I think one of the reasons for them to join the 
treaty was to have this face lifting operation' (HAC 05). 
Despite the fact that the data supports the argument that humanitarian 
engagements created a neutral, non-threatening space for communication 
and interaction between the parties to the conflict, that space was also 
caught in the cross-fire between the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan. 
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Both parties aimed at gammg more legitimacy and more recognition 
through their engagements on humanitarian issues. 
Instrumentalisation of a humanitarian process to achieve political ends 
Humanitarian engagements were a means to an end, more specifically a 
humanitarian means for a political ends. This was more true of the SPLM/A. 
As the weaker party, as the "illegal" guerrilla movement, the SPLMI A had 
much more to gain from these humanitarian engagements. The SPLMI A 
learnt how to use the opportunities arising from the humanitarian 
engagements to their own benefits. The SPLMI A gained experience in 
manipulating discourse and 'learnt what worked' (UN 01). They 
instrumentalised their humanitarian engagements as a way of gaining 
recognition, legitimacy and resources. 
The SPLMI A came to understand through their continuous engagement 
with the international community that the more they played the game of the 
international system the better off they would be. They understood that they 
needed to seem humanitarian, in respect of human rights and that the 
development of a civilian administration would provide them with more 
support. 
It is debatable whether this is a positive or negative consequence of 
humanitarian engagements. On one hand, humanitarians are concerned with 
the politicisation of humanitarian action and would therefore qualify this as 
405 
a negative consequence. On the other hand, the SPLM/A needed to feel that 
the backing of the international community to genuinely enter a peace 
process. They needed to feel that the peace agreement was going to be in 
their favour or at least fair and this could only happen if they felt they were 
standing on strong grounds. 
Conclusion 
Humanitarian engagements have an impact on the dynamic of conflict. 
Most of this impact is a positive one in terms of strengthening the possibility 
of a successful peace process, i.e. a peace process that would lead to the 
signing of an agreement. 
Hypothesis 1 stated: 
Humanitarian engagement may affect the internal dynamics of the 
armed group by raising the voice of a moderate faction (may affect 
power distribution and decision-making procedures). 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the data is that 
humanitarian engagements did not only impact the dynamic within the 
SPLMI A but also within the Government of Sudan. The data showed that it 
was not necessarily a moderate faction that was involved in the 
humanitarian engagements in Sudan but a multitude of actors: military, 
security, humanitarian "technical" elite. The main interlocutors who 
remained humanitarian actors in semblance were not necessarily powerful 
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and influential within their organisations. Their involvement did not result 
in providing them with a higher status. However, it provided them with 
some status as the same people who were involved on either side in the 
humanitarian engagements were also involved in the peace talks in Kenya 
that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. 
Hypothesis 2 stated: 
By offering the opportunity for the armed group to acquire greater 
knowledge of negotiation procedures or other skills necessary in 
the process of political negotiations, the process of humanitarian 
engagement might reduce the group's apprehension to enter in 
further negotiations. 
The data supported that some learning by doing occurred. The SPLMI A 
found an opportunity to exercise their negotiating skills and diplomatic 
skills. The most important learning that occurred for the SPLMI A was to 
understand how the international community worked and acquire a strong 
knowledge of a diplomatic and humanitarian discourse that they could 
manipulate and instrumentalise for their own political benefits. 
Humanitarian engagements also proved to reduce the SPLMIA's 
apprehension to enter into a formal peace process as they felt that they had 
the backing of the international community as they built confidence that the 
SPLMI A was more than a mere guerrilla movement. 
Hypothesis 3 stated: 
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Humanitarian engagement may allow for a continuous 
communication channel between the different parties to the 
contlict. Humanitarian engagement may act as a confidence-
building measure affecting the dynamic among the different actors 
involved in peace negotiations (NGOs, lOs, UN Agencies, 
ANSAs, Governments). 
The data supported this hypothesis strongly. The continuous communication 
channels between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan allowed a 
better understanding of the other. The international community could also 
use these communication channels to monitor opportunities for peace. 
Confidence that a partnership and a way forward in the contlict was 
possible was helped by the fact that the parties to the contlict were able to 
agree on humanitarian issues. The fact that an agreement on humanitarian 
issues was possible build up the hope that an agreement on the general 
issues of the war and peace was possible. 
The dynamic between the different actors was also impacted by the 
humanitarian engagements. The Government's perceptions of the SPLM/A 
changed from seeing the SPLMI A as a weak guerrilla movement to realising 
that the SPLMI A represented genuine grievances and was structurally strong 
enough to challenge the sovereignty of the Government. The SPLMI A 
perceived that their status was heightened as a result of their engagement in 
humanitarian engagements as interactions with the international community 
increased. The SPLMI A believed that their engagement in humanitarian 
agreements provided them with the necessary legitimacy and recognition 
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from the international community to ensure that no peace agreement would 
be unfair. 
Although the hypotheses were to a great extent supported by the data, a 
number of concerns can be raised on the negative impact that humanitarian 
engagements can have on the conflict dynamic. Violations of humanitarian 
agreements from both sides provided rationale and support for continued 
mistrust and animosity. Humanitarian agreements became another type of 
battle field for the parties to the conflict as each wanted to win a war of 
moral high grounds. The SPLMI A manipulated and instrumentalised all 
opportunities arising from the humanitarian engagements to benefit their 
political ends. 
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Chapter IX : Conclusion 
Introduction: purpose and aims of the research 
This research was concerned with finding what the consequences of 
humanitarian engagement with armed groups are on the conflict situation. 
More specifically, the research aimed to find ways in which humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups can have a positive impact on conflict and 
under what circumstances. The research found that, indeed, humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups has an impact on conflict and that these 
consequences could be both negative and positive. 
This research had a further purpose. In order to understand the 
impact of humanitarian engagement with armed groups, understanding the 
process of humanitarian engagement itself was paramount. An in-depth 
study of three different humanitarian engagements with the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement during Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005) enabled 
a comparative analysis which uncovered how characteristics of 
humanitarian engagements playa role in the way humanitarian engagements 
impact the conflict situation. 
While there was no comparative analysis of armed groups, the 
research aimed at providing a better understanding of armed groups. The 
behaviour of armed groups is under-researched. In order to understand how 
humanitarian engagement with armed groups impacts upon the conflict 
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situation, it is necessary to understand how anned groups behave, what can 
influence them and what are their perceptions of humanitarian engagements. 
The case study enabled an in-depth analysis of the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement/ Anny (SPLM/ A), through interviews with members 
of its leadership. This in-depth analysis allowed a partial answer to how 
characteristics of anned groups may shape the impact that humanitarian 
engagements can have on conflict transfonnation. However, further 
comparative research would provide a more systematic answer to this 
question. 
Summary of findings 
Three hypotheses were presented as a conceptual framework to 
guide this research: 
Hypothesis 1: Humanitarian engagement may affect the internal 
dynamics of the anned group by raising the voice of a moderate 
faction (may affect power distribution and decision-making 
procedures ). 
Hypothesis 2: By offering the opportunity for the anned group to 
acquire greater knowledge of negotiation procedures or other skills 
necessary in the process of political negotiations, the process of 
humanitarian engagement might reduce the group's apprehension 
to enter in further negotiations. 
Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian engagement may allow for a 
continuous communication channel between the different parties to 
the conflict. Humanitarian engagement may act as a confidence-
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building measure affecting the dynamic among the different actors 
involved in peace negotiations (NGOs, lOs, UN Agencies, 
ANSAs, Governments). 
In the light of the data analysis, these hypotheses were re-evaluated. The 
first hypothesis proved to be more complex. It stated that humanitarian 
engagement may affect the internal dynamics of the armed group by raising 
the voice of a moderate faction which may affect the power distribution and 
decision-making procedures. The analysis revealed that humanitarian 
engagement did not only impact the dynamic within the SPLMI A but also 
within the Government of Sudan. The assumption that a moderate faction 
was involved in humanitarian engagement was not supported by the data. 
On the other hand, the analysis showed that a multitude of actors were 
involved in humanitarian engagements in Sudan including military actors, 
security and humanitarian "technical" elite. The people involved in 
humanitarian engagements in Sudan were not necessarily influential within 
their organisations, be it within the SPLMI A or the Government of Sudan. 
Their involvement did not result in providing them with a higher status. 
However, the data showed that the people who were involved in the 
humanitarian engagements were also involved in the peace talks in Kenya 
which led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Finally, the 
analysis of the data showed that in the case of the SPLMIA, it is not only the 
case that humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A triggered a change in 
the internal dynamic of the group, but the power structure or change in the 
internal dynamic of the SPLMI A enabled and affected humanitarian 
engagements and the impact that they may have on the conflict situation . 
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The second hypothesis focused on the opportunity for learning by 
doing that humanitarian engagements offer. The data supported the 
hypothesis as some learning occurred. The SPLMI A found an opportunity to 
exercise their negotiating and diplomatic skills. Most importantly, the 
SPLMI A acquired a greater understanding of how the international 
community worked and how to manipulate and instrumentalise their 
diplomatic and humanitarian discourse for their own political benefits. This 
outcome was favoured by the fact that the SPLM/A aimed to govern a "New 
Sudan" and this objective necessitated a positive engagement with the 
international community. In other words, the political aims of the armed 
groups shaped the way humanitarian engagements were instrumentalised 
and therefore the impact that they had on the conflict situation. Finally, 
humanitarian engagements proved to reduce the SPLMI A's apprehension to 
enter into a formal peace process, as the hypothesis stated. The SPLMI A felt 
that they had the backing of the international community as the international 
community build confidence that the SPLMI A was more than a mere 
guerrilla movement. 
The third hypothesis revealed, in the light of the data analysis, to 
have three distinct components, which were re-written into three different 
propositions. The first was concerned with communication between the 
parties to the conflict. Continuous communication channels between the 
SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan allowed a better understanding of 
the other. The international community could also use these communication 
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channels to monitor opportunities for peace. The second was concerned with 
confidence and trust building. Confidence that a partnership was possible 
and a way forward in the conflict was possible was helped by the fact that 
the parties to the conflict were able to agree on humanitarian issues. Finally, 
the third proposition was concerned with the changing relationship and 
perception of the actors involved. The analysis of the data revealed that 
humanitarian engagements allowed a changing dynamic between the actors 
involved and changing perceptions. 
Although these hypotheses were supported to a great extent by the 
data, some concerns can be raised in the light of the negative impact that 
humanitarian engagement can have on the conflict situation. The data 
showed that violations of humanitarian agreements raised animosity 
between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. Humanitarian 
agreements became another battle field for the parties to the conflict as each 
wanted to win a war of moral high grounds. Finally, the SPLMI A 
instrumentalised humanitarian engagements for their political ends. 
Humanitarian actors are concerned with the manipulation of humanitarian 
action and this instrumentalisation could be a significant negative 
consequence for them. 
Regarding armed groups, the analysis allowed some tentative 
answers on how characteristics of armed groups shape the impact that 
humanitarian engagements have on conflict transformation. Three 
characteristics were highlighted. The political aims of the armed groups 
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shapes the way the armed group reacts to humanitarian engagements and 
therefore the consequences they have on the conflict situation. The internal 
organisation and dynamics of the armed groups enables or disables the 
possibility of humanitarian engagements as well as how they impact the 
conflict situation. Finally, the relationship between the armed group and its 
constituency shapes the impact that humanitarian engagements can have on 
conflict transformation. 
The comparative analysis of the three engagements researched 
allowed some conclusions to be made. The higher the status of the actor 
engaging with the armed group, the greater the impact on the political and 
conflict situation. The earlier the humanitarian engagement occurs in the 
conflict and the longer the implementation period of this engagement, the 
greater the impact is on the conflict situation. The more negotiations occur 
in the process of engagement, the greater the impact of the humanitarian 
engagement is on the conflict situation. Finally, the more the humanitarian 
engagement encompasses the different actors involved in the conflict and in 
the possible peace process, the greater is the impact on the conflict dynamic. 
These findings have three important implications. The findings of 
this research tell us to change the way we approach humanitarian 
engagement or dialogue with armed groups in internal conflicts and to 
change the way we approach peace processes. As humanitarian engagement 
proves to have a number of political impacts, there is a need to move away 
from the apolitical concept of humanitarianism. In more pragmatic terms, 
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this means that humanitarian engagements with armed groups need to be 
evaluated to understand their potential to help further the start of peace talks 
or to hinder that development. This evaluation includes analysing the actors 
involved and especially the armed groups involved. Furthermore, when 
establishing strategies for engagement, the engagement itself needs to be 
evaluated as a parameter that could potentially help or hinder peace. 
The findings of this research establish that humanitarian 
engagement, under certain circumstances, impacts positively the peaceful 
transformation of conflict. In light of this finding, there is a need to look at 
peace processes as a wider process of conflict transformation involving 
other processes such as humanitarian engagements. Humanitarian 
engagement with armed groups can help the start of formal peace talks, but 
can also influence the way peace is negotiated, agreed and implemented. In 
order not to miss opportunities or ripe moments, there is a need to evaluate 
the potential for peaceful conflict transformation in the light of all the 
engagements or negotiations that occur within a conflict, including 
humanitarian engagements with armed groups. 
Finally, these research findings support the argument that inclusion 
rather than exclusion of violators of human rights and humanitarian 
principles can not only improve the treatment of civilians but can also 
trigger opportunities for a peaceful transformation of conflict. At a time 
where punishment rather than engagement is at the forefront of third party 
involvement in conflicts (War on Terror, International Criminal Court, etc.), 
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these findings support the argument that, under well evaluated and analysed 
circumstances, engagement provides a better strategy to trigger a peaceful 
transformation of conflict and a mores sustainable solution to conflict. 
Conflict transformation: a review of the literature in the light of 
findings 
This section links the literature on the impact of humanitarian 
engagements on conflict as well as the conflict transformation literature 
with the outcomes of the analysis. This aims at answering the following 
questions: Does the analysis resulting from the data gathered on 
humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A support general arguments 
presented in the literature on peace processes? Does it refute the existing 
literature? It will be argued that the findings have supported general 
arguments presented in the literature on peace processes and peacemaking. 
This research draws extensively from Interactive Conflict Resolution 
(Fisher, 2003:61). The a priori motive for this was the similarity of 
Interactive Conflict Resolution (lCR) workshops with humanitarian 
engagement in providing a neutral, less-threatening environment for parties 
to a conflict to interact. The findings from this research on the impact that 
humanitarian engagements with armed group may have on the peacemaking 
effort or transformation of conflict prove to be similar to the findings 
reported in the literature on ICR. 
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Kelman's work and experience with ICR in involving Israelis and 
Palestinians provided four main learning experiences on which this research 
was based (1990:211-3). First, Kelman argues that ICR provides 'some 
insights into the perspective of the other party'. Humanitarian engagements 
with the SPLMI A and the Government of Sudan provided the parties to the 
conflict with this first type of learning experience. As one interviewee from 
the Government explains, through humanitarian engagements the 
Government of Sudan was able to change their perception by having a better 
idea about the reasons behind the SPLM/A's struggle and realised that the 
SPLMI A was not just a mere rebelling faction but a very genuine movement 
(HAC 02). 
The second learning experience Kelman reports is that ICR creates 
'a greater awareness of changes that have taken place in the adversary' 
(1990:211-3). This learning experience was less present in the findings of 
this research. However, a number of changes occur through humanitarian 
engagements through a socialisation process between the parties to the 
conflict. As Rouhana explains, ICR contributes to conflict transformation in 
'a slow but dynamic and potentially important [way] through a number of 
effects that characterise social change' (2000:312). One interviewee 
mentioned that for humanitarian engagements to have an impact there needs 
to be time for a social work to happen to get to know each other (HAC 02). 
The third learning experience that Kelman presents is the heightened 
awareness of people involved in ICR workshops of 'the significance of 
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gestures and symbolic acts and become more aware of action they could 
take that would be meaningful to the other' (1990:211-3). A similar learning 
occurred or resulted from humanitarian engagements with the SPLMI A and 
the Government of Sudan. However, this learning experience was more 
specifically targeted towards actions that would bring trust in the possibility 
of establishing a working relationship between the parties to the conflict. 
Rather than seeing humanitarian engagements or actions taken around the 
implementation of the humanitarian agreements, actors involved in these 
engagements valued the possibility to show each other their ability to 
commit and implement an agreement. Demonstrating this ability to commit 
and implement an agreement was symbolic in opening the option of a 
potential sustainable peace process. 
Finally, the fourth learning experience that Kelman presents is the 
knowledge that 'there is someone to talk on the other side and something to 
talk about' (1990:211-3). The findings on humanitarian engagements in 
Sudan emphasise the role that open communication channels and constant 
communication channels provided by these engagements play in furthering 
the possibility of talks. As most people involved in humanitarian 
engagements were also involved in the peace talks leading to the signature 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, one can argue that it is during 
humanitarian engagements that individual relationships formed to provide 
this awareness that there is someone to talk to on the other side. 
Furthermore, continuous communication allows a change in perception. 
Coupling with an existing dialogue on humanitarian issues, these two 
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factors help furthering this feeling that a peaceful solution is possible as 
there is someone to talk to on the other side and something to talk about, if 
only humanitarian issues. 
Similarly to Kelman, Lieberfeld identifies three types of transfers 
resulting from ICR that provided a theoretical base for this research (2005). 
Lieberfeld argues that ICR fosters the support for negotiations, as well as 
support for the "diplomatists" on either side of the conflict (2005: 121). 
Analysing the findings from this research on humanitarian engagements in 
Sudan, this argument did not find supporting evidence. This may be due to 
the differences between ICR workshops and humanitarian engagements. 
Nevertheless, from interviews carried with different actors involved In 
humanitarian engagements III Sudan, as well as actors involved In 
humanitarian engagements in general, there is little evidence that external 
processes support moderate members of armed groups or governments. 
Indeed, it seems that third parties must work within the constraints of 
hierarchy or power distribution given by the armed group or government, 
rather than third parties influencing or supporting a certain type of actors 
within the armed group or the government (GC 03). However, support for 
negotiations and actors involved in negotiations can be fostered by ICR and 
has been fostered by humanitarian engagements in creating learning-by-
doing opportunities in terms of exercising negotiation skills and diplomatic 
skills. To extend this transfer to fostering support for the "diplomatists" 
does not find grounds in this research. Whether this support occurs or not, it 
does not change the power structures and influences actors involved in 
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humanitarian engagements and therefore cannot be said to have a great 
impact on the political processes and the peaceful transformation of conflict. 
Lieberfeld argues that ICR has a number of substantive transfers 
which include the clarification of positions and the generation of options to 
manage the conflict (2005: 121). This argument is similar to Kelman's 
learning experience as participants become more aware of the perspective of 
other parties (1990:211-3). The opportunities for dialogue and 
communication provided by ICR are similar to the ones provided by 
humanitarian engagements and thus, substantive transfers occurred as a 
result of humanitarian engagements with the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLM/A. 
The final transfers resulting from ICR according to Lieberfeld are 
procedural transfers relating to the 'changes in the political cultures of each 
side in ways that make the parties more receptive to negotiations' 
(2005:121). Similarly, humanitarian engagements in Sudan provided some 
procedural transfers in demonstrating the viability of agreements between 
opposite sides of the conflict. This was highlighted in interviews when a 
number of interviewees stated that humanitarian engagements created a 
sense of 'if we can agree on humanitarian issues, then we could agree on 
more substantial issues relating to the conflict'. 
The parallel between ICR and humanitarian engagements proves to 
be a useful one in strengthening and answering research issues and 
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questions relating to peacemaking. Fisher argues that ICR workshops 
provide support for parties to consider entering into negotiations as: 
'The typical process and outcomes of workshops are deemed to 
include more open and accurate communication, more accurate 
and differentiated perception and images, increased trust, and a 
cooperative orientation, all of which may be transferable to official 
interactions' (2005:4). 
This summary could easily be transferred to the experience of humanitarian 
engagements with armed groups in conflict. More open and accurate 
communication resulted from humanitarian engagements in Sudan. More 
accurate and differentiated perceptions and images were an important 
outcome of humanitarian engagements as perceptions of different actors 
changed throughout these engagements. Increased trust and a cooperative 
orientation seems to have gone hand in hand in the case of humanitarian 
engagements. Trust was increased as the possibility of a working 
relationship between the conflicting parties increased, thus fostering a 
general cooperative orientation. 
A second important theory was examined as part of the 
conceptualisation of this research. Zartman's theory of ripeness and more 
importantly the pitfalls highlighted by Zartman himself, provided a building 
block for this research (Zartman, 1995; Zartman 2000). 'Ripe moments' for 
a peaceful transformation of conflict, according to Zartman, 'are composed 
of a structural element, a party element, and a potential alternative outcome 
- that is, a mutually hurting stalemate, the presence of valid spokesperson, a 
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formula for a way out' (1995:18). According to Zartman, further research is 
needed to refine this theory in order to understand what actions can be taken 
to support the identification of ripe moments: 
'More work needs to be done on ways in which unripe situations 
can be turned ripe by third parties so that negotiations and 
mediation can begin, and, of course, the mainstream of negotiation 
research on how to take advantage of ripe moment by bringing the 
parties to a mutually satisfactory agreement needs to be continued' 
(Zartman, 2000:245). 
Researching the effects of humanitarian engagements as a third party 
intervention in the conflict on the transformation of conflict is inscribed in 
finding ways in which unripe situations can be turned ripe. The transfers, 
learning experiences or impacts that humanitarian engagements in Sudan 
had supported in many ways the different elements of ripeness. 
Zartman's approach was certainly supported by the findings of this 
research. The communication channels opened and maintained throughout 
the conflict in Sudan between the SPLMI A and the Sudanese Government 
provided the possibility to "perceive" a mutually hurting stalemate, the 
existence of spokesperson as well as a way out of the conflict. The 
Government of Sudan believed throughout the 1990s that a military victory 
over the SPLMI A was possible. Through humanitarian engagements and the 
resulting communication opportunities, the Government of Sudan realised 
that the SPLMI A was not a mere guerrilla movement, that it was a strong 
military and political force in South Sudan, thus perceiving the situation in a 
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very different light. Humanitarian engagements in Sudan not only helped 
identifying the existence of spokesperson and ensuring that both sides 
perceived the existence of spokesperson, but furthered the creation of 
changed relations between individuals involved in these engagements. 
Finally, the establishment of a continuous working relation through the 
implementation of humanitarian engagements unabled each side to 
understand the issues and limits of that cooperation as well as the 
possibilities and potential opportunities for a successful cooperation 
providing the parties to the conflict with a more practical and thorough 
understanding of the type of formula for a peace agreement that could work, 
as well as the safeguards that needed to be put in place for it to be 
sustainable. 
Methodology: lessons learned 
Armed groups 
Armed groups are under researched, mostly due to the difficulty to 
access information, as well as the legal and security constraints. In the 
context of this research, the armed group was studied after the signing of the 
peace agreement. This was made possible by the fact that the structure of 
the armed group was maintained in the post-agreement period. Studying 
anned groups in the post-agreement period allows researchers to reach the 
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members of the armed groups and acquire a better understanding of the 
organisation. 
The post-agreement period allows researchers to study armed groups 
in transition towards a government or political party. However, there exists 
a post-peace agreement bias. In the context of this research, the difficulties 
of implementation of the peace agreement were often at the forefront of 
interviews rather than the subject of the research. This issue with a bias in 
the post-peace agreement period reflects the problems linked to researching 
a dynamic organisation. Armed groups, as any organisation, change all the 
time. The history of an armed group can change how the story is told and 
who tells the story. In the case of the SPLM/A, the death of the long-lasting 
leader John Garang led to significant changes in the leadership of the 
SPLM/A. 
Triangulation 
Triangulation is necessary but difficult. In this research, triangulation 
was done by interviewing three different clusters of interviewees: the 
Government of Sudan, the SPLMI A and the organisations that were 
involved in the humanitarian engagements. By clustering the interviews in 
this way, the aim was to acquire a more rounded, balanced picture of the 
situation. This aim was difficult to reach. The organisations that were 
involved in the humanitarian engagements were difficult to contact and 
when the contact was established it was difficult to track the people who had 
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been involved in the humanitarian engagements. NGOs or UN agencies 
experience a very high level of turn over and therefore the people involved 
in the humanitarian engagements have moved on or retired. Furthermore, 
people working in such organisations are very much embedded in the 
organisation's culture and mandate. It proved difficult to make a 
humanitarian actor talk about the peace process and vice versa. Finally, 
triangulation was made difficult as constraints were put on meeting certain 
people in the Government of Sudan, mostly for security reasons. The 
Government of Sudan appeared very secretive and fragmented and there is a 
strong feeling that nobody had the whole picture in mind. 
Elite interviews 
Elite interviews seem the best research tool to acquire the subjective 
perception of certain actors that were involved in non-public processes such 
as peace talks or humanitarian engagements. However, elite interviews 
remain difficult to guarantee and are usually short due to the busy schedules 
of actors interviewed. As a result, the data is rich in content but small. The 
data provides a very special overview of the situation and documents and 
records perceptions and beliefs not recorded elsewhere. On the other hand, it 
is open to criticism has the data is not large and relies on a small numbers of 
interviews. 
Conclusion 
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Humanitarian actors are not reduced to delivering aid only. The 
complexity of internal conflicts is challenging. The growing practice of 
humanitarian engagement with all actors involved in the conflict opens an 
array of unanswered questions. This research has provided some initial 
answers and a greater understanding of the consequences that humanitarian 
engagements with armed groups have on the conflict situation. 
This research examined one armed group in one conflict. Further 
research should take a comparative approach. Comparing between conflicts 
and armed groups would enable a more acute understanding of how these 
aspects may shape the impact that humanitarian engagements with armed 
groups has on the conflict situation. The comparison of three humanitarian 
engagements with the SPLM/A during Sudan's second civil war provided 
answers to how the characteristics of humanitarian engagements can shape 
the impact that humanitarian engagement have on conflict transformation. 
Further studies can use these initial answers to control for the variable 
relating to humanitarian engagements and compare armed groups or conflict 
situations. This would enable a wider understanding of the circumstances in 
which humanitarian engagement can have a positive impact and a negative 
impact on the conflict situation. As humanitarian engagements with armed 
groups impact the political environment to favour the beginning of peace 
talks, peace negotiations, the peace agreement as well as the implementation 
of the agreement may be shaped by prior humanitarian engagements with 
armed groups. 
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Humanitarian actors are reluctant to see their work as "political". 
Understanding the wider consequences of humanitarian action is paramount. 
Being blind to these consequences does not erase the problems. A 
continuous questioning of the impact of humanitarian action, and 
humanitarian engagements with armed groups in particular, needs to be 
made in order for practitioners to work within the ethics of humanitarianism 
and the do no harm principle. In other words, the politicisation of 
humanitarian action is a fact and needs not to be taken as a negative aspect 
of humanitarian action, but as a natural consequence of humanitarian action 
that needs to be understood better in order to use it towards better ends. 
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Appendix 1 : Interview Schedule 
This table is a list of all the interviews carried out for this research. Codes 
are used to guarantee the anonymity of respondents. Codes are made of the 
initials of the organisations the respondent works with (or worked with at 
the moment of humanitarian engagements) and a number to differentiate 
between respondents from the same organisations. 
SPLM = Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
SSDF = South Sudan Defence Force. 
UN = United Nations. 
Expert = designates respondents who were interviewed because of their 
expertise. 
Third Party = designates different international NGOs who were present 
during the conflict in South Sudan. 
ANSAs = Armed non-state actors (other than SPLM/A). 
CC = Carter Center. 
HD = Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 
ICRC = International Committee of the Red Cross. 
GC = Geneva Call 
HAC = Humanitarian Aid Commission of the Government of Sudan. 
GOS = Government of Sudan. 
Codes Date Location Description 
One of the leading 
SPLM01 24/0112007 Juba, South Sudan members of the 
Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation 
Association, the 
humanitarian wing 
of the SPLM/A 
SPLM02 26/0112007 Juba, South Sudan Gatekeeper 
One of the leading 
SPLM03 30/0112007 Juba, South Sudan political figures in 
the SPLM/A 
One of the leading 
SPLM04 0110212007 Juba, South Sudan political figures in 
the SPLM/A 
Former military, 
SPLM05 02/0112007 Juba, South Sudan one of the leading humanitarians in 
the SPLMI A and 
one of the leading 
negotiators during 
the peace talks 
One of the leading 
SPLM06 06/02/2007 Juba, South Sudan political figures in the SPLM/A 
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One of the leading 
SPLM07 08/0812007 Khartoum, Sudan political figures in 
the SPLM/A, one 
of the key 
negotiators during 
the peace process 
One of the leading 
SPLM08 12/08/2007 Khartoum, Sudan military person in 
the SPLMI A, one 
of the negotiators 
during the peace 
process 
One of the leading 
SPLM09 14/0812007 Khartoum, Sudan political figures in 
the SPLM/A 
Former high level 
SPLM10 15/0812007 Khartoum, Sudan military person 
who converted to 
humanitarian work 
as part of the 
SRRA in the 
SPLM/A 
Former SPLM 
FORMERSPLM 0110211007 Juba, South Sudan child soldier 
CHILD SOLDIER working in post 
01 
war reconstruction 
Former military 
SSDF01 28/0112007 Juba, South Sudan leader in the SSDF 
Humanitarian 
UNO 1 07/09/2007 Phone Interview worker working 
for OLS UNICEF 
in South Sudan in 
the 1990s on the 
Ground Rules 
programme 
Worked for OLS 
UN02 1110112008 Phone Interview UNICEF in the 1990s in South 
Sudan at a high 
decision-making 
level 
Journalist and 
Expert01 03/0112006 Phone Interview researcher 
specialised on 
and Sudan and the 
23110/2007 Sudan People's 
Liberation 
Movement 
Track 1 Mediator 
Expert02 26110/2007 Phone Interview working on mediation 
involving armed 
groups. Worked 
with the SPLM/A 
Expert on 
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Expert03 811112007 Phone Interview humanitarian 
action 
Humanitarian 
Third Party 01 1511112007 Phone Interview worker in Sudan 
European 
ANSAI 05/06/2007 Geneva, Switzerland representative of 
an armed non-state 
actor 
Mediator, who 
CCOI 03/0112007 Phone Interview worked for the 
Carter Center on 
peace mediation in 
Sudan 
Humanitarian 
CC02 0112007 Email Interview worker for the 
Carter Center who 
worked on the 
Guinea Worm 
ceasefire 
Technical and 
CC03 20106/2007 Phone Interview policy level person 
Former scholar at 
HDOI 07/06/2007 Geneva, Switzerland the Centre for 
Humanitarian 
dialogue 
Human rights and 
HD02 08/06/2007 Geneva, Switzerland humanitarian 
action specialist 
Former delegate 
ICRCOI 08/0612007 Geneva, Switzerland with the ICRC 
Humanitarian 
GCOI 1811212006 Geneva, Switzerland actor working on 
engaging armed 
groups on a ban on 
landmine 
Humanitarian 
GC02 1811212006 Geneva, Switzerland actor working on 
engaging armed 
groups on a ban on 
Iandmine 
Humanitarian 
GC03 29/05/2007 Geneva, Switzerland actor working on 
engaging armed 
groups on a ban on 
landmine 
Humanitarian 
GC04 29/05/2007 Geneva, Switzerland actor working on 
engaging armed 
groups on a ban on 
landmine 
Humanitarian 
HACOI 31/07/2007 Khartoum, Sudan actor working for the Government of 
C"An~ tho 
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Sudan, the 
Humanitarian Aid 
Commission 
throughout the 
1990s 
Researcher, former 
HAC02 31107/2007 Khartoum, Sudan humanitarian 
worker for the 
Government of 
Sudan, the 
Humanitarian Aid 
Commission 
throughout the 
1990s 
Humanitarian 
HAC03 14/0812007 Khartoum, Sudan worker for an 
NGO in the South 
before joining the 
Humanitarian Aid 
Commission. Took 
part in the peace 
talks 
One of the leading 
HAC04 16/08/2007 Khartoum, Sudan members of the 
Humanitarian Aid 
Commission 
One of the leading 
HAC05 16/08/2007 Khartoum, Sudan members of the 
Humanitarian Aid 
Commission, 
working as a 
humanitarian 
worker now 
Technical person 
00S06 19/08/2007 Khartoum, Sudan who worked on the 
Guinea Worm 
issue for the 
Ministry of Health 
of the Government 
of Sudan 
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Appendix 2: Network Diagrams Contacts Sudan 
Gave contacts of or facilitated meeting with 
Advised to interview 
For the purpose of safeguarding anonymity, codes are used in these 
diagrams. Codes will reflect organisation affiliation of the person and a 
number, referencing the sequence of meeting. In the case where the person 
is a former member of an organisation, the mention "former" will be 
indicated in brackets right after the code. 
Organisations: 
UN: United Nations 
PRDU: Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit 
SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
MSF: Medecins Sans Frontieres 
PACT: Pact 
SSDDR : South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Commission 
CA: Christian Aid 
CC: Carter Center 
GC: Geneva Call 
KCAL: Kenyan Campaign Against Landmine 
NPAID: Norwegian People's Aid 
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UN06 
E-mail 
Logistical advice 
South Sudan 
MSFOI 
(Spain-
Somalia) 
Contact 
MSF02 (Spain-
South Sudan) 
Contact in South 
Sudan 
UN05 (Former) and 
PRDUOI 
UN08 
Contact 
SPLMll 
"Gatekeeper" 
SPLM04 
Interviewed 
UN07 
Email 
Logistical advice 
before and during 
field trip to South 
Sudan 
UN08 
Juba for 
internet 
utilities 
PACTOI 
Kenya 
No answer 
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CAOI 
Khartoum 
SPLMl2 
Contacts not 
forwarded by 
gatekeeper Did 
not happen 
PRDU02 
Through PRDU Alumni 
y 
SSDRCOI 
Involved with 
SCUK and CRS 
with OLS 
HAC04 
SPLM06 
Interviewed 
Was 
supposed to 
forward 
contacts of 
SPLM 
members in 
London 
Contact not forwarded to 
me 
UN09 
UNIO 
Kenyan 
Involved in 
lOAD peace 
process 
SPLM04 
Interviewed 
UNII 
No time 
to arrange 
interview 
SPLMOI 
Interviewed 
SPLM02 
Interviewed 
SPLMl3 
Did not have time to 
arrange interview 
SPLM03 
Interviewed 
~----..110... SPLMOS 
Interviewed 
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PACT02 
South Sudan 
Logistical advice 
Talked about 
contacts for 
Khartoum but never 
materialised 
PRDU03 
CC05 
CCO! (former) 
Interviewed 
CC04 
CC06 
CC02 
Interviewed 
1 
CC03 
Interviewed 
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More contacts from GC, but did not work: no 
answers to e-mails and phone numbers out of use 
GCOI 
Interviewed ___ ~ .... ::-____ _ GC02 Interviewed 
SPLM14 
SPLMI0 
Interviewed 
KCAL 
Logistical 
Advice 
SPLM15 
SPLM Nairobi 
Called for direction to 
SPLM Office 
GC05 
Nairobi 
Help in Nairobi 
ExpertOl 
Interviewed 
Former SPLM child 
soldier 01 
Facilitated logistical 
issues in Juba such as 
a driver, car, and 
finding offices 
Interviewed 
NPAID Juba 
No time for interview 
Former SPLM child Soldier 02 
Facilitated first contacts at offices' receptions 
in Juba for the first four days 
SSDFOI (Former) 
Interviewed on other armed 
groups in South Sudan 
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PRDU04 
GOS07 
PRDU Alumni 
Gatekeeper 
1 
GOS08 
Gatekeeper Khartoum Government 
of Sudan 
HAC07 
Gatekeeper Humanitarian Aid 
Commission 
HACOl (former) 
Interviewed 
GOS08 (Former) 
GOS06 
Interviewed 
HAC03 
Interviewed 
HAC05 
Interviewed 
HAC02 
Interviewed 
\ 
HAC04 (Former) 
Interviewed 
UNl2 
Interview not 
possible 
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SPLM18 
Interview not 
possible 
Conference in Geneva organised by Geneva Call 
1 
SPLM16 (Former) 
1 
SPLM17 
Administrative 
Assistant 
1 
SPLM07 
Interviewed 
SPLMIO 
Interviewed 
SPLM08 SPLM09 
Interviewed Interviewed 
SPLM19 
Interview 
not 
possible 
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Appendix 3: Chronology of the Sudanese Conflict (1983-
2005) 
Chronology: 
(This chronology relies on Woodward (1990), Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), IRIN 
website (Wwv\. irinnews.org), 
16th_19th Century: Arabisation and Islamisation of Northern and western Sudan. 
1820: Turco-Egyptian invasion. 
1838: Captain Salim Qaduban, Turkish sailor, successfully penetrates the Sudd swamp in 
southern Sudan. This breakthrough launches an era in which the South becomes the object 
of ruthless plunder - primarily of ivory and slaves, first by Egyptians, then expatriate 
merchants, and eventually northern Sudanese. 
1840s-1850s: Christian mission operates in southern Sudan. 
1881-1885: Revolt of Ahmed al-Mahdi, withdrawal of the Turco-Egyptians. 
1885-1898: Khalifa Adballahi, successor of al-Mahdi. 
1896-1898: Anglo-Egyptian conquest, Madhist forces crushed. 
1899: Anglo-Egyptian agreement, British dominated condominium. 
1930: "Southern Policy" introduced secretly to isolate the south. Aimed at separating the 
south from the north. 
1945: The Umma Party is founded under the patronage of Sayyid Sir Abd aI-Rahman al-
Mahdi. 
1947: Juba Conference. South integration with the North. 
1953: Sudan's election, National Unionist Party (NUP) wins. 
1955: Fear of northern domination in the South cause the Equatoria Corps to start a mutiny 
in Torit and cause widespread killing of northerners in the South. These events can be seen 
as the premature signals of the first civil war between North and South. 
1956: Sudan's independence. 
1958: General elections return the UmmaJPDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) coalition under 
Abdullah Khalif. 
October 1958: Amidst political uncertainty General Abboud leads a military coup, 
encouraged by Abdullah Kahlif. 
1962: Government adopts Missionaries Act. Foreign Christian missions asked to leave the 
country. Sustained guerrilla war with Anyanya, the main opposition group, in the South. 
1963: Fonnation of Anyanya to lead the war in the South. 
1964: October Revolution overthrows Abboud's regime and establishes national 
government under Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa. 
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1965: The old parties force Sir al-Khatim to resign and create a new coalition of NUP 
Umma and the Islamic Front under Muhammed Ahmed Mahjoud. ' 
April 1965: General elections: coalition of Umma, NUP, Southern Front and Beja Congress 
under Muhammed Ahmed Mahjoud. Round table conference on Southern Sudan fails to 
end civil war. 
1969: May Revolution led by Ga'afar al-Numeiri. Rule through the Revolutionary 
Commmand Council (RCC) which has a close relationship with the Sudan Communist 
Party (SCP). Left wing Arab nationalists. 
9 June 1969: Declaration by the new regime, to resolve the southern problem along the 
lines of giving regional autonomy to the South. 
1972: Addis Ababa Agreement. South become a self-governing region. 
1975: After a serious attempted military coup Numeiri centralises power in his own hands. 
1977: Nimeiri declares national reconciliation with al-Mahdi and Muslim Brothers. 
Committee formed to make Sudanese laws conform to the teaching of Islamic Sharia. 
1978: Oil is discovered by Chevron at Bentiu in Southern Sudan. 
1980: Southern boundaries redrawn to enable government to transfer oilfield into the north. 
February 1980: Nimeiri issues decree dissolving regional government and assembly in the 
south. Re-division controversies dominate southern politics through 1981-3. 
November 1981: IMF reform package. 
1982: Nation-wide student demonstration protesting against economic reform measures. 
1983: 'Following disputes over Numeiri's backing of the redivision of the south, civil war 
erupts once more with the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army led by John Garang' 
(Woodward). 
16 May 1983: Mutiny of battalion 105 of Sudanese army stationed at Bor, Pibor, and 
Pochalla in the Southern region triggers the second civil war in Sudan. 
22 May 1983: Nimeiri approves division of the Southern region into three sub-regions. 
June 1983: Nimeiri issues Republican order No.1 which abrogates the Addis Ababa 
Accords and regional self-government for the South. 
September 1983: Numeiri announces the introduction of sharia. 
February 1984: Southern rebels attack Chevron drilling site at Bentiu, the company halts its 
operations in the site. Rebels also attacks Jonglei canal construction and kidnap seven 
French workers, bringing work in the canal into a halt. 
1985: Numeiri deposed by senior army officers. A transitional military council and civilian 
cabinet rule. 
May 1985: Founding of the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Hassan al-Turabi. 
1986: General Elections: coalition with Umma Party, DUP, and Southern parties under 
Sadiq al-Mahdi. 
March 1986: Koka Dam Declaration signed in Ethiopia between, the SPLM/A and several 
political forces in the north, but excluding NIF and DUP, proposing a peace framework. 
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April 1987: Former US President Jimmy Carter initiates talks to end civil war in Sudan 
within the framework of the IGAD countries. . 
1988: New coalition Umma, DUP and National Islamic Front under al-Mahdi. 
Dec~m~er 1988: ~~P negotiates with SPLA to begin a peace process. Initially rejected by 
partIes In the coalItIOn. DUP leaves coalition. 
1989: After defeats, army submits a memorandum demanding the pursuit of the peace 
process. New Coalition: Umma and DUP without Islamic Front under al-Mahdi. DUP 
peace process resumed with SPLMA. 
1989: Operation lifeline Sudan. 
May 1989: One-month ceasefire. 
30 June 1989: Military coup followed by military regime. Led by Umar Hasan Ahmed al-
Bashir and backed by the NIF. The New regime forms a 15-man Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), dismisses senior commanders of the army, detains government officials, 
bans all political parties and dissolves trades unions. 
July 1989: AI-Bashir declares a brief ceasefire in the civil war, offers amnesty to members 
of the rebel movement, and expresses willingness to discuss an end to the civil war with 
Garang. 
September 1989: Government convenes National Dialogue Conference to discuss ways to 
end the conflict in Sudan. The participants are appointed by government. Conference 
ignores all peace initiatives prior to the coup. Endorses 'Sudan Charter' prepared in 1987 
by the NIF calling for federalism and exception of the south from Sharia application. 
October 1989: Fighting resumes in the south after a six-month ceasefire. 
November 1989: Government legislates for the formation of the Popular Defence Forces 
(PDF) as a paramilitary militia to aid the government's war in the south. 
December 1989: Former president Carter mediates talks between SPLMA and government 
in Nairobi; talks come to nothing. Reports of at least 600 southerners, mostly Shilluk, by 
pro-government militia at ai-Jabal in in Upper Nile. 
April 1990: Twenty-eight officers are executed a few hours after a failed coup attempt. 
End of 1990: World Food Program (WFP) and FAO warns of wide-scale famine in Sudan. 
May 1991: SPLA forces forced to leave Ethiopia after the fall of Mengistu. 300 000 
southern Sudanese force to return to South Sudan. 
August 1991: Riek Machar and Lam Akol defect from SPLA, denouncing lack of 
democracy. Nasir faction later SPLA-United. 
September 1991: Thousands reported to have died from hunger-related disease. 
November-December 1991: Over 200 000 flee Bor district after 5 000 civilians are 
massacred by forces loyal to SPLA Nasir. 
January 1992: Jihad declared in Nuba Mountains at a meeting in al-Obeid of regional 
governors of Southern Kordofan. 
March 1992: Government offensive. 100 000 estimated displaced. 
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June 1992: Abuja I: Nigeria tries to mediate between government and the two SPLA 
factions. Question of sharia emerges as a stumbling block. 
December 1992: UN condemnation of violations of human rights by Sudanese 
Government. 
May 1992: Abuja II collapse. 
August 1992: Sudan appears on the list of states sponsoring terrorism in US. At the same 
time, over 100 000 southerners flee into neighbouring countries because of Government 
offensives. 
September 1992: IGAD committee for peace in Sudan formed: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, 
Uganda. 
February 1994: The Khartoum Government creates a federal structure of 26 states. 
July 1994: Reports of infighting between SPLA factions resulting in heavy loss of lives 
especially civilian ones. 
December 1994: Eritrea breaks diplomatic ties to Sudan. 
December 1994: Umma and SPLA mainstream sIgn agreement recognising self-
determination for the South in Chukudum. 
1995: Carter Center Guinea Worm cease fire agreement between the Government of Sudan 
and the SPLM/A. For the first time, health teams are able to reach villages and areas never 
reached since the conflict started. The ceasefire lasted six months as the initial agreement 
stated. 
April 1995: Uganda breaks off diplomatic relations with Sudan. 
January 1996: UN Security Council resolution 1044 condemns Sudan's involvement in 
terrorism activities. 
April 1996: UN Sanctions against Sudan. 
January and February 1997: National Democratic Alliance (NDA) begins military offensive 
against government forces and positions in Eastern Sudan. Sudan Allied Forces (SAF) 
launched by former army officers - emerges as the main 'northern' military group on the 
eastern front alongside SPLA forces. Government called for jihad to counter the opposition 
offensive. 
April 1997: Tensions rises between Khartoum, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. 
April 1997: Government signs the 'Khartoum Peace Agreement' with six southern factions 
that had broken away from the SPLA. Agreement endorses the right of self-determination 
to be exercised after a three-year transitional period. SPLA mainstream rejects the 
Khartoum Agreement. 
July 1997: Sudan government accepts the Declaration of Principles (DoP) adopted by the 
lGAD group since 1994. The Declaration includes: separation of religion and state; 
principle of self-determination for the South; recognition of Sudan as a multi-ethnic, mu1ti-
religious country. 
August 1997: Riek Machar, leader of main faction that signed the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement with government becomes chairman of the newly created Southern States 
Coordinating Council. 
October 1997: lGAD talks begins. 
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November 1997: US Government places sanctions on Sudan because of its terrorist 
activities and human right violations. 
December 1997: Madeleine Albright holds a meeting In Kampala with NDA leaders 
including John Garang. 
1998: Nairobi Agreement brokered by the Carter Center between the Government of 
Uganda and the Government of Khartoum to stop proxy wars and other activities raising 
tensions between the two countries. 
July-August 1998: Government and SPLA declare unilateral ceasefire to allow aid 
organisation to operate. 
August 1998: Talks in Addis Ababa come to nothing. 
October 1998: Heavy fighting in eastern Equatoria; government declares wide jihad 
mobilisation. 
October 1999: Sudan starts oil production at 20000 barrels a day. 
September 2000: Bashir holds exploratory talks with NDA leader Muhammad Uthman al-
Mirghani in Eritrea. 
November 2000: Fighting between NDA and government forces. 
200 I: The Government of Sudan begins cooperation with US intelligence agencies to 
identify terrorist networks. UN Security Council lifts diplomatic sanctions against Sudan. 
US sanctions remain in place. Resumption ofIGAD negotiations. 
200 I: SPLM signs the Deed of Commitment of Geneva Call taking a stance to stop the use 
of landmines, production and transfer and commit to mine action activities. 
2002: Nairobi declaration signed between Garang's SPLM/A and Machar's Sudan People's 
Defence Forces (SPDF). SPLM/A and SPDF attacks lead to suspension of oil-drilling 
operations. 
January 2002: Government of Sudan and SPLM/A landmark ceasefire 6-month renewable 
in Nuba mountains. 
July 2002: Machakos Protocol signed between Government of Sudan and SPLM/A. Right 
of self-determination for the south after a six-year transitional period, south exempted of 
sharia law. Garang and Bashir meet face-to-face for the first time through the mediation of 
Museveni. 
September 2002: government breaks off talks because ofSPLM/A seizure of Torit spoiling 
the atmosphere of talks, and due to the SPLM/A reopening the issue of separation of state 
and religion by demanding that Khartoum be sharia free. 
October 2002: Government of Sudan and SPLA agreement for cessation of hostilities. 
November 2002: Memorandum of Understanding on cessation of hostility between the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLMI A. 
2003: The contlict in Darfur takes a more serious conjuncture. 
January 2003: UN negotiates separate bilateral agreement with SPLMA and Government of 
Sudan to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid into the disputed region of southern Blue 
Nile for the first time. 
February 2003: addendum to MoU on cessation of hostility. 
April 2003: The Sudanese Government agrees to the opening of corridors along River Nile 
to facilitate humanitarian access. 
September 2003: Government and SPLM/A sign security deal clearing major stumbling 
block to peace talks. 
October 2003: Lam Akol merges SPLM/A-United to SPLMA. 
December 2003: Government of Sudan and SPLMA agree in principle for the sharing of oil 
revenues. SPLM/A sends first high-profile "goodwill" delegation to meet government 
officials in Khartoum. 
January 2004: Accord on sharing country's wealth during transition period of 6years. 
January 9 2005: Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Naivasha. 
July 2005: Garang dies in an helicopter crash. Replaced by Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit 
as Sudan's vice president and South Sudan's president. 
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Annex 1 
SP1M/OlS Agreement on 
, 
Ground Rules 
[:-:S. Th~ ,;xamp!e \A.'hkh follows is the a~r~m~nt 
)i~n~d bClwc¢n the SPLWOLS. Althou,h signed 
\Cpar;lJeI~. the coment or th~ a~r>lcrn~n!S wil~ other 
m(l\'(Il\CIH~ "a,. I<l "II iOl~nl' ."nd pulllOscs. th~ 
'-1111(., 
Thi~ 3grel!m~nt i~ ill(Cndcd 10 Illy OUI the b~~tC 
princirltl upon which Operation Lireline Su~on 
tOLS, ... ()r~, .nd to LlIY oU[lhe Nlc. and regulatiolls 
r~)ulti;\~ from )u.ch pnnciplc~. It seeks 10 defin( 
the mlntl\l~m acceplable 'Itandacd' of I:onlluct for 
the acti\,llle~ of OLS agencie~ and Sud~n Relict' 
and Rehabilitation A~~ociatio" (SRRAl. as the 
ol't"lciul counterpUlt in IIreu I;onlrolled by me Sudan 
Peopk'~ Liberation Mllvemcnt/Army (SPLMiA). 
.--
We.lne under~igncd • .:ntcr int~'this agreement in a 
spirit of l,Lood faith ill\d mutual cooperation in order' 
tn Impro\~ thl! delivery ofhumilnit.lrtnn ~siSla/lCe 
10 and protection o( ciyili~nll in need. 
In sig.ning this agreem~nt. we e~press our $UPPQrt 
for the followlnl lnltrnQtion3\ hum~nit;1ri;)n 
convenllOIlS and their principb. namely: 
I. COllv~n!ton on [h~ Rtghts()f the Child 1989 
il Gen~va Convenrions of 1949 and the 1977 
PrOtocol> 3ddiuonat to !h~ Geneva 
A. Statement or Humanitarian 
. frlnclples 
I. .Th~ fund~mellli11 objecl1ve of OLS ~nd 
SKKA I. the provl5k'n o( humanitarian u)l!bncc 
(0 IXlP ... lllions in nt~1l where" .. r they mOlY be. Sut;h 
humanilarian a~~istance sedc.~ to save life. 10 c;l$( 
surrcrin •. to promote self·reliOlnce. ~el(·sufCicienc)' 
and the maiOlcnan~-c of livclihood~. The ri&:ht to 
re('eive humanitarbn as~i~GIlICI! and to ofrer it j, J 
fundamental humanimrian principle. 
2 The guiding prin~iple of OLS am.! SRRA is 
that of humanitarian neutrality - .m independent 
st~tu. for humanil;l£ian work 1x:yond IXllilical or 
mil!lJIN considemillns. In other words: 
i. Hum:u1i[:J.rian ~id musl be given ac~ordin!l 
to consldcr.llions of human need 3lon~. Its 
grantini. or il5 acceptance mu)1 not be IllJde 
dependent lin politic;&1 faclOrs or upon roC\:. 
rt:lit!ion. crhnn:it)' or nationality. It mU$t n,\t 
sed.: to i1dviIllce any IXlliticai ij~cnd:l. Wl\.:rc 
humol/marian as~istllle~ is inadl:4'1~le to m~c( 
lht need$ of all. priority mu~1 b( gi\~n to 
Ihe most vulner~ble 
ii. The p;usage of humanitariall ani)t~nce to 
populations in need shnuld not Ix denl~ll ~wn 
if this requIres that aid pa-He! through an 
area controlled by one party in order 10 re~h 
the needy in another aJ"e3.. provided thaI such 
pil:iSilgc is nol u~d for military lIliv3nta:c. 
iii. • ~licf as~isUlnc:e is provided solely on the 
basis of need: those providin; U!istance do 
nOI ~lIa~ thcrnselvc$ to any ~ide in Ihe 
on~olng contllel. 
iv. The only constr.ljnt~ on responding to 
hUfI\lU\ilwn need should be (ho~e of 
resources and practicality. 
~ AU humnnjwian a.'\.\istancc provided is (or 
the usc of Identified civilian beneliciaric~. Priority 
mu~[ at alltlntes be given to women and children 
and other vulnerable groups ~uch :1$ the elderly. 
disabled and dlsplxcd people. 
4. Those carryini OUl relief acli vilies under the 
auspices of OLS must be accountable !\I the 
beOCficiariH and their represenmi ve SllUCluru in 
first place. and to those who fund the activitie), 
Thi~ places the (ollowinll obligations on the v~ri\JU~ 
parties: 
1. those remlering hUffiilllitarlan aid have a duty 
to tn~urc it5 appropriat\! cnd usc. Thi~ 
inclw.1e~ a right to monitor and participatc in 
the Ilistribution IIf humanit:lrian aid 0/1 the 
ground in partne~hip with SRRA. 
ii. locill authorities. through the SRRA. must 
cmure that aill is distribuu:d fairly to 
civilian bcn.efici;uie~. Diversiofl of .id {rom 
. inleoclcd beneticiariGS is regarded u a breach 
o( hUm;1niWian orincipb. . 
SShttp://ochaonline.un.org/humanitariannegotiations/Documents/References(SPLM OLS i\ 
grcement on Ground Rules.pdt: accessed 07/0212009. 
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.111 4J~l.'t"lnn ... ma1o:ln, ~'n U\I! ~1~It.·tion 01 
b¢:ncfIlJlle:, "un! lh~ lllomtutiny u( the U'i< o( 
IIIVUl~ 1114.1 rc"\,'Uf\:'C'''' mu~t be .. a.m.l ~ )een It,) 
t",. if .. n;rarenl and re$pon~h e 10 bro:!d·~d 
,",cch,on'lIIIIkinB al the"l-evel of affCClCd 
,ommunl'i~s. Local aurhorities and relie! 
:(~el\Cle> >ltuulu ill' "Iv" IUf;al r~pn:>cn\;lljy~ 
or cOl\lmunille~ in the pmce~~\ oftar1!ering 
~lId Il1vm'onng of aid, Where po.I~ible. lhi. 
"1f>uIIl be dune Ihrous" [he Jninl Relief and 
kehabllilallUn Comminet! which include 
<lecleJ cOmmUtllly r.prc!lCntali"c •. 
S. OL:; IS based 011 the .:Qmplell: tl"~/l)1'1Irr11C) 
of all its ~ti ,·iticJ. This me-ans tla! local cuthoriliu 
h;" e Ihe nJhl to u.pe"t thar OLS lIienti~~ pro"iee 
iuil m(orlll~II'!n rC;llrdin~ [he (esources to bot 
~rOJ' I~ed In relurn. it i. c~pcclcd Ilia! 10l:al 
" .. lh(l;,li~ .... iIl r~p"n hl.lneMly :mli fairly in;tll their 
d.;.lInp "'Itil ULS "'llh rc~peCI 10 ncctls iderlll(lcd. 
populations In Ilceu. u.e <If re.ource~. etc. 
<> All h"'n~nil;Ul:m JCI'On, 5hQuid be t.1ilon:d 
tv 111 .. :a1 circ.:um51A.n1.!t:S ilnd J.illl h.J enhance-. not 
,ul'l'lant. l..,c~lly ;v~d;l1lc ".ou,«" ~n~ 
In(cn~n,m1>. ~Ufll!!lhr:njnllU".u ~ap.1cily to prt\'COl 
!ulu'e wi.~, und ~1I'I~r8tnCi¢s and to promote 
~(,",cr In"olvo:rn~nt or Sud~nc~ in~lil"li('n' and 
.oJi, IJU~" in all hum~mlan .. n actions is an In('-1Irul 
,'_0' "IOU;', humanll .. nan mand;l\~. 
·n\~ hJIIJ~m.:ntal humall (igl\l "r;di per.on~ 
til h"~ ill ,.[ely amI di,nllY nllJ.'>I tx: .. mrmed Jnd 
,urr<)rI~d I""'II;:h appropnatr meawre5 of 
prOttcliM a. well "' reliel. All Ihoit involvw in 
OL5 mu,(! (t'Ptl!t .,,11.1 uphold Inttrnltio~al 
hum"nn.q~lIla" ~1I<1 (IIn1.l .. mcmal hurn:tn riflll'. 
8un~ /I.se staff n1cnlbcn or OLS agcnclc$ 
.. ,,\I ,,,her, 11\111&. wo,~,nl: or Irdvelling in Sudan 
u",je. the ""'pice, <.>t OLS t\3VC Ihe righl to go 
UO(1UI \ho;i(bu$lnc!~ frcely "nd wii.lll)UI fALnlini 
\" uv'..!~\l ihal \/ley aOh~re 10 lhc~~ OrouruJ 'Rules 
411U lO locullaw.1 ~nd cu.tom.s. In all theirdealinS$ •• 
n:lidworken: and 1«~1 BUlhorili .... mu~l ucmOilSUale 
mUlu~1 r •• po.t. 
ll. Mutual Olllil;"liul1$ 
I All eAlerll.lly .upportc:d prugrummcs and 
proJect, In SrLM/A-conlrulled a'ell'. must b. 
"p~IO¥ed b} U,e SRRA (balll locally and al SRRA 
hcod nr'ike) prior to their implcrucut~lIUn. NOO~ 
III UN .gcnciu :u-e re:$pon~ible ror I'uwonll lhal 
,uell ~pproval IS Obtained In .... 'riling. Project 
,mplemtntatioll ,1", .. 11l be bast<! upon. leiter of 
WlJ.NIlln.Jin, bel ..... ~n the ~li~nc~. SMA ;Im.l Oui 
... hl~h ddine. ,,,1..-,. '''pol\Slbdl''t~ ~nd 
commllm~m. or' ~II ~lO!cs plus proceo!urcs for I 
reS(1l\ ins dlrrercne~> and ,ric\'.nc~~. 
1. All UN/~GO ",--oO;ca ~rc oxp<Octcu to actIO ' 
at;~ordancc with Ihe humanilarian principles 
previously defIned: prOvision or ai,j .cconJin~ to 
need. neulr.Ility. imparlial;I),. 3ccountabilil, and 
lranspllrency. This Inc-Iutle. non';n',,"enl;"1 in 
polilicaVmilitll}' xli\'ity. NGOs and L!N .ren"~' 
mU'1 nul ..:1 ur dl\'Ul;e infom\Mion in a mann« 
th:u ...-ill JC:Op:ud~ ~ ~Urily of lhe 3rCa. 
3. 1~III:XINC;O "'-orkcrs musl sho .... · r~.p.:'·t ((It 
cultural ~nii*'ities and for 11.lC;u laws ~nd CUS(<lnb, 
Reliei Giencre5 IlIU${ tn,ur< 11\31 thei, <I~lr ~f( 
fami hur "'ith tM •• 1.,"$ ~nd customl. 
4. UN 'gencih and NG05 sll.'lll su-i," IU or'l".:T 
the highest pouiblc St.llldarcJs of .en'ice 10 their 
benericiaries. This mc~1\S thaI all ~BeIlCle, ~ommlt 
lhemselves 10 r«nlllins only tho~~ .t~tl jud$cJ III 
havt ao.:qu:tte technic.1 and ~r~onal skllb and 
('penen.;. p;qum;d rQr their ",ork, 
S. UN a.encl~ and NGOs mllst ensure thaI all 
th<:ir ~l:IlT living. workin, 0' vi';I;n; Sud~n :tit 
be:ll'ef' of valid entry plUtc. from the re'peeri". 
!X'liIj,,,1 authoriti.~. 
6. The SRRA mlill I:ornmit il5elf 1\\ the 
hum;&nilarian principles defined ;,bove and nOI QJlo" 
it5clf tv be motivated by political. military or 
sltalelic interests. It should seek to provide lin 
.flicienl and e/Tecti ve coordinMed jl\l"onn~lion alld 
piQnninv service (or relief anu rehabilitation 
actlvilie:,;, 
7. The SPLMJA recogni<es and respects the 
humanitarian :md impartial nllture of UN .senCles 
ami thOie NGO. whith have 'igncd a Icu~r of 
un<lersumdin& with UNlCEFIOLS and SRRA. 
g. The SRRA sbould (~cilitate the now ofrclicf 
,O<X.I$ und iCrvicc51J1d provide =r.te anli limely 
information rcptdins lhe need> and !he simatlo" 
of civilians in their a.r<:1U. 
9. Loc;al authorilie~ lISIiumc full responsibililY. 
throul!h the SRRA for the safety and protection of 
relief workers in arc:a$ under the" control. Thi, 
responsibilily includes: 
i. provlliing an immedi~lc :lien 10 relic! 
workers in potentially ins.:cllte ar...s: 
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I.;":';jl~j).ll\ t.l ,-H~ r~k'.!1il\n ·'\·h~n :1C:'t'l~r:: 
~:Jh;':IC'!1 IrClIt1 :!J1: f,ll'lU.,}( IhrtJL h.1rJ.h· 
;1~';1H or lhl\tlll!~ twm ~n; i,)ur.;(; rdid st.fi 
or .g~n':I(\ ;1[( 1\0( ~XP{ClcJ to pay for \uch 
prmwillil (lIh{r..of dl(n\)~l I'e~ IJr of their 
i'{()PCJ1~ , 
: I; L ~I\GO ,"omp.lund, ,huulJ ~ r.!*CI~J.b 
pi"T'c:,) 111 tn(~( in,titullQl!', Tho\{ li\ in~ in !h<$~ 
;lr,lptlunJ} ~"l\ ~ the nghllQ pmJ:\ "oJ ~tlOlpOunJ~ 
\IMllo unl: t'( ~OI~f'..! ~\ ilh thc p<rllli~)lt\n ()( th(lr 
r~·:J.:nt' \c lllihlJI') Of pollll~.l mIl it! Sh\luiJ 
!.i.,' pb,( In lhe\( ,\1nlpllunJ, Jnd nu ptr,,'nlld 
"'::;'I1~ ~nn, m.a: tl\tertlKr.1(xc~p! \11i(n th~ '.;1((t: 
,)1 tn~ir (,,[dellh I~ Ibu~l..:n\!J. 
1.1 
III 
t'\C of relief propert)' and SUpplit5 
,\it ('\I\GO prnpcll~. indullin~ \ehicl~ l,ld 
prl'p<rI; hir~ti by l:!\~GOs. b to b.: 
conU'l)lI~ ilI'Id m\)'cd JI the Ji;crcriun o( L'~I 
\GO~ \)r their ~gelll;i(). unlm ~uch prop-
,'n) " form~lIy dOtlltcu to ~nolhcr pan}, 
PfI.))C" a~reemenb h¢ .... e~n :"GOs. SRRA 
.::'IJ C:-;IOLS ,ht)u!d ck~rI: ddrnc which 
J"t/' '" ill rtm,lin Inc prop~rty oftll< Q~cn,')' 
"\ln~-..:mcd alll! ... hi'h Jrc projw l)~L~ whi.;h 
ll1U': wnarn in $udJIl <'CIl II twn tht Jg~n~:, 
'~\lr.,.;r~.,.i Iea\~~ lClI\porilril: or ~mlan~ntt:. 
Tho,.: 4"~1, I!~nn~d ol, "~~n<) J\'i<\' r~main 
lil~ dl;~':I\~ PWP~Ii~ or' in, Jg~n.:} :11 all 
tiJll~" and m;iY be "1l'110\'~ ... ".:n<;\(1 .. 
prnjw tennjnJI~s or an agem:~' wilhdrol\\'\ 
imma localiun tor whatc\er n:ason. 
PrOJ~rI3mt~ 0Ire those ",'hieh are for direct 
u\( by prnjc't bcn.:timnes \l( an: integr:lllO 
Ihc rU'[lnmg and ~u~fllinahility ot' the proj~CL 
Th~~e"~olllls n:main Ill< property of UNI 
N(jO~ until (ormally hanl1cd om 10 th( 
S~RA hr local ClJn\mUnille~ and their Icad· 
er;, he~,sion) rci~rding the distribution a!ll.l 
u\e o( 'iH.:h Itc.'m~ shuuld be made, .... h~n.:\ CI 
po\sloit IOlntly bel'" cen NG01 ano lQ\!ul • 
:lulhwi(I¢\. under tJ~( au;pic~s of the loint 
Rdid Jnd RdwbJlil:ltion Commiltee folio ... · 
,n~ lh~ hum~nI!~n;m princjpl~~ 'IlJI~d abo\\: 
.\ U~ and N(j~ ,taff ... ill be 3110wcd 
IInrCqrl<;t,.; lC";C.\\ to the'f commun,ca!lon 
_yulpmcnt and to tJm,',se nllnnal property rifhl\ 
F.~cept rUr emertcncic~ .• 11 messa~e~ lhllUld be 
v. rlll~n Jnd Iccord<d, U~~ or' U~INGO r4Ilio~ or 
\I(hel' ';llll1maniC3!10n equipm~nl '" ill ~ irmilcJ '0 
infonn~tion on relicf ~C!i\ ittt) only. AU mC))J~') 
will b.: in lhe English I;;nguag~. Operation ~hJ!1 b.: 
by llocally de~ignated radio o~ca(Or ~condd JIW 
~k,,(d joinlly by lhc local authorities ,and ~lici 
a:encies. \\'hcne\ cr ncCes5il.'). UNiNGO lX~onnd 
will b<! Jl1oll'cd to (cammie their own messl~~) 
.I, :>;0 ~mltd or unifomlcd Personnel i) allo\l ~d 
({I \;;l\ el on C;-;r.-;GO ,d',lcil!s: planes. ixlJt) llr 
,arl, Thb indudc~ tho~ ,(hid~:\,oOlra':II:1l ~~ L'SI 
\Glk 
D. Emplu)/llent of staff 
I. All L':-; ;Jgcncks and S'GOs hJ\~ th~ n~ll! 
10 hin: their own sl;iff as direct ~mplo~ m. T.~~~~ 
:lg(n~it, Sh\lUld be eneour:lg~d 10 ~!IIpl\l: 
appropna(dy quaJititd and e.\p<ri~n~ed Su~~nN 
:I:i pat! of a cap:l~it> buihlin~ ~LrJI(~y 
In the cases of Su<lanesc suit' lee'1ulle..! I,' 
an \00 ,uppOrt~d projw (e.g, health 'IJII,. 
appollltmcnt> :llld di~nlisSJ" an: mJJ~ b~ the I''>,;JI 
~uthNit\ in ~on~uIUtion with lhe lI~~n.:)' \1 hid! j. 
e~p~~ted 10 ~upport payment o( lhat "'Mka', 
ill1:cnti\'e~. The num~r o( \lorkers (0 Ix \UPPOMU 
must be ~~reed jointl)'. An \GO or J L':-; J:,rh.·~ • 
may Jj~ the lo~al aUlborilki to withJrJ;I SI.'''I)t1~~~ 
,t.(f comiJcred incompelent. Jishon~'1 or ,llk!"\\ 1,( 
un~ui[Jtllc (\lr their Job~, 
J. Loclil ;utborities should (MUre thJl [h~ 
Sud~~se staff of UNINGO~ and especIlllly lho.( 
sl~IT who receive .SlXcial l!aining progr~mmes to 
up~rade and improve their skills. are exempted. 
whenever possible. from mili(~ry or \lther ~Cf\ kc 
so thal Ihey can contribute (0 the: welfare of Ihe 
~hilian population, 
E. Rents, Taxes. Licences. Protection 
money 
I. So (JNfNGO )hould b, ,x.p¢cL.:d to P;I> relit 
f()r bu,ldlngs or;lJ'eJ.) IloIn,ch ~re pan or th~lr ""olk. 
furaample. office, or SlIJre., IloIhen 'h~)' hale bUill 
these bUllding~ !hcm~elye) or where (hey arc 
donated by ~ local authority, 
, In the ca£c of public building~ which are 
being rented by an NGO as living accommodalion. 
a reu.~onablc n:nt may be paid by lhc NGO/UI-i 
agency to the civil admini~[ration, Genuine eifon., 
should be made to make movc~ lov.ard, 
~tanJlrdi~llion of these n:nt" 
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• J, All OLS ~t-~''''t. mOlt! t>. ':~ClllPt from (n~rulC ~:~~~ m.: rul~~ .lIe '~pr.dJ ..lHl.! r.:,pc,,;\¢,l b~ 
aU .. dh, ~us,om., uulj~~ ror ~upplies I ioduuin,M. p<mon~l 
,ul'pliei, anC-equlpment 'oroug)ji irue Slld~n: Any 
t;l.U~ 10 be p;u""'jll be 4lsr,~i~I"'c~n Ihe agtllCy- '.G. ~m:hllnislUS Cor resolving a.nellcd 
concerned lind llIe locol! :wthonl/ as p:!rt 'at 1lII!' \'io\!ltlollS ot Ground Rule.s 
projec, ~;n:"mclIl. 
F. Implementation ot this 3l:reemenl 
I, All slEMleri~s l<llllis ~ire~lll~nl mu,1 ;w;ccp! 
re'I"",',bli,IY tor en~urin~ U>;.t it i, ui"ClOillilted 10 
:III the;r om"j"l. ~R1.J <t3fr wor'dtl~ in S~iJ;Jn, II 
,hmlld al";l be puttlicl~rd In put-H. plucc< in Sudan 
10 ~n,ur~ IMI locut l."Omruullitit' and ben~licnmcs 
unul!m~nd m rmn"plC1l .lnd ruin, 
, L'''lCEFIOLS.l<llJ'!Ih<.>r ..... IUl ~ SRRA 1/.;11 
be re~pot1)iblc (or mswins Ill; hl?ldinll ot,,~ 
!lnt! m"l!li"t!~ ilt,dil key toC;i!'f08~' in which Ihe 
principles ~rul rutq~ of this i¥ee.pcni ':IN ~,'(plllntd 
Qnd disc\l;SJI.ed wilh ~11 relt\'&I\1 prrscnnel, 
3, I he SRRA i. (ully rcsrOnlihlc (or en~urin; 
O:Qll1pliance "'hh (hi, "freemenl by tho I\I~~I 
aUIMnne, and ,~um",unill~~. 
-I. Jol'tl RtHef and Reh~billllllh)n Commillccs 
c\labli~hed in ~n teltef centres on" in"nl\"i~ all 
rdc"anl aeler, ~hollid me~lln~clilcr on a re~l[U' 
t>'I>" 1,\ plan, Inlpl .. menl and mOllil()r lht d~Ii\'ery 
"i'humantmrian a""lan~c, Thcse commlnec\ will 
be reprdcd :L.' Ihe c ... ,too'an, or Ih. principi.:. of 
lhh "I"rCCnlcm 31 Io:al Ic"'" and re'pun.illie for 
I. In ClJ>CS wncre' :1l1ci"tiol\> of non·compli;>/\C\: 
" .. itll this ~!;!cemeru 3fe made . .>II ""nie, cum",i, 
mcmiC!vn \0 resolving diffcrcI"cs as 'p«":il~ a. 
poHlblc in an .n'tude <If gOOd f~itll. 
, \Vhtre alt~~d \;ol;lt\ons of Gnlund Rulo, 
nQ'c ".;ur.cu, tt>c ~l1.~""on ,h<"uIJ It.: J'''-'Unl<"I1I<.\ 
in Wntillt! hy [he compl:!iru,"1 
3, The iuue lhould th.:n he t:lken '" 111< 10" • .1 
Joint R~licf and RehabiHl.3lion Commin«, "here 
, thi~ exisu, 
~~, If unre~ol\'el!, it .110"ld tIlen be Ji,:~<",<.1 41 
local J~\'Cl""'IUl mUlln!!, belween 1M an:. 'CCI""~ 
or til" SRRA. lh. c"unl) Commissioner ~nJ (I\c: 
IOC31 head (If lll~ I:l"/NGO. (ogclher ",(h Ir,c 
UJl:K'I::FtOLS Resident Projccl Offi •• " \\Jw< 
ilppropnalc, 
5, [flhe issue rem~in. ~nreMlI\cJ ~(l",~t i., <i, 
II ~Ould be referred 10 ~"Cnlr.tl ~ulhQmi,,' In .. rnln~ 
[0 bc dcalllloiilh b,'lhC $e!liDrOmcial, orlht ~~Cll"\" 
.:oncemcll~' i,c, the SRRA hoe:ld offIce, Ihe tl<"t! "f 
lhe sea onJ. if 3ppropnule. the US1CEFIOLS 
coordm.ul1r. 
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Appendix 5: 1995 Carter Center's Guinea Worm Ceasefire 
Press release56 
Historic Cease-Fire Enables Health Workers to Attack Guinea Worm 
and Other Diseases in Sudan 
17 June 1995 
A historic cease-fire negotiated by former President Jimmy Carter has 
enabled health workers to reach remote regions of Sudan to treat Guinea 
worm and other diseases. The agreement marks the longest cease-fire ever 
negotiated to fight disease and implement preventive health programs. 
The disputing parties in Sudan's 12-year-old civil war took a bold step this 
spring by agreeing to a two-month cease-fire. President Carter and Sudan's 
military leader, Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir, announced the cease-fire 
in late March, with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement! Army 
(SPLM/A) and the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) 
signing on a few days later. The announcement came during a trip to Africa 
by President Carter and former First Lady Rosalynn Carter to assess 
progress toward Guinea worm eradication. In late May, the government, the 
SPLM/A, and the SSIM/A extended the cease-fire for another two months. 
"The primary purpose of the cease-fire is to permit the leaders and citizens 
of Sudan, working with others, to carry out a major effort to eradicate 
Guinea worm disease, prevent river blindness, and immunize children 
against polio and other diseases," President Carter said. 
More than 1 million people, mostly civilians, have died as a result of 
fighting or famine and disease caused by the war, which has pitted the 
northern-based Islamic government against southern Sudanese rebels. 
Because of the cease-fire, health workers are able to distribute cloth filters 
used to prevent Guinea worm disease; deliver the drug Mecti-zanr to treat 
river blindness; vaccinate children against polio, measles, and other 
diseases; and distribute Vitamin A, an essential nutrient for children. 
The Center's Global 2000 program is leading the effort to eradicate Guinea 
worm disease by the December 1995 target date. Guinea worm affects 
people in India, Pakistan, Yemen, and 16 African nations. The total number 
of cases worldwide has dropped almost 95 percent since 1986. 
The Center has many partners in this effort: the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention; the U.S. Agency for International Development; UNICEF; 
the U.N. Development Program (UNDP); the World Health Organization; 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency; and the governments of the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Norway, and the Netherlands, among 
others. In addition, DuPont Co., Precision Fabrics Group, and American 
Home Products have donated cloth filters, larvicide, and educational 
materials. 
56 h!m:_\\~\ \\ . l',1I1cl:S:l'lltlT.orf! Ill'" s/dOCUIl1DllS/doc 169. htl11l, accessed on 07/02/2009. 
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Of all endemic countries, Sudan has the highest number of Guinea worm 
cases remaining. In 1994, Sudan had more than 53,000 cases out of 163 ,000 
reported in the world. Ninety percent of Sudan's cases were in the south. 
The same region has some of the most severe cases of river blindness in 
Africa. Spread through the bites of black flies, river blindness causes 
persistent itching, rashes, and depigmentation of the skin. Ultimately, it can 
cause blindness. Eighteen million people in Africa, Latin America, and the 
Middle East are infected. Of those, 400,000 are permanently blind. 
Guinea worm disease is also devastating. People become infected by 
drinking water con-taminated with microscopic larvae. A year later, mature, 
thread-like worms up to a yard long work their way out through painful 
blisters on the skin. Emergence of the worm and resulting infections can 
cause permanent scarring and crippling similar to polio. 
More than half of a village population may be unable to farm or attend 
school for weeks or months. No cure exists. But Guinea worm IS 
preventable by: 
• straining drinking water through a cloth; 
• treating drinking water with the nontoxic chemical Abate; or 
• finding other ways to provide safe drinking water sources, such as 
drilling borehole wells. These techniques are now being used in 
Sudan. 
"The southern warring parties have both said they can get rid of Guinea 
worm if the logistics and supply lines are provided," said Donald Hopkins, 
M.D., senior health consultant for Global 2000. "The cease-fire has clearly 
vided these 
After the cease-fire began, the Sudanese government, 
UNICEF, and UNDP provided planes and trucks to 
deliver health supplies and educational materials. (Photo: 
Frank Richards) 
After the cease-fire began, the Sudanese government, UNICEF, and UNDP 
provided planes and trucks to deliver health supplies and educational 
materials. Health teams have made substantial progress. By mid-July, they 
already had: 
• visited 2,253 Guinea wornl villages; 
• distributed 115,425 cloth filters to households ; 
45 1 
• vaccinated 34,481 children for polio and 40,000 children for 
measles; 
• given Vitamin A supplements to 35,000 children; 
• treated 9,031 children with oral rehydration therapy for diarrhea; and 
• delivered 200,000 Mectizanr tablets, donated by the American 
pharmaceutical firm Merck & Co. Inc., for distribution in the field to 
treat river blindness. 
Merck and The Carter Center have worked together since 1988 to facilitate 
drug distribution through the Mectizan Donation Program. The program is 
administered by The Task Force for Child Survival and Development, an 
independent partner of the Center. A committee of experts oversees 
distribution of the drug, which, when given once a year, prevents river 
blindness. 
"Since the beginning of the cease-fire, the government of Sudan, U.N. 
agencies, and the NGO communities in Khartoum and Nairobi have made 
significant progress in public health promotion," said Health Policy Fellow 
William Foege, M.D., chair of the Mectizan Expert Committee. "This is 
proving to be a circular process. The success of the public health initiatives 
has strengthened the cease-fire." 
The Carters will return to Sudan in July to assess progress on the health 
initiatives and explore the possibility of advancing the peace process. 
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Appendix 6: Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment signed by 
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army57 
1 de qeneve 
qeneva 
"'1UIU4J111~O de qinebra 
DEED 011 COMMITMENT U~DER GENEVA CALL 
FOR ADHERENCE TO A TOTAL DAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL ~lI:'lES 
A~D FOR COOPERA nON IN MINE ACTION 
WE. the Sudan Peoplc's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Anny 
(SPLMJ A), through our duly authorized representative. 
Recognising the global scourge of anti-personnel mincs which indiscriminately and 
inhumanely kill and maim combatants and civilians, mustly UmoCl:!It and defcnceless people, 
especially women and children, even after the armed conflict is over; 
Realising that the limited military utility of anti-personnel mines is far outweighed by their 
appalling humanitarian. socio-l."conomic and environmental consequences. including on post-
conflict reconciliation and reconstruction; 
Rejecting the notion that revolutionary ends or JUS! causes justify inhumane means and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause UlUlcecs...wy suffering; 
Reaffirming our detennination to protect the civilian population from the effects or dangers of 
military actions, and to respect their rights to life. to human dignity. and to development; 
Resolved to play our role not only a.~ actors in anned conflicts but also as participants in the 
practice and development of legal and normative standards for such conflicts, starting with a 
contribution to the overall humanitarian effort to solve the global landmine problem for the 
sake of its victims; 
Accepting that international humanitarian law and human rights apply to and oblige all partiL"S 
to armed conflicts; 
Aclcnowledgiflg the norm of a total ban on anti-personnel mines estabtished by the 1997 
Ottawa Treaty, which is an important step toward the total eradication of land mines; 
NOW, THEREFORE. hereby solemnly COnunil ourselves to the following terms: 
1. TO ADHERE to a total ban on anti-persolUlcl mines. By anti-personnel mines, we 
refer to those dc\iccs which effectively explode by the presence, proximity or contact 
of a person. including other victim-activuted explosive dcvices and anti-vehicle mines 
with the same eRect whether with or without anti-handling devil'Cs. By total ban. we 
refer to a complete prohibition on all use, development. production, acquisition. 
stockpiling. retention. and transfer of such mines, under any circumstances. This 
includes an undertaking on the destruction of all such mines. 
57 http;;\\ \\·\v.!.!.el1t'V;lcall.orl2 /resources tesli-reference-materi:lis. It:\li-deed "ucl-()~(1ll(ll­
"plmn. pd I~ accessed 07/02/2009. 
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2. TO (()()PERA TE IN AJ\lD UNDERTAKE stockpile destruction, mine clearance. 
victim assistance, mine awareness, and various other fonus of mine action. especially 
where these programs are being implemented by indepeoocnl international and 
national organisations. 
3. TO ALLOW AND COOPERATE in the monrtonng and verification of our 
commitment to a total ban on anti-personnel mines by Geneva Call and other 
indepeooent international and national organisations associated for this purpose with 
Geneva Call. Such monitoring and verification include visits and inspections in all 
areas where anti·personnel mines may be present, and the provision of the necessary 
information and reports, as may be required for such purposes in the spirit of 
transparency and accountability. 
4. TO ISSUE the necessary orders and directives to our commanders and fighters for the 
implementation and enfurcement of our commitment under the foregoing paragraphs, 
including measures for infonnation dissemination and training, as well as disciplinary 
sanctions in case of non -compliance. 
5. TO TREAT this commitment as one step or part ofa broader commitment in principle 
to the ideal of humanitarian oonns, particularly of international humanitarian law and 
hunWl rights, and to contribute to their respect in field practice as well as 10 the 
further development of humanitarian norms for anned conflicts. 
6. This Deed of Commitment shall not affcct our legal status, pursuant to (he relevant 
clause in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. 
7. We understand that Geneva CaU may publicizl: our compliance or flQn-compliance 
with this Deed of Commitment. 
8. We see tbe desirability of attracting the adherence of other armed groups to this Deed 
of Commitment and will do our part to promote it. 
9. This Decd of Commitment compkments or supercedes, as the case may be, any 
existing unilateral declaration of ours on anti· personnel mines. 
10. This Deed of Commitment shall take effect immediately upon its signing and receipt 
by the Government of (he Republic and Canton of Geneva which receives it as the 
custodian 0 f such deeds and similar unilateral declarations. 
Done this 4tb ofOctober 2001 in Gt!neva, Switzerland. 
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For THE SCDA\ PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ~toVEMENT 
AND SVDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION AR.\fY (SPLMJA): 
NHIAL DENG NJ-llAL 
Chainnan of SPLM Commission for External Relations, Infonnation & Humanitarian Affairs 
For GE\[VA CALL: 
ELISABETH REUSSE·DECREY 
President 
LAREOKUNGU 
RegIOnal Director for Africa 
For THE GOVERNMENT OFTHE REPUBLIC AND CANTON OF G[I\[VA: 
ROBERT 
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